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ABSTRACT
This study examines the activities of the Army
in the South from 1789 to 1835.

The United States Army

began to move into the South in the mid-1790's to occupy
the posts being abandoned by the Spanish according to the
provisions of Pinckney's Treaty.

From that time until the

outbreak of the Second Seminole War in December of 1835»
the members of the Army helped to settle the southern
frontier.

The term "South" as it is used in this study

refers to the area contained in the present-day states of
North and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama,
Mississippi* and Louisiana.

Within these seven states

the Army performed similar functions and encountered the
same problems.
The officers and men of the Army performed numerous
important duties as well as countless trivial tasks.

Their

principal duties were to protect America's borders and
settlers from attacks by foreign invaders and hostile
Indians.

When not actively engaged in these operations,

the soldiers performed numerous jobs that contributed to
the settlement of the frontier.

The soldiers built roads,

vi
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mapped the country, enforced laws and attempted to bring
a semblance of order and authority to the frontier.
Special consideration is given to two factors that
complicated the duties of the Army in the South, the climate
and the existence of the institution of slavery.

The

soldiers were plagued by health problems that were directly
attributable to the South's weather.

Virtually every facet

of the men's existence was influenced by the climate.

In

addition, southern whites assumed that the troops were
available to maintain order among their slaves if the
occasion arose.

This assumption influenced the disposition

and duties assigned to the soldiers stationed in the South
and required their presence long after the frontier had
passed to the Trans-Mississippi West.
Much of the research material used in this study
came from War Department records deposited in the National
Archives.

In addition, numerous printed government

documents and personal papers, dealing with military and
diplomatic events, were utilized.

Also of value were the

printed volumes collected by the Secretary of War prior to
1850, which are housed in the Rare Bcokroom of the U. S.
Military History Research Collection at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania.

vii
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INTRODUCTION
Frederick Jackson Turner's seminal paper, "The
Significance of the Frontier in American History", pre
sented in 1893, described the westward movement of the
frontier:

"Stand at Cumberland Gap and watch the pro

cession of civilization, marching single file - the
buffalo following the trail to the salt springs, the
Indian, the fur trader and hunter, the cattle-raiser,
the pioneer farmer - and the frontier has passed by."1
According to Turner, this process was repeated again and
again as the frontier line moved across the continent.

He

gave some credit to the Army for its contributions to the
westward movement in his study, but the absence of the
2
soldier from his procession was a striking omission.
Since Turner's address, historians have studied
the history of the nation's frontier relentlessly.

The

Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of
the Frontier in American History," in The Frontier in
American History (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
T O 57J7 T 2:-----p

Ibid., 16-17. William H. Goetzmann, Army Ex
ploration in the American West, 1803-1863 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1965). Goetzmann argues that
the members of the United States Army's Topographical
Engineer should be included in Turner's procession.
1
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activities of the numerous groups that helped to tame
the wilderness have been minutely examined and recorded.
The part played by the Army has not been neglected by
historians, except for its activities on the southern
frontier.

The most logical explanation for this neglect

is that the planter class and the institution of slavery
have so fascinated historians that they have slighted
other topics in the South's history.
The purpose of this study is to examine the
activities of the Army in the southern section of the
nation from 1739 to 1835.

There is a definite lack of

information concerning the role of the Army in the South
during much of this period.

The major episodes in

volving the Army in the South - the War of 1812, the
Indian wars, Jackson's Indian Campaigns, and the Indian
removals - have been amply recorded, but other events
in the history of the Army in this area have been virtu
ally neglected.
The term "South" as it is used in this study
refers to the geographic area encompassed by the present
states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida,
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.

An examination of

the duties assigned to the officers and men of the United
States Army stationed in this area reveals that they per
formed similar functions and encountered the same basic
problems.
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These seven states presented certain common
characteristics that influenced the duties assigned to
the Army.

First, each had an exposed coastline with

rivers which allowed easy access to the interior.
Second, all seven possessed a large area of unsettled
lands with a distinguishable frontier line.

Third, a

potentially hostile Indian population lived within the
states or on their borders.

Fourth, the number of

slave3 living in the states were large enough to worry
the whites.

Finally, the region’s peculiar climate

presented the soldiers with a serious health problem.
The exposed coastline with its commercially
important harbors and large navigable rivers leading
into the interior of the nation prompted first the states
and then the Federal government to provide a system of
defense.

The War Department decided that a system of

permanent fortifications, garrisoned by regular troops,
was the beat method of protecting the coast.

The soldiers

were assigned not only the task of guarding the maritime
frontier, but also of enforcing the Federal revenue laws,
and aiding state and local officials in the enforcement
of laws when called upon to do so.

Thus, the soldiers

represented not only Federal power and authority but
they also bolster the state and local authorities when
the need

ptosq.
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In the southern region the primary duty of the
Army, as in the rest of the nation, was to guard the
frontier.

This task was complicated by the fact that

the southern frontier often coincided with an illdefined and disputed international boundary.

Until the

United States gained control of the provinces of Bast
and West Florida and the western boundary of the Louisiana
Purchase was definitely fixed, the officers and men of
the Army were plagued with diplomatic as well as military
problems.

The most obvious indication of the importance

of its role is that the Federal government deemed it
appropriate to station approximately one-half of the
nation*s military force in the South.
The southern Indians represented the most per
sistent problem faced by the Army.

The Indian tribes

were considered to be foreign nations by the United
States government, but the Secretary of War was res
ponsible for Indian affairs.

Thus the Army bore much of

the responsibility for maintaining friendly relations with
the tribes.

Army officers worked with Indian agents to

negotiate a number of treaties with the various tribes.
After the treaties were negotiated and ratified, the
Army wa3 responsible for seeing that they were observed
by both sides.

In many instances, the enforcement of

the treaties placed the Army in the delicate position of
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opposing the wishes of the white population and support
ing the rights of the Indians*

The Indian problem in the

southern states would eventually end when the Indians
were removed during the 1830's.
The presence of a large slave population brought
persistent requests from southerners for the maintenance
of permenent garrisons throughout the South.

Their pleas

were usually made privately and in carefully guarded terms.
Southerners feared slave insurrections, but they did not
want the existence of those fears widely known.

The War

Department issued standing orders to commanders in the
southern states to render aid to the local officials, in
the event of an insurrection, if it was requested.
Finally, the Army faced a number of serious
health problems which were unlike those faced in other
sections of the nation.

The South*s climate directly

influenced the duties of the soldiers and in many in
stances took their lives.

The annual sickly season in

the South spared no class of individuals, but the.members
of the Army appear to have been one of the groups most
seriously effected.

Throughout the periou under study,

various plans were suggested and tried in an effort to
reduce the number of sick at the military posts in the
South.
Many of the functions performed by the Army in
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the South were similar to those rendered by soldiers in
other sections of the nation.

The most significant

differences were caused by the South's "peculiar in
stitution" and its "peculiar climate."

Despite the

fact that the routine duties of the Army in the South
were similar to those performed in other areas does not
preclude their being studied.

As on other frontiers,

the presence of the Army was extremely important in the
development of the South.^
The officers and men of the Army, during quiet
periods, performed valuable functions such as mapping the
new territories, building roads, erecting forts, and en
forcing treaty obligations with foreign nations and Indian
tribes.

In addition they executed numerous trivial tasks

as a matter of routine.

When viewed singly, the countless

jobs performed by the soldiers do not appear to have any
particular significance.

But when taken collectively, the

varied services performed by the Army were a significant
contribution to the settlement of the southern frontier
^The list of works dealing with the activities
of the Army on the frontier is almost inexhaustable.
Unfortunately the vast majority of these studies deal
solely with the Indian campaigns and neglect the other
services performed by the Army. Two exceptions to this
general rule are by Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of
the Republic: The United States Army on ihe frontier,
T7g3=riggTirew Tork:" fSe S E c H H l H T o T T 19597 1 5 3 --Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States
Army in ihe Development of~the flortkwest, IB15-1860
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 19^7).
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as they were on other frontiers.
The Army, with its centralized organization and
the authority of the Federal government behind its
actions, was able to perform functions beyond the means
of the individual settler and his neighbors.

In many

instances, the Army was the only symbol of the Federal
government, or the authority of any kind, on the frontier.
The Army’s presence and its contributions are important to
the settlement of the South and it deserves more than
merely passing interest from frontier and military
historians.
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CHAPTER I
THE ARMY MOVES SOUTH
The history of a nation* s army normally recounts
the events of the battles and campaigns, with some con
sideration given to its organization and administration,
in which the force was involved.

These studies are

valuable in determining why certain battles or specific
wars are won or lost, but they reveal little about the
activities of a particular force when it is not actively
engaged in fighting a war.

In the period from 1789 to

1835, the soldiers of the Regular Army of the United
States participated in ninety-one battles and actions.
Seventy-twj of these actions occurred during the War of
1812, the remaining nineteen battles and skirmishes took
place during the forty-one years when the nation was not
formally at war.1

Although some of the engagements lasted

for several days or a few weeks, there were long periods
when the soldiers had sufficient time to engage in
1Prancis B. Heitman, Historical Register and
Dictionary of the United States Army (Urbana: University
of IllinoisTress, 1965), il, 391 -94". Hereinafter cited
as Heitman.

8
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activities, other than fighting, that were directly related
to the welfare of the nation.
To avoid any appearance of idleness on the part
of the troops, the federal government assigned an infinite
number of duties to the officers and men of the Regular
Army.

The primary emphasis was placed upon the task most

commonly performed by a standing army, protecting the
nation against armed aggression.

In order to accomplish

this goal, the Army was responsible for three major areas:
guarding the nation against foreign invasion; protecting
the frontier settlements from attacks by hostile Indians;
and quelling domestic insurrections.
A number of secondary tasks were added to these
primary duties and became a part of the normal peacetime
routine 5

The soldiers engaged in activities such as:

building roads, bridges, and military posts; enforcing
the nation’s revenue laws; upholding treaty obligations;
conducting surveys of the national boundaries; participating
in scientific expeditions; enforcing state and local laws;
and cultivating crops in order to provide food for the
garrison.

Since these duties were not confined to a

specific section, a soldier transferred from one post to
another probably did not notice much change in his daily
life.
In the South from 1789 to 1835 the Army usually
performed its duties efficiently.

The activities were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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many and varied, often providing services that could not
have been performed by any other group, but normally they
received little public notice.

Generally the only time

public attention focused on the activities of the Army
in the southern states was when Indian troubles flared-up
or when officers committed acts of questionable legality.
Much of the history of the Army in the South has
been obscured by the emphasis placed upon a few prominent
officers.

The person who attracted the most attention in

the period before the War of 1812 was General James
Y/ilkinson.

During and after the war, the nation watched

the activities of General Andrew Jackson until he resigned
from the Army in 1821.

Prom that time until the outbreak

of the Second Seminole War in 1835, the regulars were
involved in only two activities that prompted much comment,
Indian removal and the nullification crisis.
General James Wilkinson's career is an inextricable
part of the history of the Army in the South.

His rep

utation was clouded by a number of qxiestions that remain
unanswered to this day.

From the Conway Cabal during the

American Revolution to the Burr Conspiracy, Wilkinson was
involved in one controversy after another.

His name was

associated with conspiracies, intrigues and treason.

His

actions were reviewed by military courts of inquiry, con
gressional investigating committees and civil courts.

In

spite of all of the charges and countercharges, the General
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always maintained his position and occasionally managed
to improve his situation.
General Wilkinson resigned his position as Clothier
General of the Continental Army in 1781, and turned his
attention to a variety of commercial ventures.

In 1783

he moved his family to Kentucky and quickly established
himself as one of the most influential men in the rapidly
growing territory.

During this period Wilkinson became

involved in a series of negotiations with the Spanish
officials at New Orleans.

Wilkinson initiated the

correspondence in 1786 in an effort to obtain permission
to use the port of New Orleans as an outlet for the products
2
of the Mississippi Valley.
Through a series of letters and a personal visit
to New Orleans in 1787 he received the privilege of selling
his goods at the Spanish port.

In exchange for this priv

ilege, he not only declared his allegiance to the Spanish
Crown on August 22, but stated that he would work to detach
the disaffected western territories from the United States
and ally them with Spain. ^

2
James Wilkinson, Memoirs of General Wilkinson
(Washington, 1811), II, 10^-11, 115^137 Hereinafter
cited as Memoirs.
^William R. Shepherd, "Wilkinson and the Beginnings
of the Spanish Conspiracy,” American Historical Review, 12
(Oct. - July, 1903-1904), 490-506. Gives the English
translation of Wilkinson's oath and the basic parts of
the text of his memorials to the Spanish Governor Stephen
Miro and the Intendant Martin Navaro. A harsher translation
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Wilkinson was not the only American suspected of
planning to separate the western regions, specifically
Kentucky and Tennessee, from the United States.

At

different times a number of prominent frontiersmen were
either actually engaged or were accused of involvement
by their political opponents in separatist activities.
Before 1800 the names of such men as William Blount, John
Sevier, Judge Harry Innes and Aaron Burr were mentioned
as participants in different conspiracies.

The fact that

some of the leading citizens were negotiating with Spanish
officials seems to have been well-known among the people of
the western territories.

Although the men dealing with

Spain were charged with treason by their political opponents,
their intrigues apparently did not affect their later
careers.

A

Whether Wilkinson intended to actively work for

of Wilkinson's Memorial is contained in Temple Bodley,
"Introduction*' to Reprints of Littell's Political Trans
actions in and concerning Kentucky, anoT letters "of
George Nicholas to bis Friend in Virginia, also General
Wilkinson's Memorial. Pilson <3Tub Publications, No. 3^.
Louisville, 1926, cxix-cxxvii. Wilkinson's oath is given
on cxxxvii-cxxxix.
4
Wilkinson's friend and lawyer, Harry Innes, was
made a Federal Judge; his friend John Brown was elected
to the United States Senate;, his business partner Peyton
Short accepted a federal appointment as did his friends
Judge Muter, Samuel McDowell and James Brown. Thomas R.
Hay and M. R. Werner, The Admirable Trumpeter: A
Biography of General James‘"Wilkinson (Garden City:
Doubleday, Doran anST dompany, 1941), 107-108. William
Blount was expelled from the United States Senate, but
was elected speaker of that body while impeachment pro
ceedings were being carried forward in the U. S. Senate.
William H. Masterson, William Blount (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1954), 339. Aaron
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the separation of Kentucky is impossible to determine.
It is probable that he viewed his agreement only as a
means of gaining concessions from the Spanish that would
advance his own commercial interests.
For the next four years Wilkinson tried to make
his various business ventures pay dividends.

Despite hard

work, constant maneuvering, and foreign arrangements, he
found himself falling further and further into debt.

By

1791 Wilkinson was probably thinking of returning to
military life, because in that year he took part in two
punitive expeditions against the Indians north of the
Ohio River.
The Indian tribes living in the Old Northwest
presented the new Federal government with one of its most
pressing problems.

The attention of the Army was focused

Burr was elected to the office of Vice President after it
was rumored that he was involved with Blount. For an
interesting discussion of early Kentucky politics see
Patricia Watlington, The Partisan Spirit: Kentucky
Politics. 1779-1792 (New ^ork: 3£theneum, 1972).
5

Hay and Werner in Admirable Trumpeter assessed
Wilkinson’s activities with Spain in the following way.
"In his desire for personal gain Wilkinson had started
the Spanish Conspiracy in American History. In fact,
he was the Spanish conspiracy: while he was active the
conspiracy was very much to the fore, and when he was
biding his time or engaged elsewhere the conspiracy
languished. At intervals in the years that followed,
the Spanish conspiracy had greater or less vitality
and importance as Wilkinson’s personal necessities were
greater or less. The ambitions and desires of his
competitors and opponents were also a factor in keeping
the "conspiracy alive." 88.
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on this area after peace was obtained with the Indians of
the Southwest by a treaty signed August 7, 1790.^

In an

effort to subdue the Indians north of the Ohio, a force
tinder the command of General Josiah Harmar marched against
the Indians in October of 1790.

Harmar was defeated by

the Indians and withdrew from the Indian country to await
new orders.
Following Harmar's defeat, two small expeditions
consisting of volunteers from Kentucky crossed the Ohio
in an effort to check the Indian outrages.

In mid-May

of 1791 a force commanded by Brigadier General Charles
Scott, with James Wilkinson as second in command, crossed
the Ohio River in search of the hostile Indians.

The

Kentuckians destroyed crops and villages and returned
home with a few captives at the end of June.

The second

Kentucky expedition, commanded by Wilkinson, marched against
the Indians on August 1, 1791, and remained in the field
for twenty days.

The expedition burned a village and seme

crops and captured some Indians, without producing a full7

scale battle.’

narmar’s expedition was a total failure

g
James Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U. £3.
Army. 1783-1812 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
19475 , 4V. Hereinafter cited as Jacobs, U.
Army.
7
The details of Harmar's expedition are in Jacobs,
U. S. Army. 40-65. The two minor expeditions are recounted
Tn Tames Ripley Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior, Ma.ior-General
James Wilkinson (New York: The Macmiii'an Company, 1938),
112-13~ hereinafter cited as Jacobs, Warrior.
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whereas the two smaller expeditions were considered com
pletely successful.
On October 22, 1791, President Washington appointed
Wilkinson to fill a vacancy in the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel in the United States Army.

The appointment was

readily accepted by Wilkinson, who probably saw it as an
opportunity to save his failing business career.

He wrote

to a friend that he accepted the position because of his
Q
great need for "Bread and Fame."
In an effort to explain the appointment of a man
with Wilkinson's reputation for participating in question
able ventures, Washington told Alexander Hamilton that the
action was one of expediency.

The President believed that

if Wilkinson held a responsible position it would "feed
his ambition, soothe his vanity and by arresting discontent
o
produce a good effect."
Wilkinson was suspicious of the motives behind
the appointment and felt that it might be an attempt to
end his correspondence with the Spanish at New Orleans .10
It is inconceivable that Washington did not know that
Wilkinson had been treating with the Spanish as it was
^Wilkinson to Peyton Short, Dec. 28, 1791 (not
sent), Innes Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, XXIII.
q
Quoted in Hay and Werner, Admirable Trumpeter. 109.
10Wilkinson to Carondelet, Dec. 15, 1792, A. G. I.,
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2374.
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common knowledge in Kentucky.

The President probably saw

the appointment as an opportunity to turn the dealings to
the advantage of the United States rather than a way to
terminate the connection.

Certainly the thought of a dis

contented officer in the Army was a brighter prospect
than a discontented James Wilkinson operating on his own
without the control of any higher authority.^ ^
Wilkinson accepted the commission on November 5,
1791, and promptly took the oath of allegiance required
of all officers:
I do solemnly swear to bear
true allegiance to the United States
of America, and to serve them honestly
and faithfully, against all their
enemies or opposers whosoever, and
to observe and obey the orders of
the President of the United States
of America, and the orders of the
officers appointed over me, according
to the articles of w a r . ”*2
Thus James Wilkinson, possibly a subject and definitely
a pensioner of Spain, returned to the Army after an absence
of ten years.
11

The same fear prevailed in 1802 when Wilkinson
attempted to obtain the position of Surveyor-General. He
requested the support of the Secretary of War, who wrote
on the letter "Such a situation would enable him to
associate with Spanish agents without suspicion.” Wilkinson
to Dearborn, May 30, 1802, quoted in Jacobs, Tarnished
Warrior, 19912

J . P C a l l o n , The Military Laws of the United
State3 (Philadelphia: G. W. Childs, 1863), 897”
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Fortunately for the new lieutenant Colonel's career,
his appointment came late enough that he was not associated
with the disaster that "befell the second expedition the
Federal government dispatched to quiet the Indians in the
Old Northwest.

In October, 1791, General Arthur St. Clair

marched against the Indians with a large force composed of
regulars and militia.

The force was soundly defeated the

next month and the survivors were driven back into Kentucky. ^^
The two major military operations undertaken by the Federal
government had suffered humiliating defeats and the two
small expeditions composed of Kentucky volunteers had been
successful.

All four of the expeditions had served Lieutenant

Colonel James Wilkinson well.
On January 1, 1792, General Harmar resigned his
commission, even though a military court of inquiry had
cleared him of any misconduct in the direction of his
14
expedition.
On March 5, 1792, James Wilkinson was
appointed to fill the vacancy created by Harmar's res
ignation and General St. Clair resigned his commission as
15
a result of his defeat by the Indians.
Thus in the span
of two days Wilkinson advanced from Lieutenant Colonel to

1 ^Jacobs, U. S. Army, 85-123.
1^Heitman, I, 501.
1 *5

Heitman, I, 1037, 917; Hay and Werner, Admirable
Trumpeter, 113.
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the position of acting commanding general of the United
States Army.
When Congress was informed of St. Clair's defeat?
it took steps to provide a larger military force to
adequately protect the frontier.

The existing regiment

of artillery and the two infantry regiments were to he
brought up to their authorized strengths.

In addition,

three new infantry regiments were to be recruited for three
years service, to be discharged at an earlier date if peace
was concluded with the Indians.

Also four troops of light

dragoons were to be recruited and if the situation required
16
they might serve dismounted.
To command the enlarged Army, President Washington
reviewed the qualifications of all of the Revolutionary
War ranking officers who were still alive.

He drew up a

roster of officers with his comments on each man's abilities
and shortcomings.

17

1^Callan, The Military Laws of the United States,
'
17
The list included the names of Major General
Benjamin Lincoln, Major General Frederick Baron De Steuben,
Major General William Moultrie, Brigadier (but by Brevet
Major) General Lachlan McIntosh, Major General (by Brevet
Anthony Wayne, Major General (by Brevet) George Weedon,
Major General (by Brevet) Edward Hand, Major General (by
Brevet) Charles Scott, Major General (by Brevet) Jedediah
Huntington, Brigadier General James Wilkinson, Brigadier
General Mordecai Gist, Brigadier General James Irvine,
Brigadier General Daniel Morgan, Brigadier General Otho
Williams, Brigadier General Rufus Putnam, Brigadier General
Charles Pinckney. Washington added that "The above and
foregoing closes the list of All the General officers who
as has been observed from age - want of health - disinclination,
92-93.
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On March 9 he submitted the list to his cabinet
for their consideration.

Included were the names of an

impressive array of officers, but most of them were either
too old, did not desire the appointment, or were too in
experienced for such an important command.

The President

probably preferred Light Horse Harry Lee for the command,
but his name did not appear on the list.
of Lee was ruled out for two reasons:

The selection

(1) he had not held

a high rank during the Revolution; and (2) he was from
Virginia, which already had its share of high-ranking Federal
office holders.

18

The one officer who seemed to meet most

of the requirements was Anthony Wayne.
President Washington’s opinion of Wayne was not
altogether flattering:
. . . more active and enterprising
than Judicious and cautious. No
economist it is feared: - open to
flattery - vain - easily imposed
upon the liable to be drawn into
scrapes. Too indulgent (the effect
perhaps of some of the causes just
mentioned) of his officers and men.
- whether sober - or little addicted
to the bottle, I know n o t . 19
or peculiar circumstances, can be brought into view; from
whom to chuse [sic] an officer to command the troops of the
U. S." Comments on Officers to succeed A. St. Clair, sub
mitted to Cabinet March 9, 1792, in Worthington C. Ford (ed.),
The Writings of George Washington (New York: G. P. Putnam’s,
TS91), XIl75SS-14.
18
Harry E. Wildes, Anthony Wayne. Trouble Shooter
of the American Revolution (New York: Harcourt. Brace

S a r S o . r T O I T T '3 4 H = W .—
19
-'"Comments on Officers to succeed A. St. Clair,
submitted to Cabinet, Mar. 9, 1792", Ford (ed.), The
Writings of George Washington. XII, 507-508.
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The President's comments on the interim commander of the
western army, James Wilkinson, were similar, ". . . as he
was hut a short time in service, little can be said of
his duties as an officer.

- He is lively, sensible, pompus
a

and ambitious, but whether sober or not is unknown to me."“u
The President could not afford to make a bad
appointment.

The two costly defeats in the Northwest had

been a severe blow to the prestige of the new government
and it was essential that it not suffer another.
his shortcomings, but they could be overcome:

Wayne had

the Secretary

of War and the secretary of the Treasury could control any
reckless spending; and any movement without adequate pre
parations could be stopped until proper precautions had
been taken.

Despite his faults, Wayne had one invaluable

asset which none of the other officers possessed.

He had

"a dominating desire to meet and annihilate the enemy."

21

Wayne received the appointment on March 5, 1792.
He remained in Philadelphia for several months arranging
for supplies, enlisting men, and gathering information on
the Northwest.

The General was not a 3 impetuous as

President Washington had feared, and it was only after
months of rigorous training that he moved with his force
against the Indians.

2QIbid., 511.
21

Jacobs, U. S. Army, 127.
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The expanded army was called the Legion and when
General "Mad" Anthony Wayne brought it west to fight, it
was a different type of force than those that had pre
viously advanced against the Indians.

It was not the

poorly disciplined collection of regulars and volunteers
that Generals Harmar and St. Clair had led against the
Indians.

The volunteers were still present, but the men

of the Legion formed a solid core of well-trained soldiers.
While Wayne gathered supplies at Philadelphia and
forged an army from the motley band of recruits at Legionville, Wilkinson remained in command of the regular forces
on the frontier.

As he waited for the new commander to

arrive, Wilkinson supervised the daily routine of the Army
and kept a watchful eye on the Indians.

His actions

attracted the attention of President Washington who requested
Secretary of War Henry Knox to convey his approval to the
General.

Washington wrote:

"General Wilkinson has dis

played great zeal and ability for the public weal since he
came into the service.

His conduct carries strong marks of

attention, activity, and spirit, and I wish him to know the
favorable light in which it is viewed."

22

While managing the routine business of the Army,
Wilkinson found ample time to exercise his talents for
intrigue.

He dispatched a spy into the territory occupied

22
Washington to Knox, Aug. 13, 1792, in Ford (ed.),
The Writings of George Washington. XII, 158.
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"by the hostile Indians and he reopened his correspondence
with the Spanish officials at New Orleans.

Both of these

ventures seriously strained the relations between Wilkinson
and Wayne.
General Wilkinson ordered Reuben Reynolds, a
soldier disguised as a deserter, into the Indian country
to gather information about their movements and intentions.
Reynolds emerged from the wilderness and proceeded to
Pittsburgh to report his findings to General Wayne.

The

commanding general considered the report to be virtually
worthless and indicated that the venture had been a waste
of time and effort.

Wilkinson was angered and humiliated

by the treatment his agent received from General Wayne.

Any

possibility that the differences between the two officers
might be reconciled was lost as Wayne's suspicions that
Wilkinson had resumed his correspondence with the Spanish
23
government grew.
The commanding general was correct, Wilkinson had
revived the correspondence and was playing his new situation
for all it was worth.

In December of 1791 he wrote to

Governor Miro hinting of things to come:

"My private

interests, the Duty which I owe to the country I live in
and the aggrandizement of my family have determined me to
accept the appointment, and it is most probable, as soon
^■^Marion Morse Davis, "Three Island," Michigan
History Magazine. XII (July, 1928), 513-53.
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as St. Clair is known of that I shall be promoted the Chief
command. "

24-

A year later he wrote Governor General the Baron
de Carondelet urging him to take advantage of the oppor
tunities offered by his new position.

He referred to an

"incompetent Secretary of War . • . and ignorant commander
in chief . . .

a contemtible union."

25

The Spanish Crown rewarded Wilkinson for his efforts
on their behalf.

In 1792 he received $2,600 from New Orleans

as a part of his pension from Spain.

26

In 1794 the Spanish

governor sent an additional $12,000 to Wilkinson, $4,000
was a part of hi3 pension.

The remaining $8,000 was to be

used to defray the expenses incurred in Wilkinson’s efforts
to breakup an expedition against Spanish territory.

This

expedition, sponsored by the French, was purported to be
led by George Rogers Clark.

27

Rumors of these dealings

spread through the western territories and aroused the
suspicions and distrust of General Wayne.

The commanding

general kept a constant watch on the activities of his
subordinate.
^Wilkinson to Miro, Dec. 4, 1791, A. G. I.,
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2374.
25
Wilkinson to Carondelet, Dec. 15, 1792, Ibid.
26
Statement of Wilkinson account (undated), Ibid.
27
Carondelet to Wilkinson, Aug. 6, 1794, Archivo
Historico Nacional, Madrid, Estado, leg. 3898.
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On August 20, 1794» the Legion broke the strength
of the Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers.

However,

it was not until August 3» 1795 that the chiefs of the
defeated tribes gathered at Greenville and signed the
Treaty of Greenville.

The treaty brought peace to the

settlements of the Old Northwest and freed the members
of the Army for duties elsewhere.

28

For the next year the Army performed the routine
duties of a garrison force and occupied the posts that
the British evacuated according to the provisions of the
recently concluded Jay's Treaty.

In the Southwest the

Indians were restless and there was growing concern in the
state of Georgia for the safety of its frontier settlements.
The actions of the Spanish continued to worry the Federal
government, despite the signing of Pinckney’s Treaty.

29

Throughout this period the commanding general and
hi3 second in command labored to discredit each other.
General Wayne hoped to obtain positive proof that Wilkinson
was actually working for the Spanish and was unfit to hold
his high rank in the Army.

Wilkinson tried to prove that

^Jacobs, U. S, Army, 153-81.
29

The text of Pinckney's Treaty is in Hunter Miller
(ed.), Treaty and Other International Acts of the United
States of America (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1931), I T , 318-45. The treaty was signed on Oct. 27, 1795
and proclaimed on Aug. 2, 1796.
Samuel Flagg Bemis,
Pinckney *3 Treaty. A Study of America's Advantage From
Europe *sDistress (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
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Wayne’s military ability was greatly overestimated and
therefore he should not be the commanding general=

Both

officers traveled to Philadelphia to argue their cases
before the administration.

Wilkinson informed Baron

Carondelet that he was going to the capital in 1796 "to
keep down the military establishment, to disgrace my
commander and secure myself the command of the Army."^
General Wayne was making his second journey to the
capital to counter the actions of Wilkinson, when he died
on December 15» 1796.^1

His death left General Wilkinson

in command of the Army and his appointment as commanding
general was approved by President John Adams when he took
office in March of 1 7 9 7 . ^
Wilkinson was in Philadelphia when General Wayne
died and he remained in the capital until the new admin
istration took office in 1797.

It can be assumed that he

devoted his time to gathering support and trying to quiet
the storm that had been raised by his fight with General
Wayne.

It appears that he was successful in convincing the

new President that the rumors were politically motivated.
^Wilkinson to Carondelet, Sept. 22, 1796, A. G. I.,
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2375.
■ji

Harry E. Wildes, Anthony Wayne, 458-62.
^^Richard H. Kohn, "General Wilkinson’s Vendetta
with General Wayne: Politics and Command in the American
Army, 1791-1796," The Pilson Club History Quarterly,
------XXXXV (Oct., 1971)7^67^7?:
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President Adams, no stranger to political rumors and personal
abuse, was aware of the stories that were circulating con
cerning Wilkinson’s dealings with Spain.

He assured the

General that he would have the opportunity to defend himself
against the charges if it became necessary.

Adams confided

to Wilkinson that "nobody escaped accusation" in public
life.33
Assured of the President's support, Wilkinson
left the capital shortly after the inauguration.

He re

turned to the frontier and assumed the responsibility for
distributing the troops to provide for the defense of the
frontier settlements.

The Army that Wilkinson commanded

was no longer organized as the legion.

Congress passed a

law abolishing that organization on May 30 and it became
effective on October 31, 1796.

According to the provisions

of the act, the Army was to consist of four regiments of
Infantry, two companies of light dragoons and the corps of
artillerists and engineers.

34

The attention of the commanding

general and the activities of the Army would be concentrated
on an area with which Wilkinson was very familiar, the
Southwest frontier.
Wilkinson's dealings with the Spanish not only
33Wilkinson, Memoirs, II, 154-56.
^4
J Callan, The Military Laws of the United States,
114-17.
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kept him informed about the affairs of the southern
frontier but paid him handsome dividends.

Since 1790

the Spanish officials at New Orleans had sent at least
$32,000 up the Mississippi River to pay for the services
rendered by Wilkinson.

Of this sum the general had per•5*5

sonally received at least $26,000. '

By 1796, however,

payments were more difficult to obtain, although Wilkinson
would try to use every boundary dispute, possible foreign
alliance, and in one final effort, the Burr Conspiracy, to
extract more gold and silver from the Spanish officials.
The General apparently wanted his dealings with
Spain to lie idle for awhile after he became commanding
general.

At this time he turned down an extremely attractive

offer from the Spanish, a large land grant in the Illinois
Country and an annual bounty of $4,000.^

The General

advised the Spanish officials to fulfill their obligations
under Pinckney’s Treaty and to terminate their correspondence
with him for the present.

However, he hinted that he might

become the governor of Natchez, and this would afford ample

17
opportunity for making new plans .J
Wilkinson’s reference to Spain’s obligations under
Pinckney’s Treaty concerned the running of a new boundary

15
Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior, 158.
^Carondelet to Wilkinson, Apr. 20, 1797, A. G. I.,
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2375.

17
■"Power to Gayoso, Dec. 5, 1797, American State
Papers, Miscellaneous, II, 107-109.
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line between the United States and Spanish Florida.

On

September 16, 1796, Andrew Ellicott, the American boundary
commissioner, started fo
boundary.

Natchez to begin surveying the

Ellicott was a surveyor with an impressive record.

He had surveyed the Ian; ceded by Maryland and Virginia to
form the nation's capital and was subsequently selected to
survey the boundary line between the United States and the
Spanish Floridas according to the terms of Pinckney's
Treaty.

He secured a military escort at Pittsburgh to

accompany him to his ultimate destination below Natchez.^
The party's first indication that things might not proceed
smoothly occurred when they arrived at Chickasaw Bluffs.
The commandant of the Spanish post was not expecting the
party and appeared to be embarrassed by their arrival at
his station.
Immediately Ellicott's suspicions were aroused.
He reported to his superiors:

"First, the commandant and

officers appeared, (or affected,), to be almost wholly
■unacquainted with the late treaty between the United States
and his Catholic Majesty:

and Secondly no preparations
OQ

either had been, or were making to evacuate that post."
•30

Andrew Ellicott, The Journal of Andrew Ellicott
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1952), 5. Hereinafter cited
as Ellicott.
39

Ibid.« 34-35.
present-day Memphis.

Chickasaw Bluffs was located at
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The party proceeded down the river from Chickasaw
Bluffs and reached the Spanish post at Walnut Hills on
February 19, 1797.

The Americans were astounded when the

Spanish fired a cannon to prevent their boats from passing
the fort.

The commandant appeared to be totally unaware

of the treaty and was only satisfied after Ellicott produced
an authenticated copy of the document in Spanish.4<“*
The day after leaving Walnut Hills, Ellicott
received a letter from the Spanish Governor Manuel Gayoso
de Lemos, describing conditions in the Natchez district.
The Governor foresaw no difficulty in running the boundary
line.

But the Spanish were not yet ready to evacuate

their posts because they lacked sufficient boats to trans
port their men and supplies.

The disturbing part of the

Governor's letter concerned the party's military escort:
"I find it indispensable to request you to leave the
troops about the mouth of Bayou Pierre, where they may be
provided with all their necessaries. . . . "

Ellicott

considered the request improper, but he complied to avoid
offending the Spanish officials.

On February 24 the

surveying party, without its escort of thirty soldiers,
landed at Natchez.

41

On February 29 the Americans camped on a hill
about one quarter of a mile from the Spanish fort and
40

Ibid.t 37-38.
day Vicksburg.

Walnut Hills was located at present-

41Ibid., 39-40.
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two days later they raised the American flag at their camp.
In a short time the Governor ordered the flag lowered.
Ellicott refused and preparations were made to prevent any
attempt that might be made to lower it by force.

While the

Americans were making camp, information was received from
confidential sources that seemed to confirm Ellicott's
suspicions of the Spanish actions.
He learned that the Governor General, the Baron
de Carondelet, the principal commissioner for Spain, had
privately declared that the treaty would not be implemented.
In addition Governor Gayoso had written to a friend that
the "treaty was not intended to be carried into effect, and
that delay on their part would reduce it to a dead letter."
Finally, it was rumored that the territory had already been
or soon would be ceded to France.

As a consequence of these

reports, Ellicott tried to determine the attitude of the
inhabitants of Natchez.

He found that a "large majority"

were in favor of becoming citizens of the United States.

4.2

The surveying party was in a precarious position:
isolated deep in Spanish-held territory; the Spanish
officials apparently in no hurry to execute the terms of
the treaty; some of the local inhabitants openly hostile;
and the Indians in the vicinity of Natchez threatening the
American camp.

In order to provide for the security of

his party, Ellicott requested permission to move his military

42Ibid.. 44-45.
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escort from Bayou Pierre to Natchez.

He assured the

Spanish that there would "be no incidents between the
American and Spanish soldiers.

43

In answer to Ellicott*s request, Governor Gayoso
apologized for the activities of the local Indians and
suggested that it was probably an outgrowth of the raising
of the flag over the American camp.

He stated that he

alone was responsible for maintaining order in the territory
and he would see that the Americans were safe in their
present position.

Gayoso informed the American commissioner

that Governor Carondelet would be unable to fulfill his
duties as Spanish commissioner because of the pressing nature
of his duties as Governor General.

Therefore he would be

acting in Cardondelet's place as the Spanish commissioner
for running the boundary line.
Gayoso stated that the military escort could move
from its camp to Lofftus' Cliffs below Natchez, where the
marking of the boundary line would begin.

The treaty had

specified escorts for the commissioners, but in Gayoso*s
opinion this meant on the line and not at other locations.
Consequently, he could not permit the landing of American
troops at Natchez.

44

Contrary to the wishes of the Governor, Ellicott
ordered his military escort to join him at Natchez.

Shortly

^^Ellicott to Gayoso, Mar. 11, 1797, Ibid., 46.
44
Gayoso to Ellicott, Mar. 12, 1797, Ibid., 49-51.
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before the force arrived, Governor Gayoso reluntantly
consented to their being stationed in the vicinity of
the town.

Within a few days the presence of the troops

seriously strained the relations between the Americans and
the Spanish.

The dispute developed when the Americans

arrested a number of deserters from the United States Army
who had sought refuge in Spanish territory.

45

The Governor virgorously protested these activities
and requested that the men be freed.

Ellicott informed

Gayoso that his conduct would be guided by three consid
erations:

(1) all deserters who entered the country after

the date set by the treaty for the evacuation of the posts
were liable to arrest; (2) all deserters who had come to
the territory before the date set for the Spanish withdrawal
would not be bothered; and (3) all persons found in the area
considered to belong to the United States against whom there
were executive proclamations would be arrested.

46

Shortly after the arrival of the military escort,
the prospects for a speedy withdrawal of the Spanish seemed
to be improving.

The Spanish removed the artillery from

the fort at Natchez and carried it to the boat landing.
on March 22 the pieces were returned to the fort and re
mounted.

Ellicott demanded an explanation from Gayoso.

45Ibid., 55.
46Ibid., 55-56.
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But

33
The Governor stated that this was simply a way to store
the pieces that were being removed from the fort at Walnut
Hills.

At the same time other supplies were being shipped

from Natchez to the Spanish fort on the Arkansas.

He in

formed Ellicott that the Spanish had been demolishing the
fort at Walnut Hills as a part of a treaty concluded with
the Indians, but he had suspended these operations and
nothing further would be done until the American troops
arrived at the post.

47

Ellicott was not convinced by the Governor's ex
planation.

He had watched the strange movements of the

artillery pieces from his tent, and had seen no stores
brought to Natchez from Walnut Hills.

In addition, he

knew that instead of demolishing the fort the Spanish
were making improvements.

Finally, the idea was absurd

that supplies would be shipped from Walnut Hills to Natchez
and then transported back to the fort on the Arkansas
48
River.
On March 25 Governor Gayoso informed Ellicott that
he was sending a letter to Lieutenant Piercy Smith Pope
who was advancing down the Mississippi River from Fort
Massac.

The letter ordered the Lieutenant to halt at the

point where the letter was received and remain there until
permitted to continue by the Governor.

Gayoso hoped that

^ G a y o s o to Ellicott, Mar. 23, 1797, Ibid., 58-60.
48Ibid., 60.
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Ellicott would sign the letter to give it added authority.
Ellicott refused the Governor’s request.

Instead

he sent a letter to Pope informing him of the situation at
Natchez.

He believed the Governor's order was unwarranted,

since enough time had elapsed to allow the Spanish to
evacuate their positions.

Ellicott no longer felt that

the removal would come in a "reasonable length of time."
He advised Pope that under the circumstances "the sooner
you are here the better."

49

On March 29 Governor Gayoso issued a proclamation
to the people of the Natchez district that seemed to con
firm Ellicott's fears and aroused the anger of a number of
the inhabitants.

The proclamation stated that the Spanish

would retain possession of the country until the people
were assured of their rights to their real property.

There

would be no interference with religious matters, but there
was to be no public worship other than Roman Catholic.

The

people of the district would not be disturbed in their
daily activities because of any debts they might have
acquired.

The proclamation was designed to draw support

from two important groups in the district, property owners
50
and debtors.
49Ellicott to Pope, Mar. 25, 1797, Ibid., 63-64.
50
Ibid., 65-67. Also a copy of Gayoso's pro
clamation enclosed in Ellicott to Secretary of State,
Apr. 14, 1797, Southern Boundary MSS, U. S. and Spain,
Andrew Ellicott, 3vols., correspondence (1796-1804), I,
National Archives, Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions
and Arbitrations. Record Group 76. Hereinafter cited as
Southern Boundary MSS.
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This proclamation caused a stir among the residents
of the district who wanted to become citizens of the United
States.

Suspicious of the Governor*s motives they re

quested that Ellicott take some action on their behalf.
Ellicott informed Gayoso of the feelings of the concerned
citizens and closed by saying:
I do not pretend to say that their
apprehensions are well founded, it
is possible they are not, but your
objections to my escort being sta
tioned with me, your hauling back
and remounting the cannon at this
place, your dispatching Capt. Minor
to delay the arrival of the American
troops; at this place, added to your
proclamation however well meant,
have had a contrary effect.51
Governor Gayoso responded that those who had
expressed a desire to live under American rule were not
being persecuted by the Spanish as Ellicott had been
informed.

The sole purpose of the proclamation was to

calm the people and outline the "political arrangements
between His Majesty and the United States of America.”
He pointed out that the Governor General of the province
found it necessary to consult the King on one important
point concerning the evacuation of the military posts.
The Spanish officials interpreted the treaty to mean that
the posts would be demolished when evacuated.

On the other

hand the United States expected the posts to be surrendered
^Ellicott to Gayoso, Mar. 31, 1797, Ibid., 68-69.
Also Southern Boundary MSS, I.
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intact.

This important issue could only be settled by

the representatives of the two governments.

GO

The agitation caused by the governor’s proclamation
was so great that Ellicott feared that the citizens might
take some forcible action against the Spanish government.
As a consequence of these fears, the officer in command of
the American escort began to enlist recruits from among the
local residents.
the Governor.

This action brought a strong protest from

Ellicott replied that he would require

additional time to consider the situation before giving
his reply.

53

With this inconclusive reply all discussion

of the matter was dropped and the recruits remained in the
Army.
Ellicott also tried to locate Lieutenant Pope and
his detachment.

On April 17 he received a letter from the

Lieutenant stating that the soldiers had halted their journey
at Walnut Hills upon receiving the letter from Governor
Gayoso.

Ellicott wrote to Pope telling him to leave Walnut

Hills if bloodshed could be avoided:
. . . the proper place for yourself,
and detachment to be stationed is at
this post - here you can be of more
service to the United States than at
any other place on the river. Nine
tenths of the inhabitants . . . are
firmly attached to the United States;
52

Gayoso to Ellicott, Mar. 31, 1797, Ibid., 70-72.

■^Gayoso to Ellicott, Apr. 13* 1797, Ibid.« 74-75;
Ellicott to Gayoso, Apr. 13, 1797, Ibid.. 76.
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"but until your arrival, have no
rallying point, in case of a rupture
"between the United States and his
Catholic Majesty, which the conduct
of Governor Gayoso I am under the
necessity of concluding cannot be
very distant.54
Ellicott informed the Governor that he had requested
Pope to move to Natchez and Gayoso reluctantly gave his
permission.

55

One week later lieutenant Pope and his command

reached the landing at Natchez.

The next morning Pope's

force and Ellicott's escort joined forces and made their
camp on a high hill overlooking the Spanish fort and
government house.

For a time the tensions eased and there

was very little activity on either side.
On May 2 Lieutenant Colonel Guillimard, the sur
veyor for the Spanish government, arrived at Natchez.
Ellicott was informed that the Spanish would be ready to
cooperate in the running of the boundary in a few days.
Despite these assurances, the next day a large number of
laborers went to work repairing the fort and mounting
additional pieces of artillery.

On May 7 a detachment of

approximately forty men arrived to reinforce the garrison.
Two days later Guillimard and a number of officers left for
Walnut Hills with a boatload of equipment.
5Ellicott to Pope, Apr. 14, 1797, Ibid.. 77.
55
Jack D. 1. Holmes, Gayoso: The Life of a Spanish
Governor in the Mississippi Valley 178^-1799 (Gloucester:
Peter SmitK, 1968), 183. Holmes says that Pope commanded
the military escort that had accompanied Ellicott at the
beginning of his journey.
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While Ellicott waited in Natchez to begin running
the boundary line and watched the feverish Spanish activ
ity, he did what he could to speed the survey.

He pro

tested the numerous delays only to be informed by Gayoso
that ’’both you and the commander General of this province
will be informed of the time that the boundaries are to be
d e t e r m i n e d . G a y o s o indicated that the survey would not
begin until Carondelet received appropriate orders from
higher authorities, presumably from the King himself.
At this time Ellicott learned from an informant
that Governor General Carondelet planned to take some sort
of action against the Americans and their supporters in
the Natchez district.

Carondelet had told Philip Nolan

that the situation at Natchez was becoming serious and
". . . h e was determined to quiet them by giving the
Americans lead, and the inhabitants hemp."

57

The infor

mant reported that the Baron had ordered a large camp laid
out at Baton Rouge and that a contractor had been engaged
to supply provisions for the troops.
Again Ellicott protested the failure of the Spanish
to fulfill the terms of Pinckney’s Treaty.

58

Gayoso in

formed him that the pressure of events was so great that
56
Ellicott to Gayoso, May 11, 1797, and Gayoso to
Ellicott, May 11, 1797, in Southern Boundary MSS, I.
57Ellicott, 85.
•'^Ellicott to Gayoso, May 16, 1797, Ibid., 86-89.
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the running of the line and the evacuation of the posts
would have to he postponed.

59

On May 16 a company of grenadiers arrived in
Natchez and after resting a day and a half went on to
Walnut Hills.

60

Three days later more soldiers en route

to Walnut Hills passed Natchez.

The inhabitants of the

province watched the Spanish military preparations with
apprehension.

The citizens talked of attacking the

Spanish, but were told that such an act might provoke a
war between the United States and Spain and consequently
do more harm than good.
On May 24 the Spanish Governor General issued a
proclamation informing the people of the Natchez district
that the provisions of the treaty could not be fulfilled
at the present time.

The reason given for the delay was

the reported activities of the British forces in Canada.
It was rumored that the British planned to cross the
territory of the United States and attack upper Louisiana.
3ecause of this threat to her territory, Spain was increasing her defenses along the Mississippi.

61

The Governor

General’s proclamation only served to increase the anger
of the people of the Natchez district who were attached to
the United States interest.
59Gayoso to Ellicott, May 17, 1797, Ibid.. 90.
6QIbid., 83-84.
61
Proclamation of Baron de Carondelet, May 24,
1797, Ibid., 94-95.
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In order to provide additional troops to occupy the
posts thr.t the Spanish were suppose to be evacuating, a
detachment of regulars began to descend the Ohio toward
the Mississippi.

On May 26 two companies of the 3d regiment

of Infantry and a handful of artillerists left Port
Washington under the command of Captain Issac Guion.
While the troops were resting at Fort Massac on the Ohio
River, Captain Guion learned that instead of abandoning
their posts, the Spanish were strengthening their position
at Walnut Hills and planning to seize Chickasaw Bluffs.
These reports were probably a result of the troop movements
that Ellicott had observed at Natchez.

Upon learning of

the Spanish preparations, Guion promptly set his force in
motion in an effort to counter the Spanish plans.

The

Americans reached "the infirnal [sic] bluffs," at presentday Memphis, on July 24 and immediately began to construct
a military post.^2
As Guion moved south, the situation at Natchez
became more explosive each day.

The events leading up

to the climax centered around the actions of an itinerant
Baptist minister named Barton Hanno n . ^

Governor Gayoso

6?
"Military Journal of Captain Isaac Guion, 17971799” in Seventh and Eighth Annual Report of the Director
of the Department of Archives and History oF ike State oF
Mississippi fromjDctober 1, 1507 to October 1_, 19^8 (Nash
ville: Brandon Printing Company,"T909j, 46. Hereinafter
cited as Guion.
63eiIlicott gives his name as Hannah, 99.
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gave the minister permission to preach a sermon, provided
he avoided discussing political issues.
On June 4 a large crowd gathered at the American
camp to hear his sermon.

Hannon was greatly impressed by

the success of his sermon and on June 9 he ventured into a
"disorderly part" of Natchez in an apparent effort to extend
his ministry.

His religious zeal, heightened by the

influence of liquor, aroused the anger of a number of
Irish Roman Catholics, who took offense at the minister's
remarks about their religion.

After being beaten by the

Catholics, Hannon went to Governor Gayoso and demanded
justice.

In an effort to prevent further trouble, the

Governor ordered Hannon confined at the fort in the stocks.^
Many of the citizens of the district were certain
that Gayoso had violated the rights of an American citizen
and that he was determined to enforce the laws of Spain at
.any price.

3y the morning of June 10 the Spanish governor

and his family, accompanied by several Spanish officials,
had taken refuge in the fort.

By nighfall the population

was in open opposition to the Spanish government and there
were suggestions that the Spanish fort be assualted.
The actions of the Spanish and the people of Natchez
^Ellicott, 99-100. See Jack D. L. Holmes (ed.),
Documentos ineditos para la hi 3toria de la Luisiana,
179^-1BlO (Madrid, 19^3),~T17-55, contains the diary
of Captain Manuel de Lanzo "Diario de la Revolutiar de
Natchez, 1797.” See also the Case against Hannon, A. G. I.,
Papeles de Cuba, leg. 163-a.
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placed Andrew Ellicott and Lieutenant Pope in an extremely
delicate position*

On May 31 Governor General Carondelet

issued a second proclamation in which he charged that the
United States was contemplating military action against
Lower Louisiana,

As proof, Carondelet cited the American

troops gathered on the Ohio River, probably Guion’s force,
and the presence at Natchez of the boundary commissioner
and his military escort.

He asserted that if the United

States had no hostile intentions, they would leave Natchez
and try to stop the British force advancing against Upper
Louisiana.

Only when this was done would the Spanish

surrender the posts and lay down the weapons which the
Americans had forced them to take up.

65

As additional

proof of the intentions of the Americans, Carondelet pointed
to the fact that the citizens of the Natchez district were
in open revolt against Spanish authority because of the
66
jailing of Hannon.
Governor Gayoso considered the incident involving
Hannon to be what Pope and Ellicott were waiting for to
begin the revolt.

On June 12 Pope seemed to substantiate

this conclusion when he issued a letter of congratulation
65

Proclamation of Carondelet, May 31, 1797, in
Ellicott. 101-103; Holmes, Gayoso, 189• For Ellicotts
comments see Ellicott to Pickering, June 4, 1797, Southern
Boundary MSS, I.

66
For a Spanish account of the revolt see Captain
Manuel de Lanzo*s diary in Holmes (ed.), Documents de la
Luisiana.
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and support to the people of Natchez.

The lieutenant def

initely favored the citizen’s position, but militarily he
was in no position to offer support if hostilities began.
The small American force would be greatly outnumbered by
the troops that the Spanish could assemble in the district
in a matter of a few days.

In fact Governor Gayoso had

requested additional troops to reinforce the garrison at
68
Natchez on the day Pope issued his proclamation.
While the military forces of both nations bided
their time and made preparations, the people were discussing
an attack on the fort.

69

On June 17 an incident occurred

which could have resulted in a war between the United States
and Spain if it had not been handled properly.

Shots were

exchanged between the members of a Spanish patrol and a
group of men advancing on the hill that overlooked the
Spanish position.

No one was wounded during the brief

67
Proclamations of Pope and Ellicott, June 12, 1797,
in Pope Papers, Missouri Historical Society. Ellicott makes
no mention of this proclamation in his journal or the report
on the Southern Boundary, but states that he decided neither
to encourage nor discourage the rebels, Ellicott, 104-105.
In fact Governor General Carondelet had alerted the militia
units of Lower Louisiana. Holmes, Gayoso, 192, cites
certificates of Carondelet, New Orleans, Aug. 5, 1797,
A. G. I., Papeles de Cuba, leg. 23. Lieutenant Pope is
reported to h a v esaid that the Spanish would not evacuate
the posts without "being first damnably flogged." Quoted
in D. Clayton James, Ante-bellum Natchez (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 195b), 69.
68
Gayoso to Carondelet, June 12, 1797, A. G. I.,
Papeles de Cuba, leg. 4369
Holmes (ed.), Documents de la Luisiana, Lanzo’s
diary.
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encounter, but the situation had reached the stage where
it was essential that c o d e r heads prevail.

Ellicott issued

orders that no further incidents were to occur between the
70
Regulars and the Spanish garrison*
Ellicott and Gayoso held a number of private confer
ences in an effort to solve the problem peacefully.

By the

nineteenth the details of a settlement were worked out
sufficiently so that Gayoso felt safe in ordering Colonel
Guillimard and Sub-lieutenant Juan Ferrusola, both of whom
had just arrived from Nogales, to proceed to New Orleans.

71

On June 20 Ellicott and Gayoso held a secret meeting and
reached a tentative agreement for settling the dispute.

At

this meeting Ellicott protested the landing of any additional
Spanish troops on the east side of the Mississippi above the
thirty-first degree of latitude, except for the purpose of
obtaining provisions.

72

The day after their secret meeting Ellicott and the
Governor met with a committee composed of citizens of the
district and negotiated a general settlement.
Governor agreed to a number of conditions:

The Spanish

(1) none of the

individuals who had acted as citizens of the United States
would be persecuted or prosecuted for their actions; (2) none
of the citizens would be called into militia service except
70
Holmes, Gayoso, 193.
71Ibid.. 194.
72Ellicott, 113.
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in the event of Indian attack or internal riot; (3) no one
would be taken out of the district for trial; and (4) the
neutrality of the people was guaranteed.

In turn, the

committee, on behalf of the citizens of the district, agreed
to live under Spanish law until the Spanish evacuated the
province.73
With this agreement the "revolt" at Natchez was
over and the district remained under Spanish control until
the boundary line was marked and the Spanish garrisons
removed.

Despite the peaceful solution of the problem of

joint Spanish and American occupation of Natchez, friction
continued between the supporters of the two powers.

The

presence of Lieutenant Pope and his detachment seems to
have been the major source of trouble.
The specific actions of Pope are unclear but they
caused Andrew Ellicott to ask Secretary of State Timothy
Pickering an interesting question:
Is it possible to find a Military
Gentlemen in our army possed of sobriety,
talents, and prudence? I have only to
add that for the honor of the United
States it will be necessary to send
officers to this country who are not
E l l i c o t t , 114-18; Holmes, Gayoso, 194-195;
Gayoso's proclamation of June 22, 17$?, is in the Gayoso
Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscript, Louisiana
State University Library, Baton Rouge; and in Clarence E.
Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers of the United States, V:
Mississippi (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1337),
11-1 2 .
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Apparently Pope suffered from recurring fevers,
drank too much and caused considerable trouble and was
not the type of man to occupy a position of responsibility
in a delicate situation.

75

Pope's conduct was such that Governor Gayoso sent
a protest to his immediate superior, Captain Guion at
Chickasaw Bluffs.

The Captain ordered Pope to alter his

conduct so as not to give offense to Governor Gayoso or
76
to any of the citizens of Natchez.
In a letter to Gayoso
the Captain stated:
I am sorry to hear that the Officer
heretofore commanding the troops of
the United States at Natchez, has given
either to the inhabitants of that district,
or to the subjects of his Catholic Majesty,
the smallest just cause of uneasiness or dis
content; at all events this will no longer
be the case as his orders are to observe
a different conduct and his superior officer
will I hope shortly be there to command in
person.77
Ellicott to Secretary of State, July 4, 1797,
Southern Boundary MSS, I. His reference to Pope's mental
condition had apparently been observed by his fellow
officers because Pope bore the nickname "Crazy." Holmes
in Gayoso, l83n. speculates on the "interesting combination"
of "Crazy" Pope being selected by General "Mad" Anthony
Wayne to head the movement to Natchez.
75

Holmes, Gayoso, l83n; Pope died of fever near
Natchez on July 11, 179$ see Cushing to Williamson, July 22,
1799, Letters Sent, Cushing, Record Group 98 (National
Archives).
76
Guion to Pope, Aug. 24, 1797, and Guion to Gayoso,
Aug. 27, 1797, in Guion, 41.
77

Guion to Gayoso, Aug. 27, 1797, Ibid., 41.
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Captain Guion expressed the hope that the Governor had
already issued the necessary orders to begin the evacuation
JO

of the Spanish posts.
The Captain was to be disappointed in his hope of
arriving at Natchez in a short time and in his expectation
that the Spanish would quickly evacuate their garrisons
north of the boundary line.

Before the Captain arrived,

Governor Gayoso was promoted and removed from the Natchez
district.

On July 29, 1797, Governor Gayoso relinquished

his post to his adjutant, Stephen Minor, and went to New
Orleans to assume the duties of Governor General of
Louisiana.

79

On August 19 Governor General Gayoso informed
Captain Guion that the Spanish had not evacuated their
posts and the decision to do so would have to be made by
the two governments and not by their representatives on
the frontier.

On October 3 Captain Guion acknowledged the

receipt of the Governor's letter and declined to quarter
his force at Villa Gayoso, a Spanish fort twenty-five miles
from Natchez, until he was fully acquainted with other
sites in the district.
In an effort to reassure Gayoso of the peaceful
intentions of the Americans, he stated, "As far as it
depends on me, and is consistent with the dignity of the
78Ibid.
79
Holmes, Gayoso, 198-99.
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United States and the comfort and safety of the troops,
the harmony and tranquility subsisting between the two
go
nations shall not be disturbed."
Captain Guion and his detachment did not leave
Chickasaw Bluffs until November 9.

Thirty men remained

to occupy Fort Adams and the balance of the detachment
moved rapidly down the river toward Natchez.

The force

did not occupy Walnut Hills because the Spanish still
held that position.

The troops arrived at the Natchez

landing on December 6 and made their camp on the site
of Ellicott's first camp, about one thousand yards from
81
the Spanish fort.
The Captain's duties once he reached Natchez had
been outlined in his orders.

He was to combine his de

tachment with the force commanded by Lieutenant Pope.
After assuming command of the entire force, he was to see
that the Spanish carried out the provisions of Pinckney's
80

Guion to Gayoso, Oct. 3» 1797, in Guion, 47.
Villa Gayoso had originally been called Cole’s dJreek
when established by Gayoso after 1789. As a result of
his efforts in founding the post, the inhabitants re
quested and received permission to change the name.
"Diary of Stephen Minor, 1792," quoted in Manual Serranoz
y Sanz (ed.), Documentos historico de la Florida £
Luisiana, siglos XVI al SVllI (MadricT: Liberia General,
1$12), 419.
81
Guion to Secretary of War, Feb. 25, 1798, in
Guion, 68-69. Captain Guion halted at Walnut Hills on
Dec. 1 to inquire whether or not the commanding officer,
Captain E. Beauregard, was prepared to surrender the post
to the United States. Guion to Beauregard, Dec. 1, 1797,
Ibid., 59.
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Treaty and administer the civil law until the Governor
of the Mississippi Territory could arrive at Natchez.
After the arrival of the Governor, Captain Guion and
his men were to assist in marking the "boundary line
between the United States and the Spanish possessions.
This assignment proved to be more complicated than
it appeared.

Captain Guion faced the problem of dealing

with the Spanish officials and the equally difficult task
of dealing with the American Commissioner, Andrew Ellicott.
The first controversy with the Spanish was a result
of Guion's efforts to fortify the American camp.

The

American wrote that the reasons for the precautions were
obvious to him even if they were not apparent to the
Spanish.

He concluded "that you are intirely [sic]

ignorant of being in any Danger, I doubt not seeing that
you are snug in Garrison, - But I am not so certain that
my camp is in perfect security, or that hostility to it
is not meditated-"

Guion stated that the citizens of

the district would be reimbursed for any property damaged
by the Americans, but the complaints were a result of
Spanish actions.

The whole situation could have been

avoided if the Spanish had evacuated the garrison according
Op

to the provisions of the treaty.
The Spanish made an effort to establish cordial
relations on three issues effecting the American soldiers
Qp

Guion to Minor, Jan. 3, 1798, Ibid., 60-61.
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by offering to allow Lieutenant Pope to cut timber from
tbe King's Swamp, located on the west side of the Miss
issippi, to construct buildings for the troops; the
buildings at Villa Gayoso to serve as quarters for the
Americans; and whatever might add to the comfort of the
troops.

Now that the Americans were attempting to build

an adequate camp, Guion could not understand the Spanish
protests.

He asked Adjutant Minor why he "so strenuously

endeavor to find offense in our making a camp comfortable
when your real desire is to contribute all in your power
to that comfort? and besides when you tell us that you are
O

*3

very shortly to abandon the country."
The American officer lamented the fact that he
was more versed in the duties of the military than the
"intrigues of a court."

He implored Gayoso to fix the

time of removal so that the relations between the two
nations might not be strained by something he might say
in his correspondence.^

On January 28 two boats filled

with troops and stores passed Natchez on their way south
from Walnut Hills, and Guion speculated that the evacuation
had finally begun.

85

® \ u i o n to Minor, Jan. 6, 1798, Ibid., 62-63.
Guion*s italics.
84.

Guion to Gayoso, Jan. 5, 1798, Ibid., 63-64.
85

Guion believed that within a month he would be
able to report that the posts were completely evacuated
and in the hands of the Americans. Guion to Mitchell,
Feb. 3, 1798, Ibid., 65-66.
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The Captain informed the Secretary of War that
he had been assured by Captain Minor that the buildings
would be left in the same condition as when occupied by
the Spanish.

He described the fort at Natchez as poorly

planned, with little command of the river, and almost in
ruins.

He recommended that a new post be established below

Natchez, near the new boundary line.

Guion stated that

because of their critical situation, the citizens were
anxious for some type of government to be established by
the United States.

The Spanish troops were being with

drawn and stationed at a strong new post being constructed
at Baton Rouge.

The main problem now facing his command

was a general shortage of clothing, especially lightweight
summer uniforms.

He recommended that linen short coats

be issued to the troops stationed in the southern section
of the nation, because the summer heat was so great that
it sickened the soldiers who were required to work in
woolen uniforms.

To illustrate the situation, he reported
Og
that the temperature on February 22 had been 78 degrees.
The movement of the troops observed at Natchez

was indeed the beginning of the long awaited evacuation
of the Spanish posts.

The Captain wrote to Major William

Kersey, who was en route to Walnut Hills, informing him
of an arrangement between himself and Captain Minor.

86
68-69.

Guion to Secretary of War, Feb. 25, 1798, Ibid.,
----
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All the King's or public buildings
without the Forts or Redoubts, and
exclusive of Block houses which are
for defence 3hould be estimated or
appraised as well as the Walnut Hills
as at this and other places in this
district. To this effect one or
more persons are to be chosen on
each side whose opinion or evaluation
will be committed to writing. . .
Guion requested that Kersey make the evaluation, in qua
druplicate, and send the information to Natchez in order
Qrj

to speed the evacuation of the territory.
On March 23, 1798, the Spanish evacuated the post
at Walnut Hills.

The fort was occupied by an express

rider from Natchez and seven Americans from the neighborhood.
The United States troops under Major Kersey had not arrived
in time to take formal possession.

One week later the

Spanish soldiers left Natchez and moved south of the pro
posed line.

The buildings at Natchez were left as they

had been when occupied by the Spanish, and Guion placed a
small guard in the fort.

With the removal of the Spanish

garrison, Captain Guion was free to turn his attention to
other problems.

88

While engaged in the lengthy negotiations with the
Spanish officials, Guion was confronted with the extremely
difficult situation of dealing with Andrew Ellicott.

The

87
‘Guion to Kersey, Mar. 12, 1798, Ibid., 71-72.
OQ

Guion to Major Constant Freeman, Mar. 27, 1798;
Guion to Wilkinson, Mar. 30, 1798, Ibid.. 73-74; and Guion
to Secretary of War, Apr. 19, 1798, Ibid., 77.
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American commissioner had grown jealous of the position he
had come to occupy during the year he had been living in
Natchez.

Ellicott's description of Captain Guion revealed

his feelings:
But it unfortunately happened, that
the Commandant who superceded Mr.
Pope, was much indisposed by an
inflammatory complaint on one side
of his head, and face, at the time
of his arrival, that evidently had
an effect upon his understanding,
which was naturally very far above
mediocrity: in this state, he was
immediately surrounded by a number
of unworthy characters, who took
advantage of his situation, to
prejudice his mind against the
permanent committee, and other
friends of the United States; who
were treated by him in the most
opprobrious manner.°9
The permanent committee Ellicott referred to had
been set up during the Natchez revolt and had relied
heavily upon the commissioner's advise and directions.
After inquiring by whose authority the committee met and
terming its meetings "improper and seditious", Captain
Guion ordered the committee to dissolve.

Ellicott wrote

that many of the citizens believed that Guion wanted to
establish a military government once the Spanish left the
district.

Ellicott feared that his arrest was contemplated

by Captain Guion, because of his active opposition to the
Captain's plans.

90

89Ellicott, 162.
9QIbid.t 163-64.
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Guion*s letters indicate that he was also dis
satisfied with Ellicott*s actions concerning the Indians
of the Natchez district.

On February 3 Guion told Samuel

Mitchell, agent to the Choctaw Indians, that Ellicott had
been premature in telling the Indians about the supplies
to be given them by the United States.

The Indians were

growing restless and more insistent in their demands for
the goods which had not yet arrived at Natchez.

The Captain

wrote that Ellicott "is so far the cause of Indian impor
tunity, he should bear the trouble when they come in here,
but which he is not always willing to do.

I have no doubt

but that supplies will be sent for the Chocktaws [sic] this
spring or summer following, yet much trouble is avoided by
not holding anything up to view until within reach."

qi

When Gayoso informed Ellicott that the Spanish were
ready to begin their evacuation, the American commissioner’s
suspicions were aroused concerning their intentions.

He

believed that the letter only concealed the Spanish in
tentions to continue their delaying tactics.

On January 31

his suspicions were confirmed by a letter shown to him by
Stephen Minor.

92

The letter from Governor Gayoso to Captain Guion
91

Guion to Mitchell, Feb. 3, 1798, in Guion. 65-66.

92

Gayoso to Ellicott, Jan. 10, 1798, in Ellicott,
167-68, and Southern Boundary MSS, II. For Ellicott*s
suspicions see Ellicott, 169.
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stated "that he would come up to Natchez, and make the
arrangements with him for furnishing the military escort,
and supplying it with provisions, likewise a plan for
running the boundary."

This communication evoked a

sharp response from Ellicott in which he stated that the
letter to Guion was " . . .

wholly unnecessary, as he is

not the person appointed to carry that part of the treaty
into effect.

My instructions, and those to the surveyor,

1 am fully persuaded will be sufficient guide to us in the
execution of the business, without any foreign or domestic
advice."

94
Captain Minor informed Gayoso that he had com

mitted a diplomatic blunder in addressing the letter to
Captain Guion.

The American officer had spread the story

throughout Natchez and had greatly exaggerated his own
importance.

The episode greatly embarrassed Ellicott,

since it appeared that an officer of the Army was placed
in a higher position than a special commissioner from the
State Department.

Minor reported that Ellicott was ex-

tremely angry over the incident.

95

Ellicott decided to run the boundary line despite
93Ellicott, 169.
9^Ellicott to Gayoso, Feb. 1, 1798, Ibid., 17071 and also in Southern Boundary MSS, II; and Ellicott
to Pickering, Feb. 10, 1798, Southern Boundary MSS, II.
9^Minor to Gayoso, Jan. 27, 1798, A. G. I.,
Papeles de Cuba, leg. 215-6 as cited in Holmes, Gayoso,
2 33.
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any attempt by Gayoso to further delay the starting date

and the possibility that Guion might withhold his escort.

96

On April 9 Ellicott*s party left Natchez for the point on
0 *7

the Mississippi from which the boundary was to be run.
Captain Guion was glad to be rid of the Commissioner.
He wrote General Wilkinson that "Ellicott went from here . . .
to Willings Bayau [sic] where he now is doing little or
nothing; he has very much lessened himself and sullied the
commission given him by his conduct before and since his
arrival here - I did not believe it *till I saw it, and
supposed it calumny."

98

With the departure of the Spanish

and then Ellicott*s party, life in the Natchez district
took on a fixed routine for the soldiers.
In his report to General Wilkinson, Guion summa
rized the nature of his civil duties:

"I am constantly

perplexed with all kinds of business, complaints for abuse,
slander, arrest for debts, thefts, and the whole catalogue
of vexations, and happy am I to find that a government for
99
this country had been formed by the General Government."^
^Ellicott to Pickering, Feb. 10, 1798, and Ellicott
to Pickering, Feb. 25, 1798, Southern Boundary MSS, II.
^ G u i o n to Y/ilkinson, May 5, 1798, in Guion, 80-82
and Ellicott, 177.
98
Guion to Wilkinson, May 5, 1798, in Guion, 81.
99

Ibid., 82. For the new system of government re
ferred to by Guion see "An Act for an amicable settlement
of the limits with the State of Georgia, and authorizing
the establishment of a government in the Mississippi
Territory," in F. N. Thorpe (ed.), The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other Organic laws
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For a short time Captain Guion contented himself
with the duties of a military and a civil administrator.
He worried with countless details concerning commerce,
the maintenance of law and order, and the settlement of
countless c l a i m s . H e moved troops throughout the
district, sought supplies for his men ‘because of the
failure of his contractor, pleaded for clothing for his
men because they were "naked", and watched the activities
101
of the neighboring Indians.
Guion*s major concern was the unrest among the
Indians since the departure of the Spanish.

The Captain

attributed the Indian agitation to Spanish and French
agents who were encouraging the tribes to test the firmness
102
of the United States.
Because of these problems the
Captain urged that a reliable interpreter be sent to him
so he could deal more effectively with the tribes.
of the States, Territories and Colonies, now or heretofore
forming tke United Statesof America (Washington! Government
Printing 6£fice, 1909), iV, 20^5-2027. The act was approved
on Apr. 7, 1798.
100For example see, Guion to Clark, May 5, 1798,
in Guion. 83 . Guion to John Wilkins, Quarter Master
General, May 9, 1798, Ibid., 86. Guion to the Secretary
of War, June 13, 1798t~T5Td., 91-92.
1 0 1

-

‘(iuion to Quarter Master Craig, May 9, 1798;
Guion to James O ’Hara, May 9, 1798; Guion to Kersey,
May 10, 1798; Guion to Mitchell, May 15, 1798, Ibid.,
83 -8 8 .
--102
Guion to Mitchell, May 15, 1798, Ibid., 87- 88.
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He requested that Samuel Mitchell send two men to
the Spanish fort on the Tombigbee to determine if the
Spanish had left that post and moved below the new boundaryline.

Guion expressed the belief that the delays caused

by Gayoso in marking the line were a part of a Spanish plan
to aid French designs against the district.

He closed with

the assurance that "we will soon have a respectable military
force in the Country, and things must then have an Issue.
In an effort to provide for the security of Natchez
and the surrounding country Guion requested a detachment
from Walnut Hills to reinforce his command.

He blamed all

of the problems of his office on the French:
The french are beyond doubt
meditating a stroke at this country;
and the Dons are secretly abbeting
the business - I would recommend it
to you, to have an eye to some of
the people left at your Garrison
when the Dons left it.104
To protect the party running the boundary line
from possible Indian attacks, Guion dispatched Ensign
John McClary with a detachment of soldiers from Natchez
to their camp.

The troops were not to be employed as

laborers or "drudges" unless such work was directly
connected with their duties as soldiers.

The soldiers

were to be drilled regularly and kept in constant readiness
1°3lbid.
10^Guion to Kersey, May 15, 1798, Ibid., 88-89.
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to meet any threat that might present itself.

105

In fact, the soldiers would not he used in cutting
the line because Ellicott and Gayoso had decided that slaves
would be used for the heavy work.

They made this decision

because the summer heat had taken a heavy toll among the
members of both parties, and it was believed that the slaves
could withstand the h e at.^^

On May 31 Governor Gayoso

arrived at the point where the boundary party was working
and approved the initial location of the thirty-first
parallel.

107

The commissioners of the two nations continued

their work and pushed on to St. Mary's in Spanish East
10R
Florida, reaching there on February 26, 1800.
^Guion to McClary, May 19, 1798, Ibid., 89-90.
The Captain quoted Article 6 of the Standing General Orders
of May 22, 1797 to remind the Ensign of his obligation to
his men. "To abstract a soldier from his professional
duties, and to subject him to the orders of persons not
attached to the Army, or to impose upon him menial laborious
services is an abuse of authority, a breach of contract,
and a deep injury to the service, because it authorizes
neglegence in the soldier and in effect destroys his arms
and his clothing - This practice is therefore positively
prohibited.”
10^Holmes, Gayoso. 234; Ellicott, 180.
1<^Ellicott to Pickering, June 19, 1738, Southern
Boundary MSS, II. Ellicott, 180. Moniteru de la
Louisiana (New Orleans), June 11, 1798. Holmes, Gayoso,

TW.

10R
Ellicotts; correspondence with the Secretary
of State is contained in Southern Boundary MSS, II, and
his account of the operation is contained in Ellicott,
181-279. Ellicott to Dunbar, Apr. 18, 1800, in Eron
Rowland, Life, Letters and Papers of William Dunbar
(Jackson, Press of the Mississippi Historical Society,
1930), 105-106.
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Apprehensions concerning the intentions of the
Choctaws increased steadily during June.

Governor Gayoso

warned the commissioners that the Indians would try to
block the running of the line and drive the Americans out
of the territory.

Ellicott considered this report as

merely an attempt by the Spanish to further delay the
109
fulfillment of the treaty obligations.
But Governor
Gayoso and Captain Guion both felt that there was a definite
possibility of an attack upon the small party of men on
the boundary line.1"10
Reports came to Natchez from Samuel Mitchell that
the unrest was caused by Spanish agents who were telling
the Indians that the Americans would take all of the land
above the line for their own use and that the Indians
should hold out.

111

Captain Guion did not believe that

the Choctaws would take such a stand without encouragement
from the Spanish.
Many of the Indians who had expressed feelings of
hostility toward the United States had moved; either below
the new boundary line; or to the Spanish post on the Tombigbee,
109Ellicott, 181.
110Holmes, Gayoso, 235-36. Guion to Secretary of
War, June 13, 1798, in Guion, 91-92. Guion to Wilkinson,
June 23, 1798, Ibid., 193—$5- The military escort with
Ellicott consisted of thirty men under the command of
Lieutenant McCarty.
93-95.
98-99.

111Guion to Wilkinson, June 23, 1798, in Guion,
Guion to Secretary of War, July 9» 1798, ibid.,
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Fort St. Stephens.

The post was well within the territorial

limits of the United States but was still garrisoned by
about thirteen Spanish soldiers.

The fort was only ninety

miles from the Spanish town of Mobile but it was a twelve
day march from Natchez.

The inhabitants of the area were

well disposed toward the United States and required some
type of protection from the Spanish and Indians.

Captain

Guion recommended the construction of a post in the area
to counteract the activities of the Spanish.

112

While Guion tried to keep the Indians from starting
a war, his civil administration, by his own assessment was
going smoothly.

He informed the Secretary of War:

The people of this district, who
when left to the unbiased exercise
of their own judgement, are in the
majority above the ordinary capacity
of like numbers in most of the States,
anxiously look for the laws and officers
of government for this country. They
are, and have been remarkably tranquil,
their situation fairly considered; a
few turbulent and busy spirits excepted;
yet the arrival of the governor, Judges,
etc would add much to their satisfaction,
and my case.113
112

Ibid. Peter J. Hamilton, "St. Stephens*,
Spanish Fort and American Town,** Transactions of the
Alabama Historical Society, 1 8 9 8 - ^ , III, 227-1T.
Hamilton stages that Fort St. Stephens was transferred
to the United States by the Spanish on May 5, 1799* The
United States would eventually establish Fort Stoddert
to replace Fort St. Stephens, American State Papers,
Military Affairs, I, 163.
113

Guion to Secretary of War, June 13, 1798, in
Guion. 91-92.
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Guion's assessment differed greatly from the comments
made by Ellicott in his Journal.

Ellicott attributed the

good order at Natchez to the activities of the permanent
committee he had helped organize and not to the efforts
of Guion.

Ellicott wrote that the committee did not listen

to the advise of pretended friends nor did it heed the abuse
of its opponents.

Because of its wise actions the committee

was able to maintain order in Natchez despite the fact that:
"the shadow of the Spanish jurisdiction, which had remained
in the district since the termination of the commotion, was
withdrawn in January, 1798, and the inhabitants left without
law or government, till September following, I never heard
of a single outrange being committed in the territory except
by the Commondant, and one or two other officers."11^
As the boundary party moved east, Captain Guion
continued to watch the activities of the Indians and the
Spanish agents.

Many of the chiefs had come to Natchez

to talk to Guion and declare their "friendly disposition
and intention."

Despite these assurances, the Captain

feared that some of the Choctaws and the Huwanies, who
had long been attached to the Spanish, were contemplating
hostilities.

One indication of their feelings was that

the Huwanies, who lived in the Choctaw territory, had
burned their corn and moved south to the border of Lake
1 U Ellicott, 167.
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Pontchartrain.

115

On July 29 Guion received information from the
Tombigbee region that Colonel Benjamin Hawkins, agent
to the Creeks, had left his post because of threats made
against him by the Indians.

The Captain maintained that

the Indian problems were caused by the activities of the
Spanish, whose efforts were connected with some French
plan to attack the region.

Guion suggested that the

Indian problems might be eliminated if the tribes were
played against one another.

To accomplish this the Choctaws

should be conciliated and brought under the influence of
the United States.

Since the Choctaws and the Creeks were

enemies, there existed the possibility of using the Choctaws
to divert the attention of the Creeks from the Amer XCcUiS •
Captain Guion never tried his plan because he was relieved
of further responsibility for Indian affairs by the arrival
11
of Governor Winthrop Sargent.
115

Guion to Secretary of War, July 9, 1798, in
Guion. 98-99. Guion's reference to the Huwanies probably
referred to the Yowanni people. In addition to these two
spellings these Indians were referred to as the Haiowanni,
Youone, Hewanni and the Ewany. Their capital was located
on the east side of the Chickasahay River and was called
Yowanni. H. S. Halbert, "District Divisions of the
Choctaw Nation," Report of the Alabama History Commission
"k° the Governor of Alabama, flKomas id.""Owen (ed.). I
XMontgomery, 190T7, 380-81.
11^Guion to Samuel Mitchell, Aug. 11, 1798, in
Guion, 101-102. The system of government established by
Congress made the territorial governor the superintendent
of Indian affairs. F. N. Thorpe (ed.), The Federal and
State Constitutions, 2026.
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By the middle of September Captain Guion was
replaced as the commander at Natchez by Colonel John
Francis Hamtramck and assumed command of the troops
117
stationed at Loftus Heights.
On September 25 General
Wilkinson arrived at Natchez and personally assumed the
responsibility for directing the activities of the American
troops in the area.

*1 *1 ft

Governor Sargent and General Wilkinson quickly
turned their attention to organizing the civil and military
affairs of the territory.

The two officials became involved

in a heated controversy concerning the right of the troops
to occupy certain buildings received from the Spanish,
but not a part of the district’s fortifications.

The

building in question was located in Natchez, and Governor
Sargent wanted to use it as a courthouse.

General

Wilkinson refused to order the troops to turn the buildings
over to the civil authorities.

The controversy soon spread

to include the public buildings at Villa Gayoso occupied by
soldiers.
The controversy began in September 1798, and was
not resolved until the next spring when the troops were
moved out of Villa Gayoso and all but a small guard in
117

Sargent to Ellicott, Sept. 10, 1798, Dunbar
Rowland (ed.), The Mississippi Territorial Archives,
1798-1803 (Nashville: Brandon Printing Co., 1^05),
I, 45-46. Hereinafter cited as Rowland, MTA.
118
Guion to Secretary of War, Jan. 3, 1799, in
Guion, 102-103.
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the old Spanish fort was removed from Natchez.

Sargent

had gained control of the public buildings, but only after
threatening to send his correspondence with Wilkinson to
the proper governmental department.

119

The other controversy arose over the transfer of
Lieutenant Andrew Marschalk from Natchez to Walnut Hills.
The Lieutenant possessed the only printing press in the
territory and had contrived to bring this fact to the
attention of Governor Sargent.

The Governor arranged

the transfer of the officer and

his printing press to

Natchez so that he could print the laws of the Mississippi
120
Territory.
Apparently Marschalk*s activities while he
printed the laws angered his superiors, and he was ordered
from Natchez before he finished

his printing assignment.

By late October, 1799, when he sold

his printing press and

left Natchez, Marschalk had finished printing the first
119

Sargent to Pickering, Sept. 29, 1798, in
Rowland, MTA, I, 57-58; Sargent to Captain John Heth,
Feb. 23, 1?$9, Ibid., 136; Sargent to Pickering, Mar. 13,
1799, Ibid., 11 C>—1'11; Sargent to Wilkinson, Apr. 3, 1799,
Ibid.. 130; Sargent to Wilkinson, Apr. 17, 1799, in Rowland,
MTA. I, 138-139, Sargent to Pickering, Apr. 20, 1799. Ibid.,
---T39-44.
120
Marschalk to L. A. Besancon, Sept. 2, 1837,
in Madel J. Morgan, **Andrew Marschalk* s Account of
Mississippi's First Press," Journal of Mississippi
History. VIII, 146-48; Marschalk to Sargent, Sept. 30,
1798, in William B. Hamilton (ed.), "The Printing of
the 1799 Laws of the Mississippi Territory," Journal
of Mississippi History, II, 92.
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thirty-five laws.

121

With the exception of the controversy concerning
the public buildings and the transfer of Marschalk,
Wilkinson and Sargent worked well together.

The Governor

concurred in Wilkinson's recommendation that Loftus Heights
should immediately be fortified.

He also tried to help the

General eliminate the problem of desertion which according
to the Governor was so great as to "hazard the loss of
almost all our Little Army in this Country."

In an effort

to make desertion more difficult, Sargent issued a pro
clamation requiring passports for all foreigners and the
ipO
registration of newcomers to the area.'
As the eighteenth century drew to a close, the
members of the Army remained scattered across the nation's
vast frontier.

Except for the old Spanish towns on the

Mississippi, the small garrisons were located far in advance
of the white settlements on the nation's borders.
was expected to perform two important functions:

The Army
guard the

international borders; and protect the isolated white
settlements from sporadic Indian attacks.

Neither of

these duties required much military activity on the part
of the Army and it did not appear that there would be any
purely military activities in the immediate future.
121 Sargent to Cushing, July 21, 1799, in Howland,
MTA. I, 158-59; Sargent to Pickering, Oct. 13, 1799, Ibid.,

T7S-81.

------122

Sargent to Wilkinson, Jan. 8, 1799, in Rowland,
MTA. I, 100-102; Sargent to Pickering, Jan. 15, 1799, Ibid..
104-106; Sargent to Wilkinson, Mar. 17, 1799, Ibid., 114-15.
Sargent's italics.
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CHAPTER II
THE OCCUPATION OF LOUISIANA

The new century began peacefully for the members of
the United States Army and with all indications pointing to
a long period of calm.

Only a few isolated incidents in

volving hostile Indians disturbed the routine of Army life.
The soldiers continued the monotonous task of building and
improving the posts that marked the limits of the nation.
In the preceding decade the Army had advanced far
into the wilderness, well beyond the settled areas, in an
effort to secure the nation’s borders.

It would be a

number of years before the vast area passed over by the
soldiers would be completely settled.

Therefore it is not

surprising that the military posts were considered to be
permanent installations.

However, the forts established

before 1800 were only the first in a series of works con
structed to protect the ever advancing frontier.1
By December of 1803 the soldiers were once again
on the march, pushing the military frontier still further
1For the names and date of construction of the
posts in the South see Appendix I. For other posts see
Francis Paul Prucha, A Guide to the Military Posts of
the United States, 17H9-18$5~ TMadi3on: The State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964).
67
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west and ever ahead of the encroaching settlers.

The posts

constructed in the 1790*s were abandoned as they outlived
their usefulness, and new posts were established to meet
the needs of an ever changing situation.

The process of

establishing and subsequently abandoning posts in the
interior of the nation was repeated time after time as
the country increased its territorial holdings and settlers
continued to push the settlement line westward.
The only interior posts in the South that remained
in existence for any length of time were of two types:
(1) those that were established in areas with large numbers
of potentially hostile Indians, such as Forts Stoddert,
Mitchell, and Hawkins; and (2) those that offered the
surrounding population a measure of protection from large
concentrations of slaves, such as Baton Rouge.
Initially the military frontier in the South moved
in two directions at the same time, west and south.

The

movement south stopped when the United States acquired the
land bounded by the Gulf of Mexico and constructed permanent
fortifications to guard the coastline.

The movement west
2
did not end until the continent had been crossed.
The first indication that the tranquil period might

be broken came when rumors began to circulate that Spain
had transferred Louisiana to France.

The transfer had been

agreed to by the two countries in the Treaty of San Ildefonso,
2Ibid.
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signed on October 1, 1800.^

The treaty was a preliminary

agreement and accomplished no transfer of territory.

The

agreement was secret because Spain was afraid that if news
of the treaty reached the United States, the territory
might be lost before France could take possession.

On

March 21, 1801, the representatives of Spain and France
signed the treaty of Aranzuez which confirmed the agreement
reached at San Ildefonso.^
News of the two secret agreements did not reach the
United States until early 1802.
anger and dismay.

The reaction was one of

Possession of the mouth of the Mississippi

River by weak Spain was one thing, its possession by ag
gressive France was something that required serious con
sideration.

President Jefferson summarized the situation:

Spain might have retained it quietly
for years. Her pacific dispositions,
her feeble state, would induce her to
increase our facilities there, so that
her possession of the place would be
hardly felt by us, and it would not
perhaps be very long before some
circumstance might arise which might
make the cession of it to us the price
of something of more worth to her. Not
so can it ever be in the hands of France.
^A. P. Whitaker, "Spanish Policy towards the
Retrocession of Louisiana," American Historical Review,
XXXIX (April, 1934), 454-76.
4
A. P. Whitaker, The Mississippi Question, 17951803, A Study in Trade, Politics and Diplomacy (Gloucester:
Feter Smith, 1F52), 184-86.
5

Jefferson to Robert Livingston, Apr. 18, 1802,
in Paul L. Ford (ed.), The Works of Thomas Jefferson
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904-05), IX, 364-^5.
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The Western, settlers were concerned about what
might happen if France should gain control of New Orleans.
They depended upon the Mississippi River to transport their
products to market.

If the right to use the river was ever

denied, the results would be disastrous.

In the much quoted

passage by Jefferson, he stressed the importance of the
river not only for the western farmers but for the nation:
There is on the globe one single spot
the possessor of which is our natural
and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans,
through which the produce of three
eights of our territory must pass to
market, and from its fertility it will
ere long yield more than half of our
whole produce and contain more than
half our inhabitants. France placing
herself in that door assumes to us
the attitude of defiance.6
If the attitude of France was defiant, the attitude
of the United States Army was relaxed and unconcerned.

From

1801 to 1803 the soldiers were occupied with a number of
routine jobs, such as:

escorting parties through the

wilderness; marking the Chickasaw boundary line; assisting
Indian agents with projects among the various tribes;
cutting roads through the wilderness; constructing buildings
for the Indian factory system; cleaning, repairing, and
packing arms; protecting postriders and travelers on the
Natchez to Nashville road; moving personnel and stores
from one post to another; building warehouses at the
6Ibid., 364.
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military posts; and cutting timber for the use of the
garrisons. 7
While the soldiers labored in the wilderness,
the commanding general, James Wilkinson, was negotiating
treaties with Southern Indian tribes.

Wilkinson’s duties

as commanding general of a force stationed at widely
scattered posts should have completely occupied his
attention, but he was given other responsibility.

In

June of 1801 he was ordered to open negotiations with
the Southern Indian tribes.

Wilkinson’s diplomatic efforts

would keep him in the wilderness for almost two years.

8

General Wilkinson and his fellow commissioners,
Colonel Benjamin Hawkins and General Andrew Pickens, first
attempted to arrange a treaty with the Cherokees when they
met at Southwest Point.

The proposed treaty provided for

7
Sargent to Wilkinson, Apr. 8, 1800, Dunbar
Rowland, The Mississippi Territorial Archives, 1793—
1803 (Nashville: Brandon Printing Co., 190$}, i, 220;
Hereinafter cited as LITA . Secretary of War to Edward
Butler, Mar, 10, 1801, m Letters Sent Relating to
Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Records of the Office of
the Secretary of War, Record Group 107, National Archives
Microfilm Publication, M6, Roll 1, 44. Hereinafter cited
as SWLS. Secretary of War to Thomas Cushing, Oct. 23,
1801, ibid., 116; Secretary of War to Thomas Butler,
Apr. 16, 1802, Ibid., 192; Secretary of V/ar to Commanding
Officer at Chickasaw Bluffs, July 20, 1802, Ibid., 252-53;
Secretary of War to A. D. Abraham, July 30, 180^, Ibid.,
252; Secretary of War to Cushing, July 10, 1803, Ibid.,
25; Secretary of War to Abraham, Sept. 9, 1802; Ibid., 28182; Secretary of War to Abraham, Nov. 11, 1802, Ibid., 31920; Secretary of War to Abraham, Dec. 14, 1802, ibid., 33233.

Q

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, June 15, 1801,
Ibid., 87.
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the cutting of a road from the Tennessee River to the
highlands.

But the Indians, reluctant to allow the Americans

on their lands, refused to have anything to do with the
g
proposal.
Failing to reach an agreement with the Cherokees,
the commissioners moved on to Chickasaw 31uffs where they
conferred with the Chickasaw chiefs.

On October 24, 1801,

a treaty was signed whereby the Indians received seven
hundred dollars in merchandise for allowing a road to be
opened across their lands.

The road was to be built by

details of thirty soldiers working in monthly shifts from
the Mero district of Tennessee to the settlements near
Natchez.

The trail would be fairly typical of the early

roads that were cut through the wilderness.

The Secretary

of War outlined how the trace should be cleared, "not
exceeding sixteen feet in width and not more than eight
feet of the sixteen to be cut close to the ground, and
smoothed for passengers. . . .
q
American State Papers, Indian Affairs (Washington:
Gales and Seaton, 183^), I, 648-53, 656, 663. Hereinafter
cited as ASPIA. General Pickens was named in place of
William R. Davie who was named in the original commission.
Secretary of War to Wilkinson, June 15, 1o01, SWLS, Roll 1,
87.

^ASPIA, I, 651-53; Charles J. Kappler, Indian
Affairs: Law3 and Treaties (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 190^), II, 41-42; Secretary of War to
Wilkinson, Feb. 18, 1803, in Clarence E. Carter (ed.),
The Territorial Papers of the United States; Volume V,
The Territory of Mississippi, 1793-1817 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1937), 187.
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After concluding the successful negotiations at
Chickasaw Bluffs, the commissioners proceeded to Fort
Adams to meet with the Choctaw chiefs.

Wilkinson and

his associates persuaded the Indians to allow the con
struction of a road from Fort Adams to the Yazoo River.
In addition, the chiefs agreed to accept the old boundary
line between their territory and the United States.1"1
When the roads provided for in the treaties with
the Chickasaws and Choctaws were completed, communications
between Nashville and the southwest would be greatly improved.
In an effort to protect the postriders and travelers on the
road, small detachments of soldiers were stationed along
the route.

In 1303 the mail was carried from Natchez to

Nashville at the rate of fifty miles a day.

By 1805 mail

was being carried over the route by postriders who were
expected to cover 120 miles every twenty-four hours.

12

The commissioners proceeded from Fort Adams to
Fort Wilkinson, near Milledgeville, Georgia, where they
opened a conference with the Creeks on May 24, 1302.

In

exchange for 310,000 in gifts and the promise of annuities,
the Creeks ceded their land in the Ockmulgee Forks to the
United States.

This cession pushed the western boundary

11

The treaty was signed on Dec. 17, 1801, ASPIA,
I, 648-53; Xappler, Indian Affairs, II, 42-43*
12
Postmaster General to Claiborne, Feb. 15, 1803,
Carter, Territorial Papers, V, 186; Postmaster General to
Pratt, Dec. 9, 1805, m Carter, Territorial Papers, V, 44.
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of Georgia further west.1^
Upon concluding the treaty with the Creeks, Colonel
Hawkins and General Pickens returned to their homes.
General Wilkinson moved to Port Confederation, a frontier
post located on the Tombigbee River, where he again met
with the Choctaws.

By the terms of a second treaty, signed

on October 17, 1802, the Indians ceded their lands between
the Tombigbee and Chickasawhay rivers.

They also agreed

to the establishment of a new boundary line and the cutting
of a highway through their lands.

In return the United

States agreed to establish a trading house for their use. 14
Following the negotiations with the Choctaws,
Wilkinson established a camp at the mouth of the Yazoo
River.

From this location he personally supervised the

work of the soldiers who were marking the boundary line
between the territory of the United States and the land
15
held by the Choctaws.
The marking of this line was
^ASPIA, I, 668-69; Kappler, Indian Affairs, II,
44-45.
1^ASPIA, I, 681-82; Kappler, Indian Affairs, II,
47. The trading house was finally established at I?ort
St. Stephens, Ora B. Peake, A History of the United
States Indian Factory System, 1795-1o2T~(Denver: Sage
B T o k s " , “ T5 5 7 7 ,

------------------

16

Wilkinson to Claiborne, Sept. 18, 1802, Rowland,
MTA, I, 514. Claiborne to Dearborn, Nov. 16, 1802, Ibid.,
552. Wilkinson to Claiborne, Nov. 11, 1802, in Dunbar
Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne,
1801-1816 (Jackson: Mississippi State Department of1
Archives and History, 1917), I, 230-32. Hereinafter
cited as Rowland, WCC.
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extremely important to the settlers living along the
Mississippi River.

The new Governor of the Mississippi

Territory, W. C. C. Claiborne, stated:

"the line embraces

a much larger tract of fertile land than was expected and
is consequently highly satisfactory to the citizens in
this quarter."1^
Although the settlers considered the achievements
of Wilkinson in the last two years to be important, he was
dissatisfied.

He did not feel that his talents and energy

had been utilized to the best advantage.

In September of

1802 he expressed a hope that he would "be able to promote
measures, more extensive in their salutary consequences to
17
this territory and the United States."
He estimated that
he had traveled sixteen thousand miles on government

business during 1802 and 1803.

18

The General was probably correct in feeling that
his services might have been used to better advantage.

The

negotiations with the Indians were important, but Colonel
Hawkins and General Pickens probably would have been just
as successful without vVilkinson's help.

Certainly the

General found enough to do on arriving at the Yazoo:
"^Claiborne to Dearborn, Jan. 17, 1303, Rowland,
ME A , I, 581.
17
Wilkinson to Claiborne, Sept. 18, 1802, Ibid.,
---515.
18
James Wilkinson, Memoirs of My Own Times
(Philadelphia: A. Small, 1816), I, vii.
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"I regret to find here, the road cutting entirely neglected,
and to learn that everything Military, is in disorder. . . .
I feel for the public service and for the discipline and
19
subordination of the troops.”
The supervision of the road construction had been
assigned to Colonel Thomas Butler in April.

The Secretary

of War had ordered that details of soldiers working for
sixty days at a time were to cut the road from Natchez to
Tennessee.

As compensation for their labor the soldiers

were to receive frocks and overalls and ten cents extra
20
pay for each full day of work.
Wilkinson reported that
work had come to a standstill because Colonel 3utler ’’has
arrogated himself unwarrantable consequence, and instead
of doing his duty, has in my Judgement done injustifiable
acts, and now under the plea of indisposition has gone to
the North-ward.”^
While supervising the work of the soldiers on
the boundary line and restoring a semblance of military
order, Wilkinson was faced with a problem involving the
nation’s foreign relations.

The problem concerned the

method of transporting supplies to the southern garrisons
19
Wilkinson to Claiborne, Nov. 11, 1802, Rowland,
WCC, I, 232.
90
Secretary of War to Butler, Apr. 16, 1802, SWLS,
Roll 1, 191-93.
21

Wilkinson to Claiborne, Nov. 11, 1802, Rowland,
WCC, I, 232.
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located in the interior.

Some of the posts were located

on rivers that flowed through Spanish territory before
they emptied into the Gulf of Mexico.

As a result, it

was possible that American goods passing through the
territory to the posts might either be subject to duties
or prevented from passing entirely by the Spanish officials.
On August 6, 1802, Governor Claiborne touched upon
the same problem.

He suggested to the Secretary of War

that a trading house for the Choctaw Indians be established
at some location on the Tombigbee River.

He mentioned that

trouble might arise because the right to navigate Mobile
Bay was not secured to the United States.

However, he

could foresee no lasting difficulty on this point because
of "the present friendly and accomodating disposition
of the Governor General of Louisiana towards the U.
States. . . .”22
The Governor’s optimism was a bit premature.

On

October 28 he received a letter from William S. Huling,
American vice-consul at New Orleans, reporting that the
American right of deposit had been withdrawn.

In addition,

permission had been denied for the military stores destined
23
for Fort Stoddert to pass through Spanish territory.
Claiborne immediately sent a protest to the Governor General
22

Claiborne to Dearborn, Aug. 6, 1802, Ibid.,

153-54.
23

Huling to Claiborne, Oct. 18, 1802 and Claiborne
to Huling, Oct. 28, 1802, Ibid., 207-208.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78

of Louisiana and informed James Madison of the closing.2^
The letter from Huling was prompted by the issuance
of a proclamation by the acting intendent of Louisiana,
Juan Ventura Morales, ending the American right of deposit
at New Orleans.

As far as the western farmers were concerned,

the right of deposit was the most important part of Pinckney's
Treaty.

When the right of deposit was withdrawn the

settlers who were most effected threatened to take matters
into their own hands if the government could not resolve
the problem.

The situation was made even worse by the news

that on October 15, 1802, Charles IV, King of Spain, had
ordered the territory of Louisiana transferred to the
properly accredited representatives of Napoleon. 25
The outcry from the west was not as great as
Jefferson feared it would be and certainly not as loud
as the Federalists might have hoped for.

A letter from

Bourbon County, Kentucky, indicated the mood of at least
one frontiersman:

"Our country is in a state of perfect

tranquility, the confidence the people has in the president
and I may add in Congress too, are so firmly fixed that
they will not move in any direction but that pointed out
by the General Government." 26
2^Claiborne to Lon Manuel de Salcedo, Oct. 28, 1802
and Claiborne to Madison, Oct. 29, 1802, Ibid., 209-11.
25
Whitaker, Mississippi Question, 186.
P6
John Allen to John Breckinridge, Feb. 15, 1803,
in Breckinridge Papers, Jan. - Sept., 1803, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress.
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The government was for the time being doing
nothing openly, but behind the scenes it was striving
for a satisfactory settlement.

The administration's

policy of patience had the support of one of the powerful
Kentucky papers, The Palladium.
January 27, 1803:

The editor wrote on

"one sentiment only prevails on this

subject, a perfect reliance on the justice of the Federal
Government. and a determination to support its decision,
let it cost what it will."

27

Despite the strong support

voiced in favor of the governments dictates, some citizens
demanded that it take military action against the Spanish.
One Kentuckian wrote:

"...

I believe there are

few (if one) who would not cheerfully give his aid in
bringing Mr. Intendant and his adherents to condine [sic]
oQ
punishment. . . . "
Even the Palladium carried an
assessment of the state's military strength which might
be used if peaceful means failed.

The militia returns

for 1802 showed that there were 26,605 officers and men
enrolled and that they were armed with 11,157 rifles and
2,923 muskets.
In February rumors reached Washington that seemed
to verify the reports that the western settlers were
prepared to act without the consent of the government.
27
Palladium, Jan. 27, 1803. Editor’s italics.
pQ
Achilles Sneed to Breckinridge, Dec. 20, 1802,
Breckinridge Papers, Jan. - Sept., 1803.
2^Palladium, Jan. 20, 1803.
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reports said that a man named Wilson was raising an
expedition in the neighborhood of Pittsburgh.

Its purpose

was to descend the rivers and take possession of the city
of New Orleans.

Although the Secretary of ’
War expressed

doubts about the validity of the reports, he could not
risk the possible consequences if his judgement was
incorrect.

He issued orders to the commanders of the

American posts on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to stop
any expeditions that might try to descend the river.

^0

The Secretary informed General 'Wilkinson that the commanders
had been ordered "to use all prudent means in their power to
prevent the passage of any armed force not authorized by
the government which may attempt to pass down either of
those rivers."

If an expedition was mounted, the

Secretary told Wilkinson to "consider it your duty to
use all the means in your power to prevent it."^
The extent of the dissatisfaction was indicated
by the President when he wrote that "remonstrances and
memorials" were circulating throughout the western regions
and that a great many citizens were signing them.

The

President accepted the discontent in the West as natural
and honest, but the excitement in other areas he attributed
^Secretary of War to Thomas Cushing, Feb. 19,
1803, SWLS, Roll 1, 366.
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson. Feb. 18, 1803,
Ibid., 363-66.
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to other motives:
In the seaports it proceeds from a
desire for war which increases the
mercantile lottery; in the federalists
generally, and especially those of
Congress, the object is to force us
into War if possible in order to
damage our finances, or if this
cannot be done, to attach the western
country to them, as their best friends,
and thus get again into power.32
At least one

member of the President’s own party

doubted the wisdom of the policy followed by the adminis
tration.

Governor Claiborne publicly endorsed the actions

of

Jefferson, but privately suggested to JamesMadison

it

might be best to seize New Orleans by force.

that

Hebelieved

that six hundred well-armed members of the territorial
militia could probably take the city if they were opposed
only by Spanish troops.

He suggested that there were a

number of citizens in Orleans and along the coast who would
support the Americans if hostilities started.^
The major reason the citizens of the West were
dissatisfied was because the government did not appear
to be

doing anything to regain the right

Jefferson recognized

this factor when he

of deposit.
wrote:"The

measures we have been pursuing being invisible, do not
satisfy their minds.

Something sensible therefore was

82

Jefferson to Monroe, Jan. 13, 1803, in Ford
(ed.), The Works of Thomas Jefferson, IX, 418.
^Claiborne to Madison, Jan. 3, 1803, Rowland,
WCC, I, 253.
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become necessary. . .

The sensible action that Jefferson proposed to
take was the purchase of New Orleans and if possible the
Ploridas.

When James Monroe and Edward Livingston were

successful not only in purchasing New Orleans but also
the rest of Louisiana, the discontent in the West died
quickly.

The treaty which ceded Louisiana to the United

States was signed on April 30, and finally proclaimed on
October 21, 1803.^
While the commissioners were negotiating with
the French, a battle was being waged in the United States
Congress for the support of the west.

The fight was

between the Federalists, who were trying to win support
in the west, and the Jeffersonians who were working to
retain the support of the west.

The Federalist Senator

from Pittsburgh, James Ross, introduced a series of res
olutions designed to win the support of the western settlers.
Ke proposed that the United States assert its right to freely
navigate the Mississippi River and its right to deposit on
the isle of New Orleans.
In addition to asserting the nation's rights, the
■^Jefferson to Madison, Jan. 13, 1803, in Ford
(ed.), The Works of Thomas Jefferson, IX, 418.

35
Hunter Miller (ed.), Treaties and other
International Acts of the United States of America
(Washington: Government Printing Office, l93i)> ll,
498-515.
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resolutions authorized the President to call into service
50,000 militia men, to be drawn from Georgia, South
Carolina, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee and the Mississippi
Territory.

These men along with the regular land and

naval forces were to be used by the President to seize
and hold some place on the isle of New Orleans.

The site

seized was to be used as a place of deposit for American
products.

In order to finance the other resolutions, Ross

proposed that Congress appropriate five million dollars.^
Ross *s resolutions were defeated by a vote of
15 to 11.

Ross was the only Senator even remotely connected

with the interests of the west to vote for the resolutions.
Senator John Breckinridge of Kentucky offered a counter
proposal, which probably represented the administration's
point of view.
Breckinridge's plan authorized the President to
call out 80,000 militia and to enlist volunteers, when and
if he deemed it necessary.

The militia levy was to be

apportioned through all of the states not just among the
western states and territories.

More importantly, there

was no mention of seizing any portion of Louisiana.
scheme was adopted by unanimous vote.

The

At the same time it

provided additional troops, Congress provided funds to
construct fifteen gunboats to be used on the Mississippi
Annals of Congress, 7th Cong., 2nd Sess..
95-96.
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River or in the southern waters of the United States.

•17

Upon learning of the passage of the Breckinridge
resolutions, General Wilkinson expressed the fear that
Spain might he angered.

He suggested that Spain might

transport a force of one thousand men to Louisiana from
Cuba.

However, he assured the Secretary of War that he
■ )Q

would be ready to open an offensive if ordered to do so.
The Louisiana Purchase was a major coup for the
United States and a total vindication of President
Jefferson's patient pursuit of a peaceful solution to
a problem that might have led to war with both France
and Spain.

The dire prediction of a resident of New

Orleans that, "The Kentucky men have often wished for
an opportunity of sacking New Orleans, and the day may
■JQ

not be far distant," was not to be.
While the turmoil raged over the transfer of
Louisiana to France and the closing of the deposit, the
Army went about its daily business as if nothing out of
the ordinary was happening or even expected.

In fact the

strength of the force seemed to be melting away.

On May 14,

1800, Congress had authorized a force of 4,436 officers and

37Ibid.. 119.
3®Wilkinson to Dearborn, July 24, 1803, Wilkinson
Papers, the Boston Public Library, as cited in James R.
Jacobs, The Beginning of the U. S. Army. 1783-1812
(Princeton: Prince tonTTni vers ity Pre ss, 194 y ) , 2^1.
^ Palladium, Jan. 20, 1803, "Extract of a letter
from a very intelligent gentleman at New Orleans, dated
the third instant."
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men.

By December 24, 1801, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn

reported that there were 4,051 men of all ranks present for
40
duty.
The reason the Army was below strength was that
vacancies which occurred were not filled as an economy
measure.
As an additional economy measure, the Secretary
of War issued an order cn March 20, 1801, Just sixteen
days after Jefferson's inauguration, that the two companies
of United States Dragoons were to serve on foot.

He stated

that the order was issued as a result of the President's
decision to eliminate an unnecessary expense.

The horses

belonging to the Dragoons were to be sold and the money
deposited in the Treasury and their arms and furniture
were to be returned to the public stores.

41

General Wilkinson was informed of the decision and
ordered to arm the men and order them to garrison the posts
in Tennessee.

This move freed the infantry stationed in

Tennessee to move to the mouth of the Ohio to await another
40
American State Papers. Military Affairs
(Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1932), I, 154-56.
Hereinafter cited ASPMA.
41

Secretary of War to the Commanding Officer of
Dragoons in Georgia, Mar. 20, 1801 and Secretary of War
to the Commanding Officer of Dragoons in Tennessee,
Mar. 20, 1801, SWLS. Roll 1, 47. The two companies
of Dragoons had been authorized in 1796, J. P. Callan,
The Military Laws of the United States (Philadelphia:
g 7"w .' em^s,"TBS4T7 t t t -t t :---------
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assignment.

42

The dismounted dragoons were finally stationed

at South West Point.
On March 16, 1802, the authorized strength of the
Army was reduced to 3,287, and by the end of the year the
actual strength was 2,873.

By December, 1803, when the

Army was called upon to occupy the Louisiana Territory,
its actual strength had dwindled to 2,486.
While Congress and the Administration struggled
with the problem of what positive action should be taken
with regard to Louisiana, the tempo of the Army's activ
ities increased.

On January 19, 1803, Governor Claiborne

purchased forty-three acres of land near Washington,
Mississippi.

The site was to be used for the construction

of a new fort to protect the vicinity of Natchez.^

The

people of the Natchez area had been forced to rely on the
troops at Port Adams for protection since the troops were
withdrawn from the town on March 10, 1800.

44

The new site

was occupied by a company of soldiers from Port Adams.

The

^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Mar. 20, 1801,
SWLS, Roll 1, 47-48; Secretary of War to Caleb Swan,
5ug7 3, 1802, Ibid., 100.
^Claiborne to Secretary of War, Jan. 19, 1803,
Rowland, WCC. I, 261-62; Claiborne to Secretary of War,
Peb. 15, 1803, Ibid., 268-69. For additional information
on the location and establishment of Port Dearborn see
Chapter VI. See also Secretary of War to Claiborne,
Apr. 8 , 1802, Ibid., 110-12 and Claiborne to Dearborn,
Mar. 2, 1803, Ifbid., 276.
44

Sargent to Wilkinson, Mar. 10, 1800, Rowland,
MTA, I, 214-15.
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troops started a blockhouse in January and completed the
work by May.

45

On February 18, 1803, General Wilkinson wrote to
Governor Claiborne from Fort Adams that the marking of
the Choctaw boundary line was finished.^

On the same

day Secretary of War Dearborn wrote to inform the General
that he could expect to be sent on another mission to the
Indians.

The Secretary’s letter also warned of the reported

activities of Wilson and contained the order to stop him
if possible.

47

Three days later the Secretary issued an

order directing Wilkinson to hold a meeting with the
Choctaws.

He was to try to arrange the cession of the
Aft
lands bounded by the Yazoo and the Big Black rivers.
Before the Secretary's order arrived at Fort Adams,
Wilkinson was able to supervise the various projects being
carried out in the area.

In addition to the work on the

blockhouse at Washington, the works at Fort Adams were
being improved.

The War Department ordered an engineer

to Fort Adams to plan and supervise the work.

Two companies

45
^Claiborne to Secretary of War, Jan. 19» 1803,
Rowland, WCC, I, 261-62; Wilkinson to Claiborne, May 10,
1803, Carter, Territorial Papers, V, 215-18.
46
Wilkinson to Claiborne, Feb. 18, 1803, Rowland,
WCC, I, 271. The cost of marking the line was $2,155.00.
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 18, 1803,
Carter, Territorial Papers, V, 186-88.
48
Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 21, 1803,
Ibid., 189.
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of soldiers were assigned to aid in the construction of
43
the fortifications.
Governor Claiborne was concerned about the safety
of the territory.

On May 2, 1803, he made several sugges

tions to General Wilkinson as to how and where the regulars
should be deployed.

On May 10 Wilkinson informed Claiborne

that he would not divide his force into a number of small
units and scatter them throughout the territory.

He

believed that when they were completed, the works at Fort
Adams would make it impossible for a large force to pass
that point on the river.
The new works were to be constructed of bricks,
timber, and earth.

The troops were to make the bricks

and dry them in the sun and cut the timber in the neigh
boring swamps.

Since it was impossible for the troops

to work in the swamps or the hot sun after the end of
June, it was essential that those two jobs be completed
immediately.

To speed the gathering of materials, Wilkinson

had ordered the troops who were working on the road to
Nashville to return to Fort Adams.
In his effort to consolidate his force, General
Wilkinson declined to send troops to reoccupy Walnut Hills,
unless it was absolutely necessary.
on two points:

He based his decision

the position offered no military advantages

49

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 16, 1803,
Ibid., 212-14.
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but several disadvantages; and a great number of soldiers
had died when the position was last occupied.

Also he

refused to send additional troops to occupy the new block
house at Washington, preferring instead to leave that task
to the local militia force.

Wilkinson did retain one small

detachment at 3ayou Pierre, a force he considered necessary
to defend that part of the frontier.

50

On April 16 Dearborn issued an order that took
Wilkinson away from his efforts to direct the nation’s
defenses on the Mississippi frontier and sent him back
into the wilderness.

The Secretary instructed the General

to proceed to the Creek Nation, where he would join Colonel
Hawkins in a meeting with the Indians.

The purpose of the

negotiations was to persuade the Creeks to extend their
cession of land between the Oconee and Ockmulga rivers so
that the latter would be the boundary.

51

In addition to arranging a treaty with the Creeks,
Wilkinson was to determine the attitude of the Spanish
concerning the transportation of supplies through their
territory above Mobile.

If the Spanish would not permit

supplies and men to pass through their territory, the
supplies would have to be shipped overland at considerable

215 -18 .

50
Wilkinson to Claiborne, May 10, 1803, Ibid.,

^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 16, 1803,
Ibid., 212-14.
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expense to the government and the Choctaw factory would
"become virtually useless.

52

The desire of the Secretary of War to obtain some
definite statement from the Spanish concerning the use of
the Mobile River was understandable.

Spanish policy con

cerning the use of their rivers and ports was continually
changing.

On March 3# 1803, Governor Claiborne reported

that the port of New Orleans was partially open to
Americans.

But the Governor did not indicate what policy

might apply at other places and he did not believe that
New Orleans would be completely opened until the Spanish
Crown ordered it.

53

Before departing for the conference with the
Creeks, General Wilkinson received a letter from Intendant
Juan Morales concerning the use of the Mobile River by
American vessels.

Morales had granted the "free passage

of Army provisions into the Mobile River.'*

However, the

permission was not a continuing grant and in his reply to
Morales, Wilkinson requested that the Spanish establish
some system to govern the passage of supplies in the
future.

He suggested that the United States be allowed

to send one unarmed boat into the Mobile in the spring
and autumn.

The vessel was to carry a certificate from

the Secretary of War or the Commanding General stating

53
Claiborne to Madison, Mar. 3» 1803, Rowland,
WCC, I, 275.
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that it was employed solely in the public service of the
United States.
The General alluded to the fact that:

"the public

service of the United States is liable to embarrassments,
delay and unnecessary expense by the circuitous route
which supplies for the support of our establishments on
the Mobile and Tombigby [sic] are obliged to take."
Wilkinson also requested that the Americans living above
the Spanish territory on the Tombigbee, Alabama and Mobile
rivers be granted the privilege of free navigation on
54
those rivers to the Gulf of Mexico.
In late July General Wilkinson proceeded to the
vicinity of Port St. Stephens where he met with the
Choctaw chiefs at the village of Hoe Buckintoopa.

On

August 31, 1803, an agreement was reached that provided
for the cession of approximately 853*760 acres of land
by the Choctaws.

In return the United States would pay

the overdue bills that the Indians owed the British firm
of Panton, Leslie and Company.

55

After concluding the

54
Wilkinson to Morales, July 6 , 1803, Carter,
Territorial Papers. V, 219-21. The letter from Morales
to Wilkinson has not been found. Peake says: "Goods
which ordinarily would be sent to Port Saint Stephens
by the way of Mobile were sent to New Orleans and up the
Mississippi or were sent overland from Natchez by pack
animals if trouble developed with the Spanish at Mobile."
A History of the United States Indian Pactory System, 93.
55
Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 16, 1803,
Carter, Territorial Papers. V, 213. Kappler, Indian
Affaira. II. 51. Arthur H. De Hosier, The Removal of
the dkoctaw Indians (Knoxville: University of Tennessee
Press, 1976), 31.
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treaty, Wilkinson remained in the Tombigbee region to
direct the retracing and remarking of the boundary line
between the United States and the Choctaw Nation.
On July 18, 1803, President Jefferson wrote to
Governor Claiborne inquiring whether or not he would be
able to proceed to New Orleans and take possession of that
territory for the United States.

The President also asked

if three companies of regulars from Port Adams would be
sufficient to man the fortifications in the neighborhood
of the city.

56

On August 12 Governor Claiborne accepted

the appointment as commissioner to receive Louisiana from
the French.

In addition, he stated that the three companies
57
of regulars "should be ample.”
On July 15 the Secretary

of War had ordered the commanding officer at Port Adams to
be prepared to transfer four companies of soldiers and a
large supply of stores that were being sent to New Orleans
from Philadelphia.^®
On September 9 Daniel Clark, a resident of New
56

Jefferson to Claiborne, July 18, 1803, Clarence
E. Carter (ed«), The Territorial Papers of the United
States, IX, The Territory of Orleans, 1851-1812
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), 5.
57
Claiborne to Jefferson, Aug. 12, 1803, Ibid.,
11-12, On Aug. 24 Governor Claiborne again wrote to
the President to express his gratitude for the appoint
ment and answered a number of questions the President
had posed concerning Louisiana. Ibid.. 16-25.
58
Order cited, Ibid., 71n.
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Orleans, addressed a letter to the Secretary of State
that contained some unsettling news.

The letter was an

answer to a communication from the President requesting
information about Louisiana.

Clark reported at great

length about affairs in the territory, and in the course
of the report, he stated that there were 5,440 militia in
Louisiana.

59

If the Spanish decided to contest the French

surrender of Louisiana to the United States, the militia
combined with the regular Spanish troops in the province
would constitute a powerful force.
On October 5 the Secretary of War stated that there
were rumors that Spain might oppose or try to delay the
efforts of the United States to assume control at New
Orleans.

After the delaying tactics employed by the

Spanish at Natchez, there was every reason to believe
that the rumors were valid.

As a consequence of these

fears, General Wilkinson was ordered to have enough boats,
provisions, field pieces, and other equipment ready for
the use of not only the regulars but for five hundred of
the best militia from the Mississippi Territory .^0
Wilkinson, being absent, could not supervise the
activities at Fort Adams.

Therefore Governor Claiborne

assumed the responsibility for directing the preparations
59
Daniel Clark to Secretary of State, Sept. 8 ,
1803, Ibid.. 28-47.
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 5, 1803,
Ibid.. 71.
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for the trip to New Orleans.

The Governor gather informa

tion from a variety of sources:

from Captain Edward Turner

concerning preparations at Port Adams; from Daniel Clark
with regard to possible delays on the part of Spain; and
from a traveler who said that the fortifications at New
Orleans were virtually useless and that the Spanish
regulars could not furnish an adequate garrison for the
^
61
defenses.
Claiborne realized that he was assuming duties
that were not a part of his office, but he justified his
military questions on the basis that:
These are enquiries which would come
more regularly from General Wilkinson,
but he has not yet returned to this
territory, and as the utmost dispatch
is required by Government in this
affair, it is my duty not to loose
one moment unnecessarily.
On October 31 a commission was issued which
appointed Governor Claiborne and General Wilkinson as
agents on behalf of the United States to receive Louisiana.
On the same day lengthy instructions were issued to both
men by which they were to govern their conduct before and
after the territorial transfer.^
^Claiborne to Secretary of State, Nov. 18, 1803*
and Claiborne to Clark, Nov. 18, 1803, Rowland, WCC, I,
284-90.
I, 288.

^Claiborne to Clark, Nov. 18, 1803, Rowland, WCC,
---

^Commission of W. C. C. Claiborne and James
Wilkinson as Agents, Oct. 31* 1803, Territorial Papers.
IX, 94; Secretary of State to Claiborne, Oct. 31, i803,
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General Wilkinson was to occupy the military posts
in the province as soon as they were transferred to the
United States, but those in New Orleans and its vicinity
were to be garrisoned first.

It was anticipated that

Wilkinson would have a force composed of six companies
of regulars and a hundred militia, from the Natchez district,
with which to work.

After the territory was transferred

the government of the territory would be in the hands of
Governor Claiborne.
The foregoing instructions were based on the
assumption that the territory would be surrendered without
opposition.

However, if Spain should resist American

occupation, the General and Governor Claiborne were to
decide whether or not to seize the territory.

If the use

of force was decided upon, Wilkinson was to use the regulars
at Fort Adams and as many, militia as could be gathered in
the neighborhood of Natchez.

In issuing these orders the

Secretary of War calculated that between six and nine
hundred militia could be raised and that the regular force
would number between three and four hundred.

He considered

his force adequate to seize New Orleans.
The Secretary informed Wilkinson that the Governor
of Tennessee had been instructed to raise five hundred men
and send them to Natchez.

These troops were to be used if

the General felt they were necessary.

If the troops were

Ibid.. 91-94; Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 31, 1803,
TEH.. 96-98.
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not employed in taking New Orleans, the General could use
them as he saw fit.

As an added precaution, the Governors

of Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio had been instructed to
have 6,000 men ready to march if necessary.^
Despite the detailed instructions from the Secretary
of War, General Wilkinson would not to able to supervise
the preparations at Fort Adams for some time.

Captain

Turner, the commanding officer at Fort Adams, informed
Governor Claiborne that a letter from Wilkinson, dated
October 27. stated that he would leave Pensacola in three
days.

65

On November 26 Claiborne reported that he expected

the General to arrive at Fort Adams at any time.

On

November 11 the General left Fort St. Stephens for Mobile.
From there he would travel to New Orleans and then up the
Mississippi to Fort Adams.
While he waited for Wilkinson, Governor Claiborne
became more concerned about the possibility that the
Spanish would resist American occupation of Louisiana.
He applauded the decision to order the mounted infantry
from Tennessee as "a wise and provident measure, as that
64.
Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 31, 1803,
Ibid., 96-98. Secretary of War to Sevier, Gerard and
fZHin, Oct. 31, 1803, SWLS. Roll 2, 250.
65

Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 18, 1803, Rowland,
WCC. I, 295.

66
297-98.

Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 26, 1803, Ibid.,
----
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reinforcement will at all events be useful, if they arrive
in time as an addition to our little Army. . .

In

addition to the militia from Tennessee the Governor
arranged for some of the Mississippi Territorial militia
to move to New Orleans.
The Governor clearly missed the presence of General
Wilkinson.

He informed Albert Gallatin that:

The Government having placed
(and with great propriety too) their
principal reliance on General Wilkinson
for the management of a Coup De Main if
it should be deemed expedient, I cannot
describe to you the painful anxiety
which I feel at the absence of this
experienced and valuable officer. I
indulge however some hope that his
speedy arrival will relieve me from
my present embarrassment.6®
The Governor told the militia Captains that he would
accept the services of any company, to act as volunteers,
to escort the Commissioners to New Orleans.^

As a safe

guard against delays, Claiborne wrote:
I deem it good policy for the
American Commissioners not to proceed
to New Orleans until our Army is ready
to move: - with a number of brave men
at our command, the negociations [sic]
^Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 18, 1803, Ibid., 287.
CQ

293*

Claiborne to Gallatin, Nov. 18, 1803, Ibid.,
Claiborne’s italics.
^Claiborne to Clark, Nov. 21, 1803, Ibid.,

295-96.
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may be considerable [sic] accelerated
if delays should be attempted.70
Claiborne continued his preparations for the
movement to New Orleans.

On November 26 he reported

that fourteen boats were ready at Fort Adams and that
in a few days the soldiers would complete six more.

71

Two days later Claiborne reported that the response from
the militia had not been as great as he had hoped, but he
anticipated that two hundred men would eventually volunteer.
He estimated that when the two hundred men joined the
regulars at Fort Adams the force would be about five
hundred men.

72

On November 29 Daniel Clark sent word to Claiborne
and Wilkinson from New Orleans that the French would take
possession of the territory the next day.

73

J

The day after

the French took possession of Louisiana, Governor Claiborne
embarked about one hundred militia at Natchez for Fort
Adams.

He anticipated that eighty more men, moving by

land, would join him at the fort.

Claiborne stated that

the troops from Tennessee had not arrived but were on the
way.

He also reported that General Wilkinson had arrived

in New Orleans on the twenty-fifth and was expected to

71
297-98.
72

Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 26, 1803, Ibid.,
---Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 29, 1803, Ibid., 299.

73
Clark to Claiborne and Wilkinson, Nov. 29, 1803,
Carter, Territorial Papers. IX, 125.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

99
arrive at Port Adams at any moment.

74

The movement from Fort Adams was delayed until
sufficient transportation could be arranged for all of
the men and supplies.

Claiborne informed the Secretary

of State that he had assembled one hundred and sixty
volunteers and expected about forty more to join him
before the force marched.

He estimated that the combined

force numbered between four hundred and fifty and five
hundred, exclusive of the Tennessee militia which had not
yet arrived.^
On December 10 the two commissioners and their
military escort began the movement down the river on
76
eighteen boats and two barges.
By December 15 the
Americans reached a point approximately two miles above
the city of New Orleans where they prepared their camp.
The total strength of the force that Wilkinson commanded
was about three hundred and fifty men.

77

At noon on December 20 Commissioners Claiborne
7A.
Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 1, 1803, Howland,
WCC. I, 300-301.
75
Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 5» 6 and 7, 1803»
Ibid.. 303-305.
76
General Order, Dec. 8 , 1803 and General Order,
Dec. 10, 1803, in General James Wilkinson’s Order Book,
Dec. 31 t 1796 - March 8 , 1808, Records of the Adjutant
General's Office, Record Group 94, National Archives
Microfilm Publication, M654.

77
General Order, Dec. 19» 1803, General James
Wilkinson's Order Book.
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and Wilkinson took possession of the province of Louisiana
for the United States.

The formal transfer was greeted

with mixed emotions by the onlookers in the Place d' Armes;
78
some cheered but most watched in silence.
General Wilkinson reported that the transfer was
accomplished peacefully and the town was quiet.

He

stationed one hundred and seventy men throughout the city
to maintain law and order.

The General's force numbered

four hundred and fifty men, and from that number be proposed to maintain three distinct patrols in the town.
The General stationed his men at points where he thought
trouble might occur.

He cautioned the soldiers to be on

their best behavior and to be friendly and considerate to
80
the local residents.
Wilkinson soon discovered that the
maintenance of discipline was difficult in New Orleans.
In his first General Order the General mentioned that most
of the men on guard at Fort St. Louis had left their post
to explore the city.

The few soldiers remaining in the

78

Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 20, 1803, Rowland,
WCC. I, 306-307. Governor Claiborne wrote: "The standard
of"my country was this day unfurled here, amidst the reinterated acclamations of thousands." But some reports
indicate that there was little enthusiasm on the part of
the crowd, Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana (New
York: Goupil & Co. of Paris, 19^4),”Tl, 284-86.
79
Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Dec. 20 , 1803,
Carter, Territorial Papers. IX, 138-39.
80

General Order, Dec. 20, 1803 and General Order,
Dec. 25 f 1803» General James Wilkinson's Order Book.
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fort were so drunk that they were unable to move.

81

The celebrating by the American soldiers was prob
ably inevitable, but it could have destroyed the discipline
of the small force.

As a result, Governor Claiborne issued

an order banning the sale of wines, spirits, or other
strong liquor to soldiers.

The order strictly prohibited

sales to non-commissioned officers and privates without
the written permission of an officer.

The permit was to

be addressed by name to the individual who was selling the
liquor.

Any person who was found guilty of violating the

order was subject to a fine not to exceed fifty dollars.

82

The principal concern of the Commissioners was
the continuing presence of the Spanish in New Orleans.
Wilkinson and Claiborne filed a joint report on this
problem on December 29.
had gone smoothly.

The transfer of the province

However, the Spanish were still in

the city and their presence was causing some problems and
uneasiness.

The Spanish still occupied the barracks,

magazines, hospital, and public storehouses.

The repeated

requests of the Americans for the Spanish to vacate the
buildings had gone unheeded.

The Americans had occupied

only the forts at Plaquemine and the blockhouse at the Balize.
The other posts would be occupied as soon as possible.
81

General Order, Dec. 20, 1803, General James
Wilkinson's Order Book.
Op

Order of the Governor, Dec. 24, 1803, Rowland,
WCC, I, 311- 12.
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Wilkinson had determined that the militia from
Natchez would he retained a little longer at New Orleans.
The General believed that additional troops were necessary
since there were still about three hundred Spanish soldiers
in the city.

If he dismissed the militia, the regulars

would be outnumbered

by the

Spanish, a situation thatwould

make "the possession

of the

city somewhat precarious."

Besides, in addition

to the

large number of Spanish

soldiers present in the

city, there were reports that

Spain was gathering troops on the Mexican frontier.

The

military build-up in Mexico was apparently being made with
Q
a view to encroaching on the ceded territory. J
The Commissioners reported on January 3, 1804, that
orders had been issued for the surrender of the posts of
Concordia, Attakapas and Opelousas to the United States.
The Americans had obtained the use of only a part of the
barracks, "but the more eligible portion of those buildings"
was still occupied by the Spanish troops.

The French and

Spanish still retained possession of the storehouses and
magazines.

The American supplies were still 3tored aboard

the boats that had transported them from Natchez.

Wilkinson

rented private storehouses in the city in an effort to save
®^Claiborne and Wilkinson to Madison, Dec. 27,
18C3, in James Alexander Robertson, Louisiana under
the Rule of Spain, France and the United Spates, 1^851867 (Cleveland; The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1911), il,

IS^I.
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QJ
the provisions from the elements.
General Wilkinson was preparing to return to the
capital as soon as possible, but he was detained by the
delays encountered in taking possession of the military
facilities.

Also he faced the perplexing problem of

which officer to place in command when he left New
Orleans.

Wilkinson's assessment of his subordinate's

was dismal at best:
Wadsworth is interdicted the exercise
of authority, Turner is the only
officer who can be trusted with the
distant and delicate command at
Natchitoches - Gregg, Cooper &
Mughleriburgh remain - the second is
at Placquimenes [sic] tho unfit for
a separate command - the first is
utterly destitute of education,
manner, & intelligence, and poor
Mughleriburgh's devoted to drink,
with good disposition but feeble
intellect - Bowyer with his company
a fine one, is daily expected from
the Mobile, but this officer tho
greatly superior to Gregg labours
under the same disqualification.°5
In another letter of the same date, the General
reported that his men occupied the ground floor of the
barracks, but the Spanish still possessed the second floor.
The building was without heat and the men were falling ill
84

Claiborne and Wilkinson to Madison, Jan. 3,
1804, Carter, Territorial Papers. IX, 149-50.
85

Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Jan. 3, 1804,
Ibid., 150-51. The officers referred to were Aaron Gregg,
Henry L. Cooper, Decius Wadsworth, Edward Turner, Henry
Muhlenberg, and John Bowyer.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104
as a result of their exposure to the weather.

The hospital,

which the Americans desperately needed, was still occupied
by the Spanish.

The sick list showed that fifty-nine

non-commissioned officers and privates were ill, and one
man had died the previous night.
The Americans possessed none of the public
buildings in New Orleans, although the post of Plaquemine
and St. Jean had been occupied.

The next day a detachment

was to move to Attakapas and Opelousas and take possession
of those posts.

The French had not ordered the delivery

of the Illinoiscountry and it appeared that it

would take

a few days longer to procure the necessary order.

In an

effort to curtail expenditures, Wilkinson had dismissed
the militia force from Mississippi.

86

3y January 9 the Commissioners reported that the
situation had not improved.

The French had not issued

the necessary orders for the surrender of Natchitoches
or the

posts in Upper Louisiana.

The delay was attributed

to the failure of the Spanish Commissioners to order the
transfer by their post commanders.

They reported, however,

that it was likely that the orders would be delivered the
next day.®^
The situation in New Orleans reported in the joint

86

Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Jan. 3» 1804,
Ibid.. 152-53.
87
Claiborne and Wilkinson to Secretary of State,
Jan. 9, 1804, Ibid.. 155-57.
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communication to the Secretary of State was different in
tone than the one addressed to the Secretary of War by
Wilkinson.

He stated that he had discharged the militia

because of "their importunity, their impatience, the
irregularities into which they were running and the expense
they occasioned."

Three regulars had died since the third

of the month, but the number of men on the sick list was
declining.

Because of the necessity of maintaining a

constant guard, many of the men had not spent more than
one night in bed.

He expected that the men would be

afforded some relief by the arrival of the troops from
Mobile.
The General said that he would be unable to leave
New Orleans until the objects in his commission had been
fulfilled and that would require time because conditions
in the city were dangerous:

the Spanish had more troops

than the Americans had; the French Prefect, Mr. Laussat,
was involved in a dispute with some of the French officers;
the conduct of a group from Bourdeaux, unidentified in the
sources, endangered the public safety; and the tensions
between the white citizens and the free people of color
were growing.

All of these factors had convinced the

General that a strong garrison was required in the city.
Wilkinson observed that "our puny force has become
a subject of ridicule."

One example of how inadequate his

force was and the rapidity with which events could move was
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recorded by the General:
A few nights since some person observed
that the Governor or the General had
given leave for the demolition of the
stockade which surrounded the city,
and by 8 o'clock the next morning,
before the operation was noticed by
our guards, which occupy the center
of the city, and the Ports St. Charles
and St. Louis near the River, not one
stick was left on a line of one and a
half miles, and a House in one of the
rear redoubts was rased to its foundation
and the materials carried off.
Wilkinson related that two of his officers were to
be tried by courts martial:

Captain Aaron Gregg for allow

ing a prisoner to escape from confinement; and Captain
Henry Mughleriburgh for leaving his post contrary to direct
orders.

The General apologized for the freedom of his

communication and the views it contained but he felt that
the Secretary should be aware of the situation that existed
in New Orleans.

88

On January 16 General Wilkinson reported that the
order for the delivery of the posts in Upper Louisiana had
been received.

This information had been sent to Captain

Amos Stoddard, who was waiting at Fort Massac to occupy the
posts when the Spanish evacuated them.
Wilkinson said that the possibility existed that
problems might develop with the French.

A French ship

carrying soldiers and refugees from Santo Domingo had
®®Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, Jan. 11, 1804,
Ibid.. 159-61.
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landed at the Balize.

With the approval of Governor

Claiborne, the General had ordered the commanding officer
at Plaquemine to prevent the ship from ascending the river.
The ship was detained for two reasons:

(1) there was

sickness aboard that might spread to the local population;
and (2) it was feared that the arrival of French troops
might upset the delicate balance that existed in the
province•89
A company of regulars commanded by Lieutenant
Henry Hopkins was ordered to occupy the posts at Attakapas
and Opelousas.

To provide for the continuation of the

civil government in the area after the removal of the
Spanish Commandant, Governor Claiborne appointed Hopkins
to the post of Civil Commandant.

The Governor believed

that the young officer was well suited to meet the
responsibilities of his dual office, because he was a
"young man of prudence, good information, and possesses
some knowledge of the French language.*'

Thus Lieutenant

Hopkins assumed the duties not only of military commander
of the district but also civil commandant, a position
identical in authority and responsibilities to that occupied
90
by the former Spanish Commandant.
^Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, Jan. 16, 1804,
Ibid., 164-66. See also Claiborne and Wilkinson to
Secretary of State, Jan. 17, 1804, Ibid.t 166-67.
90
Claiborne to Hopkins, Jan. 20, 1804, Rowland,
WCC. I, 336-38; Claiborne to Madison, Jan. 24, 1804,
TEId.. 344-49.
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By the final week of January the situation had not
changed appreciably.

The Americans were still sharing the

barracks with the Spanish troops, and the magazines and
storehouses still contained the French and Spanish
supplies.

There appeared to be no preparations on the

part of either group to withdraw.

Expenses were high

because it was necessary to rent quarters and storehouses
and repair the various public buildings.

Wilkinson wrote:

"everything which could be neglected by the Spaniards after
the cession of this province has been neglected, and we
find everything out of repair."
The American soldiers were relatively comfortable.
Although two men were seriously ill, the sick list was
decreasing.

The men had built fireplaces and chimneys

in the barracks to provide heat against the cold weather.
The General reported that there was snow on the ground and
that the temperature the previous night had dropped to
thirty degrees.

The troops were complaining about their

pay, which for some was fifteen months in arrears.

A

detachment had not been sent to Natchitoches because the
garrison at New Orleans was too small to furnish an adequate
garrison for the new post.

The reinforcements from Mobile

had not arrived because contrary winds had prevented them
from entering the Mississippi.

91

91

Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Jan. 24, 1804,
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 168-70.
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On January 23 General Wilkinson ordered Captain
Amos Stoddard to take possession of the military posts
in Upper Louisiana.

The next day Governor Claiborne in

formed the Captain that he was to act as the Civil
Commandant for the district.

Claiborne told Stoddard

that he would possess "the same powers in civil matters
which heretofore were exercised by the first Civil
Commandant of the District of Upper Louisiana under the
Spanish Government. . . ."

92

On February 17 Governor Claiborne informed
Secretary of State James Madison that the Spanish and
French forces were still in New Orleans.

The representatives

of the two powers spoke of a speedy evacuation, but the
Governor feared that further delays were likely.

Ten days

later the Commissioners reported that the Spanish had
finally begun to remove their cannons from some of the
posts in the area.

The Spanish Governor of Florida,

Vincente Folch, was in New Orleans and he indicated that
3ome of the troops in the city would be embarked for
Pensacola in three or four days.

He predicted that a

complete evacuation would be effected in approximately
twenty days.

94

^Wilkinson to Stoddard, Jan. 23» 1804, Ibid.,
170-71. Claiborne to Stoddard, Jan. 24, 1804, Rowland,
WCC, I, 350. Claiborne*s italics.
93

Claiborne to Madison, Jan. 31» 1804, Rowland,
WCC. I, 352-55. Claiborne to Wilkinson, Feb. 13, 1804,
Ibid., 371.
94

376-77.

Claiborne to Madison, Feb. 17, 1804, Ibid.,
Claiborne and Wilkinson to Madison, Feb. 27,
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General Wilkinson dispatched Captain Turner and a
detachment of regulars to occupy the post at Natchitoches.
On February 25 Governor Claiborne appointed Captain Turner
as Civil Commandant of the District of Natchitoches on the
Red River*

Turner’s appointment meant that three officers

exercised not only military but also civil authority in
three districts of Louisiana.

95

On March 11, Wilkinson and Claiborne reported that
a part of the Spanish troops had departed and arrangements
were being made for the removal of the remaining soldiers.
Various Spanish officials had assured the Americans that
the final evacuation would be accomplished by March 20.

96

While the Spanish were preparing to leave Louisiana, the
United States was increasing its military strength.

The

Secretary of War informed General Wilkinson that two
companies of marines and three companies of soldiers were
on their way to New Orleans.

97

The Spanish forces did not complete their removal
by March 20 as Governor Claiborne had been assured.

On

1804, in Robertson, Louisiana under the Rule of Spain,
France and the UnitecT"States. 1785-1807, IIt 2^2-93.
95

Claiborne to Turner, Feb. 25, 1804, Rowland,
WCC. I, 385-86.
^Claiborne and Wilkinson, Mar. 11, 1804, Robertson,
Louisiana under the Rule of Spain, France and the United
States. f785-lb0T7~XI, 293^95".
97

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at New
Orleans, Mar. 15, 1804, SWLS. Roll 2, 197.
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April 7 Governor Claiborne expressed his exasperation in
a letter to James Madison.

He wrote:

"the Spanish forces

are still here, preparations for an evacuation are making,
but with all the sloth peculiar to Spanish operations."
Within two days the Governor was able to state that the
Spanish troops, numbering about three hundred officers and
men, had finally departed for Pensacola.

The only Spanish

soldiers remaining were .a company of dragoons destined for
Mexico, and a company of infantry that made up the guard
for the Spanish boundary commissioner, the Marquis Casa de
Calvo.^®
While the Spanish prepared to evacuate Louisiana
the members of the Army were actively engaged in a number
of duties in the new territory.

William Dunbar was pre

paring to explore the Red and Arkansas rivers at the re
quest of President Jefferson.

He was to have an escort of

one officer, a sergeant and ten enlisted men.

The .Secretary

of War cautioned that none of the soldiers accompaning
qq
Dunbar should be intemperate in their habits.^ The ex
pedition was finally cancelled because Congress failed to
appropriate the necessary funds.

Instead of exploring the

two rivers, Dunbar took a smaller expedition up the Washita
qa
^Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 7, 1804, Rowland, WCC.
II, 83-84. Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 9, 1804, Ibid.,
88-89.
99
Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at New
Orleans, Mar. 31, 1804, SWLS, Roll 2, 208 and Secretary
of War to Commanding Officer at New Orleans, Apr. 19,
1804, Ibid.. 226.
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River.

The expedition was composed of Dunbar, one officer,

a sergeant and twelve enlisted men supplied by Colonel
Freeman from the garrison at New Orleans.100

While Dunbar

was preparing his expedition, Wilkinson was conducting a
military inspection of Lake Ponchartrain.101
Claiborne availed himself of the opportunity
offered by the presence of Governor Folch in New Orleans
to try to resolve the problem of transporting goods through
Spanish territory to Fort St. Stephens.

Claiborne re

quested permission for goods to pass to and from the factory
without paying duties or being stopped by Spanish officials.
Folch denied the request but promised to present the
American case to the King for his consideration.

102

Upon receiving Folch's reply, Claiborne told the
Secretary of War that the problem could be resolved if the
United States would occupy the territory east of the
Mississippi to the Perdido River.

The Governor believed

that the United States had a valid claim to this area under
the provisions of the treaty that ceded Louisiana to the
United States.

Upon further consideration, Claiborne advised

100Duribar to Jefferson, May 13, 1804, Eron Rowland
(ed.), Life. Letters and Papers of William Dunbar (Jackson:
Press of the Mississippi historical Society, 1930), 130-33;
Dunbar to Jefferson, Aug. 18, 1804 and Dunbar to Jefferson,
Oct. 14, 1804, Ibid., 139-41.
101Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 7, 1804, Rowland,
WCC, II, 83-84. Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 10, 1804,

Ibid.. 89.
102Claiborne to Folch, Mar. 7, 1804, Ibid., 19-20.
Folch to Claiborne, Mar. 15, 1804, Ibid.. 38.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113
Joseph. Chambers, the factor at Fort St. Stephens, to ship
his goods through Mobile and if necessary pay the duties
demanded.

He cautioned Chambers to lodge a formal com

plaint with the Spanish if he was required to pay duties
on government property.10-^
When he returned from inspecting Lake Ponchartrain,
Wilkinson took time to renew his dealings with the Spanish.
He approached Governor Folch and requested that his pension
be increased to $4,000 a year, and that the $20,000 in
arrears be paid in full.

In exchange for these payments,

Wilkinson would write some reflections on Louisiana that
might be helpful to the Spanish.

Folch did not have the

funds necessary to meet the General's demands, but he sent
Wilkinson to Casa Calvo who could use a portion of his
boundary commission funds to pay the General.

Casa Calvo

accepted Wilkinson's offer and paid him $12,000, for which
Wilkinson produced his reflections.10^
Wilkinson's reflections were of little value to the
Spanish as they recommended policies which would be virtually
impossible for Spain to carry out.

39-40.
52-53.

At the same time he

10^Claiborne to Dearborn, Mar. 15, 1804, Ibid.,
Claiborne to Chambers, Mar. 21, 1804, Ibid..

104
Folch to Someruelos, Apr. 10, 1804, A. G. I.,
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 1574; I. J. Cox, "General
Wilkinson and his“ITater Intrigues with the Spaniards,"
American Historical Review, XIX (June, 1914), 794-814.
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prepared his reflections for Casa Calvo, Wilkinson pre
pared another version for President Jefferson.

The General

was playing both ends against the middle, a game at which
he was a master.

Before he left New Orleans for Washington

the General assured Folch that he would determine the
President's views concerning Spain.

Wilkinson promised

to communicate the views tc Folch as soon as possible.10^
On April 28, 1804, with his money from Casa Calvo
invested in sugar speculations and his report for Jefferson
prepared, Wilkinson left New Orleans for Washington.10^
This trip was the fourth that Wilkinson had made to the
capital since 1796.

When he returned to the frontier a

year later, he would be the Commanding General of the
Army as well as the Governor of the Louisiana Territory.
The situation in Louisiana was improving when
Wilkinson left New Orleans.

Lieutenant James B. Many had

occupied the post and the district of the Arkansas and
Lieutenant Joseph Bowmar had occupied the district of
Ouachitas.

The two officers would exercise both civil

and military authority -until permanent arrangements could
10^Folch to Someruelos, Apr. 10, 1804, A. G. I.,
Seville, Papele3 de Cuba, leg. 1574.
1^Deposition of William Simmons, American State
Papers, Miscellaneous (Washington: Gales and Seaton,
TS3TT7 it* 11^. Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 28, 1804,
Howland, WCC. II, 118.
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be made for the government of the districts.

107

The

American troops stationed in New Orleans were healthy
and well disciplined.

On May 4 one hundred marines

arrived in the city to bolster the depleted garrison.

10R

The officers and men stationed at the various
posts were occupied with the problems of maintaining law
and order throughout the territory.

Captain William Cooper,

commanding officer at Plaquemine, was required to enforce,
a number of regulations.

He stopped a number of armed

vessels at his post that were attempting to ascend the
river.

He also detained vessels that were engaged in

transporting slaves into the region, and perhaps most
importantly he quarantined a ship with smallpox aboard.

109

The officers commanding in the outlying districts found
themselves occupied with few military duties but numerous
civil responsibilities.110
107

'Claiborne to Dearborn, Apr. 14, 1804, Rowland,
WCC, II, 96. Claiborne to Bowmar, May 15, 1804, Ibid.,

TO.

108

Claiborne to Dearborn, May 5, 1804, Ibid., 129.
Claiborne to Turner, May 6, 1804, Ibid., 131-32.
10^Claiborne to Cooper, Apr. 14, 1804, Ibid., 9o.
Claiborne to Cooper, Apr. 14, 1804, Ibid., 99. Claiborne
to Manor Bore, n.d., Ibid., 113-14. Claiborne to Cooper,
May 9, 1804, Ibid.. 1357"
110See for example: Claiborne to Turner, May 6,
1804, Ibid., 131-32. Claiborne to Hopkins, May 9, 1804,
Ibid., 1^7. Claiborne to Hopkins, May 29, 1804, Ibid.,
168-169.
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Governor Claiborne was concerned about the activ
ities of the Spanish.

By mid-May there were six former

Spanish officials, fifteen army officers, a company of
dragoons, and a detachment of infantry still in New Orleans.
Spanish supplies, powder, balls, and arms filled the public
warehouses and there was a large train of artillery in the
park.^

The dragoons were expected to leave before the

end of the month but the remaining Spaniards were expected
to remain through the summer.
The Spanish officials at Mobile had detained some
of the provisions shipped from New Orleans to Fort Stoddard.
The contractor had finally been forced to pay a duty of
twelve percent on the supplies before they were released.
The*‘furs being shipped from the factory at Fort St.
Stephens had been stopped and the same duties exacted upon
them.

The products being exported by the citizens living

above Mobile were subject to the duties, which the citizens
were paying reluntantly.

In addition, it was reported that

the Spanish were fortifying Pensacola and Mobile.

When the

new works were completed, five or six hundred Spanish troops
would be stationed at the former post and a battalion of
artillery and a company of dragoons at the latter.

146-47.
227-29.

112

111Claiborne to Madison, May 13» 1804, Ibid.,
Claiborne to Madison, June 27, 1804, Ibid.,
11^Claiborne to Dearborn, Apr. 20, 1804, Ibid.,

108.
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During the first week of June Lieutenant Colonel
Constant Freeman arrived in New Orleans with three additional
companies of infantry, and assumed command of the troops in
Louisiana.

Governor Claiborne reported that the Colonel

was pleased with the discipline of the troops and he pre
dicted that Freeman was an excellent choice for the com
mander at New Orleans.

The Colonel was an experienced

officer, he had a good knowledge of the French language,
•

I 1 *5

and, a final point in his favor, he was a Catholic.
By late June Claiborne wrote:
I cannot too highly approve the
General conduct of the Army: the
officers act with propriety and the
troops are under excellent discipline,
Colonel Freeman commands with prudence
and dignity and I am, persuaded his
...
conduct will be perfectly satisfactory.
The Governor realized the difficult position that
the officers of the Army occupied when they were assigned
to administer the
the

civil government of a district. He told

Commandant of Ouchita, Lieutenant Joseph Bowmar:
It is one of the serious incon
veniences of the present state of
things in this country that we are
under the necessity of being governed
as nearly as possible, by a system,
in most points incongenial with the
principles of our own Government by
Laws to which we are almost utter
strangers, and forms a practice as
.
intricate as they are new to us. . .
11^Claiborne to Dearborn, June 9, 1804, Ibid., 199.
4 J 4

Claiborne to Dearborn, June 22, 1804, Ibid.P
217-19.
115

Claiborne to Bowmar, June 27, 1804, Ibid.,

223-27.
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The only advice the Governor could give was to consult
him if questions arose that the Lieutenant was unable
to answer.
On July 16, 1804, Governor Claiborne requested
that an officer and about twenty enlisted men be stationed
at the Balize.

The detachment was to assist the revenue

inspector who was stationed at the Balize.

The soldiers

were to prevent the entrance into "this province of Negroes
whose characters and conduct have given serious alarm to
the good inhabitants."

The Governor did not expect the

detachment to remain at the Balize after October 1, 1804,
when the law prohibiting the importation of slaves into
Louisiana was to take affect.

116

The Governor instructed the Commanding Officer at
Plaquemine, Captain Abimall Y. Nicoll, to inspect all
ships ascending the river to determine whether any of
the crew had been landed between the Balize and Plaquemine.
The Captain was also to inspect all ships descending the
river to determine whether or not there were any runaway
slaves aboard the ships.

All runaways discovered were

to be detained until claimed by their owners.

The man

who discovered the runaway could charge eight dollars for
the recovery.

The slave was to be furnished with one

ration per day while at the fort.

All expenses were to

11^Claiborne to Freeman, July 16, 1804, Ibid..
250-51. Claiborne to Freeman, July 17, 1804, ancl
Claiborne to Captain Johnson 1st Pilot at the Balize,
July 18, 1804, Ibid.. 254-58.
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be paid by the slave's owner before he could take the
slave away.

The Captain was also to inform people as

cending the river that they were required to register at
the Mayor's office within twenty-four hours after arriving
117
in the city.
In Orleans Territory the period from June until
December of 1804 w a s

spent in consolidating the position

of the United States and watching the activities of the
Spanish to the east and to the west.

Governor Claiborne's

solution to all of the problems with Spain was fairly
simple.

He suggested that:

"the marching of a few

thousand troops to the western frontier of Louisiana would
make Spain tremble for her Mexican possessions, and promptly
yield to our just claims."

113

For the soldiers stationed in the South who were
not actively involved in the occupation of the Louisiana
Purchase, the period from November of 1803 until September
of 1805 was a period of idleness.

The soldiers were occupied

with maintaining the military posts and waiting to see how
the situation to the west would develop.

The one thing

that might have required any activity on the part of the
officers and men was an order to cooperate with civil
authorities in the enforcement of "An act for the more
117Claiborne to Nicoll, July 25, 1804, Ibid., 262-63.
118
Claiborne to Secretary of State, Oct. 22, 1804,
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 312-13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

120
effectual preservation of peace in the ports and harbors
of the United States.”

The officers were required to give

assistance when it was requested by civil officers, but it
appears that no requests were made.

119

Conditions were so relaxed in the South that
apparently the War Department was not in communication
with some of the troops.

The Secretary of War addressed

a letter to the commanding officer at Fort Wilkinson that
contained a strange request:
*

Enclosed herewith I send you a
communication for the officer command
ing the troops on the sea coast of
Georgia. Should there be any stationed
in that quarter of the state, I will
120
thank you to forward it to the officer.
The lull in the Army's activities in the area
outside of the Louisiana Purchase was a result of several
factors:

(1) the Army's limited manpower made more than

one large operation virtually impossible; (2) the lack of
transportation facilities did not allow rapid movement of
men or supplies from one part of the nation to another; and
(3) the limited funds available to the War Department meant
that only the most important operations could be undertaken.
A letter from the War Department to General Wilkinson
revealed the situation confronting the commanding general.
11^Secretary of War - Circular, June 19* 1805,
SWLS, Roll 2, 342.
120

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at
Fort Wilkinson, June 22, 1805, Ibid.. 345.
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Wilkinson was to adhere to the most rigid economy in all
of his actions and to make no unnecessary expenditures.
He was to establish no permanent posts or incur any
"considerable expense for work or buildings at present."

120

For a few months the activities of the Army were
virtually at a standstill.

Time was required to determine

how the Army should be employed on the frontier and what
it was expected to accomplish.

Before any definite plans

could be made, events occurred that required the attention
of the Army.

The temporary calm was dispelled by reports

of growing problems between the United States and Spain.

120

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 19> 1805,
Ibid.. 319-21.
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CHAPTER III
PROBLEMS WITH THE
SPANISH AND AARON BURR
The acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase put a
severe strain upon the limited resources of the Army, which
had to divert troops to occupy it.

Although only a small

portion of the territory was initially occupied, new posts
were established that required men to garrison them.

Within

the limits of the present state of Louisiana seven new posts
were established between 1803 and 1806; by contrast, in the
rest of the nation only eight other posts were founded.
While the Army established fifteen posts, it abandoned
three and another was washed away by the Atlantic Ocean.
The net gain of eleven new posts in only four years meant
that the strength of many of the older garrisons were re
duced to a bare minimum.

Consequently, the pace of the

Army's activities slowed, while decisions were made con
cerning its future assignments.1
1See Appendix for posts in the South. Information
concerning other forts was taken from Francis Paul Prucha,
A Guide to the Military Posts of the United States, 1789T895 (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin,
T9S7)• Fort Greene located on Cockspur Island was washed
away by the action of the sea in 1804.
122
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The Army's period of inactivity was brief.

But

during that time the relations between the civil and
military officials in New Orleans were strained to the
breaking point.

The conflict arose over the question of

whose authority was supreme, and where the powers of one
official stopped and those of the other one began.
The disagreement resulted from the occupation of
certain buildings in the city by the military, specifically
the house in which Colonel Freeman and his family were
living.

On May 14 Governor Claiborne requested that the

Colonel vacate the house so that the district court might
use it.

The Colonel's residence seemed to be the only

suitable public building in town and the court could not
be denied its use.

The Governor closed with a strong

statement:
I sincerely wish it were in
my power comfortably to accomodate
the civil a3 well as the military
authorities. But as it is not, the
civil officers may of right claim a
preference in the occupation of
public buildings not attached to
the Barracks.2
At the time, Freeman was living in a building that
had originally been a school, but the Spanish had used it
as a hospital and a barracks.

After Freeman moved in, the

2
Claiborne to Freeman, May 14, 1805, in Dunbar
Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne,
. 1801-1816 (Jackson: Mississippi Department of“Archives
and History, 1917), III, 56. Hereinafter cited as Rowland,
WCC.
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artificers attached to his command had made numerous
repairs in an effort to make the quarters livable.

Since

there were no quarters available in the barracks, Freeman
declined to move until the Secretary of War authorized
him to rent other accomodations.

He informed the

Governor, "I shall expect orders from the Head of the
Department to which I belong - to those I will pay the
most implicit obedience."^
Governor Claiborne was not satisfied by Freeman's
response, and his reply contained a threat:
I deem it proper to declare that
your continuance in your present
Quarters is not agreeable to me.
Since by so doing the Federal
Court for this district is sub
jected to great inconveniences. . . .
I deem it proper further to inform
you that to myself (for the present)
more properly belongs the care and
disposition of the public buildings
not appertaining to the military
establishment, and I am assured
Sir, that your conduct on this
occasion will not be approved by
the President, to whom our corre
spondence together with Judge Hall's
communication will be submitted.4
The next day Claiborne sent a long letter to the
Secretary of State outlining the jurisdictional dispute
over the Colonel's house.

In the letter he touched upon

f r e eman to Claiborne, June 2, 1805 and Claiborne
to Freeman, June 3» 1805, Ibid.. 62-66; Freeman to
Claiborne, June 5» 1805, Ibid., 72.
4
Claiborne to Freeman, June 5, 1805, Ibid., 72-73.
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the subject that probably bothered him as much as the
question of where the court would meet or where Colonel
Freeman would live.

Colonel Freeman had refused the

Governor’s request to increase the garrison at Fort St.
John until he could determine whether or not the increase
was justified.

Because of this apparent affront to his

authority as Territorial Governor, Claiborne asked the
Secretary of State to define his position:
The line of demarkation between my
powers, and those of the officers
who may command the troops in this
quarter be distinctly marked. . . .
But while the Army is stationed in
the interior of this Territory, I
should presume that a requisition
from the Governor ought to be viewed
as binding on the officer commanding . . . . where a military force
is requisite for the protection of
society or the support of the Laws.
I think the Governor should have
authority to command such force and
not be dependent upon the will or
disposition to oblige of a Colonel,
Major or Captain who may happen (often
by merit but sometimes by chance) to
be the commanding officer.
The Governor's argument was based upon his position
as the commander of the territorial militia.

Since the

coordination of the efforts of the militia and the regulars
in the event of an emergency was essential, he felt that he
should have the authority to determine the disposition of
the troops.

5

5

78.

Claiborne to Madison, June 6, 1805, Ibid., 76----

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

126
The dispute between Claiborne and Freeman soon
expanded to include the New Orleans City Council.

The

council had ordered property owners to pave the sidewalks
and repair the gutters on their property.

If the improve

ments were not made, the council would order it done at
the owner’s expense.

As a result of improvements made to

streets adjoining the military barracks, the United States
owed the city $642.00.

When the bill was presented to

Governor Claiborne, he immediately sent it to Colonel
Freeman along with a bitter note:

"as you appear to

suppose that you have particularly, in charge the buildings
of the United States in this city, or rather those in which
troops have at any time been stationed I presume you will
feel no difficulty in adjusting this account as a public
age nt. . . •"
The following day, June 13, Claiborne demanded
that Freeman acknowledge the receipt of the Governor's
letters.

He stated, "my communications to you are always

official, and therefore an acknowledgement of their re
ceipt will at all times be expected."

On the same day

Claiborne acknowledged a letter from Freeman by saying,
"your last letter is now before me.

It is unfortunate

that we cannot understand each other."

Any hope for a

settlement of their differences was rapidly disappearing.

7

^Claiborne to Freeman, June 12, 1805, Ibid., 91-92.
7
Claiborne to Freeman, June 13» 1805, Ibid., 93;
Claiborne to Freeman, June 13, 1805, Ibid., 95.
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Within a week Governor Claiborne touched a senitive nerve and evoked a sharp note from Colonel Freeman.
Claiborne suggested that the troops destined for Pointe
Coupee and Natchitoches be ordered to respect the civil
authorities and the rights of the citizens.

In light of

their previous correspondence the Governor's letter implied
much more than it actually said.

The letter brought an

indignant reply from Colonel Freeman, "I flatter myself
that the officers under my command will never require an
order to respect the civil authorities, or the rights of
o
their fellow citizens."
In mid-June Governor Claiborne had inquired if
Colonel Freeman planned to move the troops to the country,
and if so when the move would be made.

Since the sickly

season was beginning, the question was probably prompted
by a genuine concern for the health of the soldiers.

How

ever, by July Claiborne suggested that only one company of
regulars was needed in New Orleans since the city was quiet
and a regular police was maintained by the civil author
ities.

He recommended that the troops not needed could

be put to work either on the fortifications at Plaquemine
or constructing a new fort below New Orleans on the
Mississippi.

If they were not required at those places,

they should be sent to strengthen some of the frontier
posts.

Claiborne believed that some of the troops should
Q

Claiborne to Freeman, June 20, 1805, Ibid., 100101; Freeman to Claiborne, June 21, 1805, Ibid., 1'02.
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be stationed at Port Adams, which was presently garrisoned
by only twelve men.

At Port Adams the troops would be in

a position to defend New Orleans or move against Florida
if trouble developed with the Spanish.

He was correct in

his assumption that the troops would be useful at other
locations.

It is equally certain that the Governor would

have been glad to see Colonel Freeman and his men out of
New Orleans.

q

The controversy between the two men delayed the
improvements ordered by the New Orleans City Council.
Neither Freeman nor Claiborne considered themselves author
ized to pay for the repairs.

Claiborne asked that the

Federal government pay the bill in full as soon as possible.
He requested that the Council suspend any additional repairs
on property held by the United States until he received an
answer from the government.

However, he feared that the

delay in the settlement of the account would hinder the
completion of the project, which was necessary to maintain
the health of the city.10
While Claiborne and Freeman argued over unpaid
^Claiborne to Freeman, June 12, 1805, Ibid., 91;
Claiborne to Madison, July 27, 1805, Ibid., 136-38, also
in Sron Rowland, Life, Letters and Papers of William Dunbar
(Jackson: Press of the iiissi'ssippi Historical Soclety,
1930), 148-150. Hereinafter cited as Rowland, William
Dunbar.
10Claiborne to Freeman, June 13, 1805, Rowland,
WCC, III, 95; Claiborne to Madison, July 27, 1805, Ibid.,

115-38.
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tills and the disposition of the public buildings, the
Army was fulfilling its assignments.

One of the most

important jobs was to determine exactly what the United
States had purchased from Prance.

To accomplish this

task a number of expeditions were sent into the vast new
territory to gather information.

For the most part the

expeditions were composed of officers and men from the
Regular Army.

In some cases civilians with special

scientific skills accompanied the parties, but generally
the work was done by the soldiers.
The explorations began as soon as the United States
took possession of Louisiana.

In 1804 a party under the

joint command of Meriwether Lewis and William Clark started
on a trip that would take them from the Mississippi River
to the Pacific Ocean.

In the same year William Dunbar

took a small party up the Washita River to collect in
formation.

In 1805 Wilkinson sent Lieutenant Zebtzlon

Montgomery Pike up the Mississippi River in an effort to
find the source of the river, and he ordered his son,
Lieutenant James B. Wilkinson, to establish a post at the
mouth of the Platte River.
In the South an expedition was prepared to explore
the Red and Arkansas rivers.

A similar operation had been

suspended the previous year because of a lack of funds.
On March 25, 1805, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn wrote
to William Dunbar telling him to begin preparations to
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explore the two rivers.

The Secretary cautioned that if

expenditures for the expedition exceeded $2,000 it might
be cancelled again.

The commanding officer at Port Adams

would furnish an escort for the expedition upon Dunbar's
requisition.11
On May 4 Dunbar informed Dearborn that he would
begin his preparations immediately.

Colonel Freeman at

New Orleans would have to supply the men for the escort
because the garrison at Port Adams was too small to allow
the detachment of any soldiers.

Dunbar suggested that it

would be best to investigate only one river at a time,
because the passage of the river twice would offer a
better opportunity to collect information.

After con

sidering Dunbar's recommendation, President Jefferson
agreed and requested that the Red River be explored first.
Dunbar stated that Captain Richard Sparks would be
assigned to command the military part of the expedition if
the Secretary felt that he was qualified.

The Secretary

recommended that Sparks should receive $1.50 a day and his
expenses, in addition to his normal pay and emoluments if
he accepted the appointment.^

On May 25 President Jefferson

wrote to Dunbar to suggest that Colonel Freeman assist in
11Dearborn to Dunbar, Mar. 25, 1805, Rowland,
William Dunbar, 150-52.
12

Dunbar to Dearborn, May 4, 1805, Ibid.. 148-50;
Dearborn to Dunbar, May 24, 1805, Ibid., 152-53.
1^Dearborn to Dunbar, July 10, 1805, Ibid., 156.
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the command of the expedition.

At the same time the

President stated the principle reason for the trip, "the
work we are now doing is, I trust, done for posterity, in
such a way that they need not repeat it.”

14

The President's letter caused some confusion when
it reached Natchez.

Dunbar found that Colonel Constant

Freeman, the only Colonel Freeman he knew, was unaware of
any plans for him to join the party.

Dunbar wrote to

Jefferson in an effort to determine who the President
meant.

15

While awaiting an answer from the President,

he proceeded with the arrangements at Natchez.
In December Dunbar was able to report that two
boats were ready to sail and the escort had been gathered.
He recommended that Lieutenant Edmund P. Gaines be appointed
as the second in command, as he possessed the necessary
skills to do the party's geographical w o r k . ^

The year

ended with the expedition's preparations almost completed.
While Dunbar was outfitting his party at Natchez,
Governor Claiborne was completing the necessary arrangements
at New Orleans.

Since it was possible that the party would

pass through Spanish territory, it was necessary to secure
a passport.

Claiborne requested a passport from Casa Calvo,

1^Jefferson to Dunbar, May 25, 1805, Ibid., 174-77.
^Du n b a r to Jefferson, Oct. 8, 1805, Ibid., 182-84.
1^Dunbar to Jefferson, Dec. 17, 1805, Ibid., 185-88.
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and assured the minister that the purpose of the expedition
was purely scientific.

One or two Spanish officers would

he allowed to accompany the expedition as observers.

Casa

Calvo replied that he would issue the passport upon Dunbar’s
request.

Whether any Spanish official would join the

party would be determined by the Commandant General, to
whom the matter had been referred.

17

Governor Claiborne was not only successful in
obtaining a passport for the Red River expedition, he
also obtained permission for the United States mail to
pass through Spanish West Florida.

The route was estab

lished to improve communications between New Orleans and
Washington.

The mail was always irregular and agonizingly

slow and some improvement was necessary to govern the
territory properly.

In January President Jefferson in

formed Claiborne that a new mail route was to be laid out
between the two cities.

It would run from Washington down

the eastern side of the mountains to Georgia, then west to
New Orleans by way of Fort Stoddert.
Between the Fort and the mouth of the Pearl River
the new route passed through about seventy miles of Spanish
territory.

The proposed line had not yet been authorized

by Congress, but the President was certain that legislation
17

Claiborne to Casa Calvo, July 11, 1805, Rowland,
WCC, III, 119-20; Casa Calvo to Claiborne, July 15, 1805,
ibid.. 128-29; Claiborne to Dunbar, July 29, 1805, Ibid.,
TTP42.
----
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would be passed in the coming session.

To facilitate the

passage of all types of mail it would be necessary to open
a road from Georgia to the Pearl River.

But before the

new road was opened, the President proposed "a mail of
letters only** carried by horseback over the existing
Indian trails.

It was hoped that the distance between

the Potomac and the Mississippi could be covered in twelve
days.

However, before anything could be done, permission

to pass through the territory of Spain had to be obtained.

18

In June Governor Claiborne received a letter,
written in mid-March, from the Postmaster General inquir
ing about the arrangements for carrying the mail through
West Florida.

The Governor replied that the Spanish would

probably allow the passage of postriders through their
territory.

To facilitate the crossing of Lake Ponchartrain

by the postriders, the Governor had arranged for the operation of a ferry.

19

In July Governor Claiborne informed President
Jefferson that the Spanish had no objection to the mails
crossing their lands.
protect

Iruc

x Xuci o

tO

In addition, they had promised to
uac

best of their ability.

The

18

Jefferson to Claiborne, Jan. 7, 1805, Clarence
E. Carter (ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United
States. Vol. IX, 4?he territory of*~Crleftnci, 1803-lSl 2
(Washington: “Government Printing Office, 1§4o;, ^6364. Hereinafter cited as Carter, Territorial Papers.
19
Claiborne to Postmaster General, June 7, 1805,
Rowland, WCC, III, 83-84.
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postriders had been in New Orleans twice, but no regular
schedule had been established.

Claiborne predicted that

the mail would soon be carried over the entire distance
in twelve or fourteen days.

He recommended that bridges

be built at all fords where there was the slightest possi
bility of flooding, so that the road would be open in all
20
types of weather.
During the next few months Governor Claiborne and
the Army officers on the frontier probably wished that the
mails ran more frequently and on a regular basis.

The

officials were called upon to solve problems that required
constant communications with Washington.

But in most cases

the men made their decisions on the basis of orders issued
months before and in some instances they operated with
virtually no instructions from their superiors.
The problems confronting the civil and military
authorities were the result of Spanish activities in
Mexico, West Florida, and within Louisiana itself.

Several

Spanish officials were still living in New Orleans and
conducting the duties of their offices.

On the western

frontier a border dispute was developing that threatened
the friendly relations that existed between the two nations.

20

Claiborne to Jefferson, July 14, 1805, Ibid.,
124-27; Marquis de Casa Calvo to Claiborne, July 16, 1805,
Ibid., 130; Governor Folch's reply is contained in
dlaiborne to Madison, Aug. 9, 1805, Ibid., 156-57.
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To the east the Spanish were charging duties on American
goods being shipped to and from the American territory.
On July 15, 1805, Governor Claiborne requested
information about the progress of the negotiations at
Madrid concerning the western boundary of Louisiana.
Claiborne was certain that the Spanish would demand the
Mississippi as the dividing line between the two countries.
He was certain, however, that Spain would relent in her
demands when she realized that the United States was pre
pared to hold the territory between the Mississippi and
the Sabine rivers by force, if it became necessary.

21

The treaty ceding Louisiana to the United States
was vague about the western limits of the territory.

The

first difficulties had developed in the vicinity of
Natchitoches, where the border with Mexico presented
American slaves with an opportunity to escape.

The run

aways had sought refuge at Nacogdoches, but after the
Americans had protested the activities the slaves had
been returned to their owners.

22

Yet the indefinite

boundary was a continuing source of irritation and worry
to both nations.

Governor Claiborne said:

In receiving possession of
the ceded territory, the American
Commissioners would have been much
relieved, had the limits thereof
21Claiborne to Madison, July 15. 1805, Ibid., 127-28.

22
Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 8, 1805, and Casa
Calvo to Claiborne, n. d., Ibid., 155-56.
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been precisely ascertained, but
these being uncertain, the com
missioners thought it best to
demand Louisiana as described
in the Treaty.23
The troops at Natchitoches kept a watchful eye
upon the activities of the Spanish along the Sabine River.
Since early May reports had been made concerning Spanish
activities on the eastern side of the river.

On May 1

Doctor John Sibley, a resident of Natchitoches, reported
that a Choctaw hunting party had encountered Spanish
troops at the Bay of St. Bernard.

The troops were con

structing two forts, one at the mouth of the Trinity River
and the other at Matogordo.

The Indians had been told to

abandon the Americans and rejoin the Spanish.

The officers

had said that they would soon be building forts at
Opelousas, Attakapas, Natchitoches, and finally New
24
Orleans.
On May 3 Captain Edward Turner sent a similar
report to General Wilkinson.

25

At the end of May an informer

reported that he had seen Spanish troops at the Orkekesaw
2^
Claiborne to Secretary of War, Aug. 11, 1805,
Ibid., 162-64. The treaty with Prance had incorporated
the language of the Treaty of San Ildefonso in defining
the limits of Louisiana. Hunter Miller (ed.), Treaties
and Other International Acts of the United States of1
America (Washington: Government PrintingOffice, T§31),

TT, 538-509.
^ J o h n Sibley to Secretary of War, May 1, 1805,
American State Papers, Foreign Relations (Washington:
tales and Seaton, 1832), 11, 6 9 ^
Hereinafter cited as
ASPFR.
^ T u r n e r to Wilkinson, May 3> 1805, Ibid., 690-91.
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and that more troops were expected to join them.

26

With reports that five hundred families and a
large number of troops had arrived at St. Antonio, concern about the Spanish build-up continued through July.

27

On September 30 Turner stated that a Spanish colonel and
two companies of soldiers were supposed to be coming to
Nacogdoches.

One of the companies would reinforce the

garrison at Oreoquisas and the other was to be divided
between Nacogdoches and Adaes.

He also had learned that

six hundred families were coming from Spain to settle at
Matogordo.
The information that the Spanish had erected a
fort at the confluence of the Trinity and Snow rivers,
about one hundred and twenty miles from the American
settlement, had been vertified by men employed by the
Indian agent at Natchitoches.

The disturbing part of

Turner's letter was the section that concerned the Spanish
occupation of Adaes.

This small settlement was about

twenty miles from Natchitoches, and the Americans conpO

siaered it to be within their territorial limits.
Turner's information was confirmed by an American living
at Nacogdoches, who said that two companies of soldiers
were expected by the Spanish.
26

Sibley to Secretary of War, May 31, 1805, Ibid.

2^Sibley to Secretary of War, July 2, 1805, Ibid.
a

Q

Turner to Wilkinson, Sept. 30, 1805, Ibid.
2^Johnson to Sibley, Oct. 3, 1805, Ibid.
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Governor Claiborne personally protested the
occupation of Adaes to Casa Calvo and asked that the
soldiers be immediately withdrawn from the village.

The

Governor argued that the post was an appendage of
Natchitoches and should have been surrendered with
that post.
Casa Calvo heard the protest with polite attention.
In reply, the Spanish Commissioner stated that the Gov
ernor* s argument concerning Adaes was incorrect.
Natchitoches was the furthest post up the Red River
considered by the Spanish to be within the Province of
Louisiana.

Adaes and Bayou Pierre, although close to

Natchitoches, were considered to be within the Province
of Texas.

Casa Calvo promised that if the two settlements

were found to be within Louisiana when he traced the bound
ary, they would be turned over to the United States.

The

Spanish Commissioner assured the Governor that there were
no Spanish troops closer to Natchitoches than those
stationed at Nacogdoches.-^0
Despite Claiborne's protest, reports of Spanish
activities continued to be made by officers on the frontier.
Captain John Bowyer, stationed at Opelousas, stated that
Spanish troops, perhaps numbering 800, were on the Calcasieu
River on the eastern side of the Sabine.

Bowyer seriously

^°Claiborne to Secretary of War, Aug. 11, 1805,
Rowland, WCC, III, 162-64.
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doubted that figure but he knew that there were definitely
troops east of the Sabine.

The Captain stated that the

troops from Nacogdoches maintained a regular patrol along
the Sabine River.
While attempting to determine what the Spanish
were doing on the frontier, Claiborne was trying to rid
himself of a Spanish official living in New Orleans.

The

official was Juan Morales, Paymaster General of the Spanish
Army and Intendant of East and West Florida, who had issued
the order revoking the American right of deposit in 1802.
While living in New Orleans, Morales was selling land in
East and West Florida, a practice which Claiborne con
sidered a direct insult to the United States.

The sales

were not only insulting but the ownership of the land being
sold was disputed.

Both the United States and Spain claimed

the area of West Florida and negotiations were in progress
at Madrid to settle the dispute.

After being informed that

Morales intended to continue his activities in New Orleans,
Claiborne strongly suggested that Morales move to Spanish
32
Territory.
The controversy over Morales continued because

.

^1Bowyer to Freeman, Oct. 13, 1805, ASPFR, II,

692

WCC,
Casa
Casa
Casa

32
Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 3> 1805, Rowland,
III, 146; Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 9, 1805, and
Calvo to Claiborne, Aug. 8, 1805, Ibid., 159-61;
Calvo to Claiborne, Aug. 7, 1805 and Claiborne to
Calvo, Aug. 17, 1805, Ibid.. 172-75.
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Claiborne was dissatisfied with the answer he received from
Casa Calvo.

Claiborne finally agreed to allow the Intendant's

office to remain open long enough to settle any unfinished
business.

However, no additional land west of the Perdido

River was to be sold.

These were the only conditions upon

which Morales could be permitted to remain.

Morales con

sidered Claiborne's conditions to be unacceptable because
they infringed upon the rights of his commission.
The American Governor refused to alter the con
ditions, and stated that if the Intendant did not abide
by them, his departure would be demanded.

Claiborne

summarized the rights that Morales possessed:
His Catholic Majesty could not authorize
Mr. Morales to exercise any official acts
within the territories of the United
States, or to open a land office within
their limits. If the Paymaster General
of the Spanish Army is solicitious that
his authority should remain unshackled,
why does he not retire to the dominions
of His Catholic Majesty, and depart
from a territory within which he has
no right to continue his residence,
much less to exercise official functions.
Claiborne concluded with-a- statement that indicated that
he was serious:
The customary passports shall be
prepared, and I will cheerfully
afford your Excellency such conduce
to the speedy and comfortable con
veyance to some post within the do
minions of His Catholic Majesty.33

174-75*

■^Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 17, 1805, Ibid.,
Claiborne's italics.
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The problem surrounding Morales and his activities
was resolved on January 11, 1806.

Acting upon Presidential

orders, Governor Claiborne directed Morales and all indi
viduals attached to his office to leave the territory
immediately.

34

The controversy with Morales did not

directly effect the men of the United States Army, but
indirectly it influenced the lives of the civilians and
soldiers who lived above the Spanish Floridas.

Morales,

as the Intendant for East and West Florida, was the official
with whom the Americans dealt concerning the duties charged
on products shipped through the Spanish ports.
However, the growing concern about the Spanish
military preparations diverted attention from the problem
of duties charged on American products.

The military

activity on the frontier overshadowed the differences
between the American military and civil officials, and
for a month or two they managed to put aside their dif
ferences and work together with a degree of cooperation.
On July 26 the Mayor of New Orleans, Doctor John
Watkins, sent three decrees passed by the City Council to
Governor Claiborne.

The Council wanted:

(1) the destruction

^Claiborne to Morales, Jan. 11, 1806, Ibid.,
238-39. The President's order was to apply to all
persons holding commissions or retained in the service
of Spain; Secretary of State to Claiborne, Nov. 18,
1805, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 533-34; Claiborne
to Casa Calvo, Jan. 10, 1806, and Morales to Claiborne,
Jan. 11, 1806, Ibid., 563-66.
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of the old Custom House; (2) the evacuation and demolition
of the forts in the city in order to eliminate the stagnant
water that surrounded them and endangered the health of the
city; and (3) the withdrawal of Federal troops from the
lower rooms of the Hotel de Ville in order to provide
space for the city guard.
The Governor answered that the old Custom House
was national property and could not be turned over to the
city until the Federal commissioners decided the validity
of land claims.

The forts fell into the same category as

the Custom House, but Claiborne agreed that all of them,
except Forts Charles and St. Louis, could be levelled.
These two forts were occupied by American soldiers, who
could not be removed except by the order of the President.
However, the Governor had no objection to draining the
ditches around the forts, provided it did not damage the
fortifications.

Regarding the third request, the Governor

felt that if a guard was needed during the day, it would
be best to use the regular troops.

If the quarters were

needed for the night watch and the guard at the jail,
Claiborne would consent to the removal of the troops.

35

Within a few days, the Mayor requested that the
old public school building be used for its original purpose.
The Governor admitted that the building was no longer under
his control.

Colonel Freeman still occupied the building

35

Claiborne to Watkins, Aug. 2, 1805, Rowland,
WCC, III, 143-45.
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and the Secretary of War had not decided whether or not
the Colonel should relinquish his quarters.

The Governor

promised to refer the Mayor's request to the President .^
On August 4 Claiborne referred the requests from
the City Council to the Secretary of State, with one comment
of his own.
evacuated.

He suggested that the forts within the city be
The works afforded little or no protection to

the city and a better location on the Mississippi River
should be selected and fortified.

37

Governor Claiborne's letter to Colonel Freeman was
milder and more concilitory than h i s earlier communications.
The Governor requested that Freeman permit the draining of
ditches, but only under his personal supervision.

He stated

that because the Hotel de Ville was the property of the
city and the rooms were needed for the night watch, the
troops should be withdrawn and quartered in the barracks.
With regard to Freeman's house, Claiborne wrote:
When it is convenient for you
to remove from your present quarters,
you will much oblige me, if you would
deliver the key to the Horible. Judge
Hall. But I wish not that you should
subject yourself to any inconvenience
by an early removal, since it is not
expected, that the district court (for
whose accomodation the building is in
tended) will be in cession for several
weeks.
■^Claiborne to Watkins, Aug. 3, 1805 and Claiborne
to Madison, Aug. 3» 1805, Ibid., 147-48.
37
Claiborne to Madison, Aug. 4, 1805, Ibid., 149.
*3 O

Claiborne to Freeman, Aug. 8, 1805 and Claiborne
to Watkins, Aug. 8, 1805, Ibid., 176-78.
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The barracks should have been large enough to
house the troops, as the number of soldiers in the city
was barely adequate to meet the demands made upon them.
On August 14 Claiborne requested that a non-commissioned
officer and four privates accompany him on a trip up the
Mississippi.

The following day he told Freeman, "Being

aware of the weakness of the troops and supposing that
you could illy spare even a small detachment, I should
not have made the request of yesterday, had I not been
compelled to take with me a barge. . . . "

The Governor

reduced the number of men required for his escort to
four.

39

While the soldiers in Louisiana were concerned

with the activities of the Spanish, the other troops in the
South were occupied with routine duties at their garrisons.
Occasionally the troops were called upon to perform
duties other than those associated with their day-to-day
existence.

On September 4, 1805, the Secretary of War

ordered the commanding officer at Fort Wilkinson to remove
a number of white settlers occupying land that belonged to
the Creek Indians.

The Indians had protested to the Federal

government and the settlers had been ordered to move.

If

the officer determined that the order had not been obeyed,
he was to use whatever means were necessary to remove them.
He was ordered to treat similar incidents in the same manner.
Orders such as these would become increasingly common until
39
Claiborne to Freeman, Aug. 14, 1805, Ibid., 165;
Claiborne to Freeman, Aug. 15, 1305, Ibid., 168-69.
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the Indians were finally removed from the South in the
1830's.

The removal of squatters was the one duty that

would involve the Army in numerous controversies with the
white settlers.^0
The activities of the troops across the southern
frontier increased as the reports of a Spanish military
build-up continued to circulate.

In addition to the news

received from western Louisiana, information was obtained
that additional troops were being moved into the Floridas.
In late August Governor Claiborne stated that the Spanish
Fort at Baton Rouge had been repaired, but it had few
military advantages as it was commanded by high ground,
not more than a quarter of a mile away.

In addition the

fort was poorly constructed and could not be adequately
manned by a force of less than a thousand men.

41

One month later Governor Claiborne informed Madison
that he considered the conduct of the Spanish to be hostile.
He believed that the Spanish Court was encouraging such
attitudes by its officials.

The Governor requested the

results of the negotiations in Madrid, since "I have not
been honored with an official letter from you, for two
40

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort
Wilkinson, Sept. 4, 1805, in Records of the Office of the
Secretary of War, Letters Sent, Relating to Military
Affairs, 1800-1889, Record Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 2,
375- Hereinafter cited as SWLS.
41

Claiborne to Madison, Aug. 27, 1805, Rowland,
WCC, III, 183.
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months past. . . . "

On October 8 Claiborne told Doctor

Sibley that the newspapers seemed to indicate the likeli
hood of a rupture between the United States and Spain.
However, he refused to believe the accounts in the press
until they were confirmed by the Secretary of State.

42

On October 16 Secretary of War Dearborn informed
Wilkinson that there was every reason to believe that
Pensacola was to be reinforced by five or six hundred men.
Officers stationed on the Lower Mississippi and on the
Mobile were cautioned to be on the alert for any Spanish
activity.

41

At the end of October Claiborne reported the

arrival of six hundred soldiers at Pensacola, with more
expected to reinforce the posts at Mobile and Baton
Rouge.

44

An additional complication was that the mails

between New Orleans and Port Stoddert were frequently
delayed.

One postrider had been killed and another wounded

and the route could no longer be considered safe.

45

The Spanish continued to halt American vessels and
exact a duty of twelve percent on imports and exports at
Mobile.

The duties were charged on goods belonging to

^Claiborne to Madison, Sept. 25, 1805, Ibid.,
190; Claiborne to Sibley, Oct. 8, 1805, Ibid., 19£.
^ Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 16, 1305,
SWLS, Roll 2, 333-86.
^Claiborne to Secretary of War, Oct. 30, 1805,
ASPPR, II, 692.
45

Claiborne to Gideon Granger, Post Master General,
Oct. 17, 1805, Rowland, WCC, III, 202-204.
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civilians and to the United States government.

Claiborne

issued protests to Intendant Morales and Governor Folch,
since he did not know which of the officials had directed
that the duties be charged.

46

On October 24 the Governor sent some distrubing
news to his superiors in Washington.

He had obtained

positive proof that four hundred soldiers had arrived
in Pensacola and more men were expected to arrive in a
few days.

He had also learned from a reliable source

that three hundred men were to be sent to Baton Rouge .
and eight hundred men had been stationed, on the Texas
frontier.
As proof of the Spanish build-up, Claiborne stated
that a New Orleans merchant had contracted to deliver 4,000
barrels of flour to Mobile.

The same man had also pur

chased a large quantity of leather in order to fulfill a
contract for 4,000 pairs of shoes.

Claiborne intended to

ask Governor Folch the meaning of the military activity.
Claiborne was certain that peace could be maintained,
but in the event war broke out the Governor made several
recommendations for the defense of New Orleans.

He sug

gested that Fort St. John commanding the mouth of Bayou
St. John, be repaired and strengthened since it was in
ruins.

If repaired, it could stop the passage of troops
46

Claiborne to Morales, Oct. 22, 1805, Ibid., 205;
Claiborne to Madison, Oct. 24, 1805, Ibid., 211-13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.

148
and ships from Pensacola and Mobile.

Colonel Freeman did

not agree with the Governor, and even if he had, he did
not have the money necessary to repair the works.

Claiborne

also suggested that Fort St. Philip be strengthened and
gunboats be stationed on the Mississippi River and the
lakes around New Orleans.

47

On October 30 Claiborne dispatched a number of
documents, collected by Doctor Sibley, that verified that
the Spanish had established a fort on the Trinity River.
There were also two depositions from several American
citizens recounting outrages committed by Spanish soldiers.

43

The depositions stated that on two different occasions
Spanish soldiers had stopped Americans and confiscated
some of their property.

The first incident involved three

people who were traveling between Natchitoches and Opelousas.
They were stopped within fifteen miles of Opelousas Church
by five Spanish soldiers who took one of their horses and
then retreated toward Nacogdoches.

The second incident

involved a group of traders who were transporting furs to
New Orleans.

They were detained by a detachment of Spanish

troops who confiscated eighteen horses and 1,000 deer skins
before marching in the direction of Nacogdoches.

49

On the

^Claiborne to Madison, Oct. 24, 1805, Ibid., 211-13*
i O

Claiborne to Madison, Oct. 30, 1805, Ibid., 215.
49
Deposition of Gaspard Bodin, Lewis Bodin, and
Andrew Chamer, Oct. 2, 1805, and Deposition of Francis
Robar, Oct. 3, 1805, in ASPFR, II, 694-95.
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same day Claiborne informed the Secretary of War that six
hundred troops had arrived at Pensacola and a new Governor
General of the Province of Texas had arrived at St.
50
Antonio.
In the midst of the Spanish build-up, the problems
between the military and the civil officials in New Orleans
erupted again.

The troops stationed in the city had in-

terferred with the city guard.

The Governor told the Mayor

that the incident was probably the result of a misunder
standing on the part of the troops.

He hoped that similar

events would not occur again in the future.

However his

closing statement indicated that he and Freeman had not
resolved their differences:
I will endeavour to remedy the
Inconvenience complained of by the
citizens; - But whatever I may do
on the occasion, must be by way of
Request, for it is not admitted by
the officer commanding here, that
the Governor has any control over
the military.51
On November 26 Claiborne informed the President that
he and Freeman had reached an agreement to end the existing
problems.

The Governor believed that the troops stationed

in New Orleans had behaved as well as any other troops in
similar circumstances.

He observed that it was virtually

impossible for a commander to maintain the discipline of
50

Claiborne to Secretary of War, Oct. 30, 1805,
Rowland, WCC, III, 215-16.
51

20.

Claiborne to Watkins, Oct. 31, 1805, Ibid., 219-

----
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his troops when they were stationed in a city.

Claiborne

felt that this was especially true in New Orleans where
"the temptations to dissipation are so various, and the
means of evading the attention of officers so easy."

For

this reason he recommended that the troops be removed from
the t o wn.^
The Governor was not only interested in restoring
the discipline of the troops and ridding himself of Colonel
Freeman, he was also concerned about the safety of the
city.

Rumors were circulating in New Orleans that the

Spanish would soon take some action against the Americans.
The Governor believed that the rumors were greatly exag
gerated, but he had definite information concerning some
of the preparations:

(1) Mobile and Pensacola had been

strongly fortified and at the latter place barracks were
being constructed to accomodate 4,000 soldiers; (2) two
hundred troops had been ordered to reinforce the garrison
at Baton Rouge; and (3) Doctor Sibley had reported that
two hundred and twenty soldiers had recently arrived at
Nacogdoches and would soon move to fortify a position
only fifteen miles from Natchitoches.
Claiborne thought that the Spanish were definitely
planning to attack Louisiana.

The number of regular troops

available to defend the province were few and the reli
ability of the local militia was questionable.

28.

Claiborne

^Claiborne to Jefferson, Nov. 6, 1805, Ibid., 227----
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felt that the Creole portion of the population would
support the United States, but the French and Spanish
speaking parts of the population were certain to support
Spain.

To adequately defend the province, especially the

city, the Governor made a number of recommendations:

(1)

that reinforcements be sent as soon as possible; (2) that
Fort St. John and Plaquemine be repaired; (3) the troops
at Fort Adams be transferred to Pointe Coupee; (4) the
soldiers in New Orlesins be stationed at Fort St. John
and at other positions above and below the city, not to
exceed six miles; and (5) that rallying points for the
militia be established.

He believed that these preparations

would allow for a proper defense until more troops could be
gathered.

53

On November 7 Governor Claiborne reported that he
believed that Spanish soldiers were present in the city
and that they were being watched.

Five days later he

wrote, "I have received but one letter from the Department
of State for three months past, and in that nothing was
said as to our relations with Spain.”

54

On November 20 the Secretary of War issued in
structions to guide the conduct of the commanding officer
at Natchitoches.

He was to warn the Spanish commander not

^Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 5» 1805, Ibid., 22527.
^Claiborne to Dearborn, Nov. 7, 1805, Ibid., 229;
Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 12, 1805, Ibid., 230-31•
Claiborne's italics.
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to encroach upon American territory east of the Sabine
River.

The Americans were to maintain patrols in the

area east of the river to protect American citizens from
Spanish activities.

If armed men were found in the area,

who were not under the authority of the United States,
they were to be arrested.

Spanish subjects arrested east

of the Sabine were to be turned over to the commander at
Nacogdoches, provided he promised to punish them.

If such

a promise was not made, the individuals were to be placed
in the custody of the civil authorities for trial.

The

officer was to use every means, short of actual force, to
see that the Spanish commander restored the confiscated
property of the citizens of the United States.
Six days later the Secretary of War instructed
General Wilkinson to determine the meaning of the Spanish
activities in Texas.

The directive authorized the General

to direct the proper officers to obtain reliable in
formation about Spanish movements in progress or already
completed in a number of areas:

(1) within the boundaries

of Louisiana; (2) between the Rio Brazos and the American
posts west of the Mississippi River; (3; within the region
bounded by the Red River and the Gulf of Mexico, especially
at Nacogdoches and the Bay of St. Bernard; (4) and finally,
at St. Antonio.
55

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at
Natchitoches, Nov. 20, 1805, SWLS, Roll 2, 397-99.
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The officer or officers assigned to the task were
to draw funds from the War Department to meet expenses.
The Secretary suggested that the individuals making the
reconnaissance might disquise themselves as hunters and
traders in order to maintain secrecy and afford the mission
a chance of success.

Dearborn requested that the coast

line of the Bay of St. Bernard, for a distance of forty
or fifty miles, be checked carefully to determine if any
operations were in progress.^
General Wilkinson must have been delighted to be
placed in a position to exercise his talents for intrigue.
However, the assignment was ambitious - St. Antonio was
approximately 360 miles from Nachitoches and the Bay of
St. Bernard was about 300 miles away.
While the troops in Louisiana watched the Spanish
and tried to determine their intentions, the soldiers in
the east were occupied with routine duties.

Some of the

soldiers from Port Wilkinson were assisting Colonel
Hawkins in running and marking the boundaries of a re
served tract at Ocmulgee Old Fields.

After the boundary

was marked, the soldiers were to assist in building a

57
temporary building on the tract•
While the portion of the troops from Port Wilkinson
were assigned to cut a line through the wilderness, a

56

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Nov. 26, 1805,
Ibid.. 399-400.
57

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort
Wilkinson, Nov. 27, 1805, Ibid., 404.
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number of men from Port Stoddert were directed to help
transport the United States mail.

The men were involved

in an experiment to determine whether it was better to
carry the mail between Fort Stoddert and New Orleans by
land or water.

A detachment of soldiers, all able to

handle small boats, were assigned to the water route
while the postriders moved overland.

The experiment was

to last three months, when a decision would be made as to
which method was best.

58

The test was a result of the

trouble encountered by the postriders on the land route
between the two post offices.
On December 5, 1805, the. Secretary of War issued
an order to remove the troops from the city.

It was hoped

that the transfer would eliminate the source of trouble
between the military and civil authorities in New Orleans.
To facilitate the movement, Colonel Freeman was to find a
suitable site for the new post near the city; a distance
of not more than four miles was suggested.

If possible,

the new location was to be opposite the city on the west
bank of the Mississippi and include the magazine.

The

Secretary believed that a tract of land ranging in size
from ten to twenty-five acres would be sufficient for the
new post.

Freeman was also to recommend what should be

done with the military buildings within the city.

Spec

ifically, should they be torn down and the materials used
58

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort
Stoddert, Nov. 29, 1805, Ibid., 406.
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at the new site, or should they be left standing and rented
to local residents?
Four days after the Secretary of War issued the
directive to Freeman, Claiborne sent a letter to Madison
that contained some disturbing news.

His secretary, John

Graham, had just returned from Pensacola, where he had
presented a protest of the duties charged at Mobile.
Governor Folch informed Graham that American trade on
the Mobile would be treated in the same way as Spanish
trade on the Mississippi.

On the surface this answer

appeared to be satisfactory, but Claiborne feared that the
Spanish might use the pretext that foreign vessels with
Negroes on board were not allowed to pass New Orleans as
a reason for continuing the regulations at Mobile.

If

this happened, Claiborne predicted that the settlements
on the Tombigbee River would be ruined by the twelve percent
duty.

More distressing than the duties, was the extent of

the military preparations being made by the Spanish.

Graham

stated that there were eight hundred soldiers in and around
Pensacola.

Improvements were being made at the fort that

59

Secretary of War to Freeman, Dec. 5, 1305, Carter,
Territorial Papers, IX, 541-42. The military buildings in
New Orleans were:
(T7 the military barracks, a row of
brick buildings large enough to house 1,200 to 1,500 men;
(2) the military hospital; (3) the cavalry barracks, con
sisting of two brick buildings; (4) the powder magazine,
a brick building on the opposite side of the Mississippi;
and (5) the public school house, occupied by Freeman.
Claiborne to Jefferson, Oct. 23, 1805, Rowland, WCC,
III, 207-11.
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commanded the entrance to the bay.

However, the forti

fications near the city were in a state of disrepair.

At

Mobile there were about one hundred and fifty soldiers, and
the fort within the city had recently been repaired.

As

added protection for the city, a blockhouse was being
constructed on Dauphin Island to guard the entrance to
Mobile Bay.

To improve their communications, the Spanish

were building a series of signal towers between Mobile and
Pensacola.

In addition, more troops were expected at

Pensacola to reinforce the Florida garrisons.^
The Spanish continued their preparations and the
Americans continued to watch and wait.

The only incident

that caused any trouble was the order for Spanish officials
to leave the territory.
party left for Pensacola.

On February 1 Morales and his
61

However, Claiborne’s letter

of the tenth of January informing Casa Calvo of the order
did not reach the Marquis because he was touring the
western part of Louisiana.

Consequently, on February 6,

two days after the Marquis returned to the city, Claiborne
sent a second letter informing him of the President's order.
Casa Calvo was not pleased with the order and re
quested an interview with Claiborne to discuss the subject.
^Claiborne to Secretary of State, Dec. 9, 1805,
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 542-43.
61
Claiborne to Madison, Feb. 6, 1806, Rowland,
WCC, III, 260-61.
62
Claiborne to Madison, Feb. 6, 1806, Ibid., 26061; Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Jan. 10, 1806, Carter,
Territorial Papers, IX, 563-64.
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The Governor refused to dehate the President’s order and
told the Marquis not to delay his departure for more than
a few d a y s . ^

On February 8, the day he refused to discuss

Casa Calvo*s departure, Claiborne requested a passport for
Dunbar’s Red River expedition.

64

The Spaniard considered the order to leave the
Province of Louisiana an instilt to himself and his King.
Again Claiborne refused to debate the issue but stated
that the United States had intended no insult.

He pointed

out that the continued residence of the Spanish officials
was a liberal indulgence granted only because of the friendly
relations that existed between the two nations.

The

President believed that the ministers had been allowed
stifficient time to conclude the duties of their commissions.
The Marquis was to depart on or before the fifteenth of
February.

65

On February 12 Claiborne issued a passport

to Casa Calvo, who immediately left for East Florida.^
On the day he issued the passport to Casa Calvo,
Claiborne informed William Dunbar that the Spanish had
^Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Feb. 8, 1806, Rowland
WCC, III, 261-62.
64

Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Feb. 8, 1806, Ibid.,

262-63.
65

Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Feb. 11 , 1806 , lb id.,

263-64.
66

Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Feb. 12 , 1806 and
Claiborne to Secretary of State, Feb. 13» 1806, Ibid.,
265-66 .
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refused to issue his party a passport.

Dunbar was told

that "under the existing circumstances between the two
countries, it remains with you to act on the occasion as
67
you shall think proper."
The preparations at Natchez
were completed and the leaders of the expedition hoped to
be able to take advantage of the spring high water.

The

expedition finally left Natchez without a passport on the
twenty-eighth of April.

Colonel Freeman was in command of

the expedition, with Captain Sparks as second in command,
and Lieutenant Enoch Humphreys was the geographical
assistant.

68

The rest of the party consisted of Doctor

Curtis, two non-commissioned officers, seventeen privates,
and a black servant.

The party entered the Red River on

the third of May and ascended the river to Natchitoches,
approximately one hundred and eighty-five miles from the
Mississippi.

The expedition reached the post on the

nineteenth, where they delayed for a few days, because
information had been received that the Spanish would oppose
their passage of the river.

As a result of the hostile

disposition of the Spanish, the strength of the party was
increased by twenty soldiers drawn from the garrison.

On

June 2 the reinforced expedition resumed its journey up the

67
Claiborne to Dunbar, Feb. 12, 1806, Rowland,
William Dunbar. 190.
^®Dunbar to Jefferson, May 6, 1806, Ibid., 194-95.
Lieutenant Gaines who had originally been designated as
the geographical officer declined to accompany the ex
pedition at the last minute.
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Red River.

Five days later Doctor Sibley warned them that

a detachment of Spanish troops had left Nacogdoches to
intercept the Americans and force them to return.

The

party continued to ascend the river until the twentyninth of July, when they encountered a large force of
Spanish cavalry.
At a long conference between the commanders of
the two forces, the Spanish officer announced that he was
determined to stop the Americans from moving further up
the river.

The Americans reluctantly agreed to return to

Natchitoches because they were greatly outnumbered by the
Spanish.

Before turning back, the expedition had traveled

six hundred and thirty-five miles from the mouth of the
69
Red River.
On March 18 an order was issued by the Wax Depart
ment that was a direct result of the unexplained Spanish
movements in Texas.

Henry Dearborn informed Wilkinson that

Spanish troops were on the move and the post at Natchitoches
required reinforcements.

The General was to order Colonel

Thomas Cushing to proceed directly to the frontier post with
two companies of soldiers.

70

On the same day that the order

was issued to bolster the garrison at Natchitoches, Claiborne
69

Reuben Gold Thwaites (ed.), Early Western
Travels, 1748-1846, Vol. XVII, Part IV of Jameses Account
o£ S. H. Long’s Expedition, 1319-182<T~(Cleveland: The
Arthur H. Clark Co., 1905), 5(5-71. Dunbar to Dearborn,
Sept. 6, 1806, Rowland, William Dunbar, 348.
70

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Mar. 18, 1806,
SWLS, Roll 2, 437.
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sent a plea to the President for more troops to defend
New Orleans.
Claiborne was concerned primarily about the
activities of Vincente Folch, the Spanish Governor of
Florida.

The Spaniard was supervising the work on the

defenses of Mobile and conferring with the local Indian
chiefs.

According to Claiborne, the defenses at New

Orleans were not strong enough to withstand an assualt
and the gunboats that were supposed to guard the rivers
and lak«B had not arrived from Kentucky.

He insisted that

the presence of a strong military force was essential to
the safety of the city.

71

In a second letter of the same day to Jefferson,
Claiborne reported that an American vessel loaded with
supplies for the factory at Fort St. Stephen had been
stopped at Mobile.

The Governor offered a solution to

the problem at Mobile that ran counter to the ideas of
President Jefferson.

He believed that further discussion

of the situation with the officials in Florida was a waste
72
of time.
He felt "that to obtain for our fellow citizens
a free and uninterrupted use of the waters of the Mobile,
we must have recourse to force, and perhaps the sooner the
71

Claiborne to Jefferson, Mar. 18, 1806, Rowland,
ICC. Ill, 271.
72
Claiborne to Secretary of State, Mar. 18, 1806,
Ibid.. 271-72.
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expedient is resorted to, the better.”

73

One week later the Governor reported that Judge
Harry Toulmin had arrived in New Orleans from Mobile with
information on conditions in that area.

The Judge stated

that the garrison at Fort Stoddert was running short of
supplies.

In addition, Claiborne was convinced that the

Spanish at Mobile were trying to arouse the Indians against
the Americans and were distributing gunpowder to the
tribes.

74
On April 8 Claiborne stated that he had no recent

intelligence from Natchitoches.

The last report received

from the area asserted that the Spanish troops were camped
on the western bank of the Sabine River.

Major Moses Porter

had ordered a company of infantry stationed west of
Natchitoches, within the area claimed as a part of the
Province of Texas by the Spanish.

Claiborne did not know

what orders had been given to the officer in command of
this company.

75

Claiborne informed the Secretary of War that
Governor Folch was attempting to acquire a train of artillery
left in New Orleans when the French evacuated the town.
^Claiborne to Jefferson, Mar. 18, 1806, Ibid.,
273.
^Claiborne to Secretary of State, Mar. 25, 1806,
Ibid., 281.
75
Claiborne to Secretary of State, Apr. 8, 1806,
Ibid., 285.
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Spanish Governor suggested that the French should turn
the artillery over to her ally since it appeared that a
war between the United States and Spain was likely.

The

artillery would then be transported to Mobile to strengthen
that location.

The French Consul, one Desforgues, informed

Folch that he would not deliver the artillery to Spain or
the United States without orders from his government.
Claiborne was convinced of the French official's
sincerity and felt that he would abide by his decision.
The Governor reported that he would not allow the artillery
to be moved to any place possessed by the Spanish, unless
ordered to do so by the President.

Also he would not allow

the United States Army to have it unless the territory of
76
Orleans was invaded.
The disposition of the train of
artillery was settled in December when the United States
purchased twenty-four pieces of brass ordnance from France.
Dearborn ordered Wilkinson to divide the pieces between
New Orleans, Natchitoches and Fort Adams.

77

On April 26, 1806, the Secretary of War advised
Claiborne of the steps that were being taken to provide
for the security of Louisiana.

The fortifications in and

around New Orleans were to be improved and a number of
gunboats were to be stationed on the approaches to the
76

Claiborne to Secretary of War, Apr. 8, 1806,
Ibid., 286.

77

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Dec. 8, 1806,
SWLS, Roll 3, 102.
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city.

To supplement the existing garrisons, six addi

tional companies had been ordered from St. Louis, and
were expected to arrive in early May.

In addition to

the six companies of artillery, two hundred recruits were
on their way to New Orleans to fill the depleted ranks of
the companies already stationed in Louisiana.

On the same

day the Secretary informed Colonel Freeman that an engineer
was being ordered to the city to determine how its defenses
7o

could be improved.
The Secretary outlined a plan to supply the troops
at Fort Stoddert and the factory at Fort St. Stephens with
out passing through Mobile.

The details of the project

were contained in the orders issued to the commanding
officer at Fort Stoddert.

An officer with six or eight

enlisted men was to find a suitable route, as near the
boundary line as possible without being in Spanish ter
ritory, from the Fort to the Pascagola River.
Once the road to the river was found, the soldiers
were to descend the river to its mouth, eliminating
obstructions as they traveled.

If large vessels could

use the waterway, then supplies would be sent from New
Orleans.

The scheme called for the supply boat to be

escorted from New Orleans and up the river by a gunboat.
Such an escort was essential since the Pascagola flowed
78

Secretary of War to Claiborne, Apr. 26, 1806,
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 627-28; Secretary of
War to Freeman, Apr. 26, 180^7 SWLS, Roll 2, 457-59.
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through a part of the Spanish Ploridas.

If it was deter

mined that this method of transportation was feasible, the
officer was to request a shallop load of provisions and a
gunboat from Colonel Freeman.
The Secretary authorized the establishment of a
temporary storehouse at the landing on the Pascagola if
it was considered necessary.

Ke cautioned the officer

not to divulge the plan to anyone but the factory agent.
The officer commanding the exploring party was to be
cautioned not to make any unnecessary communications to
anyone he might meet on the river.

79

Many of the residents of Orleans Territory were
apprehensive about the possible outcome of the negotiations
at Madrid between the United States and Spain.

The re

presentatives were trying to determine the limits of the
province known as Louisiana.

The treaty between the United

States and France had incorporated the language of the
treaty of San Ildefanso, "the colony or province of
Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the
hands of Spain and that it had when France possessed."

80

While the diplomats talked in Spain, rumors were rife in
Louisiana.
Governor Claiborne's report of July 15 that Spain
79

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort
Stoddert, Apr. 26, 1806, SWLS. Roll 2, 455-56; on the
28th Colonel Freeman was informed of the plan, Secretary
of War to Freeman, Apr. 28, 1806, Ibid., 459.
30
Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts
of the United States of America. II, 568-509.
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would demand the Mississippi River as the boundary was only
the first of a number of statements that the United States
might lose that portion of Louisiana lying west of the
river.

On August 8, 1805, Doctor Sibley reported that

certain individuals were spreading a rumor that the
United States would not retain Louisiana much longer.

On

August 23 Governor Claiborne, who was traveling through
the country, reported that the citizens were very dis
turbed by the news that all of the land west of the
Mississippi had been ceded to Spain.

Despite his repeated

assurances that there was no basis for the reports, many
O4
of the citizens were not convinced.
Three days later Claiborne stated that the news
of the retrocession of Louisiana had been circulating in
New Orleans before he left.

He had conferred with Casa

Calvo in an effort to determine if the rumors had any basis
in fact.

The Spaniard had replied that he did not know the

source of the rumors concerning the province.

However, he

understood that the negotiations at Madrid had failed and
James Monroe, the American minister, had left the city.
Casa Calvo related that the Spanish Minister of State had
told him that Spain wished to make the "Mississippi River
the boundary, and in time it was expected that, that ob.ject
would be attained."
81

Sibley to Secretary of War, Aug. 8, 1805, ASPFR,
II, 691; Claiborne to Secretary of State, Aug. 23, 180^,
Rowland, WCC, III, 180-81. Claiborne's italics.
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Governor Claiborne attributed the gossip to the
Spanish officials still living in New Orleans.

He believed

that their removal from the territory was necessary in
order to lessen the rumors and solidify the citizens in
their support of the United States.

Claiborne closed with

the request that "I should indeed be pleased to have it
hinted to me, that in my character as commissioner or
Governor, I could on this occasion, take (if necessary)
compulsory measures.”

82

The request by Governor Claiborne and the failure
of Monroe's mission to Madrid caused the Secretary of State
to issue the order for all Spanish officials to leave
Louisiana.

Regarding the presence of Casa Calvo in New

Orleans, the Secretary wrote:
As the pretext for the Marquis
remaining as a commissioner for
delivering possession has ceased,
or seems to be exchanged for another
arising from his character of comm
issioner for setting limits, it may
be proper to remark that he has never
been accredited in any such character
and that no arrangement has ever been
proposed to us for setting such a
commission on foot, that the Marquis
and nearly all his attendants are
military characters, some of them
of considerable rank, and that as
long as such a difference of opinion
continues respecting the lines to be
run, there can be no necessity for
the commission.
Op

Claiborne to Secretary of State, Aug. 26, 1805,
Rowland, WCC, III, 182-83. Claiborne's italics.
ft}
Secretary of State to Claiborne, Nov. 18, 1305,
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 533-34.
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On the basis of this letter, Claiborne ordered Juan Morales
and Casa Calvo to leave the Territory.
Exaggerated stories circulated throughout the South
that clashes had taken place between the Americans stationed
at Natchitoches and the Spanish forces based at Nacogdoches.
The Charleston Courier stated that Major Moses Porter had
driven a large Spanish force back across the Sabine River
after they refused to leave voluntarily.

The account also

related that Porter had met five hundred Spanish troops
marching to reinforce the post east of the Sabine, and
after a sharp engagement the Spanish had been routed and
driven across the boundary.

84

The published story bore little resemblance to
what had actually happened.

Major Porter, acting on the

orders of the Secretary of War, had requested that a
detachment of Spanish soldiers move west of the Sabine
River.

When an unsatisfactory reply was received, Porter

dispatched Captain Turner and sixty men to remove the
Spanish.

After the intruders were removed, Turner's

command was ordered to patrol the area between Natchitoches
and the Sabine to prevent further intrusions.

85

On February 6 Turner reported that the Spanish
commander had agreed to withdraw his force to the western
84

"Extract of a letter from the town of Washington,
M. T. dated Feb. 18," Charleston Courier, Apr. 4, 1806.
85
Porter to Secretary of War, Feb. 3, 1806, ASPFR,
II, 798; Porter to Turner, Feb. 1, 1806, Ibid., 798-99.
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bank of the river within six days.

He had also agreed

that no more Spanish patrols would enter the area.

Turner

stated that he would escort the Spanish to be certain that
they actually recrossed the river.

After this was accom

plished, the Americans would begin their patrol of the
disputed territory.

c36

Although no armed hostilities had actually occurred
along the Sabine, the situation was tense.

The presence

of someone with more experience in handling delicate dip
lomatic situations than Major Porter possessed was required.
On May 6 the Secretary of War ordered General Wilkinson to
leave St. Louis and proceed to the Territory of Orleans
"with as little possible delay as practicable."

Wilkinson

was to assume command of the regulars and all of the militia
and volunteers that might assemble in the area.

He was to

employ "all of the means in your power, repel any invasion,
of the territory of the United States, east of the river
Sabine:

or north, or west of the bounds of what has been

called West Florida."

If any hostile acts had taken place,

Wilkinson was to take steps to counteract the Spanish.

He

was to keep the War Department informed of his actions and
of the activities of the Spanish.
Wilkinson was to do everything in his power to avoid
hostilities and his conduct was to be governed by the
Turner to Porter, Feb. 6, 1806, ASPFR, II, 799;
Statement of Joseph Maria Gonzalez, Feb. 6
~, 1806, Ibid.
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intentions of the Spanish.

He was to consider:

Any attempt on the part of his
Catholic Majesty's officers to disturb
the existing state of things, by en
deavoring to occupy any new posts,
east of the Sabine, a westward or
northwestward of the former boundaries,
of what has been called West Florida,
must be considered by the government
of the United States, as an actual
invasion of our territorial rights
and will be resisted as such.°'
The construction of the defenses at New Orleans
was delayed by the lack of a qualified engineer who could
be stationed in the city.

On June 9 Secretary Dearborn

requested that Wilkinson decide upon the best location
for two blockhouses to be built on the flanks of the
city.

88

Despite the fact that he was urgently needed at

Natchitoches and New Orleans, Wilkinson did not arrive at
Natchez until the seventh of September.

89

At Natchitoches Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Cushing,
who had superceded Major Porter, ordered Colonel Herrera,
the commander of a large Spanish force that had recently
crossed the Sabine River, to retire to his own country's
territory.

Cushing stated that the reinforcements that had

^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, May 6, 1806, SWLS,
Roll 3» 4-8. A quote from the Kentucky Gazette in the
Charleston Courier of June 16, 1856, reported that Wilkinson
had been ordered to Louisiana with all of the troops from
St. Louis.
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Secretary of War to Wilkinson, June 9, 1806 and
Secretary of War to Freeman, June 9, 1806, SWLS, Roll 3.
25-28 .
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James R. Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior Major-General
James Wilkinson (New York: Macmillan Company, i938),£29.
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recently arrived at Natchitoches were to provide for the
defense of the territory actually surrendered to the United
States.

He assured the Spaniard that the movements were

not motivated by any hostile intentions.
Colonel Herrera answered that he had crossed the
river in order to prevent the territory that rightfully
belonged to Spain from being taken by the United States.
He warned that if hostilities resulted, the responsibility
would rest with Cushing, because he had no intention of
on
fighting the Americans unless his force was attacked.
On August 8 Captain Turner said that Governor
Herrera considered the removal of the Spanish troops
east of the Sabine River to be a hostile act.

The Captain

was concerned because a large body of Spanish troops was
marching in the direction of Natchitoches.

If the force

continued to move at the same pace, they would be within
twelve miles of the American post by nightfall.

As

additional proof of the hostile intentions of the Spanish,
Turner had recently learned that the Red River expedition
qi
had been turned back by a Spanish patrol.
The Spanish continued their build-up along the
Sabine.

On August 16 Governor Claiborne and Cowles Mead,

the Acting Governor of the Mississippi Territory, learned
90

Cushing to Herrera, Aug. 5, 1806 and Herrera
to Cushing, Aug. 6, 1806, ASPFR, II, 801.
91

Turner to Claiborne, Aug. 8, 1806, Rowland,
WCC, III, 382.
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that an armed force had crossed the Sabine in order to
establish a post at Bayou Pierre.

They promptly issued

a joint statement that summarized their view of the
situation.

They resolved on the following measures:

(1) the force should be compelled to move west of the
river; (2) the territorial militia should be called into
service if more troops were required; (3) the presence
of Governor Claiborne at Natchitoches might speed the
raising of the militia; (4) the Governor would send as
many of the militia from the Mississippi Territory as
possible if the Spanish should threaten New Orleans; and
(5) the Mississippi Territory would furnish one hundred
mounted infantry if hostilities started at Natchitoches.
The two officials expressed their regrets that
General Wilkinson had not yet arrived to carry out the
military preparations.

However, they stated that upon

his arrival, they would surrender the direction of the
military activities to him.

92

The following day Claiborne

stated that the Spanish force was preparing to establish
O'}

a camp near Natchitoches.

J

The next day he informed the

Secretary of War that he feared no danger from Mobile or
Pensacola and was proceeding to the frontier to supervise
the operations there until Wilkinson arrived.

94

92

Statement of Governor Claiborne and Cowles Mead,
Aug. 17, 1806, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 696-97.
93

Claiborne to Richard Claiborne, Aug. 17, 1806,
Rowland, WCC, III, 378-79.
94

Claiborne to Dearborn, Aug. 18, 1806, Ibid., 381.
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Reports that the Governor of Texas was on the
march with nine hundred men circulated throughout Louisiana,
This large force was supposed to be within fifteen miles of
Natchitoches and determined to reoccupy their former posi
tion.

To meet this threat, a large number of United
QK

States troops had been ordered to the western frontier.
On August 29 Richard Claiborne informed the Secretary of
State that he had no knowledge of the location of the
Governor of Texas and his force.^
When Governor Claiborne arrived at Natchitoches,
he dispatched a letter to Colonel Herrera protesting a
number of Spanish actions:

(1) the Spanish attack upon

Colonel Thomas Freeman and the Red River expedition; (2)
the arrest of three American citizens within twelve miles
of Natchitoches and their detention at Nacogdoches; (3) the
harboring of runaway slaves; and (4 ) the occupation of
United States territory by Spanish troops.

The Governor

warned that if these activities continued "the sword must
97
be drawn.M
Colonel Herrera answered Claiborne's letter
politely but firmly.

His troops were on the east side

95

Two letters published in the Charleston Courier
of Sept. 29, 1806. One was from Pinckneyville, dated
Aug. 18 and the other was from Fort Adams, dated Aug. 25.

96h. Claiborne to Secretary of State, Aug. 29,
1806, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 681-82.
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Claiborne to Herrera, Aug. 26, 1806. ASPFR,
II, 801-802.
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of the Sabine in order to preserve the territory that had
always been and was still Spanish,

The Red River expedition

had not been attacked but merely ordered to return to
American soil.

The three citizens who had been arrested

had twice been discovered observing Spanish activities
and had been sent to Nacogdoches for questioning.

98

On August 28 Governor Claiborne wrote to Dearborn
that no offensive action had been taken by the Americans
against the Spanish.

Claiborne intimated that he felt

that the intruders should be forcibly expelled from their
position.

However, Colonel Cushing was determined to take

no action as long as the Spanish remained in the disputed
territory, but if they crossed into the “acknowledged limits
of the territory of the United States" he would move against

them.^
Within a week Claiborne reported that there were
1,200 Spanish soldiers stationed at Bayou Pierre and
three hundred more were moving to join them.

The report

was based on a report from Lieutenant John Du Forest who
had just returned from the Spanish Camp.

He stated that

there were eleven companies in camp, each consisting of
one hundred and ten men.

Claiborne believed that the United

^^Herrera to Claiborne, Aug. 28, 1806, Ibid., 802.
99
Claiborne to Dearborn, Aug. 28, 1806, Rowland,
WCC, i n , 386-90.
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States regulars already at Natchitoches, those ordered
from Port Adams and the local militia could force the
Spanish to retire.

The Governor based his opinion on

the fact that the large Spanish force was composed pri
marily of militia c a v a l r y . D e s p i t e the optimistic
assessment of the situation by Claiborne, the negotiations
continued in an effort to resolve the conflict without
bloodshed.
On September 18 Captain General Don Menesio
Salcedo sent a letter to Claiborne assuring him that
the Spanish did not intend their activities to be hostile.
The Spanish officers had no plans to establish any new
posts in the disputed area, but were only trying to prevent
the seizure of the land by the Americans.

They would

continue to patrol the disputed area in an effort to prevent
any settlements being made by the citizens of either side.
Salcedo closed with a warning, "I must also repel all
aggressions of the American Government, and act conformably
to the strictest accomplishment of the first obligation of
my station." 101
General Wilkinson's arrival at Natchitoches pro
bably prevented the controversy from developing into open
^^Claiborne to Dearborn, Sept. 4, 1806, Ibid.,
396-99.
101 Salcedo to Claiborne, Sept. 18, 1806, American
State Papers. Military Affairs (Washington: Gales and
Seaton, 1832), I, 205-2^1 Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.
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warfare.

Governor Claiborne distrusted the Spanish and

had suggested on more than one occasion that the problems
with Spain could be solved with military force.

On the

other hand, Wilkinson had the ability to use the right
mixture of threats and persuasion to accomplish his goals.
On September 24 Wilkinson addressed a letter to
Antonio Cordero in which he outlined the history of the
controversy concerning the boundary.

He then recited the

Secretary of War's instructions of the sixth of May to
him.

It was on the basis of these orders that he demanded

that the Spanish troops withdraw.

Wilkinson concluded by

saying that his orders were absolute and he would sustain
the American claims to the land against any force that
might oppose them.

102

Five days later Cordero informed

Wilkinson that his letter had been referred to Salcedo for
his consideration.10-^
During the first week of October the tense situ
ation seemed to be relaxing.

Cordero informed Claiborne

that the American slaves would be returned to their owners
and that Herrera had been ordered to release the three
American citizens.

104

General Wilkinson was able to dis

charge all of the militia that had been called into service,
102

Wilkinson to Cordero, Sept. 24, 1806, ASPFR,
II, 803-804.
----10^Cordero to Wilkinson, Sept. 29, 1806, Ibid., 804.
104
Cordero to Claiborne, Oct. 2, 1806, Carter,
Territorial Papers. IX, 683.
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except one hundred dragoons and mounted infantry.

He was

prompted to take the action for reasons of economy and
because the Spanish had recrossed the Sabine.

The General

retained the dragoons in order to observe the activities
of the Spanish.10^
On October 4 Wilkinson told Cordero that he was
advancing toward the Sabine River with a force of regulars.
The purpose of the advance was to "demonstrate the pre
tentions of the United States to the territory east of
the river."

He assured the Spanish official that the

movement had no aggressive motives.

He observed that the

Spanish should not object to the American's presence in
the disputed region since they were on the west bank of
the Sabine, some sixty miles in advance of their post
at Nacogdoches.10^
On October 11 Cordero told Wilkinson that without
further instructions from his superiors he was bound to
consider the Arroyo Hondo as the eastern boundary of Texas.
In addition, he pointed out that even if the American
movement to the Sabine was peaceful, his duty required
that he oppose any incursion into the area.

107

105

Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Oct. 4, 1806,
ASPFR, II, 803.
106ffiikingon to Cordero, Oct. 4, 1806, Ibid., 804.
107

Cordero to Wilkinson, Oct. 11, 1806, ASPMA,

I, 205.
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On October 21 Wilkinson revealed his intentions
to the Secretary of War.

He planned to propose that both

sides withdraw their forces from the disputed area, and
return to the positions that they had occupied at the time
the province was surrendered to the United States.

If

this scheme was agreed to by both parties, the Americans
would return to Natchitoches and the Spanish to Nacogdoches,
thereby creating a neutral zone between the two posts.

If

the Spanish refused to agree to his proposal, Wilkinson
would govern his conduct according to existing conditions.

1oft

The Spanish agreed to accept Wilkinson's plan and
both sides withdrew from the disputed territory.

The

location of the western boundary of Louisiana was left to
the diplomatic officers of the two countries.

The agreement

establishing the neutral ground was probably a satisfactory
arrangement as far as the officers on both sides were con
cerned, with the possible exception of Governor Claiborne.
War was averted and the officers had maintained the claims
of their governments.
The agreement concerning the neutral zone at the
Sabine River freed Wilkinson to turn his attention to a
problem that was developing in the nation's interior.

The

troops of the regular Army would soon be called upon to
counteract the plans of Aaron Burr, the former Vice-President
of the United States.

The actual purpose of Burr's scheme

10®Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Oct. 21, 1806,
ASPFR. II, 804.
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is still open to question, but in all probability it was
directed toward seizing Spanish territory in the south
west, and possibly detaching a part of the United States.
Whatever he was planning, there is little doubt that
General Wilkinson was well informed as to the former
Vice President’s intentions.

As early as May 23, 1804,

Wilkinson had addressed a letter to Burr that indicated
the two men were holding secret meetings.

He wrote, "to

save time of which I need much and have but little, I
propose to take a bed with you this night, if it may be
done without observation or intrusion.”

109

Burr had traveled through the western territories
during 1805 and had been received with all of the ceremony
befitting a former vice President of the United States.
He had traveled as far as New Orleans where he stayed for
ten or twelve days before starting back to St. Louis.

Upon

leaving he intimated that he would return to the city in
October.1^

After his journey through the West, Burr pro

ceeded with his preparations.

By the summer of 1806 he

had raised $50,000 and could state that his plans were
proceeding rapidly.

111

109
Wilkinson to Burr, May 23, 1804, in Worthington
Chauncy Ford (ed.), "Some Papers of Aaron Burr," Proceedings
of the American Antiquarian Society, XXXIX (Apr. - Oct.,
1919), 122.
^Claiborne to Jefferson, July 14, 1805, Rowland,
WCC, III, 124-27.
111Samuel H. Wandell and Meade Minnigerode, Aaron
Burr (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925), II, 68-7B.
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On July 29 3urr outlined his plan in a coded letter
to Wilkinson.

His force would descend the Mississippi to

its mouth, where it would be joined by English ships and a
part of the United States Navy.

Burr would leave for the

West in August; money was available and boats were being
constructed to carry the party South.

He predicted that

between 500 and 1,000 men would be collected at the Falls
of the Ohio.

Within a month the force would reach Natchez

and from that time on their actions would be determined by
existing circumstances.
share.

In all of this, Wilkinson was to

Only Aaron Burr would hold a position above him.

112

The letter from Burr did not reach Wilkinson until
early October.

By that time the General was in his camp

at Natchitoches and unable either to forward or hinder
Burr's preparations.

The extent of the preparation was

revealed in a report from Lexington, "Colonel Burr has
engaged every shipwright at Marietta, at double time, and
high wages, to build 15 gunboats, to row 32 oars, and a
schooner of 120 tons, to draw only 5 1/2 feet of water."11
Suspicions concerning Burr's activities were wide
spread:
Colonel Burr for some cause or
other, has during the last 18~~months,
112

Burr to Wilkinson, July 29» 1806, American
State Papers, Miscellaneous (Washington: Gales and
Seaton, 1834), I, 4?1. Hereinafter cited as ASPMis.
11^Lexington, Kentucky, Oct. 2, in Charleston
Courier, Oct. 28, 1806.
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been traversing *to and fro' in the
western country. . . .
Colonel Burr
is now gone to the westward. It has
long ago been intimated, that he is
preparing to effect something in that
quarter-supposed to be a separation
of the western states etc. from the
Union.114
Whether or not Wilkinson intended to take an active
part with Burr is impossible to determine.

It seems likely

that he was more than willing to let Burr play his game and
see how things worked out before making his decision.

The

General's standing with the administration was not high and
this might be his opportunity to regain the President's
favor.

115

Not only could his position with his own govern

ment be improved, but he could possibly renew his dealings
with Spain.
Wilkinson wrote to Governor Folch to inform him of
the projected attack upon Spanish territory.

He stated

that Burr first planned to attack Baton Rouge and then
the provinces of Mexico.

He assured Folch that he would

do everything in his power to prevent Burr's attack.11^
On or about November 18, in an effort to cover all possible
alternatives, Wilkinson sent Walter Burling, one of his
^ ^ Charleston Courier. Oct. 28, 1806, Editor’s
italics.
115

ASPMis, I, 539-56 contains Wilkinson's testimony
at Burr's trial. See also Reports of the Trials of Colonel
Aaron Burr: In the Circuit~Court oT~the United S^Eates,
Summer Term, TH07, 2 vols. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1969)*
116

Wilkinson to Folch, Dec. 6, 1806, A. G. I.,
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2375.
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aides, to Mexico City with a letter to Viceroy Iturrigaray.
He described how he had stopped Burr's attack on the coast
of Mexico, and requested that the Viceroy reimburse him
for the expenses incurred in halting Burr.

The General

estimated that $111,000 would just about cover the cost
of his services.
Iturrigaray had already learned about the proposed
attack and he was certain that he had the means at his
disposal to repel the Americans.

Therefore the Viceroy

returned Burling with a letter thanking the General for
his efforts on the behalf of S p a i n . A l l

that Burling

had accomplished was to accumulate a bill for expenses
amounting to $1,500, which was eventually paid by the
United States government.

118

After warning the Spanish officials, Wilkinson
turned his attention to spreading the alarm throughout
the United States.

He informed the President that he had
11 q
discovered a plan to attack Vera Cruz.
He informed
Colonel Freeman at New Orleans to be alert to a possible
attack upon that city.

The General did not elaborate on
120
the possible assault or by whom it may be made.
Wilkinson
117

"Extract of a letter from New Orleans received
at New York," Charleston Courier, Jan. 20, 1807, Walter F.
McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy (New York: Dodd, Mead,
& Co., 1 9 S U ,T^6T.------- ----118
Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior, 234.
119

James Wilkinson, Memoirs of General Wilkinson
(Washington: 1811), II, Appendix, XCV.
120
Wilkinson to Freeman, Oct. 23 and Nov. 7, 1806,
Ibid.. Appendix XCIX and Cl.
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told Cushing that the plot was thickening but most people
were unconcerned.

He closed with "My God.

has our country reached.

What a situation

Let us save it if we can."

121

Five days after issuing his warnings to Cushing and Freeman,
Wilkinson sent a translation of Burr's letter to the
President.
The letter that Wilkinson enclosed to cover Burr's
communication was designed to convince Jefferson of the
existence of:
A deep, dark, and widespread
conspiracy, embracing the young
and the old, the democrat and the
federalist, the native and the
foreigner, the patriot of *76 and
the exotic of yesterday, the
opulent and the needy, the ins
and the outs.'22
The President was not taken in by his commanding
general's letter, but he did consult his cabinet to
determine what actions 3hould be taken.

After the meeting

he ordered that armed bands descending the Ohio and Miss
issippi rivers should be arrested.

To accomplish this,

the commanders at the various military post3 were ordered
to watch for and stop any suspicious activities.

If it

was deemed necessary, the militia could be called out to
assist the regulars in suppressing the activities.

12 3

121

Wilkinson to Cushing, Nov. 7, 1806, Ibid.,
Appendix XCIX.
1^Wilkinson to Jefferson, Nov. 12, 1806, Ibid.,
Appendix C.
123

Cabinet Memoranda, Nov. 25, 1806, cited in
McCaleb, Aaron Burr, 195.
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On November 27 President Jefferson issued a
Proclamation announcing the existence of a conspiracy,
it enjoined all citizens and officials to aid in stopping
1OA
the conspirators and in arresting their designs.
Ad
ditional orders were

issued to the officers stationed along

the Mississippi to stop anyone

who might be preparing an

expedition against the territory of any nation at peace
with the United States.

Their instructions authorized

the officers to call out the militia if additional troops
were r e t i r e d . 125
In addition,
the troops in such a

Wilkinson was ordered to dispose of
way as to prevent any unlawful action

against New Orleans or any other location.

He was to do

everything in his power to protect the territory of the
United States and Spain.

The Secretary noted that Burr

was generally felt to be the leader of the expedition, but
the General's name was often associated with the activities.

126

Wilkinson warned Governor Claiborne of the conspiracy
on the same day that he sent Burr's letter to Jefferson.
124
Proclamation of the President of the United
States of America, Nov. 27, 1806, James D. Richardson
(ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents:
1789-1902“ (Washington: Government 5r in-ting
(5'ffi'ce, 1'503)7T7 TO=405.
125

Secretary of War to Lt. Swearinger, Nov. 26,
1806, SWLS, Roll 3, 105-106; Secretary of War to Freeman
and Commanding Officer at Fort Adams, Nov. 28, 1806, Ibid.,
109.
126
Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Nov. 29, 1806,
Ibid.. 107-108.
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He told Claiborne, "You are surrounded by dangers of which
you dream not and the destruction of the American Union is
seriously menaced.

The storm will probably burst on New

Orleans, when I 3hall meet it and truimph or perish."

To

ensure that Claiborne was properly impressed with the
extent of the conspiracy, Wilkinson wrote that it "implicates
thousands and among them some of your particular friends as
127
well as my own."
The Governor, who was overly suspicious
of everyone and everything, was duly aroused and frightened
by Wilkinson's letter.
While the instructions passed from the capital to
the frontier, Wilkinson was busy.

In mid-November Major

Porter and forty artificers arrived in New Orleans from
Natchitoches to begin repairing the forts and defensive
works of the city.

It was expected that eight hundred

troops would soon arrive from the western frontier.

Two

companies of soldiers normally stationed in New Orleans
returned to the city after spending only five days at
Natchitoches.

128

On November 18 it was reported that Cowles Mead
had refused General Wilkinson's requisition for five hundred
territorial militia.

129

Apparently some of the citizens

127
Wilkinson to Claiborne, Nov. 12, 1806, Rowland,
WCC, IV, 55-56.
128
Report from New Orleans dated Nov. 25 in
Charleston Courier, Dec. 13, 1806.
129
Report from Natchez dated Nov. 18 in Charleston
Courier. Jan. 14, 1807.
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were not overly impressed with the extent of the suspected
conspiracy.

The comments of one resident of Natchez

summarized a portion of popular opinion:
The promoters of all this, are
falling fast into contempt, by every
description and class of people.
Wilkinson is vastly unpopular here,
in consequence of his having made a
requisition of several hundred men,
when not wanted, and lately repeating
the farsical act. - The affair is too
barefaced and contemptible to be
patiently born with. . . .
We want
not the parade of Wilkinson nor to
feel and participate in the perpetual
fears of Claiborne. . . .130
Despite the opposition of the citizens of the
Mississippi Territory, General Wilkinson continued his
propaganda campaign about the dangers posed by the party
descending the river.

He stated that unless "reinforced,

New Orleans will certainly fall before Colonel 3urr."1^1
At New Orleans preparations were being made to
withstand the anticipated assualt upon the city.

On

December 4 Colonel Freeman was ordered to examine the
public buildings in the city to determine the number of
troops that could be housed in them.

He and. the military

agent were to determine what repairs were necessary to put
the buildings in good condition, the length of time required
to make the repairs, and the cost of rennovating the
"Extract of a letter from Natchez to a gentlemen
in this city, dated Nov. 25, received the last mail" in
Charleston Courier, Jan. 16, 1807.
1^ Charleston Courier, Jan. 19, 1807.
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structures.

The military agent was ordered to provide

four hundred entrenching tools, one hundred hatchets, and
a supply of timber to be used by the troops in repairing
the public buildings and fortifications.
The repairs at Fort Charles were to be supervised
by Major Porter and those at Fort Louis by Major Abimall
Nicoll.

As laborers and workers were hired they were to

be assigned to the two officers in equal proportions.

1 12

The next day additional orders were issued, the lines of
the various works were to be

laid out and the

officers were to be told how

they were to be constructed.

Freeman was to supervise all

of the works and dispose of

the workmen and materials in such a way as to
construction.

superintending

speed the

The Colonel was to assign men to cut trees

to be made into abatises and placed around the redoubts.1^
Not all of the work was being performed by the soldiers as
there were a number of Negro workers employed by the Army
to work on the fortifications.1^
On December 6 General Wilkinson wrote to Claiborne:
Under circumstances so imperious
extraordinary measures must be resort
ed to, and ordinary forms of our civil
institutions must, for a short period,
112

Garrison Order, Dec. 4, 1806, in Orders Garrison
of New Orleans, 1806; Army Commands, Record Group 98
(National Archives).
1^General Order, Dec. 5, 1806, Ibid.
1 ^General Order, Dec. 10, 1806, Ibid.
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yield to the strong arm of military
law. . . .
I most earnestly entreat
you to proclaim martial law over this
city its ports and percints.
[s[ic]135
On December 16, 1806, Governor Claiborne issued a
proclamation against unlawful combinations that strongly
resembled President Jefferson*s proclamation.

The following

day he declared to the Secretary of State, "but in no event
will I take upon myself to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeus corpus and to proclaim martial l a w."^^
The Secretary of War issued orders to the commanding
officers at New Orleans and Fort Adams to arrest anyone who
appeared at their posts and who were in apparent violation
of the nation's laws.

1 57

By the time these orders were

issued the entire crisis seemed to be well in hand.

On

the twenty-seventh of December President Jefferson told
Senator William Plummer of New Hampshire:

"there was no

room to doubt the integrity, firmness and attachment of
Wilkinson to our government . . .

the conspiracy would be

crushed, extensive as it was, with little trouble and
1 ^8
expense to the United States.”
1 55
Wilkinson to Claiborne, Dec. 6, 1806, Rowland,
WCC, IV, 46-47.
1-^Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 17, 1806, Ibid., 68.
1 57

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer Fort
Adams, Dec. 20, 1806, SWLS, Roll 3, 109-110; Secretary
of War to Freeman, Dec. 20, 1806, Ibid.. 110.
1 38
William Plummer, Memorandum of Proceedings in
Senate, 1803-07* E. S. Brown (ed.), (New York: "T^oT,

543-44.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

188

In New Orleans, however, the situation was becoming
unmanageable.

For all intents and purposes Wilkinson had

suspended the civil authority.

During the crisis a number

of individuals were arrested because of their suspected
association with Burr.

When Judge Workman ordered them

released on writs, Wilkinson had them arrested again and
smuggled out of town.

Judge Workman finally resigned in

disgust because of the lack of support he received from
the civil authorities, and Wilkinson had him arrested.
Wilkinson was apparently becoming the victim of his own
fears of disaster.
President Jefferson wrote of Wilkinson’s conduct:
My general has trodden the law
in the dust, set at naught my courts
to their faces; and swaddled my
governor in his sash, and laid him
to bed, like a great baby. . . .
This general felt himself in a most
uncommon predicament, from which
nothing could extricate him but
uncommon measures. I would blame
the general but that I am so glad
to think what a scrap I ’ve got out
of by his means.139
The high-handed methods employed by Wilkinson
angered a number of New Orleans residents but many others
159

J. H. Daveiss, **View of the President’s Conduct
concerning the Conspiracy of 1806,** I. J. Cox and H. A.
Swineford (ed.), Quarterly Publication of the Historical
and Philosophical society of Ohio, ffllll TXpr. - 3ept., 1^17),
125. In relation to Wilkinson's actions in New Orleans,
Jefferson wrote: HThe defence of Orleans against a land
army can never be provided for according to the principles
of the constitution, till we get a sufficient militia
there." Jefferson to Gallatin, Nov. 22, 1807, Paul L.
Ford, The Works of Thomas Jefferson (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 15^5)', X, 5^8.
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took the threat presented by Burr in the light in which
Wilkinson presented it.

One citizen wrote in January:

The military means of defense here
are in readiness - the regular
troops and militia are alert. . . .
Wilkinson and his regulars - and
the true Americans9 are determined
to fight and I fear much blood will
be spilt. Perhaps this may be my
last letter.140
Ten days after the prediction of a full scale armed
conflict, Aaron Burr surrendered to the civil authorities
of the Mississippi Territory.

On February 3 the Grand

Jury at Natchez that was hearing Burr*s case returned no
indictments on any of the charges brought against him.
However, the Federal Judge, Thomas Rodney, refused to
release Burr from bail and ordered him to appear in court
each day.

Burr was fearful of being transferred to New

Orleans where he would probably be tried before a court
martial selected by General Wilkinson.

Consequently, he

failed to appear in court on the sixth of February.

The

next day Governor Williams of the Mississippi Territory
declared him to be a fugitive.
Burr fled from Natchez in a southeasterly direction,
hoping to reach the Gulf and take a ship out of the country.
On February 18 he was recognized and his presence was re
ported to Lieutenant Edmund P. Gaines at Fort Stoddert.
140

"Extract of a letter from a gentleman in office
in New Orleans to his correspondent in this city, dated
the 7th Instant," Charleston Courier. Jan. 31, 1807.
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The next day Gaines, accompanied by a detachment of
soldiers, met Burr and his two traveling companions on
the road.

After ascertaining his identity, Gaines ar

rested Burr on the authority of the President's proclama
tion.

Burr was taken to Port Stoddert where he was held

until March 5, when he and an escort of nine soldiers
left by ship for Washington.
The entire Burr Conspiracy was blown completely
out of proportion by a number of individuals, but the
primary offender was James Wilkinson.

Fearful that his

position as commanding general was in jeopardy, he had
taken a situation that was only remotely dangerous and
magnified it until even he lost touch with reality.

When

the actual size of Burr's force became known, Wilkinson
seemed to be a fool rather than the savior of the west.
By early January the size of the force was be
ginning to come to light, Jefferson told Wilkinson that
he did not believe the number of men had ever reached five
hundred.

The President stated that he had never seen any

positive proof that indicated more than one hundred men
had joined his former Vice President.

142

Late in January

^ 1Cowles Mead to Secretary of War, Jan. 19, 1807,
in Third Annual Report of the Director of the Department
of Archives and History of the State of Mississippi
TTTashville: Press of Brandon Printing Co., 1905;, 64-66.
This volume consists of letters concerning the Burr
Conspiracy. Wandell and Minningerrode, Aaron Burr, II,
161-71.
1^Jefferson to Wilkinson, Jan. 3, 1807, in Albert
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the Secretary of War wrote to inform Wilkinson that he
had authentic information that Burr* a force could not
amount to more than six hundred men.

143

On February 3,

Dearborn stated that Burr's entire force consisted of ten
boats with only six men on each, amounting to the formi
dable force of sixty men.
To stop this small band of men, Wilkinson had
assembled about 1,000 regulars, a naval force, and three
or four hundred militia men in the vicinity of New
Orleans.

145

The force of approximately 1,000 regulars

represented about one-third of the total strength of the
United States Army.

The remaining troops were stationed

along the frontier from Portland to New Orleans and from
Michilimackinac to Vincennes.

The Secretary of War's

letter of the third of February instructed Wilkinson to
distribute the troops at the various posts as soon as the
turmoil surrounding Burr had subsided.

He suggested that

six companies be retained at New Orleans, one company at
Plaquemines, four at Natchitoches, two on the Mobile and
E. Bergh (ed.), The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington:
The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 19t>7), XI, 127-30.
143

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Jan. 21, 1807,
SWLS. Roll 3, 117-20.
1 44

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 3, 1807,
Ibid.. 126-28.
145

Secretary of War to House of Representatives,
Jan. 9, 1807, ASPMA, I, 207.
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Tombxgbee, and the remainder at Fort Adams.

146

Two weeks

later Wilkinson was ordered to detach an escort for an
expedition being prepared to explore the Arkansas River
to its source.

147

General Wilkinson had played the Burr Conspiracy
for all it was worth and had discredited himself in the
eyes of many citizens.

However, the actions of the

officers and men resounded to the credit of the Army.
They had responded quickly and efficiently to the Pres
ident's call to oppose Burr and his expedition.

Although

the expedition did not materialize on the scale that had
been predicted, the potential for gathering such a party
did exist.
Aaron Burr was the type of man who could inspire
other men to follow him to fame and fortune and there were
many men on the frontier willing to follow such a leader.
What stopped the frontiersmen from joining Burr is open
to speculation.

But one thing is certain, the news that

Wilkinson was gathering a large force to oppose the
expedition was well known across the nation.

Even the

most adventuresome frontiersman must have hesitated when
faced with the prospect of encountering a large well-armed
force of regulars.
1^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 3» 1807,
SWLS. Roll 3, 126-28.
147

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 13, 1807,

Ibid.. 132.
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On April 10, 1807, the Secretary of War informed
Wilkinson that he would be summoned to Richmond, Virginia,
to testify against Burr.

14.8

On May 20, the General left

New Orleans for Richmond vowing that he would convict
Burr, that "little arch traitor" and "damned and pickled
villain."1^

With the departure of Wilkinson from New

Orleans, Colonel Thomas Cushing was left in command of
1 *50

the troops on the southern frontier. ^

The arrest of Burr, the tentative agreement on the
Sabine and the departure of the commanding general, left
the situation in the South relatively quiet.

The Army

was left to untangle itself and try to return to a more
or less normal existence.

The troops returned to their

isolated frontier posts to await some other assignment
that would break the monotonous routine of garrison duty.

148

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 10, 1807,
Ibid.. 161-62.
149

Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior. 237.

1^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 10, 1807,
SWLS. Roll 3, 161-62.
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CHAPTER IV
FORTIFYING, GUARDING AND
EXTENDING THE NATION’S FRONTIERS
The end of the Burr episode brought the start of
a period of peace to the frontier.

The problems on the

western border of Louisiana had temporarily been resolved,
the southern Indians were quiet for the moment, and only
the problem of duties at Mobile remained unsettled.

From

March of 1807 until the outbreak of the War of 1812, the
principal activities of the Army would be directed toward
improving the nation's fortifications and garrisons.
Occasionally the normal routine of garrison life was dis
rupted by orders to perform duties that were out of the
ordinary.
A large-scale building problem was started across
the South, with the most ambitious projects at Charleston
and New Orleans.

Initially the Wax Department expected

that the fortifications would be built by civilian workers,
but as costs rose the soldiers were called upon to perform
more and more of the construction work.

All of the con

struction, whether by civilians or soldiers, was to be
supervised by Army engineers.

Captain Alexander Macomb

194
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was the engineer assigned to direct the work planned for
Charleston Harbor,

However, no engineer had been found to

superintend the work at New Orleans.1
For the works at New Orleans the skilled laborers
were hired in other cities, usually at Philadelphia and
Washington.

The bricklayers, masons and carpenters were

sent to begin the works even before an engineer had been
assigned to New Orleans.

The unskilled workers were hired
2
by the military agent from among the local residents.
The absence of a qualified engineer delayed the
beginning of work at New Orleans, and construction at
Charleston could not get started because the state of
South Carolina had not ceded a site for the fortifications
to the United States.

The cession did not take place until

August of 1807, and little work, other than acquiring
Secretary of War to Jonathan Williams, May 11,
1807 and Secretary of War to J. Williams, May 11, 1807,
in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. Letters
Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889 , Record
Croup 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 3, 178-79* Hereinafter cited
as SWLS. Roll 3 is filled with letters sent by the
Secretary of War during 1807-1808 concerning the con
struction of new fortifications and the improvement of
existing garrisons. It is especially valuable for in
formation concerning the purchase of materials.
2
Secretary of War to William Linnard, Military
agent for the Middle Department, Feb. 7, 1807, Ibid.,
131• Directs him to hire a brickmaker, and two to four
assistants; a master mason and six or eight assistants
to go to New Orleans for one or two years service.
Secretary of War to Abraham, Apr. 11, 1807, Ibid.. 16263, encloses a contract for two master masons and three
black assistants; three brickmakers and four bricklayers.
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materials, was accomplished.^

While waiting to begin

construction in Charleston, Macomb supervised the building
of a Federal arsenal at Rocky Mount, South Carolina.^
The workers for the project at Charleston were hired by
the military agent, lieutenant Robert Roberts, from avail
able labor in the city.

This force was to be increased by

the transfer of workers from Rocky Mount when that project
5
was completed.
At New Orleans there were problems with the con
tract workers, the bricklayers refusing to work during the
summer of 1807.

The Secretary of War directed the military

agent, Abraham, to consult the United States District
Attorney to determine if their contract required them to
work, or whether they could be dismissed without compen
sation. ^
By the spring of 1808 the Secretary of War was
complaining about the lack of progress in the fortifications
and the mounting expenses.

He informed Abraham that the

^American State Papers. Military Affairs (7 Vols.
Washington! Gales and Seaton, 183^-1861), 1, Report on
Fortifications, Dec. 8, 1807, 223-24. Hereinafter cited
as ASPMA.
A

Secretary of War to Macomb, Apr. 20, 1807, SWLS,
Roll 3, 169.
---^Secretary of War to Roberts, May 11, 1807, Ibid..
180; Secretary of War to Macomb, June 22, 1807. Ibid.,
199.
216.

^Secretary of War to Abraham, Aug. 14, 1807, Ibid.,
----
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commanding officers at posts where works were being erected
would be ordered to assign soldiers to assist the civilian
workers.

They would receive one extra gill of spirits and
7
an extra ten cents a day as compensation for their work.
In April the Secretary told Macomb:

"Let the workmen

complete the buildings and magazine at Rocky Mount.

There

has been already time and money enough expended at that
Q
place to have built a small city."
Unless they were called upon to work on the forti
fications, the building program did not effect the daily
routine of the enlisted men.

Normally their activities

were confined to the tasks of a garrison force:
drills, guard duty, and policing the post.

daily

Occasionally

they performed light manual labor not directly associated
with the duties of a soldier.
At Natchitoches the men were required to guard
the Indian trading post in an effort to prevent robberies.
In addition a few of the soldiers were ordered to aid the
factor in packing the pelts and furs before they were
q
shipped to New Orleans.
At Port St. Stephens the soldiers
assisted the factor in repairing his storehouse so that the

301

.

7
Secretary of War to Abraham, Mar, 1, 1808, Ibid.,
Q
Secretary of War to Macomb, Apr. 25, 1808, Ibid.,

336.
q

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at
Natchitoches, Mar. 24, 1807, Ibid.. 148.
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supplies would be secure.

Also, the troops were to con

struct bridges over the creeks on the road from the Oconee
River to the post.

The existing road was in such a bad

state of repair that during 1;he rainy season supplies
could not be moved to Fort St. Stephens.10

The type of

work that the soldiers were expected to perform was in
dicated by an order to supply the garrisons at Chickasaw
Bluffs and on the Arkansas River with a dozen axes and a
dozen spades.11
However, not all of the assignments called for
manual labor on the part of the soldiers; at times they
were required to enforce Federal laws and regulations.
On July 3» 1807, orders were issued to all officers
commanding posts in the nation's ports to assist revenue
officers in the enforcement of President Jefferson's
12
Proclamation of July 12.
The proclamation ordered all
armed British ships to leave the ports of the United States.
If the order was not complied with, all communications with
the ships were to be stopped and no provisions were to be
10Secretary of War to William Boote, June 16, 1807,
Ibid.. 197.
11 Secretary of War to Swearinger, May 7, 1807,
Ibid.. 176.
12Secretary of War to Burbeck, July 3, 1807, Ibid.,
201. Order of July 3, 1807, in Order Book for the Garrison
at Fort Johnston, N. C., 1795-1811, Army Commands, Record
Group 98 (National Archives).
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acquired in American ports.1^

Apparently the soldiers

were not needed to enforce the proclamation because there
is no indication of such activities.
In late July Captain Edmund P. Gaines was ordered
to

send a party to explore the area

between the Tennessee

River, both above and below Muscle Shoals, and the Tombigbee
River.

The purpose of the expedition was to determine how

far up the Tombigbee River boats could navigate and the
distance from that point to the Tennessee.

The information

collected was to be communicated to the War Department as
soon as possible.

The Secretary requested that Gaines

lead the expedition, provided his other duties would not
suffer during his absence.

14

The summer and fall of 1807
no

passed with little or

activity on the part of the Army.

In late October the

Secretary of War tried to correct one of the most persistent
complaints of the soldiers by ordering that the troops be
paid on a regular basis.

The paymaster of the Army was

warned that further incidents of late payments would be
investigated by the War Department.

15

1^Proclamation, July 2, 1807, James D. Richardson
(ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, 1789-1897~TWashington: GovernmentPrinting
Office, 1896T7T,"T22-24.
^Secretary of War to Gaines, July 31, 1807,
SWLS, Roll 3, 209.
15

Secretary of War to the Paymaster of the Army,
Oct. 29, 1807, Ibid.. 230-31.
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On November 30 orders were issued to the commanding
officer at New Orleans to remove, a number of settlers who
had moved onto land that belonged to the United States.
He was to prevent the settlers from returning after they
were removed and prohibit any new intrusions.1®
On February 1, 1808, the officers of the Army were
ordered to assist the revenue officers inthe enforcement
of the Embargo Act passed by Congress in December.

How

ever, the assistance of the soldiers at the southern posts
was not required.

17

Instead of helping enforce the Embargo,

the soldiers at New Orleans and those at Fort Adams were
engaged in cleaning and oiling the muskets that were stored
at the posts.

All of the weapons that required repairs

were to be boxed and prepared for shipment to one of the
nation's arsenals.1®
The War Department anticipated that the construction
in and around New Orleans would begin in earnest as an
engineer had finally been found to supervise the work.
The engineer who had agreed to go to New Orleans was Colonel
J. Foncin, who was to receive a compensation of five dollars
1®3ecretary of War to Commanding Officer at New
Orleans, Nov. 30, 1807, Ibid., 238.
17

Secretary of War to
Orleans, Fort Johnston, North
South Carolina, Feb. 1, 1808,
18
Secretary of War to
Ibid.. 289.

Commanding Officers at New
Carolina, and Fort Johnson,
Ibid.. 288.
Kingsbury, Feb. 8, 1808,
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a day from the time he left Washington.

19

Poncin’s in

structions were to try to complete the important works
at Plaquemine and those at the mouth of the Bayou St.
John’s before .beginning any new projects.

He was to

obtain building materials from the military agent and
was authorized to draw upon Major William MacRea for
soldiers as laborers.^
Whatever expectations the Department had nourished
were disappointed, for Poncin was back in the capital by
early June.

He had fallen ill shortly after arriving at

his station and had decided to return to the North to regain
his health.

His departure left the works incomplete, and

the task of finishing them fell on Major MacRea.

The

Department directed MacRea to follow the plans already
laid out and to seek any assistance that Governor Claiborne
might be able to offer him.

In the meantime efforts would

be made to find another engineer.

21

To the east, in the Mississippi Territory, the
soldiers were engaged in a different type of activity.
At Port St. Stephens there were still problems in trans
porting supplies to the post.

The contractor was to decide

19

Secretary of War to Poncin, Feb. 16, 1808, Ibid.,
Secretary of War to Poncin, Feb. 18, 1808, Ibid., 294.
20
Secretary of War to Poncin, May 22, 1808 and
Secretary of War to MacRea, May 22, 1808, Ibid., 350-51.

292;

21

Secretary of War to MacRea, June 6, 1808, Ibid.,

359.
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how to transport the provisions to the fort.

22

The troops

nearby Port Stoddert were ordered to remove a group of
intruders from the Cherokee lands on the Georgia frontier.
The operation was to begin as soon as the boundary line
between the state the Indian lands was marked by Return J.
Meigs.^
In April 1808, Macomb now a Major, was informed
that a site at Five Pathon Hole near Savannah had been
obtained for the fortification and the site for the work
at Savannah would be acquired soon.

The Major was to

supervise the construction of the works intended to protect
Savannah, with as little delay as possible.

He was also

to begin the works at Smithville on the Cape Fear River and
the battery at Old Topsail Inlet near Beaufort, North
Carolina.

Macomb was to give his personal attention to

the completion of these works.

24

In July Macomb was

instructed to procure sufficient materials to build
barracks to accommodate four companies at Charleston and
three companies in the Savannah area.

25

22

Secretary of War to William Linnard, Feb. 22,
1808, Ibid.. 295.
^Secretary of War to Boote, Feb. 24, 1808, Ibid.,
314.
24

Secretary of War to Macomb, Apr. 11, 1808, Ibid.,

324-25.
^Secretary of War to Macomb, July 8, 1808, Ibid.,
383.
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Soon troops were on the move from Highwassee in
Tennessee to Savannah.

At Highwassee these men had acquired

some experience in construction, and they were expected to
26
put their knowledge to work at their new post.
Their
commander, Captain George Armistead, was told that upon
arriving at Savannah he was to do everything in his power
to help with the works at that city and at Five Fathom
Hole.

He was to detach as many men as possible from his

command for fatigue duty each day.

27

For the Army as a whole, the most significant
event of 1808 was an increase in size authorized by
Congress in April.

The authorizing act added five infantry

regiments, one regiment of riflemen, one regiment of light
artillery, and one regiment of light dragoons to the Army.
The authorized strength of the Army was increased from
3,287 to 9,921.

28

for each brigade.

In addition, a chaplain was authorized
The increase was not as important as it

appeared because the units were never fully recruited.

For

instance, only one company of light artillery was raised,
and its horses were sold in 1809 as an economy measure.
Secretary of
Ibid.. 373« Secretary
A i d ., 375. Secretary
A i d ., 427.
27
Secretary of
Ibid.. 427.

29

War to Armistead, June 30, 1809,
of War to Shefsall, July 1, 1808,
of War to Armistead, Oct. 12, 1808,
War to Armistead, Oct. 12, 1808,

28

J. F. Callan, The Military Laws of the United
States (Philadelphia: G. W. Childs, 7U5?), 266-2
29
^Fairfax Downey, Sound of Guns:

The Story of
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In late autumn the activity of the Army began to
increase as the nation’s foreign relations deteriorated.
On November 30, 1808, orders were issued to all commanders
of permanent fortifications to inspect their cannons and
ammunition to be sure that they were ready for service on
the shortest notice.^0

The following day all commanding

officers were ordered to give amply notice to their con
tractors so that supplies could be purchased.^1

The next

day Wilkinson was ordered to New Orleans to take command
of the force being gathered there to defend the city
against a possible invasion.

32

On December 6 the Secretary

of War ordered that boats be prepared to transport troops
from Norfolk to New Orleans.^
But for the soldiers not engaged in some sort of
activity that broke the monotony of garrison duty, the
time passed slowly.

The soldiers engaged in a number of

diversions, some of which resulted in the establishment of
stringent regulations at some of the posts.

At Port

American Artillery from the Ancient and Honorable Company
to ike Atom Cannon and Guided MlssTe (New York: McKay,

TfcSTT63-^6.

^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Nov. 30, 1808,
SWLS, Roll 3, 453.
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Dec. 1, 1808, Ibid
32
Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Dec. 2, 1808, Ibid
456-57. Por the results of this build-up see Chapter 8.
■^Secretary of War to Saunders, Dec. 6, 1808, SWLS,
Roll 3, 457.
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Johnston, North Carolina, for example, the commanding
officer prohibited artificers, musicians, and privates
from leaving the area attached to the garrison.

The reason

for the restriction was apparent from the last paragraph of
the order:
The degrading habit of drunkenness
is not sufficient to disgrace them, in
addition to that crime they must for
the amusement of the citizens show which
is the greatest black guard and by way
of proving and deciding the point turn
out in the public place to be found there
commence hostilities, the object of which
is to bruise, mangle, disfigure and in
jure each other. . . . these are crimes
which would disgrace a vagabond much less
the soldier.34
At New Orleans, where discipline was always difficult
to maintain, a similar order was issued in February of 1809.
The commander ordered that no more than four men from each
company would be granted passes on the same day.

The men

who left the post were to be accompanied by a non-commissioned
officer, who was to be held responsible for the conduct of
the soldiers.

All of the men were to return to the garrison

by four o'clock in the afternoon.

35

The officers and men stationed at Raleigh, North
Carolina, took an active interest in the presidential
election of 1808.

During the congressional elections the

-^Garrison Orders, June 27, 1308, Order Book for
the Garrison of Fort Johnston.
35

Garrison Orders, Feb. 14, 1809, Orders, Garrison
of New Orleans, 1808-1809, Army Commands, Record Group 98
(National Archives).
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question had been raised as to. whether or not the troops
should be allowed to vote.

With the approach of the

election of the presidential electors, the subject became
even more heated because the number of troops had increased.
However, it was discovered by the officers that a majority
of the..men would vote for the Federalist candidate, who
was opposed by the officers.

When this fact was revealed,

the soldiers were assembled and marched out of town, where
those soldiers who wished to vote for the Federalist ticket
were held until the voting was concluded.

The officers re

turned to town with the soldiers who would vote properly.
The citizens were so aroused by this obvious trick that the
soldiers were finally withdrawn by their officers.^
There were not many similar incidents to relieve
the routine of soldier life.

The drudgery of life is

illustrated by the garrison orders, issued in New Orleans.
The companies of artillery and infantry within the city
were to be drilled four hours each day, two in the morning
and two in the afternoon.

One month later another order

was issued reminding the officers of the previous order
and adding that a commissioned officer should supervise
the drill of each company.

37

^"Extract of a letter to the editor of the Raleigh
[North Carolina] Minerva, dated Nov. 16, 1808," in
Charleston Courier, Nov. 30, 1808.
37
Garrison Order, Feb. 18, 1809, and Garrison
Order, Mar. 8, 1809, Orders, Garrison of New Orleans,
1808-1809.
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The construction of the coastal fortifications
continued slowly and unevenly.

Macomb was instructed to

pay attention to all of the works in his district and not
just the fortifications at Charleston.

He was to see that

the works in Georgia were started, and William MacRea was
Q
assigned the task of supervising the works.
On February 17 two new Brigadier Generals, Peter
Gansevoort and Wade Hampton, were appointed as a part of
the military build-up.

The new generals joined Wilkinson

as the ranking officers of the Army and were assigned to
direct the Army*s numerous operations while Wilkinson was
occupied at New Orleans.

39

The commanding officer at Ocmulgee Oldfields was
instructed to remove a number of intruders from the Indian
lands on the frontier of Georgia.

He was also told not to

disturb two of the settlements in the area until he re
ceived further orders.

In addition to removing intruders

from Indian lands, the soldiers at Ocmulgee were constructing their own barracks and building a public sawmill.

40

At Fort St. Stephens there were still problems
^Secretary of War to Macomb, Jan. 24, 1809,
SWLS. Roll 4, 18; Secretary of War to MacRea, Feb. 11,
1bCi9, and Secretary of War to Bourke, Feb. 11, 1809,
Ibid., 28-29.
39

Secretary of War to Gansevoort and Hampton,
Feb. 17, 1809, Ibid., 34.
40
Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at
Ocmulgee Oldfields, Feb. 27. 1809, Ibid.. 38; Secretary
of War to Smith, Mar. 20, 1809, Ibi3TT"33.
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getting the factory's goods through the Spanish port.
Captain Gaines was informed that the proper department
would take steps to obtain the release of the goods being
detained at Mobile.

In March Gaines was appointed

assistant military agent for Fort Stoddert, and all of
the problems of supplying the troops north of the thirtyfirst parallel rested with the young officer.

41

One of the problems that Gaines would encounter in
trying to supply the troops at Fort Stoddert was exem
plified by his own company.

The 1808 clothing allowance

for his men had not been delivered.

On February 15, 1809,

the Secretary of War reported that the clothes were stored
at Fort Adams and told Colonel Thomas Cushing:

"I will

thank you to have it forwarded to him by way of New Orleans
as the superintendent of military stores is not allowed to
send him clothing to make up for the deficiency of that
year."

Apparently the men were still wearing the clothes
42
issued to them in 1807.
Gaines had to be extremely careful in his actions

so that he did not anger the Spanish officials at Mobile.
^Secretary of War to Gaines, Mar. 17, 1809, Ibid.,
49; Secretary of War to Gaines, Mar. 29, 1809, Ibid.. 5i.
JA
Secretary of War to Cushing, Feb. 15, 1809,
Ibid* t 33* The clothing allowance per year as established
in 1801 was 1 uniform coat, 1 woolen vest, 2 woolen over
alls, 4 woolen socks, 1 hat, 4 shirts, 2 linen overalls,
4 pair of shoes, 1 blanket, 1 forage trousers. In 1815
the allowance had been changed only in that the 1 pair
of forage trousers were eliminated, ASPMA. I, 802.
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On May 4 the Secretary of War cautioned General Wilkinson:
The same disposition continues in the
Executive to maintain the friendly
relations subsisting between the U. S.
and the neighboring colonies- At all
times desirable, it is pecularily [so?]
in the present interesting crisis of
our foreign relations to preserve a
good understanding and to avoid any
cause of collision or complaint-43
In June of 1809 the recruiting parties that had
been operating in an effort to reach the level authorized
by Congress for an ’'additional military force” were ordered
to report to their assigned stations with their recruits.
Upon their arrival the recruits were to "labor and assist
in erecting, repairing, and preserving the public works,
buildings and property a3 a primary object.
The work at the various garrisons was increasingly
assigned to the soldiers as the War Department tried to
eliminate the cost of hiring workers to build the new
fortifications.

General Hampton was told:

"The work

which can be done by the troops will not only expedite
the completion of the fortifications, but diminish the
expense:

these are favorite objects to which too much

45
attention cannot be paid.”
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, May 4, 1809,
SWLS. Roll 4, 98.
44

Secretary of War to Hampton, June 30, 1809,
and Secretary of War to Wilkinson, June 30, 1809, Ibid.,
155-56.
^Secretary of War to Hampton, July 15, 1809,
Ibid.. 174.
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The Secretary expressed the same opinion when he
authorized the payment of drafts drawn on the War Department
for work done at another garrison:

"It is presumed that

his expenditures will not be of any considerable amount,
as most of the labor ought to be performed by the garrison,
and the necessary timber can be obtained for the cutting
and hauling nearby."

46

In August the commanding officers

were ordered to assist the health officers in enforcing
the recent Act of Congress relative to a quarantine.

If

additional instructions were required, General Hampton was
to be consulted.

47

The approach of cooler weather and the depletion
of the appropriations for fortifications caused construction
at many of the posts to be suspended or radically curtailed.

48

Even work at the important works in the harbor

of Charleston, except at Port Pinckney, were stopped.
Major Macomb was informed that expenditures totaling
$110,000 had already been made for the works in South
Carolina.

This sum greatly exceeded the Major's initial

4-6
Secretary of War to Linnard, Sept. 30, 1809,
Ibid.. 210.
47
Secretary of War to Armistead, Aug. 12, 1809,
Ibid.. 196.
48
Secretary of War to Gratiot, Oct. 26, 1809,
Ibid., 214, concerns the supervision of work at Port
Joimston, North Carolina; Secretary of War to Kelly,
Oct. 29, 1809, Ibid.. 216, work suspended at Port
Johnson and Oak Island.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

211
estimate of $75,000, and it appeared that more expenditures
would he necessary before the works were completed.

As a

consequence, the hired laborers were to be discharged and
the work confined wholly to Fort Pinckney.

To replace the

civilian workers at the site, he was to make the best
possible use of the soldiers.
On September 10 General Wilkinson was ordered to
Washington to face a court of inquiry into the disaster
that had befallen his command at New Orleans.

General

Hampton relieved Wilkinson and assumed command of all of
the troops in the Territory of Orleans and the Mississippi
50
Territory.
At New Orleans, Fort Adams and Columbia Springs
the soldiers were occupied with collecting and inspecting
muskets, rifles, pistols and swords.

The weapons were to

be cleaned and those that required repairs were to be boxed
for shipment by sea to one of the nation’s arsenals.^

At

New Orleans the soldiers were to make minor repairs to the
hospital until it could be determined whether or not to
completely rennovate the building.

Orders were also given

that finally settled the question of where the commander of
49

.

Secretary of War to Macomb, Nov. 1, 1809, Ibid.,

----

220

50

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Sept. 10, 1809,
and Secretary of War to Hampton, Sept. 10, 1809, Ibid.,
206.
---^Secretary of War to Cushing, Nov. 28, 1809, Ibid.,
233; Secretary of War to Pike, Dec. 13, 1809, Ibid., 24^.
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the troops in New Orleans would live.

If a site could be

found and bricks purchased at a slight cost, the soldiers
were to build the commander a house.

At Fort Stoddert the

soldiers were assigned the task of either repairing or
making new carriages for the six pound cannons at the

post.^
Except for those soldiers caught up in the problems
at Terre au Boeufs, the year 1809 was quiet, and 1810 held
little promise that it would be different.

One historian

of the Army, William A. Ganoe, wrote of 1810, after
skipping the proceeding year completely:
In 1810 little of account happen
for the Army. The uniform was radi
cally changed to single breasted coats
without facings and with silver lace
along the buttonholes. There was
also prescribed the silk hat (much
like the civilian one at present)
with a cockade on the side.
West Point's faculty was in
creased by teachers of "drawing
and of the French language."53
With this statement he moved on to 1811 and a
discussion of the United States on the eve of the War of
1812.

The Army was not involved in any activities that

would bring fame and glory to its officers and men during
1810, but it accomplished more than simply changing the
52

Secretary of War to Pike, Dec. 5, 1809, Ibid.,
237; Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 30, 1809* Ibid.*
253.
^^William A. Ganoe, The History of the United
State8 Army (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company,
Inc./ 1 W T , 112.
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design of its uniform.

The adoption of the new uniform

was probably the least important event of the year for
the officers and men who were required to spend most of
their time on the frontier engaged in hard manual labor.
The process of building and repairing fortifi
cations and abandoning the posts that had outlived their
usefulness continued during the first months of 1810.
Instead of building a fort to protect the area of the
St. Mary’s River, the War Department decided to assign a
number of gunboats to patrol the surrounding waters.

To

supplement the boats, heavy cannons mounted on traveling
carriages would be stationed at the mouth of the river.
In order to house the guns when they were not being used,
an arsenal was to be built.

The barracks near Washington,

North Carolina, were no longer needed and were to be sold
and the money placed in the treasury.
surrendered to the owner of the land.

While one

The lease was to be
54

site was being sold, the War Department

ordered that the land at Old Topsail Inlet, on which the
fort at Beaufort, North Carolina, stood, should be pur
chased.

The government’s agent, Brian Hellen, was told to

purchase the six acres and have the deed made out to the
President.

He was cautioned not to pay more than two

^Secretary of War to Bourke, Feb. 6, 1810, SWLS,
Roll 4, 275; Secretary of War to Orr, Jan. 30, 1810, Ibid.,

.
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hundred dollars for the site, and less if possible.
At Fort Johnston, Major Joseph G. Swift was ordered
to remove all of the government's buildings onto the site
recently ceded to the United States by North Carolina.
His expenditures for the movement, improvement of existing
facilities, and the construction of new buildings was not
to exceed $5,000.

Swift was to assume command of the

troops and garrison until the work was completed in order
to speed the work by utilizing the soldiers stationed at
56
Beaufort.
At Charleston the construction work had been
dragging, and in March Macomb was informed that appropri
ations for construction in South Carolina had been exceeded
and all work except the mounting of cannons should be
suspended.

However, in April he was ordered to complete

the barracks and cisterns at Castle Pinckney.

By May

Macomb was authorized to spend an additional $20,000 to
complete Castle Pinckney; the sum was to include the
covering of Fort Littleton which required a little addi
tional work to complete it.

He was ordered to suspend

work on the buildings at Rocky Mount and turn the public
property over to the commanding officer.

300.

In June the

^Secretary of War to Hellen, Mar. 14, 1810, Ibid.,
56

Secretary of War to Swift, Apr. 9» 1810 and
Secretary of War to Roberts, Apr. 9, 1810, Ibid., 31617.
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Secretary of War again cautioned Macomb not to exceed the
$20,000 appropriation.

57

In Louisiana the work

on the fortificationswas

not moving much more rapidly than at

Charleston. On

April 3» 1810, the Secretary of War informed the military
agent, William Swan, that it had been expected that the
works would have been completed at an earlier date.

The

Secretary said:
The monies expended in that country
for this object, have far exceeded
every calculation and
unless the
works can be finished
with a small
additional expense, the authority
of this department must be interposed
to Arrest the p r o g r e s s . 58
By mid-May Major MacRea was informed that the funds
for the works had been exhausted and that he was to stop
construction.

The existing works were to be secured and

all workers were to be discharged.

If any other work was

necessary, it should be performed by the troops stationed
at the sites.

An additional source of labor was made

available when corporal punishment was abolished.

Instead

of d^ath, offenders were sentenced to hard labor or
solitary confinement.

59

57

Secretary of War to Macomb, Mar. 6, 1810, Ibid.,
293; Secretary of War to Macomb, Apr. 14, 1810, Ibid., 332;
Secretary of War to Macomb, May 8, 1810, Ibid., 340; Sec
retary of War to Macomb, June 4, 1810, Ibid., 367.
^Secretary of War to Swan, Apr. 3» 1810, Ibid., 31 3«
^Secretary of War to MacRea, May 18, 1810, and
Secretary of War to Swan, May 18, 1810, Ibid., 353;
Secretary of War to Cushing, May 16, 1810, Ibid., 349-50.
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In the spring the War Department announced that
it was prepared to issue the yearly supply of clothes to
the troops, "but it could not do so because

it had re

ceived no recent returns from the various commanding
officers stating the quantities required.

General Hampton

was informed that the present issue would be filled by
using the last available returns, whifch indicated that
there were 1,166 men under his command.

If the clothing

sent on the basis of the old returns was not sufficient,
the soldiers would be forced to wear their

old uniforms.

In addition to the delay of the clothing issue, the pay
of the soldiers was in arrears.^0
The problems .concerning the clothing issue and
the payment of the soldiers was fairly typical of the
administration of the Army.
has stated:

One observer, Lynton Caldwell

"Jefferson's reluctance to insist upon an

energetic, well-organized federal administration system .
had left a legacy of military incompetence in the Army
and administrative ineptitude in the War Department."^1
The War Department was not inept, it was simply too small
to meet the countless demands made upon it.

In 1812 the

Department consisted of only the Secretary and a dozen
clerks.

These thirteen men were responsible for directing

the activities of the Army and managing the nation's
^Secretary of War to Smith, Feb. 22, 1810, and
Secretary of War to Hampton, Feb. 23, 1810, Ioid.t 286-87.
61

Lynton K. Caldwell, The Administrative Theories
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Indian affairs.

By 1821 the size of the Department had

been increased to include twenty clerks.

62

Leonard D. White has observed:
The Secretary of War was not
only the head of the department,
attending as such to the claims
of pensioners, the grant of military
land warrants, and the supervision
of Indian agents, he also had to act
in a strictly military capacity as
adjutant general, quartermaster
general, commissary general, pay
master, and as appellate authority
for review of courts martial. . . .
The Secretary and his clerks spent most of their time
processing hundreds of letters, dealing with countless
subjects, that were addressed to the Department.

As a

result, the small staff had insufficient time to devote
to the important task of directing the activities of the
Army.*’4
In 1813 efforts were made to improve the admin
istration of the Army by the creation of a General Staff.
of Hamilton and Jefferson (Chicago:
Press, 1944), ilT.

University of Chicago

^^Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians: A Study
in Administrative History. 1H(5T-1829 (rtew York: The S'ree
Press," 1955), 215, 234. For administrative studies of
the War Department during other periods see: Leonard D.
White, The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History,
1789-1801" (llew York: The Free Press, 1$65); and Leonard
L. Whi'fce, The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative
History. 18 £9-TS£l (New~?orkT t h eFree Press, 1^65).
^"Vhite, The Jeffersonians, 235.
64Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

218
But this designation was misleading because the members
of the General Staff were the civilian and military
officials concerned with the housekeeping functions of
the Army.

At the same time each military district also

had its own staff which duplicated those of the General
Staff.65
After the War of 1812 the members of the General
Staff remained in Washington and acted as advisors to the
Secretary of War.

This marked the beginning of a bureau

system within the Army and brought a degree of organization
and expertise to the administration of the Army.

However,

the administration still did not operate efficiently and
breakdowns were frequent.

During the late 1820's the

issuance of regulations to govern the various branches of
the Army was an effort to improve the administration of
the Army.

Despite the various feeble attempts to improve

the management of the Army, the system continued to function
poorly.

The soldiers continued to suffer from the effects

of a faulty administration until a more efficient system
65

The General Staff included: the adjutant and
inspector general, and two assistants; the quartermaster
general; the commissary general of ordnance, and three
assistants-; the paymaster of the army; and the assistant
topographical engineer. ASPMA, I, 385-392. Included in
the district staff were: the district commander; adjutant
general and inspector general; assistant quartermaster
general; deputy commissary of ordnance; engineers, surgeons;
judge advocates; chaplains; paymasters; deputy commissary
of purchases; and military storekeepers. "Rules and Re
gulations of the Army of the United States," May 1, 1813,
Ibid., 425-ff.
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was finally established during the Civil War.
On June 22, 1810, two paymasters were appointed,
one for the Territory of Orleans and the other for the
Mississippi Territory.

The action was prompted by a

memorial from the officers in command of the survivors
of the Terre au Boeufs episode.

The petition stated that

the troops had not been paid during the period from June
of 1809 to March of 1810.

When they had finally been

paid, it was only for the period to the end of 1809.

The

Secretary of War requested that Mat least during the
summer and autumn months, the troops at this and every
other post where it may be practicable may receive their
pay monthly as it shall become due.M

The law required

that the payments be made at least every two months if
not more frequently.^
By July the Secretary of War felt that the problem
of paying the troops was solved, and it was assumed that
there would be no further delays.

However, there were

still problems concerning the clothing issue.

Although

supplies of clothes were stored at New Orleans, returns
67
had still not been received for some of the garrisons.
^Secretary of War to Brent, June 22, 1810, SWLS,
Roll 4, 385; Secretary of War to Brent, June 23, 1 81^
Ibid., 387.
^Secretary of War to Cushing, June 29, 1810,
Ibid., 391-92; Secretary of War to Cushing, July 13,
1810, Ibid.. 404; Secretary of War to Irvine, July 19,
1810, and Secretary of War to Coxe, July 19, 1810, Ibid.,
407-408; Secretary of War to Irvine, July 27, 1810,
Ibid.. 411-12.
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While many of the soldiers went unpaid and wore their old
uniforms, they continued to execute a variety of orders.
On March 2, 1810, General Hampton was instructed
to remove his troops from the vicinity of Natchez during
the summer months.

The Secretary of War suggested that

they be moved north into the forests, where they might
avoid the sickness so prevalent in the South.

The move

ment could be made without endangering the security of
New Orleans.

There was no cause to think that the troops

would be called upon to descend the river during the
coming months.
One week later the Secretary cautioned the General
not to mix the new soldiers arriving at his camp with the
old soldiers who were still recovering from their exper
ience at Terre au Boeufs.
troops be removed:
army on earth.

Again he suggested that the

"This is the secret of health to every

None particularly so to that which you

command, and in that climate.

I should prefer another

hundred leagues north to the hazard even of an imaciated

„68

camp. . . . "

In an effort to improve the quality of the rations
issued to the men, the Secretary of War authorized the
military agents to supply the troops with pulse or some
kind of vegetables.

They were also to exchange the ration

68

Secretary of War to Hampton, Mar. 2, 1810, Ibid.,
289-90; Secretary of War to Hampton, Mar. 9, 1810, Ibid..
296-97.
----
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of bread for cornmeal, because the flour tended to sour
in the summer months.

In addition, the occasional sub

stitution of vegetables for other parts of the ration
might be permitted if the commanding officer of a specific
post agreed.

On April 27, 1810, orders were issued to

send the summer clothes, medicine and hospital stores to
the troops on the Mississippi, if it had not been done
already.^
At Charleston the soldiers were busy not only
with construction work but were also employed in the
armory.

Under the direction of officers, the men inspected

the arms, cleaned the muskets, pistols, and swords, and
painted the ordnance.

Any weapons found to be unserv-

iceable were to be shipped to Springfield for repairs.

70

Many of the tasks performed by the troops were
trivial and-were undertaken merely to avoid the appearance
of idleness.

The men 3pent long hours engaged in boring

jobs that accomplished little, other than adding to the
drudgery of their daily lives.

While many of the soldiers

labored on important projects, many others were engaged in
69

Secretary of War to Morrison, Mar. 5, 1810,
Ibid.. 293; Secretary of War to Morrison, May 15, 1810,
Ibid.. 347; Secretary of War to Cushing, May 16, 1810,
Ibid... 349-50; Secretary of War to Irvine, Apr. 27, 1810,
ibid.. 333. Pulse is the edible seeds of peas, beans,
lentils, and similar plants having pods; or a pottage
made of meal or pulse.
70

Secretary of War to Smith, Mar. 22, 1810 and
Secretary of War to Irvine, Mar. 22, 1810, Ibid., 305.
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an endless round of frivolous chores.
In the Mississippi Territory the soldiers were
engaged in an activity that was becoming increasingly
important.

They were protecting the white settlers from

the Indians and the Indians from the white settlers.

In

March the Secretary of War informed Governor William
Blount that steps had been taken to eliminate the problem
of Indian raids upon the people from Tennessee who wished
71
to trade with Mobile.
But more importantly, the Army
was removing white intruders from lands still held by the
Indians.

As early as March 4, 1809, Thomas Freeman had

informed the Secretary of the Treasury that trouble was
developing in Madison County in Mississippi Territory.
Settlers had moved onto the Indian lands, and the Indians
were threatening to remove them by force if the United
72
States did not take some action.
On March 28, 1810, the
Secretary of War requested a legal opinion from Caesar
Rodney, asking if the United States had the right, under
their 1806 treaty with the Cherokee, to eject the whites.
He told the Judge:

"let me add that an early decision is

very desirable, as measures are required to be taken without
delay.
Secretary of War to Blount, Mar. 6 , 1810, Ibid.,
293.
72
Freeman to Secretary of the Treasury, Mar. 4,
1809, Clarence E. Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers of
the United States. V: The Mississippi Territory
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1^37), 720-22.
^Secretary of War to Rodney, Mar. 28, 1810, Ibid.,
310.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

223
On May 4 the Secretary sent a letter to General
Hampton advising him that the intruders should he removed
from the lands in Madison County.

He recommended that

the troops from the post at Highwassee be moved into the
area below the Muscle Shoals in order to be in a position
to act against the invaders.

These troops would be re

inforced by two companies drawn from Natchez.

The

soldiers were to establish a new post:
The post at the Highwassee ceases,
from the settlement of the country
to be either important or useful.
Occupying a more advanced post in
the neighborhood of the public
lands most intruded on, will more
essentially secure them, at the
same time that it will protect
the rights of our own citizens,
a3 well as those of the Indians.
Hampton was to arrange the movement and select the
site for the post.

He was cautioned:

"In the present

undetermined state of our foreign relations, our object
is in all necessary movements, and in preserving generally
the present state, to incur as little expense as possible."
On May 20, 1810, Governor Holmes of the Mississippi
Territory informed James Neelly, agent to the Chickasaws,
that the subject of the intruders was before the Secretary
of War.

The Governor felt that the order to remove them

would be given during the course of the summer.

75

^Secretary of War to Hampton, May 4, 1810, Ibid.,
338-39.
^Holmes to Neelly, May 20, 1810, Clarence E.
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On June 15 the necessary orders were given to
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Purdy, who commanded the force,
to remove the trespassers from the Indian lands.

In

Axigust Purdy was ordered not to select a permanent site
for the new post until he was certain that it was
healthy.

76

On September 13 the removal of another group

of whites in the same area was authorized.
at a critical moment.

The order came

The Indians, angered by the in

trusions, were attacking whites traveling through their
lands.

These attacks had caused the Indian agent to post

notices advising travelers to use only the public trace
or their safety could not be guaranteed.

77

The process of removal was carried out with relative
mildness.

Colonel Purdy was told that if widows and

orphans, who did not possess the means of removing them
selves, were found among the intruders, he was to afford
them all of the assistance he could.

In addition, if their

immediate removal meant that they would be forced to leave
Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers of the United States, VI:
The Mississippi Territory (tfashiruFFon: Government PrinTTne
S m ce, ’191977 '68.
"^Secretary of War to Holmes, June 15, 1810, SWLS,
Roll 4, 380; Secretary of War to Hampton, June 15, 1810,
in Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, 70-71; Secretary of
War to Purdy, July 7, 1810, SWL’5’7 Roll 4, 396-97; Sec
retary of War to Purdy, Aug. 20, 1810, Ibid., 421-22.
77

Holmes to Neelly, Aug. 5, 1810, Carter,
Territorial Papers, VI, 95.
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their crops behind they should be allowed a reasonable
time to harvest them.

If the troops found others during

the removal process who fell into this category, the
officers were to use their discretion in deciding what
to do, and were ". . . to be governed by considerations
78
of clemency and humanity as occasion may require.”
The soldiers were involved in other removals in
Louisiana.

Settlers had moved into the neutral ground

between the Sabine River and the Arroyo Hondo.

A force

of an equal number of Spanish and American soldiers were
ta cooperate in a joint operation to remove the intruders.
At New Orleans whites had filtered back onto the public
land at the batture and had to be removed by the
soldiers.

79

In an effort to gether more information about the
means of communication between Mobile and the Tennessee
rivers, two expeditions were dispatched from Fort Stoddert
in the summer of 1810.

Captain Gaines, who had made a

similar exploration the previous year, was to proceed by
water and land to Highwassee and return to Fort Stoddert
78

Secretary of War to Smyth and Purdy, Oct. 18,
1810, SWLS. 449-50; See "Petition to the President and
Congress by Intruders on Chickasaw Lands," Sept. 5, 1810,
in Carter, Territorial Papers. V I . 106-13. The petition
bears the names of 450 settlers who were occupying the
Indian lands.
79
Secretary of War to Cu 3hing, May 24, 1810, SWLS,
Roll 4, 358; Secretary of War to Jefferson, June 4, 1816,
Ibid.. 367-68.
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by water.

A second party was to follow the Indian trails

overland to Highwassee and return with Gaines by water.
The parties were to be no larger than absolutely necessary
so as not to alarm the Indians, who were to be informed of
the purpose of the expeditions.

The Secretary of War

ordered:
The commanding officer of each detach
ment will keep a journal of his pro
ceedings in which are to be stated as
correctly as practicable, the daily
progress he makes, the distances from
points on
the route, the quality of
the soil,
the kind of timber and face
of the country, the rapidity of the
current and the depth of water, with
such other remarks as he may deem
useful or necessary to gain a full
knowledge of the Country .80
The detachments could not have been made at a
worse time, because there was trouble developing around
Port Stoddert that could have endangered the friendly
relations between

the United States and Spain. On June 20,

1810, Cayetano Perez,

commandant of Mobile, informed

Maximiliano de St. Maxent, temporary governor of West
Florida, that a plot against Mobile was contemplated by
81
some of the residents in the area of Port Stoddert.
The
plot involved a secret organization called the "Mobile
80

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Port
Stoddert, June 23, 1810, Ibid., 386; Secretary of War to
Hampton, July 13, 1810, Ibid.. 404; Secretary of War to
Blount, June 28, 1810, Ibid.. 390.
81
Perez to St. Maxent, June 20, 1810, A. G. I.,
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 1568.
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Society."

Upon receiving this information, St. Maxent

requested that Richard Sparks, the commander of Port
Stoddert, stop the expedition, if he could.

This was

apparently the first indication that Sparks had that a
plot existed to attack Mobile.

He immediately began an

investigation to determine if the reports had any valid.. 82
xty.
Sparks found that the information from St. Maxent
was essentually accurate and he informed the Secretary of
War of the existence of the plan.

The conspirators con

templated disabling the army at Port Stoddert, seizing the
arms stored there, and capturing Mobile.

The inhabitants

of the area strongly supported the plan because of the
continual problem presented by the Spanish possession of
Mobile.

Sparks stated that he was virtually without troops,

since he had sent two detachments to the Tennessee River and
"owing to an unaccountable aversion which the soldiery have
to this place, they uniformly refuse to re-enlist here.
The manner in which the Garrison has suffered from deser
tions will appear to you Sir no doubt remarkable."

Sparks

requested that his force be reinforced as soon as possible
by four companies of infantry and one company of artillery.^
82

St. Maxent to Sparks, June 15, 1810, in Carter
Territorial Papers, VI, 77; Sparks to St. Maxent. June 27,
1810, A. G. I., SeviTXe, Papele3 de Cuba, leg. 1568;
Sparks to St. Maxent, June 36 , 1877, Ibid.
8^
Sparks to Secretary of War, July 12, 1810, in
Carter, Territorial Papers. V I . 79-82, Sparks’ italics.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

228
As a consequence of the letter from Sparks, the
Secretary of War ordered General Hampton to send him re
inforcements.

However, the troops should wait until late

autumn “before making the move unless it became necessary
to send them sooner.

In an effort to protect the men

from disease, the General was cautioned to send only
veteran troops to Fort Stoddert and not recruits.

A

letter was sent to Sparks informing him that he would be
reinforced.

The Secretary hoped that the efforts to open

the new means of communication by the Tombigbee and the
Alabama to the Mobile would eliminate any need for illegal
action on the part of the citizens.

84

If immediate reinforcements were required at Fort
Stoddert, General Hampton was authorized to detach two
companies of riflemen from Highwassee.

If such a detach

ment were made, additional troops could be sent from the
camps on the Mississippi River to reinforce the command
at Highwassee.

85

The problems around Mobile were soon complicated
by a series of events at Baton Rouge.

In the fall the

Sparks mentioned that a large number of American deserters
were living in the Mobile district. Sparks to St. Maxent,
June 27, 1810, A. G. I., Seville,Papeles de Cuba, leg. 1568.
84
Secretary cf War to Hampton, Aug. 22, 1810, in
Carter, Territorial Papers. VI, 101-102; Secretary of War
to Sparks, Aug. 24, 1sT0, SWlTg-, Roll 4, 426.
85

Secretary of War to Hampton, Aug. 22, 1810, in
Carter, Territorial Papers, V I , 101-102.
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United States troops occupied a portion of Spanish West
Florida.

The occupation was a direct result of a rebellio

by a number of settlers in the Baton Rouge District of
West Florida.

On October 27 President Madison issued a

proclamation authorizing the occupation of the territory
below the Mississippi Territory and east of the Mississipp
River to the Perdido River.

The action was taken because

the United States claimed the area was included in the
purchase of Louisiana from France and because the settlers
had indicated their desire to become a part of the United
States.

86

Governor Claiborne was designated to receive

the territory from the rebels and incorporate it into
Orleans Territory.

To support the Governor when he moved

into St. Francisville and Baton Rouge, a large military
force was assigned to act as his escort.
On October 19 General Hampton was ordered to have
all of the effective troops in the vicinity of Washington,
Mississippi Territory, held in readiness to descend the
river.

The troops were to take four pieces of artillery

with them when they marched.

In addition to the troops,

all of the public boats and gunboats on the river were to
be held ready to transport the troops.

The contractor was

86
Proclamation of the President, Oct. 27, 1810,
in James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, 17^9-189 T “(Washington:
Government’Printing office,”"1856), 1, 480-81 • Isaac
J. Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813: A
Study i: A m e n c a n Diplomacy (Gloucester; Peter Smith,

T^57t.-
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to be notified so that he could have one month’s provi87
sions collected for the force.
Governor Claiborne was in Washington, D. C., when
his commission was issued and he moved rapidly across the
country in order to receive the territory as soon as
possible.

The officers at the various frontier posts

were ordered to offer him every assistance as he jour
neyed to Mississippi.

On October 27 the Secretary of War

informed Hampton that Claiborne was to take possession of
the "country laying South and East of the Mississippi as
OO

a part of the Territory of Orleans."

Claiborne could

requisition as many of the forces on the Mississippi River
as he required to support him.

During the operation the

troops were not to be allowed to go into any town in whose
"vicinity they might be camped."

They were to respect the

rights and property of the citizens and to be "obedient to
the civil authority."
On November 2 orders were issued to the commander
at Natchez by which he was to govern his conduct if Governor
Claiborne had not arrived by the time the letter reached
Natchez.

He was to consult Governor Holmes, and if the

latter recommended in writing that the territory should
^Secretary of War to Hampton, Oct. 19, 1810,
SWLS. Roll 4, 452.

88

Secretary of War to the Commanding Officers at
Posts and Stations on the South West Frontier, Oct. 27,
1810, Ibid., 458; Secretary of War to Hampton or the
Commanding Officer on the Mississippi, Oct. 27, 1810,
Ibid.. 459-60.
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be taken without waiting for Claiborne, the officer was
to:

"proceed with or detach from your command, under a

suitable officer, such number of troops as may be deemed
necessary, take possession of and occupy the post of Baton
gq

Rouge in the name and behalf of the United States."
On November 5 the Secretary of War sent a copy of the
President's proclamation to the commanding officers
stationed on the Mississippi.

90

While the troops in the western part of the
Mississippi Territory were preparing to move into West
Florida, the soldiers in the eastern part of the Territory
were again ordered to evict the intruders in Madison
County.

At the same time Colonel Smyth was warned to

keep his soldiers from becoming farmers on the frontier.
Officers and soldiers were permitted to keep cattle and
hogs, but the Secretary of War cautioned that the raising
of the stock was to be kept within bounds and should not
result in speculation or injury to the service.

91

While the troops were being concentrated in and
around Washington, some of the posts were woefully under
strength.

At the post at the English Turn, there were

89

troops

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer of the
on the Mississippi, Nov. 2, 1810, Ibid., 460-61.
90

troops

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer of the
on the Mississippi, Nov. 5, 1810, Ibid., 463.
91

Secretary of War to Smyth, Nov. 2, 1810, Ibid..
461; Secretary of War to Smyth, Nov. 9, 1810, Ibid.,46 3 64.
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one sergeant, and four privates; at Chickasaw Bluffs and
at the Arkansas, there were a total of two corporals and
six privates.

At Port St. Stephens there was only one

private, who was apparently attached to the factory at
that post.

The Secretary of War questioned whether or

not these small posts were essential.

If they were

needed, they should be supplied with provisions for
several months at a time in order to reduce expenses.

qp

Governor Claiborne arrived at Natchez on December 1
and immediately conferred with Governor Holmes concerning
the appropriate actions to be taken.

They decided that

Claiborne should take possession of the territory as
quickly as possible.

Therefore, he ordered Colonel John

Covington, commanding the troops on the Mississippi, to
have two hundred and fifty to three hundred troops ready
to march to Pointe Coupee on the west side of the river.
The troops were to be held there until ordered to cross
into the District of Baton Rouge.

The remaining troops

were to be prepared to follow the governor and his escort.
The next day Claiborne increased his request to include
seven to eight hundred men to move "with all possible
dispatch."

But at "least" two hundred and fifty were to

move to Pointe Coupee at once.

q\

92

Secretary of War to Hampton, Nov. 19, 1810,
SWLS. Roll 5, 3; Secretary of War to Mason, Aug. 31,
TBTU, SWLS. Roll 4, 428.
93

Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 1, 1810, and Claiborne
to Covington, Dec. 1, 1810, in Dunbar Rowland (ed.),
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On December 7 Claiborne stated that he had taken
possession of St. Francisville without any opposition.
If he encountered resistance at Baton Rouge, "the troops
of the United States will be commanded to take the fort."
Five days later Claiborne reported that he had taken
possession of Baton Rouge on the tenth without resorting
to force.

04.

The disturbance at Baton Rouge was the subject of
some concern at Fort Stoddert and Mobile.

The Spanish

officials and Colonel Cushing, who had been sent to command
at Stoddert, were afraid that the Mobile Society might
seize this opportunity to move against Mobile.

Cushing

was informed that if the Spanish should voluntarily offer
to abandon any of the posts in the area described in the
President's proclamation, he was to garrison them with
troops from his command.

95

In orders of the same date the Secretary stated:
"the reinforcement of Fort Stoddert have for its object
the security of the post and the preservation of the public
Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne. 1801-1816
(.Jackson: State Department of Archives and History,
1917), V, 34-37. Hereinafter cited as WCC. Claiborne
to Covington, Dec. 2, 1810, Ibid., 38-3$* Claiborne's
italics.
94

Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 7, 1810, Ibid.. 46-50;
Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 12, 1810, Ibid.. 53-56. Claiborne's
italics.
95

Secretary of War to Cushing, Dec. 21, 1810,
SWLS. Roll 5, 24.
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peace but more particularly the prevention and defeat of
a military enterprise against the Spanish posses
sions. . .
On December 21 Colonel Sparks informed Claiborne
that he suspected that the people in the vicinity of
Port Stoddert would use the revolt in West Florida as
an excuse to attack Mobile.

In an effort to stop the

citizens from attacking the Spanish, he had sent Captain
Gaines to Mobile to guard the fort.

However, the Spanish

had eighty to one hundred men posted in the fort, a
formidible structure mounting thirty-six pieces of heavy
artillery, surrounded by a deep ditch and with walls that
were eighteen feet thick.

97

Claiborne had ordered Colonel Cushing to take
possession of Mobile if the Spanish would voluntarily
withdraw.

But he had also informed Sparks that if the

Spanish did not surrender the fort on demand he was to
await further orders as to what actions he should take.
If Sparks learned that any of the settlers were contem
plating an attack upon Pensacola, he was to do everything
possible to stop them.

98

96

Secretary of War to Hampton, Dec. 21, 1810,
Ibid.. 25.
97
^'Sparks to Claiborne, Dec. 21, 1810, Rowland,
WCC. V, 73-75.
98

Claiborne to Sparks, Dec. 23, 1810, Ibid.,

76-77.
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Fortunately for the continued existence of peace,
Colonel Cushing arrived at Mobile before the American
troops began a war.

Colonel Sparks had called out the

militia in his district, in addition to sending Captain
Gaines with a force of fifty regulars to demand the
surrender of Mobile.

The Spanish Commandant had refused

the demand, and Colonel Sparks had sent a company of
mounted riflemen to support the regulars.

Also, he was

preparing to send the remaining troops, both regulars
and militia, from Fort Stoddert to join Gaines at Mobile.
This was the situation Colonel Cushing found when he
arrived at Mobile.
await instructions.

Dismissing the militia, he decided to
99

On January 24 the Secretary of War informed General
Hampton and Colonel Cushing that plans had been made to
take possession of "all or any part of the territory lying
east of the River Perdido, and south of the state of
Georgia and the Mississippi Territory.”

This action was

to be taken only if the Spanish officials agreed to
surrender their control to the United States.

General

George Matthews had been authorized to negotiate with the
Spanish and to supervise the occupation if the occasion
presented itself.

He was to be supported by the Army and

99

Cushing to Claiborne, Jan. 8 , 1811, in Carter,
Territorial Papers, VI, 167-68; Holmes to Secretary of
State, Feb. 2 , 1811, Ibid.. 173-75.
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Navy if he requested their help.

If such a surrender was

offered before Matthews arrived, the two officers were to
occupy the territory until General Matthews arrived.1^0
The Spanish declined to surrender the town and
Cushing withdrew his foree from Mobile to Port Stoddert
upon orders from General Hampton.
wrote of the removal:

Judge Harry Toulmin

”1 regret this step, - as I fear

that many of the citizens at Mobile have so far committed
themselves with the Spanish officers - that they may now
feel their displeasure.”

101

The occupation of West Florida between the
Mississippi and the Perdido rivers removed a situation
that had been causing problems since the United States
first occupied the Louisiana Purchase.

As the new year

began, the troops were returned to their garrisons to
resume the dreary peacetime routine.

There were thirty-

nine companies with a strength of approximately 2,300
soldiers stationed in the southern part of the country.
For most of these men the rest of the year would be a
period of relative inactivity.

102

The removal of the

1^Secretary of War to Hampton and Cushing,
Jan. 24, 1811, SWLS. Roll 5, 41-42; Secretary of War
to Smith, Jan. 26, 1811, Ibid.. 54. Both letters
were marked confidential.
^01Toulmin to the President, Feb. 6, 1811, in
Carter, Territorial Papers. V I . 175-77. Toulmin's
italics.
102
Secretary of War to Irvine, Feb. 12, 1811,
SWLS. Roll 5, 58-61,
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intruders in the Mississippi Territory continued.

The

commanding officer was given discretion to grant indul
gences in point of time to the individuals occupying
Indian lands.

In South Carolina the work on the forti

fications continued, but expenditures were to be held to

S9 ,000 and completed as rapidly as possible.

General

Hampton was instructed not to make any expenditures for
fortifications that might be erected in the territory
acquired as a result of the President's Proclamation.1®^
On July 20 General Hampton was ordered to begin
the construction of three roads, the only major undertaking
of the year.

The first road was to begin in the vicinity

of Muscle Shoals and run to the Mobile.

The object was

to provide a means of transportation for the inhabitants
of Tennessee to the Gulf.

The second road was to run from

Port Stoddert to Colonel Hawkins' station on the Flint
River, and the third was to be opened from Port Stoddert
to Baton Rouge.

The roads were to be constructed by the

troops under the general's command.

Primary consideration

was to be given to the road from the Tennessee to Port
Stoddert, the others would be built as conditions would
admit.

The construction of the roads by soldiers was

justified because:

"The United States must have roads

1®^Secretary of War to Troup, Feb. 12, 1811, Ibid..
62; Secretary of War to Macomb, Mar. 9» 1811, Ibid.. 77;
Secretary of War to Hampton, Mar. 14, 1811, Ibid.. 81.
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for the purpose of transporting their ordnance and military
stores from one military post to another, . . ,H
The Secretary of War cautioned Hampton that the
Indians should be informed of the reasons for the large
number of soldiers moving through their territory so as
not to alarm them.

The Secretary envisioned a rapid com

pletion of the road from the Tennessee by having the
troops from Highwassee work south and those from Port
104
Stoddert work north.
The construction of a trans
portation system was important, but the condition of the
nation'8 defenses required more than good roads.
As the nation drifted toward war with Bngland, the
United States Army was also drifting.

The only positive

action that had been taken was the construction of a
system of coastal fortifications.

By 1812 there had been

completed twenty-four forts and thirty-two enclosed
batteries and masonry works, armed with 750 guns of all
calibers.

Theoretically this system would have required

12,610 soldiers to man them adequately.

In December of

1811 President Madison asked that the military force be
strengthened.

He requested that the existing regiments

be recruited to full strength and that 10,000 men be
authorized for new regiments.

In addition, he asked that

104

Secretary of War to Hampton, July 20, 1811,
Ibid., 177-78.
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he be authorized to accept 50,000 Federal volunteers.

To

finance the volunteer regiments the President requested
an appropriation of $3,000,000.
Congress responded to Madison's requests, but not
on the scale that he had wanted.

They authorized the

President to accept 30,000 Federal volunteers, presumably
to come from the existing militia organizations.

The

regular army was to be increased to 25,000 men, including
thirteen new regiments.

To finance the volunteer re-

giments, Congress appropriated $1,000,000.

105

While the appropriation was not as large as the
President had requested, it represented a substantial sum
when considered in the light of past appropriations for
the military establishment.

In the entire period from

March 4, 1789. to December 31» 1809, the disbursements
for the whole military establishment had amounted to
only $ 3 0 , 9 4 1 , 6 6 9 . 4 7 . By the time war was declared,
the Regular Army numbered only 6,744 men, not the 25,000
men authorized by law.

Most of this force was scattered

along the coast and across the frontier, with the largest
single concentration reported at Baton Rouge and Pass
10*5
^Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 113;
Callan, Military Laws of t5e United Spates. 212-16. 220221; Richardson. Messages and Papers. 1. 494; Niles
Weekly Register. Dec. 7, 1BTT.
^^Report submitted to the House of Representatives
Apr. 5, 1810, ASPMA. I, 268.
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Christian, where there were 1,244 soldiers.

The second

largest concentration was in the harbor of New York,
where 901 men manned the defenses.

107

Most of the officers who held high command in the
Army before the war were either old veterans from the
Revolution or influential politicians.

During the War

of 1812 the old revolutionary officers were typified by
Henry Dearborn and William Hull.

In writing of Dearborn

a contemporary, Charles Peterson., summarized the weak
nesses of most of the old officers:
Age had dampened his ardor, and
weakened his energy: instead of
being the first to lead, he was
content to delegate this task to
others. Forty years had completely
changed his changed his character.
In 1776 he had been distinguished
for promptitude and fire; in 1812
1Qg
he was remarkable only for inactivity.
In 1815 a report on the length of service of some
of the officers of the Army illustrated the prospects for

107
'Report of the military force in June, 1812,
Ibid.. 319-20. The breakdown of the 6,744 men was as
follows: St. Mary's River in Georgia, 194; Fort Hawkins,
73; New Orleans and Fort St. John, 143; Pass Christian
and Baton Rouge, 1,244; Natchitoches, 89; Fort Hampton
and Highwassee, 169; Fort Massac, 36; Belle Fontaine,
134; Fort Osage, 63; Fort Madison, 44; Vincennes, 117;
Hichillimackinack, 88; Fort Dearborn, 53; Fort Wayne,
85; Detroit, 119; On the march to Detroit, 430; Charleston,
175; New York, 901; Newport, 193; Boston, 131; and Fort
Miffin, 65.
10S

Charleston J • Peterson, The Military Heroes of
the War of 1812. with a Narrative of th e W a r (5 ed.,
Philadelphia: William~A. Leavy k So., 184'$J. "He was
conquered by his own fears, not by the prowess of the
enemy," 4.
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most officers.

The number of years of service for the

eleven men surveyed ranged from twenty-five years for
Major William Beall to thirty-eight years for Colonel
Jacob Kingsbury.

The age of the officers varied from

fifty-three to sixty-four years.

The old officers had

seen long years of service and most of them were no
longer capable of effective leadership.

10Q
*

Most of the appointments from civilian life fared
little better than did the old generals with two excep
tions, Jacob Brown and Andrew Jackson.

Brown was a com

petent militia general who trained his men rigorously
and led them well.
single category.

Jackson was atypical and fitted no
He possessed the same characteristic

that President Washington had seen in Anthony Wayne, the
"overwhelming desire to meet and annilate the enemy."
Chambers wrote to Jackson:

"There never, perhaps, was

a warrior of greater resolution than Jackson."110
Of more importance for the postwar Army was the
rise to prominence of a number of young officers, such
as Winfield Scott and Edmund P. Gaines, all of whom had

1Q9Niles Weekly Register. VII, Feb. 11, 1815; the
officers, years of service and age were: General James
Wilkinson, 32, 63; General Burbeck, 30, 62; General
Cushing, 32, 56; General Porter, 35, 57; General Bissell,
27, 59; Colonel Freeman, 27, 63; Colonel Kingsburg, 38,
57; Colonel Sparks, 27, 53; Major Pike, 32, 64; Major
Whistler, 26, 58; Major Beall, 25, 59.
1812

.

110Chambers, The Military Heroes of the War of
197

.
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been members of the Army prior to the war and had learned
their trade well.

The young men rose rapidly once the

war began and they quickly demonstrated their competence
and ability to command.

There was no conclusive evidence

produced by the War of 1812 as to whether Regulars were
superior to militia or vice versa.
around leadership:

The question revolved

If the troops were badly led they

performed poorly; if they were well led, they fought well,
whether they were Regulars or militia.

But the war was

not the glorious affair that had been predicted in 1811
and 1812 by the War Hawks.

However, the Army gained one

thing from the war at the Battle of Chippawa.
wrote of this encounter:

Henry Adams

“Small as the affair was and

unimportant in military results, it gave to the United
States Army a character and pride it had never before
possessed."111
But pride was of little tangible value, and on
March 3, 1815, Congress drastically reduced the wartime
Army.

The force as outlined by Congress would have an

authorized strength of 12,383 officers and enlisted men,
and the regiment of dragoons disappeared from the Army's
organization.

The commissioned officers that were re

tained must have served in the war, and preference was
111

Henry Adams, History of the United States During
the Administrations of Jefferson and Ma3ison
Vols..
llew York: Charles Seritners, 1883-19^5, VlII, 45.
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given to the graduates of the Military Academy.

112

During the war the country had been divided into
nine military districts in an effort to achieve a more
efficient organization of the Army.

On May 17, 1815, the

wartime districts were abandoned and the country was
divided into two divisions, the Northern and Southern.
Major General Jacob Brown commanded the former and Major
General Andrew Jackson commanded the latter.

Within each

division there were smaller administrative units, con
sisting of the old military departments.

There were five

departments in the North and four in the South, each com
plete with its own staff system.
With the return of peace, the large concentrations
of troops that had been gathered during the war were
scattered across the frontier.

In 1815 there was every

reason to believe that the peace would not be broken,
and the War Department expected that the problem of re
turning the Army to a peacetime 3tatus could proceed at
a leisurely pace.

The new administrative system would be

tested to the utmost as the Army was broken up into small
units.

Bor the common soldiers the return of peace meant

the beginning of another round of thankless tasks to be
performed.

112

266-67.

Callan. Military Laws of the United States,
-------------------------
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CHAPTER V
THE ARMY ATTEMPTS TO BRING
PEACE TO THE FRONTIER
The government's expectations of a period of
quiet in which to return to a peacetime organization
were not realized.

Problems with the Indians continued

after the war was concluded.

On May 22 the Secretary of

War ordered General Jackson to furnish an escort for the
party that was to survey the boundary outlined in the
Treaty of Fort Jackson.1

The task of maintaining peace

along the Florida frontier was assigned to General Edmund
P. Gaines.

By June Gaines had assembled a force of about

1,000 men along the frontier and was requesting additional
troops in an effort to make an impression on the Indians.
In September Gaines requested a force of 6,000 men to aid
in the work of surveying and marking the new boundary line.
1Secretary of War to.Jackson, May 22, 1815, in
Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. letters
Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Record
Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 8, 107-109. Hereinafter
cited as SWLS.
2
James W. Silver, Edmund Pendleton Gaines, Frontier
General (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Staie tfniversiiy Press,
1$47), 57-58.
244
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The War Department anticipated trouble with the
Indians and had authorized Jackson to make requests for
militia from the states and territories until reinforce
ments could be sent from other posts.

The Indian opposition

to the survey was attributed to the activities of a British
agent, Colonel Edmund Nicholls.

He had been working to

persuade the Creeks to join the Spanish and British, and
to denounce the Treaty of Port Jackson.

He told the

Indians they should demand that the United States abide by
the agreements of 1811.

He suggested that if the Indians

supported the British these would be guaranteed.^
In an effort to conciliate the Indians, General
Gaines was allowed to distribute provisions among the
Indians who were without food.

He was also to determine

the Spanish opinion of Nicholl’s activities at Appalachicola.
As additional assurances to the Indians, Colonel Benjamin
Hawkins, the Creek Indian Agent, was ordered to accompany
the commissioners when they marked the boundary.

The War

Department believed that his influence with the Indians
might help to remove their objections to the running of
the line.

In August General Jackson was authorized to

draw $40,000 from the War Department, if the hostile
attitude of the Creeks make it necessary to extend more
protection to the frontier.

General Gaines estimated that

^Secretary of War to Jackson, June 12, 1815, SWLS.
Roll 8, 155-56; Augusta Mirror. May 29, 1815.
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moving the troops to protect the commissioners would cost
127,215.

By November 1 it was reported that the commission

ers were running the boundary lines without opposition
4
from the Indians.
Throughout the rest of the South, the period from
the end of the War of 1812 to December of 1815 was devoted
to the job of returning to a peacetime status.

On

November 11 the Secretary of War informed the Quarter
master General, Callender Irvine, that the peace estab
lishment consisted of 9,980 men, exclusive of non-commis5
sioned officers and musicians.
Early in 1316 the War Department began a survey
to determine where new fortifications should be constructed
and which of the existing fortifications should be improved
and expanded.

The Secretary of War requested that the

governors of the various states have their legislatures
cede the land needed if they had not already done so.^
The construction of the new works was a logical result of
the War of 1812 when many of the permanent fortifications
had been found to be inadequate.

By May the sum of

^Secretary of War to Gaines, July 5, 1815, SWLS,
Roll 8, 196; Secretary of War to Hawkins, July 15, 1815,
Ibid., 210-11; Secretary of War to Jackson, Aug. 25, 1815,
T E H . , 293-95; Secretary of War to Gaines, Oct. 4, 1815,
Ibid.. 353-54; Georgia Argus. Nov. 1, 1815.
^Secretary of War to Irvine, Nov. 11, 1815. SWLS,
Roll 8, 330.
---^Secretary of War to Governors, Jan. 22, 1816,
427.
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$838,000 had been appropriated by Congress for the con
struction of fortifications during 1816.

The Secretary

of War informed General Joseph G. Swift that it had been
decided that the soldiers who worked on the fortifications
were to receive an extra fifteen cents a day and an
additional ration of spirits.

The payments were to be

made at the end of each month and would enable the soldiers
to almost double their monthly salary.

The construction

of the works was delayed because Congress had authorized
the President to employ a foreign engineer, General Simon
Bernard, a French engineer, who was expected to arrive
during the late summer or early fall.

The work would not
7
begin until he had conferred with Swift.
In addition to expanding the nation’s fortifi
cations, the Army was also ordered to remove intruders
on Indian lands.

These settlers had moved onto the land

while the troops were occupied elsewhere during the war.
On January 27 the Secretary of War informed the various
generals that they were responsible for removing the in
truders from both the public and Indian lands.

All in

truders on the public land3 were to be removed by military
force if they did not obey the officer’s proclamation to
leave.

After the settlers left, their homes and all im

provements were to be destroyed by the troops:

"and that

^Secretary of War to Swift, May 2, 1816, SWLS.
Roll 9, 2; Secretary of War to JackBon, May 30, 1816,
Ibid., 23-24.
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every attempt to return shall be repressed in the same
_8
manner.**
On January 29 Jackson was ordered not to remove
the intruders on the public lands in Tennessee until
Congress could act upon their petition for relief.

In

all other cases Jackson was expected to comply with the
President's order.

In March the Secretary stated that a

bill for the relief of the intruders had passed the Senate
and was before the House of Representatives.

Until a

final decision was made, Jackson was to suspend any
operations against the settlers on public lands.

Congress

eventually passed a bill that provided relief for all of
those individuals who had settled on public lands before
the first of February.

All other settlers were still

subject to military removal.

The relief law was to expire

on March 25, 1817.9
In addition to enforcing the nation's laws, the
President had determined that the soldiers should be put
to work on the frontier.

They were to begin cutting a

road from the Tennessee River to Mobile and New Orleans.
Jackson was to select the best route for the road and
o
Secretary of War to Generals Jackson, Macomb,
Gaines, Smith and Brown, Jan. 27, 1816, SWLS, Roll 8, 435.
q
Secretary of War to Jackson, June 29, 1816,
SWLS. Roll 8, 436; Secretary of War to Jackson, Mar. 12,
T5T5, Ibid., 469-70; Secretary of War to Hall, Sept. 25,
1816, 3WE3, Roll 9, 150-51.
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assign the troops to the operation.

The President be

lieved the work "to be no less necessary to the discipline,
health, and preservation of the troops, than useful to the
public interest."10
While some of the troops were building the new
road, others were assigned to stop the Indian raids into
southern Georgia.

The major source of trouble on the

Florida border were the Indians living at an old fort
located on the Apalachicola Biver.

The fort had been

abandoned by the Spanish and had become a refuge for
Indians and runaway slaves.

The fort was finally des

troyed in July by a detachment of regulars under the
command of Colonel Duncan Clinch.11
The destruction of the Negro fort temporarily
eliminated the problems along the Georgia-Florida border.
The troops spent the rest of 1816 trying to adjust to the
new situation of being at peace.

By the end of the year

the troops had repaired their garrisons and were avail
able for assignment to other duties.

On January 14, 1817,

the Secretary of War reported that the strength of the
Army was 10,024.

In the southern division, exclusive of

^Secretary of War to Jackson, Mar. 8, 1816,
SWLS. Boll 8, 466-67.
11Gaines to Clinch, May 23» 1816 and Loomis to
Patterson, Aug. 13» 1816, in American State Papers,
Foreign Halations (Washington! Gales and Seaton, 1834),
IV, 558-60. Hereinafter cited as ASPFB. See also the
discussion in Chapter X.
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the artillery, there were 2,653 infantry men; of this
force approximately half were stationed at the posts in
12
Alabama and Georgia.
While the troops in Georgia and Alabama watched
the Indians, the troops at Natchitoches began preparations
to move to a new site.

The decision was made after a

recommendation by the Indian agent and memorials from
the citizens of the town that the factory be removed.
The post itself was located on private property, for which
the government was paying an annual rent equal to the
value of the land.

Jackson was ordered to select a new

site on which to erect a new fort and factory.

The post

should be near the river and not above the obstructions
to navigation.

The Secretary cautioned Jackson to be

certain that the new site was on public property and
healthy.

Once the site was selected, the soldiers should

start to build the post immediately.1^
On August 15 General Jackson was authorized to
requisition whatever tools his troops might need for
opening the new road from Tennessee to Mobile.

In

September he was to have other troops begin working on
12

American State Papers. Military Affairs
(Washington: Sales and Seaton, 1832), I, 661-62.
Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.
^Secretary of War to Jackson, July 1, 1816,
and Secretary of War to Claiborne, July 1, 1816, SWLS.
Roll 9, 81-82.
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the road from Columbia, Tennessee, to Madisonville,
Louisiana.

Congress had appropriated $10,000 to repair

that road and the road from Georgia to Port Stoddert.
However, the Secretary had decided that all of the funds
should he expended on only one of the roads.
It was not until May of the following year that
the soldiers began to work on the road.

The road from

Madisonville to Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River was
to be opened by troops under the command of Lieutenant
John Tarrant.

The route they were to follow had been

marked through the wilderness by Captain Hugh Young, an
assistant topographical engineer.

The assistant adjutant

general of the 8th Military Department issued detailed
instructions to Tarrant to guide him in the work on the
road:

(1) the path was marked by a single blaze on the

trees on the north and south side; (2) the road was to be
thirty-five feet wide; (3) all streams, except the Pearl
and Tombigbee rivers, were to be bridged; (4) all bridges
were to be above the high water mark and framed; (5) cause
ways were to be built through swamp grounds and were to be
high enough to allow the passage in the wet season; (6)
ditches were to be dug on each side of the causeway, four
feet wide and three feet deep; (7) the width of the cause
ways was to be twenty-seven feet; (8) at streams with firm
sandy bottoms the road was to be cut down to the water at
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the best fording place near the bridge.1^
While the troops in the northern part of the
Mississippi Territory were building and repairing roads,
those in the southern part were watching the Indians.
They were also trying to stop the illegal cutting of
public timber.

A large quantity of cedar and other timber

was being cut and floated down the Alabama and the other
rivers in the Territory to the Gulf of Mexico.

The soldiers

were to patrol the public lands and prevent any further
thefts.

The names of the individuals found cutting the

trees and any evidence collected were to be turned over
15
to the District Attorney.
The year 1817 was to be an active period for the
members of the Army as the Indians began to attack the
isolated white settlements in southern Georgia.

In

February the Governor of Georgia, David Mitchell, reported
that the Indians were stealing horses and one white man
who was pursuing them had been killed.

The Governor re

quested that the troops that had been withdrawn from
Forts Crawford and Gaines be returned to the posts.
Gaines

General

informed the Governor that he coiald not stop the
14

„ _
Secretary of War to Jackson, Sept. 24, 1816,
Ibid.a 148. Kirby to Tarrant, May 31, I8l?t in Letters
Sent, 8th Military Department, Army Commands, Record
Group 98 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LS8MD.
15
'Secretary of War to Jackson, Nov. 4, 1816,
SWLS. Roll 9, 181.
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troops that were already inarching to Port Mitchell from
the two forts.

However, if it became necessary, he would

order two companies of artillery, to serve as infantry,
from Charleston.

They would be ordered to stop the Indian

raids and to remove all of the intruders from the Indian
lands.

Also the Secretary of War informed the Governor

that General Jackson had been instructed to maintain a
post on the Georgia-Florida border, either on the
Chattahoochee or the St. Marks.
Throughout the month of February there were
numerous reports of Indian raids.

One letter stated

that the writer had visited Fowltown on the Flint River
where he had seen six hundred Negroes on parade.

They

were well furnished with arms, well disciplined and had
elected officers.

In addition, an equal number of Indians

had joined the blacks.

The Indians had expressed a desire

to meet either the American soldiers or the Indians of
William McIntosh in battle.

They predicted that the out

come would be different from their last encounter.

At the

same time, the people from St. Mary's appealed for a
detachment of troops to be stationed in their town to
protect them from the Indians.

In addition, the soldiers

would be able to remove the intruders from the Indian lands.
^Mitchell to Gaines, Feb. 5, 1817, and Gaines
to Mitchell, Feb. 5, 1817, ASPMA. I, 681; Secretary of
War to Mitchell, Feb. 1, 1817. SWLS. Roll 9, 234.
17
'Perryman to Sands, Feb. 24, 1817 and Clarke
to Gaines, Feb. 26, 1817, ASPMA. I, 681-82.
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In March reports of Indian raids continued to be
made to the officers stationed on the frontier.

Some of

these stated that the reason the Indians were hostile was
because of the large number of Americans who were driving
the Indians from their land.

Because of these intrusions,

the Indians believed that the Americans were violating
their treaty obligations.

There were also rumors that

British agents were actively working to arouse the Indians.
One report, from a man who had lived in the Indian country
for fifty years, stated that the Indians believed that the
Americans were afraid of them.

The basis for this belief

was the fact that Ports Crawford and Gaines had been
evacuated.

He believed that a moderate force of regulars

stationed at Camp Crawford would be sufficient to quiet
18
the Indians.
On April 2 the Secretary of War informed the
Governor of Georgia that a portion of the troops from
Charleston were marching to the frontier.

The Secretary

was confident that General Jackson’s force was large enough
to protect the southern frontier from the Indians in
Florida.1^
As the soldiers gathered on the frontier, the
Indians continued to attack the citizens of the border
18
Arbuthnot to Commander of Port Gaines, Mar. 3,
1817, Sands to King, Mar. 15, 1817, and Mitchell to
Secretary of War, Mar. 30, 1817, Ibid.. 682-83.
^Secretary of War to Babun, Apr. 2, 1817* SWLS,
Roll 9, 266.
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region.

Those whites who had settled on the public lands

acquired by the treaty of Port Jackson had requested
military aid to stop the Indians from stealing their
cattle.

General Gaines had referred their request to

the civil authorities.

He advised the settlers not to

take any rash actions against the Indians.

20

Gaines told

the citizens of Murder Creek, Alabama Territory, that the
Indians were willing to abide by the same laws that gov
erned the whites.

During the numerous Indian raids on

the border, seven settlers had been killed.
In September Major Daniel Twiggs demanded that the
Indians surrender the warriors who had killed the white
settlers.

The Indians replied that they would discuss

surrendering their warriors when the whites punished those
who had killed Indians.

They stated that the Americans

still owed them three lives since ten Indians had been
killed and only seven whites.

The reply attempted to

shift the blame for the raids to the runaway slaves living
in Florida.

The Indians stated that they had nothing to

do with the raids or the Negroes, who had been sent by the
British.

The Indians feared that their lands would be

ruined by the passage of the opposing armies over them
if the United States attacked the Negroes.

Major Twiggs

was told by the Chief at Fowltown, located fiften miles

20
Gaines to Secretary of War, Aug. 25» 1817, in
cludes reply to citizens of Murder Creek, July 12, 1817,
ASPMA. I, 684.
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above Port Scott and twenty miles above the border, not
to cut any more timber east of the Plint River,

The

Chief said that the land belonged to the Indians and
21
anyone who attempted to enter the area would be killed•
On October 30 General Gaines was authorized to
move his troops from Fort Montgomery to Port Scott.

How

ever, if the Indians were not impressed by this show of
force, he was to take no aggressive action until he re
ceived additional instructions from the War Department.
He was cautioned not to attack the Indians if they re
treated into Florida.

While awaiting a settlement with

the Indians, the troops were to remove the Indians who
PP
remained on the lands ceded by the Treaty of Port Jackson.
The Indians continued their raids upon the settlers
and finally they attacked the American troops.

Gaines re

quested a regiment of infantry and a squadron of cavalry
from the Georgia militia.

23

His requisition drew a prompt

reaction from the War Department.

He was told to confine

his operations to those that could be executed by the
regular troops tinder his command.

He was informed that

the President did not consider the invasion of Florida to
21

Twiggs to Gaines, Sept. 17, 1817, Twiggs to
Gaines, Sept. 18, 1817 and Gaines to Secretary of War,
Oct. 1, 1817, Ibid.. 684-85.
22
Secretary of War to Gaines, Oct. 30, 1817,
Ibid.. 685-86.
23

Gaines to Secretary of War, Nov. 9, 1817,
Ibid.. 686.
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be advisable at this particular time.

The President feared

that such an action would endanger the progress of the
negotiations with Spain to settle the border trouble.
Gaines tried to determine which of the Indian tribes
were hostile and which were friendly.

He ordered the

hostile Indians to move to the Suwannee River and the
friendly Indians to remain on their land.2^
In the midst of the trouble on the frontier, a
problem developed on the east coast of Florida.

A con

flict broke out between two groups trying to gain control
of Amelia Island.

The island was located in Spanish

territory at the mouth of the St. Mary's River.

There

fore, its disposition caused the American's a considerable
amount of concern as it was feared that the island would
be used as a base for smugglers.

In July the War Depart

ment had ordered that an officer with a detachment of
troops be sent to Point Petre from Charleston.

He was to

maintain the peace in the area and to see that the revenue
laws of the United States were enforced.

25

By November

the situation had become serious enough to require more
troops.

The entire command at Fort Johnston, North Carolina,

was ordered to Point Petre to support the troops already

24

Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 2, 1817 and
Gaines to Indians, n. d., Ibid., 687-88.

25

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at
Charleston, July 17, 1817 and Secretary of War to Jackson,
July 17, 1817, SWLS, Roll 9, 317.
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there.

In addition, the War Department requested that

the Governor of Georgia have a force of five hundred men
26
ready to march to Point Petre if they were needed.
On November 12 General Gaines was ordered to
leave the frontier and proceed immediately to Point
27
Petre.
On December 16 new orders were sent to Major
James Bankhead:
If the establishment on Amelia
Island under Aury, is not already
dispersed, it is the wish of the
President, that the evacuation should
take place without the application of
actual force, if possible. How to
effect this you will be the most com
petent judge. . . . You are not to
understand that if force should be
ultimately necessary, that it should
not be resorted to.
The major was told that the rebels at Amelia Island might
pQ

surrender if he threatened to use force against them.
On December 26 Gaines was instructed to return to
Fort Scott as soon as the situation at Amelia Island would
permit.

The Secretary suggested that, if the general's
pg

Secretary of War to Wilson, Nov. 12, 1317,
Secretary of War to Governor of Georgia, Nov. 12, 1817,
and Secretary of War to Bankhead, Nov. 12, 1817, Ibid.,
397-98.

27
'Secretary of War to Gaines, Nov. 12, 1817,
Ibid.. 399.
28
Secretary of War to Bankhead, Dec. 16, 1817,
Ibid.. 427-28.
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force was large enough and if the terrain of the country
would permit, he might march through Spanish Florida to
cooperate m

an attack upon the Indians.

29

On the same

day General Jackson was ordered to proceed to Fort Scott
and assume command of the force gathered there.

The

regular force numbered about 800 and 1,000 militia from
Georgia had been called into service.
The General was told that Gaines would attempt to
cross Florida to cooperate with him in an attack on the
Indians.

The Secretary closed with instructions to:
Concentrate your force, and to adopt
the necessary measures to terminate
a conflict which it has ever been the
desire of the President, from con
siderations to humanity, to avoid,
but which is now made necessary by
their settled hostilities.30

The large force being concentrated at Fort Scott, had moved
from Fort Montgomery in late November.

They had marched

over a road that they had constructed as they moved.
An idea of what action Jackson might take when he
reached Fort Scott was contained in his recommendation of
how to subdue the Indians.

He suggested that the Indians

be followed into Florida and attacked in their refuge.

The

idea of pursuing the Indians into Florida was not new.
^Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 26, 1817, Ibid.,
440.
^Secretary of War to Jackson, Dec. 26, 1817,
Ibid.. 439-40.
^1Mitchell to Secretary of War, Dec. 14, 1817,
ASPMA. I, 688-89.
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Gaines had been told to "use sound discretion in the
propriety of crossing the line and attacking them and
32
breaking up their towns."
On December 16 the Secretary
had written to tell Gaines:
On receipt of this letter, should
the Seminole Indians still refuse to
make reparations for their outrages and
depredations on the citizens of the
United States, it is the wish of the
President that you consider yourself
at liberty to march across the Florida
line and attack them within its limits,
should it be found necessary, unless
they should shelter themselves, under
a Spanish post. In the last event,
you will immediately notify this
department.33
Jackson’s activities in Spanish Florida during the
spring and summer were extremely effective and brought an
end to the Indian war.

He soundly defeated the Indians in

a number of small engagements; executed two Englishmen
captured among the Indians; and finally, he captured two
Spanish towns, St. Marks and Pensacola.

He appointed one

of his officers as the civil and military governor of
Pensacola and established American revenue laws.

The

General justified his actions thusly:
The immutable laws of self defense,
therefore compelled the American
Government to take possession of
such parts of the Floridas in which

.

32

Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 9, 1817, Ibid.,

688

■^Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 16, 1817,
Ibid., 689.
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the Spanish authority could not
he m a in ta in e d .34
While Jackson was pursuing the Indians through
Florida, an incident occurred which tested the relations
between the civil and military authority.

A part of

Jackson's force consisted of about 1,600 Creek warriors,
under the leadership of General William McIntosh, a Creek
half-breed.

While the Creek warriors were assisting

Jackson, a company of Georgia militia attacked a Creek
village and killed most of the inhabitants, mainly old
men, women and children.

The entire incident was a re-

gretable mistake on the part of the militia since they
had attacked the wrong village.

The incident might have

passed almost unnoticed, except that General McIntosh's
uncle, Chief Howard, had been killed in the raid.

In

addition, many of the young men with Jackson's army were
from the village and had lost members of their families.
Upon learning of the attack upon the village,
Jackson ordered the arrest of the officer who had commanded
the troops, Captain Obed Wright.

The General feared that

the friendly Indians would leave him and return to their
homes to protect their families.

Jackson also feared that

if Wright were not punished, the Indians might take some
punitive action on their own.

However, there was a problem

34
/
v
John S. Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew
Jackson (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington,
1 ^ 7 ) , I I , 374-75.
35
Niles Weekly Register. June 20, 1818, Vol. XIV.
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concerning Jackson's order to arrest Wright since his
militia company had not been sworn into Federal service.
Therefore, it was responsible to the state rather than
the Federal authorities.
Wright was arrested by one of Jackson's officers
and confined under military guard.

A civil court ordered

Wright's release and the Army officer complied with the
order.

Shortly after his release he was arrested again

by order of the Governor of Georgia.

The Governor in

tended to have him tried by a Federal court.

Both Jackson

and Rabun felt that Wright should be punished, but they
could not agree on the question of who should try him.
In their attempt to settle the dispute, the two
men lost all ability to communicate with each other.
Jackson informed the Governor that no state official had
the right to issue military orders while he was in the
field with a military f o rce.^

The Governor considered

Jackson's letter to be written in a haughty tone and
stated that he would continue to issue orders:
When the liberties of the people of
Georgia shall have been prostrated
at the feet of military despotism,
then, and not till then, will this
imperious doctrine be tamely sub
mitted to. You may rest assured,
that, if the savages continue their
depredations on our unprotected
frontier, I shall think and act
for myself in that r e s p e c t. 37
^ Jackson to Rabun, May 7, 1818, ASPMA. I, 777.
37
Rabun to Jackson, June 1, 1818, Ibid., 775.
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Both men submitted their views to the President
for his opinion.

On June 2 the Secretary of War informed

Jackson that the trial of Wright by a court martial was
preferable to a trial in the Federal court.

It was be

lieved that a trial by a jury in Federal court would be
a mockery.

The Secretary also suggested that all officers

of the grade of captain who had accompanied Wright should
also be arrested and tried.

The following day the Governor

of Georgia was told that "the defence of the Georgia
frontier will be devised by the general commanding in
that quarter.
In August it was reported that Wright would be
tried under an 1802 law against killing Indians.

By the

end of the month Wright had broken his parole and fled
from the United States.

The last report concerning Wright

said that he was living in Havana.
While Jackson and Rabun tested the division of
authority between the civil and military authority on a
large scale, a young lieutenant tested the same division
without attracting much attention.

In August the Mobile

Gazette reported that Lieutenant Robert Beall had marched
his troops through the city, destroyed the city jail, and
freed the prisoners.

The Lieutenant justified his conduct

■jQ

Secretary of War to Jackson, June 2, 1818 and
Secretary of War to Rabun, June 3, 1818, SWLS, Roll 10,
88-89.
---39
Niles Weekly Register, Aug. 15, 1818 and Nile3
Weekly Register. Aug. 22, 1818, Vol. XIV.
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on the basis of the fact that the jail was located on the
40
public hospital lot.
On August 30 additional information
appeared in a story in the New Orleans Gazette.

Beall had

petitioned the city’s governing body to remove the jail on
two different occasions, but both pleas had been rejected.
In his second note he had stated that he would have to
remove the building if it was not moved by the proper
authorities.

The Lieutenant set the fourteenth of July

as the day of the removal.

He requested that the prisoners

be secured elsewhere, perhaps temporarily in the fort.

On

the appointed day, the soldiers marched from the fort,
without arms, to the jail.

During their march the soldiers

were threatened by the citizens, and they went back to the
post to get their weapons.

They returned to the site and

removed the jail while the citizens watched.^1
The officials of Mobile instituted a lawsuit against
Beall for his destruction of the jail.

The officer was

granted a leave so that he could defend himself against
the suit.

The leave was to have expired on the first of

May, 1819, but by the end of September nothing had been
heard from him.

In November there was still no word on

Beall’s location or the outcome of his trial.

With the

November statement of the Adjutant of the Western Depart
ment, Beall’s name disappears from the official
40
Mobile Gazette, July 17, 1818•
41
New Orleans Gazette. Aug. 20, 1818.
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correspondence; lie was cashiered on December 4, 1819.

42

For the soldiers who were not involved in fighting
the Indians with General Jackson, 1818 was a quiet year.
Only at Amelia Island were the troops engaged in any
activities other than garrison duty.

Major Bankhead was

ordered to speed the departure of the rebels and place
the island in the best possible state of defense.

He was

to leave an adequate garrison on the island and then employ
the rest of his force in defending the frontier settlements.

43

The officer was informed that those individuals

who were leaving the island might be planning to attack
American vessels in an effort to interrupt the nation's
commerce.

If he had positive knowledge of such intentions,

he was to detain the men and their vessels.

He was

cautioned not to make any large expenditures when he
fortified the position.

The troops were to perform the

work using the materials at hand.

44

On May 14 Bankhead was instructed not to allow any
Glassell to Parker, Sept. 30, 1819 and Glassell
to Butler, Nov., 1819» Letters Sent, Eastern Department,
Vol. I, Records of United States Continental Army Commands,
1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives). Herein
after cited as LSED. Francis B. Heitman, Historical
Register and Dictionary of the United States Army
tWashington: Govemment”Frinting office, 1303)» I* 202.
43

Secretary of War to Bankhead, Jan. 15, 1818,
SWLS, Roll 9, 458.
44

Secretary of War to Bankhead, Feb. 12, 1818,
SWLS. Roll 10, 8; Secretary of War to Bankhead, Feb. 19,
TST3, Ibid., 16.
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goods to be landed at Amelia until the proper entry forms
had been filled out and bonds given at the custom house
at St. Mary’s.

In July the Major was told that his troops

would not be removed from the island during the summer.
He was to make the troops as comfortable as possible without building permanent barracks.

45

The troops assigned to watch for the illegal
cutting and shipping of timber had been having some
success.

Orders were issued to Lieutenant Colonel William

Trimble, commanding the Eighth Military Department, to have
a naval officer examine the cedar logs held at Mobile.

The

logs that were suitable for ship building were to be turned
over to the Navy, the others were to be sold at a public
sale.
m

The money obtained from the sale was to be deposited

the public account at a New Orleans bank.

46

The confiscation of the cedar timber was the sub
ject of some controversy.

Captain George Peters, who had

seized the raft of logs, had been taken to court by the
men who claimed it was their property.

The Secretary of

War ordered the District Attorney for the area to defend
the officer on the behalf of the government.

On Feb

ruary 10, 1819, Peters was granted a furlough so that he
might appear in court.

In July he was granted an extension

45

Secretary of War to Bankhead, May 14, 1818, Ibid..
78; Secretary of War to Bankhead, July 27, 1818, Ibid.. 106.
^Secretary of War to Trimble, Mar. 4, 1818, Ibid.,
25; Secretary of War to Trimble, Mar. 7, 1818, Ibid., 26.
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of his furlough so that he could continue his lawsuit at
47
Mobile.
Across the South the work of improving the
nation’s fortifications resumed after the pause to subdue
the Indians.

The War Department decided to sell the land

attached to Fort Charlotte at Mobile.

General Bernard had

decided that the fort offered no protection to the city
and could be disposed of without damaging the defenses.
Captain Gadsden was assigned to supervise the construction
of the fortifications in Louisiana, and Nathanael Coxe
was appointed as the agent for fortifications in New Orleans
• 48
and was to follow the directions of the engineer.
In addition to the resumption of the work .on the
fortifications the troops were ordered back to work cutting
roads through the wilderness.

In August the Secretary of

War inquired about the progress of the road from the
Tennessee River to New Orleans and Mobile and the pros
pects of completing the work.

He also asked what progress

had been made on the road from Fort Hawkins to Fort
Stoddert.

At Baton Rouge the troops were to begin con-

strucing the new barracks and fortifications at that site
^Secretary of War tc Crawford, Feb. 11, 1819,
Ibid., 246; Glassell to Arbuckle,. July 5, 1819> Glassell
•fco deters, July 5» 1819» and Glassell to Butler, Nov. 2,
1819» LSED. Peters died Nov. 28, 1819, Heitman, Historical
Register, I, 786.
^Secretary of War to Williams, Mar. 31, 1818,
SWLS, Roll 10, 44; Secretary of War to Jackson, Apr. 22,
j m and Secretary of War to Coxe, Apr. 23, 1818, Ibid.,
62-63.
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as soon as an engineer could be assigned to lay out the

work.^
On August 14 General Gaines was ordered to with
draw the American troops from St. Marks and Pensacola.
The posts were to be surrendered to any Spanish official
who was authorized by the Governor General at Havana to
receive them.

The surrender was to be made only if the

officer was accompanied by sufficient troops to garrison
the post and prevent the activities of the hostile Indians.
After the surrender, Gaines was to dispose of his
force in such a way as to protect the frontier from fur
ther raids by the Indians.

Port Gadsden was suggested

as a good location for a large portion of the troops,
since it was a strong position that could be easily sup
plied.

The General was told to position his troops so

that he could protect the frontier without calling upon
the militia.

The Secretary of War stated:

It is of great importance if the militia
can be dispensed with, not to call them
out into actual service as it is ha
rassing to them and exhausting to the
Treasury. Protection is the first
object and the second is protection
by the regular force.50
Secretary of War to Jackson, Aug. 11, 1818 and
Secretary of War to Mitchell, Aug. 11, 1818, Ibid., 114;
Secretary of War to Ripley, Sept. 4, 1818, Ibid., 136.
■^Secretary of War to Gaines, Aug. 14, 1818,
Ibid., 116; Secretary of War to Bibb, July 13, 1818,
Ibid., 96-97.
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To facilitate the protection of the frontier,
the President directed that the boundary line between
the United States and Florida be marked.

The Secretary

of War issued a commission to William Lumpkin, authorizing
him to mark the line from the Appalachicola to the head of
the St. Mary*s River.

The Secretary believed that it

would be better to delay the marking of the line until
the Indians had ceased their raids, thus eliminating the
expense of a large military escort.

51

On September 8 the Secretary of War addressed a
long letter to Jackson outlining his ideas concerning
Florida:
St. Marks will be retained till
Spain shall be ready to garrison it
with a sufficient force, and Fort
Gadsden and any other position in
East or West Florida within the Indian
country, which maybe deemed eligible,
will be retained so long as there is
any danger. . . .
A war with Spain . . .
would in a few years, be an English
war. . . .
We want time, time to
grow, to perfect our fortifications,
to enlarge our navy, to replenish our
depots, and to pay our debts.52
On September 11 orders were issued that turned many
of the soldiers into farmers.

The order directed the com-

maning officers at all posts and garrison to have the
51

Secretary of War to Lumpkin, Sept. 3, 1818 and
Secretary of War to Gaines, Sept. 3, 1818, Ibid., 132-35.
52

Secretary of War to Jackson, Sept. 8, 1818,
Ibid., 140-41.
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soldiers cultivate gardens.

The gardens were to supply

the needs of the hospitals and garrisons throughout the
year.

The vegetables that were grown beyond the amount

needed for the use of the garrison could be sold to the
commissary at the post.

Profits from the sales were to

be distributed among the enlisted men at the post on payday.53
The year 1819 brought only one event of any real
significance for the members of the Army.

The acquisition

of the Ploridas from Spain meant that the Army's manpower
would be spread in an even thinner line across the
frontier.

Stephen Harriman Long estimated the length of

the frontier line in 1818 as 12,885 miles.

By the end

of the year the Secretary of War reported that there were
8,668 men in the Army.

The acquisition of the Ploridas

caused a pause in the Army's movements on the frontier.
As in the case of past territorial occupations, the United
States Army was forced to consider carefully the disposition
54
of its limited force.
The running of the boundary line between the
Ploridas and Georgia was suspended as it was no longer
considered essential.

General Gaines was instructed to

suspend any new troop assignments on the frontier until
53
Adjutant and Inspector Generals Office, Sept. 11,
1818, Adjutant General Division of the South, Army Commands,
Record Group 98 (National Archives).
54ASPMA, II, 38.
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he could obtain information as to the best locations for
new posts.

The General had been contemplating the estab

lishment of a post somewhere on the southern frontier of
Georgia, west of the Okeefonoke Swamp.
was no longer necessary.

Now that post

55

In Florida itself the evacuation of the Americans
had begun with the arrival of the Spanish troops.

The

Secretary of War regretted this, since it was expected
that the Americans would reoccupy the territory by
August.

Colonel King was ordered to proceed with the

evacuation but he was to hold his expenditures to a min
imum.

A report appeared in the Niles Weekly Register that

stated that the Americans had left Florida on February 8
and that they were relieved by 450 troops, white and
black.^
Across the rest of the South the troops were busy
%

cutting their way through the wilderness.

The major pro

ject was the road from the Tennessee River to Madisonville,
Louisiana.

The work was not progressing as rapidly as

might have been desired, but the Secretary of War justified
55

Secretary of War to Lumpkin, Mar. 2, 1819;
Secretary of War to Rabun, Mar. 2, 1819, Secretary of
War to Gaines, Mar. 4, iSly, Secretary of War to Rabun,
Feb. 25, 1819, SWLS, Roll 10, 261-65.
^Secretary of War to King, Mar. 9, 1819, Ibid.,
270; "A letter from an Officer of the United States
Army, dated "Cantonment Montpelier (A. T.), Mar. 12,
1819," Niles Weekly Register. Apr. 24, 1819, Vol. XVI.
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the delays:
The labor of the troops is the only
means within the reach ofthe depart
ment, of completing those roads, and,
as the troops are so employed only
when they are not engaged in active
service, it is impossible to state
with accuracy when the roads will
be completed.57
In a letter written in September of 1818 Jackson
had stated that about fifty miles of the lower end of the
road

had been completed and forty miles at the upper end.

The hardest part of the work was believed to be completed,
since the terrain covered by the ninety miles that were
finished necessitated the building of numerous causeways
and bridges.

To speed the work, the number of men working

south of the Tennessee River had been increased recently,
and it was believed that the work would now proceed more
rapidly.^
The pace of the work increased during the summer.
More troops were dispatched to both ends of the road and
additional supplies were sent from Bay St. Louis.

The

supplying of the troops in itself was a major operation.
Wagons and carts were purchased and the supplies were
shipped overland to the troops and other supplies were
carried up the various rivers.

On May 24, 1819, the

57*»Annual Report of the Secretary of War,**
ASPMA. II, 100.
58

Jackson to Secretary of War, Sept. 19, 1818,
as seen in Nile3 Weekly Register. May 8, 1819, Vol. XVI.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Assistant Deputy Quarter Master, Captain Thomas Hunt, was
ordered to ship 30,000 complete rations up the Pearl River
to the men working on the road.

In July he was ordered

to dispatch camp equipment for the 200 men working on the
northern section of the road. 59
By September the troops were working rapidly and
there were reports that the road would be completed by
November.

The upper end of the road was reported to be

open already.

When it was finished, the route from Nash

ville to New Orleans would be about three hundred miles
shorter than the old route.

This report was apparently

overly optimistic as the troops working on the northern
section of the road went into winter quarters in the
vicinity of the Tombigbee River.
The work on the road was essential but it pre
sented definite problems.

The men were becoming skilled

road builders, but at the expense of their professional
training.

The troops were working in shifts, some building

the road and others drilling and training.

Major John

McIntosh, the commander of the troops on the north end
of the road, was told:
The commanding General is well aware
CQ
Head Quarters 8th Military Department to Hunt,
May 24, 1819, LS8MD; Head Quarters to Hunt, July.14, 1819,
Ibid. The letter book for the 8th Military Department is
filled with information concerning the movement of troops
and supplies to the road.
^°Niles Weekly Register, Sept. 25, 1819, Vol. XVII;
Head Quarters to McIntosh, Jan. 8, 1820, LS8MD.
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of the difficulties you must encounter,
in disciplining your regiment under such
circumstances, but such, Sir, is the
nature of the Service that it is un
avoidable. This road must be pushed
with all possible diligence.®1
While the troops worked through the wilderness of
the Mississippi Territory, the topographical engineers
were laying out a road from Mobile Bay to Lake Ponchartrain.
By December the Secretary of War had decided that the road
62
should be extended from Chef Menteur to New Orleans.
The Indians of Florida had been quiet for a short
time but by the fall of 1819 they were beginning to raid
the white settlements again.

In December General Gaines

decided that a show of force along the Georgia-Florida
border was necessary.

The Governor of Georgia had re

quested military aid to protect the surveyors who were
laying off a parcel of state land near the Florida line.
Orders were issued for a detachment of troops to march
through that section of the country:

"Under a hope that

the savages may at the same time be intimidated and the
primary object pursued."^
In December the troops were placed on alert be
cause of the suspected intentions of the Spanish.

The

Headquarters to McIntosh, Jan. 11, 1820, LS8MD.
62
Secretary of War to Gadsden, Mar. 25, 1819, SWLS.
Roll 10, 286; Secretary of War to Jackson, Dec. 21, 1819,
and Secretary of War to Gadsden, Dec. 24, 1819, Ibid., 398.
^Glassell to Clinch, Dec. 4, 1819 and Glassell to
Parker, Dec. 5, 1819» LSED.
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troops were ordered to observe the activities of the
Spanish at Pensacola.

If reinforcements arrived at that

garrison, the troops were to counter any offensive
operations.^
On January 12, 1820, a confidential circular was
issued to all commanding officers:
The General has directed me to say
to you that he has cause to expect
a rupture with Spain, in which event
an immediate attempt will be made to
reduce the fortresses in the provinces
of East and West Florida.65
But in late January and early February the Sec
retary of War informed Generals Gaines and Jackson that
he did not believe that Congress would authorize the move
ment of American troops into Florida until November.

With

the occupation of Florida delayed, Jackson was cautioned
not to take any steps that would increase the expenditures
of his department.^
As a result of this economy measure the troops
were expected to perform even more labor.

In addition to

the regulars assigned to the various construction projects,
military convicts sentenced to hard labor were put to work
building fortifications and barracks.

At Baton Rouge new

^Glassell to Dinkins, Dec. 26, 1819, Ibid.
65
Glassell to Commanders, Jan. 12, 1820, 1SED, I.
66Secretary of War to Gaines, Jan. 25, 1820, SWLS,
Roll 10, 412; Secretary of War to Jackson, Feb. 5, 1820,
Ibid., 416; Secretary of War to Jackson, Mar. 15, 1820,
SWTS, Roll 11, 9-10.
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barracks were being constructed, and new fortifications
were being erected at Petite Coquille and New Orleans by
the troops and convicts.

Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Taylor

was informed of a few of the duties being performed by the
troops in addition to the normal construction work:
The fragments of companies at Mobile
Point, and Petite Coquille having to
furnish boat crews for the officers
of Engineers and a clerk for this
office, and that at Fort St. John's
exclusive of a guard for the magazine,
attendants for the General Hospital at
this place, Boatmen, Orderly and Clerk
for Major Many, has lately attached to
the Engineers Department: He considers
that it would be improper to detach men
from Baton Rouge, at the very time, when
that Post has to be reinforced from your
command, and cannot weaken the garrison
of Fort St. Philip without absolute
necessity.
On January 31 the troops were ordered to resume
working on the road from Tennessee to Mobile.

In May

Jackson was told that because of a lack of appropriations,
work on the road should be suspended unless it could be
completed with little additional expense.

The road was

completed by June 19, and the soldiers were being dis
patched to new locations in order to aid in other con
struction projects.**®
67

Sands to Taylor, Dec. 19, 1820, LS8MD. For
assignment of troops and convicts see: Headquarters to
Whartenby, Jan. 16, 1820; Headquarters to Strong, Jan. 18,
1820; Headquarters to Chase, Jan. 28, 1820; Headquarters
to McIntosh, Jan. 19, 1820; Headquarters to Whartenby,
Aug. 20, 1820, all in Ibid.

68

Headquarters to Faulk, Jan. 31, 1820, Ibid.;
Secretary of War to Jackson, May 16, 1820, SWLS. &oll 11,
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(There were renewed problems with squatters and
intruders on public and Indian lands.

General Gaines

was ordered to remove the squatters from the reservation
surrounding the post at Montpilier.

One week later Jackson

was instructed to remove the intruders from the Cherokee
lands.

But those on the Creek lands would be allowed to

remain for a short time.

The Secretary of War summed up

his view of the Indian situation:
I agree with you in opinion that
it is high time the treaties with the
Indians were executed with good faith
and am aware of the evil consequences
of the failure to do so upon future
negotiations with them, but the nature
and character of the population on the
frontiers have hitherto rendered it
difficult to execute them completely.
The government however has constantly
felt the strongest solicitude to fulfil
satisfactorily all its engagements with
the Indians.
Apparently Jackson was effective in removing the
intruders as five men were brought before the district
court at Milledgeville, Georgia.

Certain officers were

to be ordered to appear before the court to testify
against the intruders.

70

42; Secretary of War to Jackson, June 19, 1820, Ibid.,
57; see reports in Niles Weekly Register, Sept. ~WT~
A

VU1«

V T T ?

AXV«

"

6Q

Secretary of War to Gaines, July 13» 1820,
SWLS, Roll 11, 73-74; Secretary of War to Jackson,
Tilly 20, 1820, Ibid.. 76-77.
70
Niles Weekly Register, Sept. 9, 1820, Vol. XIX;
Secretary of War to Jackson, Dec. 14, 1820, SWLS, Roll 11,
129.
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On the eastern part of the frontier the soldiers
were occupied throughout 1820 in preventing the illegal
importation of slaves into the United States and appre
hending runaways.

The runaways were returned to their

masters when they were identified and the bills incurred
during their detention were paid.

The slaves seized in

Florida were returned to their owners after the latter
paid for the expense of detaining them.

71

In February 1821, the Adams-Onis Treaty was finally
ratified by the United States Senate and was proclaimed on
February 22.

Within a week Congress adopted a new organ

ization for the Army.

Despite the recommendation of

Secretary of War John C. Calhoun that his plan for an
expansible force be adopted, Congress reduced the size
7?
of the Army from 12,664 to 6,183 men.
Twenty days after
the reduction of the Army, orders were issued to occupy
Florida.

The occupation of the Florida posts meant that

the other garrisons would be stripped of most of the troops.
The troops from Mobile were to occupy Pensacola.

Fort

Gadsden was to be evacuated, and the troops were to march
to St. Marks and the troops from Amelia Island were to go
71

Secretary of War to Gaines, Jan. 25, 1820, SWLS,
Roll 10, 412; Secretary of War to Fanning, Feb. 9, 1820,
Ibid.. 420; Secretary of War to Gaines, May 19, 1820,
SWI.S, Roll 11, 45; Secretary of War to Copp, June 9, 1820,
TbTcL, 51.
72

J. F. Callan, The Military Laws of the United
States (Philadelphia: G. W.'bhilds, 1864), 3<75^33*rT
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to St. Augustine.

The ships used to transport the soldiers

from Amelia Island were to transport the Spanish troops to
Havana.

By June the troops had occupied the posts, but
7\

Spanish soldiers were still present at St. Augustine.

The work on the nation’s fortifications continued
with only a few interruptions.

At Mobile construction

was suspended until a decision was made concerning the
fortifications being built on Dauphin Island.

Congress

had not made an appropriation for the works and until the
problem was resolved all of the work was stopped.

74-

The

works had been proceeding slowly and there seemed to be
little indication that they would proceed with any more
....
. .
75
speed m tne ruture.
The work at Petite Coquille was virtually at a
standstill and military convicts were sent to work on
the fortifications.

The construction of the public

buildings at Baton Rouge was hindered by a lack of paint
ers, glaziers, and carpenters.

The commands at New Orleans

"^Secretary of War to Jackson, Mar. 22, 1821,
SWLS, Roll 11, 167; Secretary of War to J. Q. Adams,
Mar. 22, 1821, Ibid., 166; Secretary of War to Butler,
June 9, 1821, Ibid7, 244.
^Secretary of War to Gadsden, Mar. 20, 1821,
Ibid., 170-71; Secretary of War to DeBussey, June 9,
1821, Ibid., 223-24. The entire question of defending
Mobile Bay was considered by the House of Representatives
in 1822, see ASPMA, II, 345-49.
75

See Report on Fortifications, Feb. 15, 1821,
ASPMA. II, 304-13.
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and Bay St. Louis were to be searched for men with the
necessary talents to speed the completion of the buildings.

76
The year 1821 was one of relative inactivity after

the troops marched into Florida.

As in the past after

occupying new territory, the Army slowed its pace in an
effort to consolidate its position and determine the
course of its future activities.

The next year was almost

a mirror image of the proceeding year.

The only major

event that occurred was that the War Department changed
its command system.

The old southern and northern divi

sions were eliminated and were replaced by eastern and
western departments:

"The eastern department comprises

all east of a line drawn from the southern most point of
Florida to the north-west extremity of Lake Superior the western, all west of that line, taking in the whole
of Kentucky and Tennessee."

77

The strength of the Army during the year had
declined because of discharges and desertions and by
December it stood at 5,211.

During the year only 310

men had enlisted, and the ratio of officers to rank and
file had dropped to 1 to 10.25.

The average expense for

76
Headquarters to Chase, Apr. 2, 1821 and Head
quarters to Sands, Apr. 14, 1821 and Headquarters to
Many, Apr. 24, 1821, Headquarters to Taylor, Apr. 24,
1821, LS8MD.
77
Francis Paul Prucha, A Guide to the Military
Posts of the United States, 178^-75^$ (Madison': The
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964), 146-47.
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each officer and soldier stood at $153.11*
The soldiers continued to work on the posts and
construct fortifications through the South.

At Baton

Rouge the new post was nearing completion.

The coastal

fortifications across the nation were being pushed to
completion as rapidly as possible.

The officers of the

Topographical Corps were occupied in mapping and exam70

m i n g the Gulf Coast and Florida.
One problem faced by the officers of the Army was
the prospect of civil lawsuits being brought against them
because of the execution of their orders.

In 1822 Congress

passed an act authorizing the President to employ the naval
and land forces to stop the cutting of public timber in
Florida.

This was just the type of order that would bring

about lawsuits.

The War Department had adopted the policy

of defending the officers in court if the officers had
been executing their orders.^0
Lieutenant Frederick Griffith was sued for his
activities for seizing slaves in East Florida in 1819.
The Secretary of War wrote:
At this stage of the prosecution the
government is not prepared to state
^®Niles Weekly Register, Mar. 16, 1822, Vol. XXII
and ASPMA.TI,~"450-7£.
79

Secretary of War to Topographical Officer,
Feb. 25, 1822, SWLS, Roll 11, 355.
®°Niles Weekly Register, June 8, 1822, Vol. XXII.
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the degree of responsibility, if any,
that it will meet, which would tend
to release that of the officers con
cerned. But in order that they may
be properly defended, you will apply
to the United States District Attorney
at Charleston, if he has not already
been employed.
During the periods of inactivity on the part of
the soldiers, discipline became a problem.

In 1823 and

1824, for example, two complaints were lodged against
officers attached to the command at Baton Rouge.

In 1823

a citizen accused a number of officers of breaking into
his house on several different occasions.

The first time

they broke into his house after midnight with a band of
musicians and knocked down the door of his bedroom.

After

forcing his wife to surrender the key to his bar, they
stripped it of liquor and wrecked the room.

A few months

later the same officer broke into his house and searched
the house and broke down a number of doors and destroyed
82
his property.
In the following year complaints were lodged
against an officer stationed at Baton Rouge who had as
saulted a Catholic priest in the city.

The officer had

81

Secretary of War to Bankhead, June 21, 1822,
SWLS. Roll 11, 408.
82
Gaines to Taylor, Oct. 15, 1823, Letters Sent,
Western Department, Records of United States Continental
Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National
Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSWD.
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been turned over to the civil authorities and a civil suit
had been instituted against him.

After the arrest of the

officer, a number of his fellow officers had marched a
Masonic procession into the Catholic church in an effort
to intimidate the priest.

The Secretary of War ordered

an immediate investigation of the incident and told the
commanding officer to prevent similar incidents from
O7
occurring in the future.
In 1825 the attention of the Army in the South
was focused upon Georgia and the possibility of a war
with the Creek Indians.

The trouble centered around a

treaty negotiated by William McIntosh and other Creek
chiefs by which more Indian lands were ceded to the
United States.

The treaty was apparently negotiated

by representatives of only a minority of the Indians.
In reaction to the treaty, William McIntosh and several
other chiefs who had signed the treaty were killed by the
members of the opposition party.

The supporters of the

treaty were said to number about 500, while those who
opposed it about 4,000.

Governor Troup of Georgia feared

that the hostile Indians would attack the frontier settle
ments of his state and destroy the Indian faction friendly
to the United States.®^
^Secretary of War to DuBourg, July 21, 1824,
SWLS. Roll 12, 72.
84

150-52.

Secretary of War to Troup, May 18, 1825* Ibid.,
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Orders were issued to General Gaines to be pre
pared to take appropriate actions to protect the citizens
of Georgia and the friendly Indians.

The General was

given specific orders to govern his conduct if hostil
ities had begun:
You are also authorized to call to
your aid such portions of the regular
troops convenient to the scene of
operations, wherever stationed, as
you may deem proper. . . .
If hostilities have been com
mitted by the Creeks on the people
of Georgia you will instantly chastise
them by pursuing them into their own
territory if necessary - and you will
pursue offensive operations till you
have inflicted a just retaliation or,
until by their entire submission they
shall be entitled to climency [sic]. 5
After these instructions came a number of items left
largely to the discretion of the general.

If he deter

mined the Indians had hostile intentions, he was to march
into their territory and govern his conduct according to
existing circumstances.

If he found that the friendly

Indians were in danger of being attacked by the hostile
party,

he was to offer them protection of

hisforce.

he was not to commence hostilities unlessattacked.

But
He

was to do everything in his power to restore peace between
the two parties and the state of Georgia.

Gaines was to

see that the friendly Indians who had fled from this lands
Ac

Secretary of War to Gaines, May 18, 1825, Ibid.,
152-55.
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were given provisions and protection.

To aid the General,

four companies were ordered to march from Baton Rouge.

The

reinforcements were to be stationed at such places as
Qg

Gaines deemed proper.
The instructions placed Gaines in a delicate
position.

He had to maintain peace between the two Indian

factions and between the Indians and the Georgia settlers.
In June the situation was further complicated by the pro
posed actions of the Georgia officials.

The officials

planned to survey the lands ceded by the Indians before
the date of removal stipulated in the treaty.

The pro

blems with the Indians who were opposed to the treaty had
not been solved and the proposed survey would arouse them
even more.

The Secretary of War informed Troup that if

the survey was attempted by Georgia:
It will be wholly upon its own responsibility,
and that the government of the United States
will not, in any measure be responsible for
any consequences which may result from that
measure.87
On the same day instructions by which he was to
govern his conduct were issued to Gaines.

He was to hold

his troops in readiness for any action that might be re
quired.

With respect to the survey and its possible

86

Secretary of War to Gaines, May 18, 1825 and_.._
Secretary of War to Gaines, May 20, 1825, Ibid., 152-%.
8T
Secretary of War to Troup, June 15, 1825, Ibid.,
162 - 6 3 .
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consequences lie was told:
You will give on the part of the
United States, no assent or co
operate to that measure whatever,
but under any consequences which
may result from it, confine your
operations to the protection of
the people in Georgia, should it
be required, within the territory
already in their possession and
against any possible hostile in
cursion of the Indians.
These instructions placed Gaines in the difficult
position of trying to resolve a number of complicated
questions to the satisfaction of all parties concerned:
he had to resolve the differences between the two Indian
parties in order to gain an acceptance of the treaty and
its provisions; and to prevent Georgia from conducting the
survey of the lands until it was agreed to by the Indians.
The Army was placed in the middle, opposed to the interests
of a state and bound to uphold the treaty obligations of
the United States.®^
The majority of the Indians refused to accept the
treaty on the grounds that it had been obtained through
intrigue and treachery.

Gaines and Major Timothy Andrews

held a conference with the Indians in an effort to elim
inate the differences between the two parties.

While

awaiting the results of this conference, the Secretary of

88

Secretary of War to Gaines, June 15, 1825, Ibid.,

163.
89
166.

Secretary of War to Gaines, July 11, 1825, Ibid.,
----
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War communicated the views of the President concerning
the survey to the Governor:
The President acting on the
treaty as though its validity had
not been impeached . . . the faith
of the United States solemnly
pledged to protect the Creek Indians
from any encroachment till their re
moval in September 1826. He there
fore decides that the entering upon
and surveying their lands before
that period would be an infraction
of the treaty, whose interpretation
and execution, should it remain un
cancelled, are alike confided to
him. I am therefore, directed by
the President to state distinctly
to your Excellency that for the
present, he will not permit such
entry or survey to be made.^u
The extent to which the President was willing to
go was revealed in the instructions sent to Gaines.

The

collision between the federal and state authorities was
to be regretted, but the President acted ’’under a solemn
sense of duty."

The Secretary of War concluded with

specific instructions by which Gaines was to govern his
conduct if Governor Troup should send a party onto the
Indian lands:
To survey the lands embrased within
the Treaty you are authorized to
employ the military to prevent their
entrance on the Indian Territory, or
if they should s u c c g c u xn cn
the country to cause them to be
arrested and turn them over to the
QO

Secretary of War to Troup, July 21, 1825, Ibid.,

169-70.
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Judicial authority to be dealt with
as the law directs.91
As the prospect of a confrontation between the
United States and the state of Georgia became more and
more likely, Gaines tried desperately to work out a
settlement with the Indians.

He managed to obtain an

agreement whereby the friendly Indians might return to
their homes from their exile.

Finally he arranged a

conference of all the Creek Indians to be held in
November.

92

On August 14 the Secretary of War told the
Governor of Alabama, Andrew Pickens, that the United
States would not enter the Indian lands until the period
agreed upon by the treaty.

By the end of the month the

Secretary was able to express his relief that Governor
Troup had decided not to proceed with the survey until
Gaines had concluded his negotiations in November. J
The instructions issued to Gaines concerning the
November meeting was straight-forward.

He was to obtain

the consent of the Creeks to the treaty negotiated in
91

Secretary of War to Gaines, July 21, 1825, Ibid

170-71.
92

Secretary of War to Gaines, July 22, 1825, Ibid
171-72; Secretary of War to Andrews, July 23, 1825, Ibid.
174-75; Secretary of War to Gaines, Aug. 30, 1825, Ibid.,
---179.
^Secretary of War to Pickens, Aug. 14, 1825,
Ibid.. 177-78; Secretary of War to Troup, Aug. 31, 1825,
Ibid.. 180-81.
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February.

If that effort was unsuccessful, he was to

negotiate a new treaty whereby the Indians would cede
their lands in the state of Georgia.

The President was

so desirous of obtaining this treaty that Gaines was
authorized to offer them land, acre for acre, and
$400,000.94
Although it appeared that the situation in Georgia
was about to be resolved, Governor Troup demanded the
arrest of General Gaines.

The Governor felt that Gaines

had violated the Articles of War by publishing his letters
to the Governor.

The President rejected the Governor's

request, but cautioned the General to refrain from any
thing offensive in his future communications to the
Governor.

95

The conference between Gaines and the Indians in
November was a failure.

In January of 1826 the Creeks

finally signed a treaty ceding their lands in Georgia.
The treaty provided for the payment of $217,600 and a
perpetual annuity of $20,000.

The treaty allowed the

Indians to select the land in the west where they would
live after leaving their homes in Georgia.
94

Secretary
Secretary of War to
95
Secretary
Secretary of War to

96

of War to Gaines, Sept. 16, 1825 and
Crowell, Sept. 16, 1825, Ibid., 181-82.
of War to Gaines, Sept. 19, 1825 and
Troup, Sept. 19, 1825, Ibid., 183-84.

96

Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and
Treaties (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1$03),
II, 264-68.
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In 1826 the Army was occupied with the routine
duties of a frontier garrison.

In Florida there was

concern that the Indians would attack Pensacola, an
event which the Secretary of War considered to be highly
unlikely.

In September a company of troops was sent to

the mouth of Suwannee to stop the sporadic Indian raids
against the white settlements.

97

The acquisition of Florida necessitated the
establishment of new roads, and the task fell to the men
of the Army.

As early as 1824 the troops were engaged in

opening a road from St. Augustine to Pensacola.

Another

road was being cut from Camden County Georgia to Jackson
ville, Florida.

The work was considered to be so important

that in October the Quarter Master at Pensacola was
authorized to employ civilians to help in the opening of
the road to St. Augustine.

In December of 1825 the Sec

retary of War reported that the road would be completed in
the course of the following month.

The troops had worked

on the road from September of 1824 to June of 1825 and had
completed one hundred and sixty-five miles of road at a
cost of $9,583.

The civilian contractor had agreed to

open the remaining one hundred and eighty miles in twelve
months for $13,500.^
97

Secretary of War to Duvall, Sept. 16, 1826 and
Secretary of War to Brown, Sept. 17, 1826, SWLS, Roll 12,
245.
98

Secretary of War to McLean, July 20, 1824, Ibid.,
71; Secretary of War to Call, Oct. 8, 1824 and Secretary
of War to Duvall, Oct. 8, 1824, Ibid.. 90.
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While the troops were cutting the road from
Pensacola to St. Augustine, Army officers were surveying
other roads through the region.

A road from the Suwannee

to Cape Sahle had been partially surveyed and also a route
from St. Augustine to Cape Florida.

The troops were also

working on a road from Coleraine, Georgia to Tampa.
By 1826 the road from Pensacola to St. Augustine,
a distance of four hundred miles, was finished.

The road

was sixteen feet wide but could easily be increased to
twenty-five feet by the troops with little additional
expense.

The soldiers had completed one hundred and

twenty miles of the road from Tampa Bay to Coleraine and
were expected to complete another forty-eight miles by
January of 1827.

The final fifty-six miles were under

contract and were expected to be completed by December

.

1826

In addition to the surveys of roads in Florida,
the engineers were searching for a route for a road from
Washington to New Orleans.

The engineers were considering

three different routes in an effort to determine the best
possible line of communication.

In addition the Secretary

of War recommended that a new road be opened by the
soldiers from Natchitoches to Fort Towson and then to
Fort Gibson, a distance of three hundred and twenty mi l e s . ^
99ASPMA, III, 117-22.
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At Port St. Philip the soldiers were building new
barracks and a hospital.

At Savannah barracks were being

constructed to house two companies and at Suwannee for
one company.

The Secretary of War recommended the con

struction of a road from Pensacola to Berkely in Alabama
to facilitate the transportation of supplies to the
Florida garrisons.10^
In December of 1826 the total strength of the
Army was reported as 5,809 officers and enlisted men.
Only 1,325 men had been recruited in the last year.

The

work on the fortifications continued and in March of 1826
it was reported that in the period from 1794 to September
30, 1824 the government had expended $2,884,558.89 on the
works.
The small Army had been engaged in an extensive
construction program for a number of years.

The massive

brick fortifications that dotted the coastline were of
little immediate value to the nation.

However, the roads

that had been built would be of lasting value to the
settlers long after the soldiers left the region.

In

fact, by 1826 there was only one thing detaining the
troops on the southern frontier, and that was the continued
presence of the Indians.

As long as the contest over the

100Ibid.. 330-38.
101 Ibid., 245-60.
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possession of the Indian lands continued, the troops
would be called upon to protect the whites from the
Indians and the Indians from the whites.

The conflict

that had developed between the state of Georgia and the
Indians living within her borders in 1825 was an indication
of things to come.

Increasingly the soldiers would be

called upon to maintain law and order on the southern
frontier.
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CHAPTER VI
INDIANS, INTRUDERS AND NULLIFIERS
In 1827 suddenly developing event3 in Georgia
threatened to disturb the peace.

In that state the Creek

Indians were becoming ominously restive and seemed about
to resort to war.

Consequently, on January 8 Colonel

Clinch was ordered to post approximately five hundred
troops in such a way as to protect the settlers along
the Georgia-Florida border.

Specifically, the Indians

were angered by the fact that white men, reputed to be
Georgia surveyors, had entered the land to be ceded by
the Creek3, and they had complained to the President that
this violated the Treaty of 1826.1
As a consequence of these complaints, a special
messanger was dispatched with letters from the War Depart
ment to the Governor of Georgia, the Federal Marshall and
the District Attorney at Savannah.

Governor Troup was

'Secretary of War to Clinch, Jan. 8, 1827, Sec
retary of War to Troup, Jan. 8, 1827, and Secretary of
War to Duvall, Jan. 8, 1827, in Records of the Office
of the Secretary of War. Letters Sent, Relating to
Military Affairs, 1800-1889» Record Group 108, Micro
copy 6, Roll 12, 265-68. Hereinafter cited as SWLS.
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warned:
The treaty of Washington like all other
treaties. . . . is among the supreme
laws of the land. Charged by the con
stitution with the execution of the
laws, the President will feel himself
compelled to employ if necessary all
the means under his control to maintain
the faith of the nation by carrying
this treaty into effect.2
The orders to the Marshall and District Attorney required
them to take immediate action to see that the treaty
obligations were fulfilled.-^
In March the Secretary of War ordered the command
ing general to detach groups of soldiers to work on five
different roads:

(1) from Memphis to Little Rock; (2)

from Port Smith to Fort Towson and then to the northern
border of Louisiana; (3) from the Georgia line to New
Smyrna by way of St. Augustine; (4) from St. Augustine
to Pensacola; and (5) from Halifax to Indian River in
Florida.

The work was to be supervised by officers of

the Quarter Master Department.^ .
For the next year the frontier was quiet, but the
threat of Indian raids always remained.

In April of 1828

p

Secretary of War to Vinton, Jan. 30, 1827, and
Secretary of War to Troup, Jan. 29, 1827, Ibid., 270-71.
•^Secretary of War to Morel, Jan. 29, 1827 and
.
Secretary of War to Habersham, Jan. 29, 1829, Ibid.
4
Secretary of War to Brown, Mar. 21, 'PSPT^arid:
Secretary of War to Quarter Master General,-Mar. 21,
1827, Ibid., 279-80.
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the settlers near the headwaters of the St. Mark’s River
were disturbed by the prospect of the withdrawal of the
one company stationed at Camp Xing.

The Commanding General

of the Western Department, Winfield Scott, had ordered the
camp broken up and the men transferred to New Orleans.
The general felt that detachments of Hess than several
companies were detrimental to the efficiency of the troops.
Therefore he had decided that a display of force by fifty
men, twice a year, from Cantonment Brooke would be sufficent to reassure the residents of the area and hold the
Indians in check.

5

Two weeks later the Secretary of War

informed Representative Joseph White that the order to
evacuate Camp King had been countermanded by the War
Department.^
In February a problem arose concerning the command
of the Army.

On the twenty-fourth General Jacob Brown

died, leaving the highest post in the Army vacant.

The

death of Brown placed the President and Secretary of War
in a difficult situation since the two Department Com
manders, Generals Scott and Gaines, detested each other.
If either was named as the commanding general, the other
would view it as a personal affront and probably resign
5

Scott to Jones, Apr. 5, 1828, Letters Sent,
Western Department, Vol. IV, Records of United States
Continental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393
(National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSWD.
^Secretary of War to White, Apr. 18, 1828, SWLS,
Roll 12, 345.
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from the Army.

The controversy between the two men was

caused by the question of who outranked whom.
to be senior to the other.

Both claimed

Their commissions as brigadier

generals bore the same date, but Gaines claimed that be
cause of his name preceded Scott's alphabetically, he was
senior.

Scott's brevet as a major general antedated
7
Gaines' brevet, and Scott claimed he was senior.
The solution which the War Department finally hit
on only created another problem.

Alexander Macomb, who

had been retained as a colonel in 1821, was promoted over
both Scott and Gaines.
resigned his commission.

As a result of this action, Scott
He recalled it when the War

Department healed his wounded pride with soothing letters,
but for a long time Scott had only the most formal reo

lations with Macomb.
While the decision as to who should be placed in
command was being thrashed out, the Army continued its
usual activities.

Construction continued on the works on

7
William B. Skelton, "The Commanding General and
the Problem of Command in the United States Army, 18211841," Military Affairs. Vol. XXXIV (Dec., 1.970;, 117-22.
g
Scott had entered the Army on May 3, 1808, was
promoted to Brigidier General, Mar. 9* 1814 and r»oq o VS Cl
his brevet on July 2, 1814; Gaines had been commissioned
Jan. 10, 1799, promoted to Brig. Genl. on Mar. 9, 1814
and received his brevet on Aug. 15, 1814; Macomb was
commissioned on Jan. 10, 1799; promoted to Brig. Genl.
on Jan. 24, 1814 and received his brevet on Sept. 11,
1814, retained a Col. and chief engineer, June 1, 1821,
Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary
of the United States~Army (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1903), o70, 442, 680.
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the Savannah River, the Cape Fear River, and the Mississippi
River.

In addition, works were being erected at Pensacola,

Beaufort, and Mobile.

In order to improve water trans

portation, engineers were removing the obstructions from
the mouth of the Pascagoula River, eliminating the shoals
at Ocracock Inlet, and deepening the harbor of Mobile.
An inspection was being made on the Red River to determine
how to remove the obstructions to navigation on the river.^
On September 20 a company of soldiers was ordered
into the Creek Nation, in Alabama, to aid in the removal
of those Indians who desired to move west of the Missisippi.

Captain Philip Wager was to offer all of the aid

in his power to carry the removal policy into effect.
The presence of the troops was intended to give confidence
to those Creeks who might be inclined to emigrate.

The

troops were expected to return to Fort Mitchell within
five or six weeks to protect the area around the
Chattahoochee Riv e r . ^
In December General Macomb recommended that a new
post be established at Key West.

The recommendation was

^Niles Weekly Register, Aug. 9, 1828, Vol. XXXIV;
Macomb to Commanding Officer at Cantonment Jesup, Oct. 9.
1828, Letters Sent, Head Quarters of the Army, *1828-46,
Records of the Headquarters of the Army, Record Group 108
(National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSHQA.
^Macomb to Porter, Septs 20, 1828 and Macomb to
Wager, Sept. 24, 1828, Ibid.; Secretary of War to Forsyth,
Sept. 23, 1828 and Secretary of War to Macomb, Sept. 23,
1828, SWLS. Roll 12, 377.
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made as a result of requests from the citizens of the
island.

According to Macomb the presence of troops at

that place was necessary Mto maintain the sorveignty of
the U. S. at that place, as well as to aid in carrying
into effect the laws and mandates of the civil courts."
On January 10, 1829, the Secretary of War ordered Colonel
Brooke to proceed to Key West to determine why the
authorities had requested the troops and what would be
expected of them if they were sent to the island.

He was

to determine if the site would be healthy or could be made
so by improvements.

Broolce was to be accompanied by a
4

4

surgeon who was to aid in selecting the site.'
The work of establishing new posts and consolid
ating the Army's position was a major concern in 1329*
In Florida the old post at St. Mark's was abandoned and
a new post was begun at St. Rosa Island.

At Tampa Bay an

area around the post was surveyed and marked out of the
public lands.

In March the troops were withdrawn from

Cantonments Towson and Leavenworth.

Those from Towson

were stationed at Fort Jesup and those from Leavenworth
at Jefferson Barracks.

While those garrisons were being

pulled back, two companies were to be stationed in a
position that would allow them to protect the traders on
the Santa Fe trail.

The Secretary of War suggested that

11Macomb to Secretary of War, Dec. 17, 1828 and
Secretary of War to Brooke, Jan. 10, 1829, LSHQA. Vol. I.
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the men camp near where the trail crossed the Neosho
River.12
While much of the attention of the War Department
was being focused on the area west of the Mississippi,
the problems with the Creek Indians flared up again.

Some

white settlers had been killed on the Georgia frontier,
and the troops were ordered to cooperate in trying to
bring the Indians to justice.

The Secretary of War in

structed the commanding officer to demand the immediate
surrender of the murders to the civil authorities of
Georgia.1^
The controversy between the Indians and the
citizens of Georgia apparently revolved around intruders
on the Indian lands.

In May the Secretary of War re

quested that the Governor of Georgia do everything in his
power to keep the whites out of the Indian nation.

The

Secretary stated that the United States was "pledged by
treaty stipulations to protect them in the enjoyment of
their soil, every solicitude is felt, that the guarantees
A

J

made may be strictly maintained."
12Macomb to Gratiot, Jan. 21, 1829, Ibid.; Sec
retary of War to Macomb, Mar. 23. 1829, SWLS, Roll 12.
---420-21.
^Secretary of War to Forsyth, Mar. 24, 1829 and
Secretary of War to Macomb, Mar. 25, 1829, SWLS, Roll 12,
421.
14

Secretary of War to Forsyth, May 14, 1829,
Ibid.. 433.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

301
By July the situation was such that additional
troops were required at the Creek Agency.

General Macomb

determined that Captain Wager’s company, ordered to the
agency in March, was to be reinforced by a company of
artillery from Augusta.

The troops were to prevent rival

Indian factions from hindering the removal of the Indians
to the west.

15

In October Secretary of War John Eaton set forth
his views regarding the Indians in a long letter to
Governor John Forsyth.

Ke felt that the state of Georgia

was justified in trying to extend its authority over all
of the land included within its boundaries.

The Secretary

asked that the state be patient a little longer before
trying to assert its authority over the Indians.

The

Federal government hoped to be able to persuade the
Indians to remove west of the Mississippi where collisions
between them and whites could be avoided.

The Secretary

doubted the success of any effort to civilize the Indians:
The years gone by, since the settlement
of this country induces an apprehension
that the first-original inhabitants of
our forests are incapable of self govern
ment by any of those rules Cf right which
civilization teaches. In all intercourse
with their civilized white brothers, and
the various efforts made and expenditures
incurred to inspire them with a knowledge
of industry and forgetfulness of their
erratick habits, as yet success has not
been attained.
15

Cooper to Crowell, July 6, 1829 and Macomb to
Forsyth, July 7, 1829, LSHQA. Vol. I.
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Concerning the removal of the Indians, Eaton
observed that it was the best thing for the Indians:
Every day observation shows that
the near association of the white and
red man is destructive of the latter.
The History of our country throughout
every quarter teems with evidence
establishing the truth of this assertion,
and points to the necessity of a removal.
In order to resolve the differences between the
Cherokee Indians and the whites, General John Coffee had
been requested to visit the Indians.

He was to assertain

their views and convey their feelings to the President.
To provide for the continued existence of peace during
the meeting, all intruders were to be ordered from the
Indian lands.

All of those who did not leave by the

fifteenth of December would be forciably removed by the
soldiers.1^
By November the commanding officer at Fort Mitchell
was told to wait for additional orders from the War Depart
ment before responding to any request from the Indian agent
to remove intruders.

The time for the whites to be re

moved might be deferred to a latter date.

He was cautioned:

"for reasons of policy it is desired that you say nothing
as to this order, but keep it entirely to yourself.”

The

reason for delaying the removal was explained to the Indian
agent a few days later.

General Coffee had not had an

^Secretary of War to Forsyth, Oct. 14, 1829,
SWLS. Roll 12, 454-59.
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opportunity to conclude his investigation and until he
submitted his report, no action would be taken.

The agent

was to urge the settlers to remove from the Indian lands
as soon as possible, because as soon as the report was
received immediate action would be taken against all
squatters.

17

While the troops watched for trouble between the
whites and Indians in Georgia, the soldiers in western
Louisiana were ordered to patrol the border between the
United States and Texas.

The military patrols were to

stop the smuggling of goods into the United States.

One

company was to be detached from Cantonment Jesup and
stationed at a suitable site on the Calcasui River.

From

this camp they were to operate against the smugglers.

If

it was found that one company was inadequate to meet the
situation, a second should be detached to assist in the
effort.

Revenue officers were to be sent west by the

Treasury Department to enforce the laws.

Upon their

arrival they were to be protected and assisted in their
efforts by the soldiers.

18

On November 30 Colonel Duncan Clinch was ordered
to afford the inhabitants of Florida all the protection
17

Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort
Mitchell, Nov. 3» 1829» Ibid., 461; Secretary of War to
Montgomery, Nov. 26, 182^, Ibid., 463.
1R
Secretary of War to Many, Nov. 20, 1829* LSHQA,
Vol. I.
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possible from Indian raids.

The Creeks were raiding into

Florida from Alabama and it was feared that the Indians
living in Florida might join them.

Since the Army was

already broken up into numerous small detachments, the
commanding general felt that it would be inexpedient to
establish any new posts in Florida.

Therefore Clinch was

to do everything in his power to protect the inhabitants
without incurring any "extraordinary expense."

To main

tain peace without additional expense, the Commanding
General suggested a plan:
The show of a detachment of one company
where there may be disorders, will be
sufficient to keep the Indians in order
should they manifest any disposition to
be mischievious.
It is presumed an
excursion could be made at any time
by a company, lightly armed and equipped
for a short tour of service, without any
considerable expense, and it is such a
movement, which is contemplated as all
that will be required to keep peace in
the Peninsula and which you are au
thorized to m a k e . 1 9
In February 1830, the Creeks prevented a mail
stage from passing through their lands, and the War Depart
ment ordered the Army to arrest the guilty Indians.

To

help quiet the Indians, General George Brooke, who was com
manding at Fort Mitchell, was to order all unauthorized
settlers from the Indian nation.

Those whites who did

not leave within fifteen days were to be arrested and
1^Cooper to Clinch, Nov. 30, 1829, Ibid.
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turned over to the civil authorities of Alabama*

20

No

sooner was this problem settled than the Army had to turn
its attention to another tribe of Indians on another part
of the frontier, the Cherokees in Georgia.
The Cherokees were disturbed because the War
Department had delayed removing the settlers from their
lands.

Taking matters into their own hands, the Indians

forcibly expelled sixteen families from their lands.

The

action had been ordered by the head of the nation, John
Ross.

The expulsion angered the citizens of Georgia, who

retaliated against the Cherokees, killing one and captur
ing three othersc

To guard against future hostilities on

either side, the commanding officer at Fort Mitchell was
ordered to send as many troops as possible into the nation
to restrain both sides.

On February 26 General Brooke was

ordered to Washington to receive instructions from the
Commanding General on how to deal with the Indians.

21

In an effort to determine what course of action
should be taken concerning the claims of the Indians and
the state of Georgia, the opinion of the Attorney General
was requested.

While awaiting the legal opinion, the

20

Secretary of War to Macomb, Feb. IS, 1330, SWLS,
Roll 12, 473; Macomb to Brooke, Feb. 20, 1830, LSHQA,
Vol. I.
21 Secretary of War to Macomb, Feb. 24, 1830, SWLS,
Roll 12, 484; Macomb to Commanding Officer at Fort Mitchell,
Feb. 75 f 1830, and Macomb to Brooke, Feb. 26, 1830, LSHQA,
Vol. I.
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garrison at Port Mitchell was strengthened by two companies
from Tampa Bay.

It was hoped that this force would be able

to maintain order among the Creek and Cherokee Indians.

22

On March 14 the Secretary of War informed the
Cherokee agent that the troops from Port Mitchell had
been ordered into the nation to preserve order.

Until

the troops arrived, the agent was to tell both the whites
and Indians to cease their hostile activities.

Those who

disobeyed would be punished according to existing laws.
With regard to the Indians removing the intruders from
their lands, the Secretary stated the government's policy:
The Cherokee Indians at the commencement
of the present administration were given
distinctly to understand, that the right
to enforce obedience to the laws of the
United States within their confines did
not belong to them, and under no cir
cumstances would be conceded to them.
They were informed that the government
had neither the power nor the disposition
to permit one of her citizens to be pro
nounced guilty of the infraction of her
laws by any other tribunal than her own.
The Secretary stated that General Coffee had de
termined the boundaries between the Indian lands and the
state of Georgia.

All of the Indians living outside of

the boundaries were to move "within their own undisputed
22

Secretary of War to Berrien, Mar. 1, 1830, SWLS,
Roll 12, 473-74; Macomb to Clinch, Mar. 6, 1830 and Macomb
to Gaines, Mar. 11, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I.

23

Secretary of War to Montgomery, Mar. 14, 1830,
SWLS. Roll 12, 475-77.
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territorial limits.”

The whites who were living within

the limits of the Indian lands would be ordered to move.
The policy of the Federal government with respect
to the Cherokees was still based upon removal:
The object of the government is
to persuade, not to coerce their Indian
friends to a removal from the lands of
their fathers. Beyond all doubt they
cannot live peaceable and happily where
they are; yet still they will be pro
tected to the extent that right and
justice and powers possessed require,
beyond this the President has neither
the inclination nor the authority to
go. It is idle to talk of rights which
do not belong to them, and of protection
which cannot be extended.24
On March 16 instructions were issued to General
Macomb concerning the removal of intruders from the
Cherokee lands.

The Indian agent was to compile a list

of those individuals who were legally entitled to live
on Cherokee land and those who were intruders.

This list

was to guide the officer assigned to remove the whites.
The designated officer was to give notice to the settlers
to leave.

After ample time had passed, he was to expel

those who remained and destroyed their houses and fenses.
After the removal had been completed, he was to place his
command in a position to prevent further intrusions.
24Ibid.
25

Secretary of War to Macomb, Mar. 16, 1830 and
Secretary of War to Montgomery, Mar. 17, 1830, Ibid.,
478-79.
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The instructions given to Major Wager, who would
supervise the removal, were intended to prevent hostil
ities.

It was hoped that the appearance of the troops

would cause the intruders to retire without resorting to
force.

If all peaceful efforts failed, then the settlers

were to be forced to retire by the destruction of their
homes and improvements.

The Secretary suggested that if

force were required:
Operate first upon some small and
detached settlement, and having
acted, to wait a little while for
the information to become effectual.
To proceed directly and generally
against any numerous and strong
settlement might make up an excite
ment, which would perhaps operate
prejudicially.26
During the controversy, General Gaines, one of the
staunchest friends the Indians had among the Army officers,
came to the defense of the Cherokees who had removed the
intruders.

The General believed that the actions of the

Indians had been justified:
They surely were competent PEACEABLY
to put such intruders out of their
houses as we should be to thrust
Russian or English intruders from
our houses or barracks should they
see fit forcible to enter them.
It is not for us in this the 53rd
year of our age, as a nation to deny
that the rights of all free men are
equal and unchanageable as the justice

480.

^Secretary of War to Wager, Mar. 17, 1830, Ibid.,
----
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27

But the General’s intervention on behalf of the
Indians was unsuccessful.

The soldiers faced the prospect

of spending the rest of the year in the Cherokee Nation.
In May there were two companies in the Cherokee Nation,
two at Port Mitchell and two on the boundary line between
28
the Creek and Cherokee Nations.
In late June it appeared likely that trouble was
developing in the Cherokee country again.

The trouble

involved the Indians and the settlers who had been re
moved.

The Indians had taken over the mining operations

that the intruders had been forced to abandon.

The whites

were angry and threatened to attack the Indians in order
to prevent them from removing the gold.

In addition to

the controversy between the Indians and the settlers, the
state of Georgia claimed the gold as its own and requested
that the mining operations be halted.

The Secretary of

ffar ordered General Macomb to have the mining stopped and
prevent the removal of the minerals.

The order against

the mining was to apply equally to whites and Indians.
The operations were to be stopped peacefully if possible,
"but if these should not succeed, resort to force must be
27

Gaines to Macomb, Mar. 25, 1830, LSWD, V. See
also James W. Silver, Edmund Pendleton Gaines, Frontier
General (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Jpress, 1§49}.
?8
Macomb to Hook, May 21, 1830, LSHQA. Vol. I.
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2Q

authorized to accomplish it." v
Neither the President nor the Secretary of War
wanted to resort to violence if it could be avoided.

On

June 18 the commanding officer in the nation, Captain
T. W. Brady, suggested that a display of force might
solve the problem.

The reply of the Secretary of War

indicated that the government wished to avoid armed
hostilities:
Your suggestion of spending a few
cartridges to enforce obedience
to the orders of the government
it is hoped was not the result of
serious reflection, and that such
a resort will, never be had until
measures of a more pacific character
have failed of the desired effect.
The shedding of blood on slight pro
vocation would entail consequences
which you would probably be the first
to feel and we should all have to
lament.30
In August the situation in the Cherokeemining
area was growing more delicate and more explosive.

On

the sixth of the month Macomb informed Captain Brady that
his actions in halting the mining had been correct.

If

there were further instructions or orders to be executed,
he would be informed by the Secretary of War.
eighteenth the Secretary of War

On the

instructedMacombto

29

Secretary of War to Macomb, June 26, 1830,
SWLS. Roll 12, 496-97.
^Secretary of War to Brady, July 13» 1830,
Ibid.. 498.
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order Captain Wager to assume command of the troops in
the Cherokee Nation.

The decision to send Wager to the

Cherokee Nation resulted from his peaceful removal of
the intruders from the Creek lands.

The Secretary believed

that his discretion was what was needed to avert the
possibility of an armed clash between the Indians and
intruders, with the Army caught in the middle.^1
On August 24 it was reported that a number of
whites had returned to the Cherokee lands to dig for
gold.

As a result, it was necessary to increase the

number of troops in the nation.

The commanders at Port

Mitchell, Augusta, and Charleston were to march one
company each from their commands to support the troops
trying to maintain order.

Captain Brady and his men con

tinued to remove the intruders, who, however, returned as
soon as the troops moved on to another area.

32

When Wager arrived in the Cherokee Nation, the
process of removal began in earnest.

The Secretary of War

approved of the methods employed by the troops in removing
the miners.

But he cautioned Wager to avoid any methods

that might “make a resort to arms necessary.
■^Macomb to Brady, Aug. 6, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I;
Secretary of War to Macomb, Aug. 18, 1830, SwTS, Roll 13,
8; Secretary of War to Wager, Aug. 18, 1830, Ibid.
32

Secretary of War to Macomb, Aug. 24, 1830, Ibid.,
9; Cooper to Brady, Sept. 1, 1830, LSHQA. Vol. I.
■^Secretary of War to Wager, Oct. 4, 1830, SWLS.
---Roll 13, 11.
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The methods employed in the removal of the in
truders was described in a story printed in the Georgia
Athenian:
The policy pursued is to destroy the
provisions, camp-equippage, working
utensils, or whatever else is found
belonging to the diggers; while the
diggers themselves are conveyed to
the nearest ferry, and put across
the river free of
charge.
The report stated that

in

one day at least one hundred

whites had been expelled or had voluntarily left the area
after seeing others removed by the troops.
Understandably, the Indians were not satisfied with
the government’s decision to halt all digging on their
lands.

On October 1 an article appeared in the Cherokee

Phoenix, an Indian newspaper, that revealed the feelings
of the Indians.

The soldiers had arrested both Indians

and whites who were mining.

The Indians had been released

after being escorted out of the area.

The story concluded

with the statement that "it now appears plainly, that our
great

father considers us
In a letter to

in light

the officer

35
of intruders."
commanding thetroops

in the nation the Indians argued their case:
They are laboring in an honest way,
upon their own lands, for the support
of their families; they intruded upon
the possessions of none; they infringe
^ Georgia Athenian, Sept. 21, 1830.
^ Cherokee Phoenix. Oct. 1, 1830.
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upon none. The United States, bytreaties and otherwise, have ac
knowledged the country to be theirs,
and have stationed their troops with
in its bounds to protect them in
their territorial possessions. . . .
The Indians were determined to continue digging gold on
their own lands, and if they were arrested they were
"resigned to such fate as the consequences of their
honest labor upon their own lands may consign them to,
■under the laws of the United States." ^
The Cherokees were fearful that the state of
Georgia might take action against them and requested
that the Federal government protect them.

Specifically,

the Indians feared that Georgia might attempt to enforce
two laws passed by the state legislature in 1828 and 1829*
The former law declared that the authority of the state
was supreme in the Indian nation and that the sovergnity
of the Cherokee was null and void.

The second act re

affirmed the law of 1828 and provided a term of four
years in prison for anyone who violated the state l a w s . ^
^ " C o p y of a letter addressed to the officer
commanding the detachment of the United States troops,”
in Niles Weekly Register. Nov. 6, 1830, Vol. XXXIX.
37
See Cherokee Phoenix for Oct. and Nov, of 1830William C. Dawson (ed.), A Compilation of the Laws of the
State of Georgia. Passed by the General A33embly since
the year 1819 to the year' 1829, inclusive (Milledgeville.
Georgia, T F 3T), l5S^99l The 1828 laws declared; "All
laws, usages, and customs made, established, and in force
in the said territory, by the said Cherokee Indians, be,
and the same are hereby on and after the first of June,
1830, declared null and void."
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If the Georgia law was not enough of a problem for the
Indians, the discovery of gold on their land in 1828 was
the final blow to their hopes of retaining their land.
A law passed by the Cherokee government had given them
control of all metals found within their borders.

It

was on the basis of this law that the Cherokees had re
moved the intruders and requested Federal troops to help
them.

But the laws of Georgia now declared the Cherokee

laws void.
The people of the 3tate of Georgia were angered
by the presence of the United States troops and requested
that they be withdrawn from the Cherokee lands.

On

October 29 Governor Gilmer of Georgia addressed a long
letter to President Jackson stating that Georgia was
capable of enforcing its laws without the aid of Federal
troops.

The Governor complained that the gold diggers

had been mistreated by Major Wager and his men:
In some instances unoffending citizens
have been made the subject of punish
ment, in violation of their rights,
and the authority of the state. Com
plaints have been made to this depart
ment, and redress asked for. The removal
of the troops is believed to be the most
effectual means of preventing the
repetition of such injuries.39
Ul>aws of the Cherokee Nation (Tahlequah, Cherokee
Cherokee Advocate Office. 1&52). 50.
•jq
Gilmer to Jackson, Oct. 29, 1830, in Nile3
Weekly Register. Nov. 13, 1830, Vol. XXXIX. For a
condemnation of Wager's actions see Planters Gazette,
Oct. 19, 1830.
Nation:
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On November 8 Macomb ordered Major Wager to re
move his command from the Cherokee Nation for the winter.
The troops were to be moved to some location where they
could be comfortably accommodated and still be in a
position to move back into the nation if they were again
needed.

The companies of artillery drawn from Augusta,

Savannah, and Charleston were to return to their stations.
Macomb felt that the "Legislature of Georgia now.in
session, will undoubtedly take the proper and necessary
steps to preserve tranquility along the Indian borders."

40

On November 10 the Secretary of War informed
Governor Gilmer that the troops had been ordered to leave
the Indian nation.
Wager:

He also justified the conduct of Major

"It is much to be regretted that in the execution

of his orders, the commanding officer should have found
himself constrained to resort to measures which may have
operated hardly upon some individuals."

41

With the withdrawal of the troops from the Cherokee
Nation, the Indians were left to the mercy of the state of
Georgia.

On December 22, 1830, the Georgia legislature

passed an act creating the "Georgia Guard," and assigned
it to the Indian territory.

The act also provided that

no Cherokee governing body could meet for any purpose
40Macomb to Wager, Nov. 8, 1830, LSHQA. Vol. I.
41

Secretary of War to Gilmer, Nov. 10, 1830,
SWLS. Roll 13, 15-16.
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other than ceding lands.

In addition, Indian officials

were liable to four years of hard labor if they held
courts of any kind.

The law required that by March 1,

1831, all whites residing in the Nation possess a
license, which was to be issued only after an oath had
been taken to uphold the laws of Georgia.

4.2

While the Cherokees were losing their battle with
Georgia, it appeared that the Creeks in Alabama were be
ginning to lose their struggle with that state.

In

November the Secretary of War informed Lieutenant P.
Newcomb that he had acted correctly when he declined to
comply with a request to stop the cutting of the road
through Creek territory.

The Secretary stated that since

the road was within the limits of Alabama and was autho
rized by an act of the state legislature, "there is no
authority in the General Government to interfere.
In Mississippi the Choctaw Indians were also
troubled by intruders on their lands.

To remove the

whites from the Choctaw lands, two companies of soldiers
were ordered from Jefferson Barracks to the Yazoo River.
From this position they would be able to remove the
settlers and maintain order in the area.

AA

42

,
x
Oliver H. Prince (ed.), A Digest of the Laws
of Georgia . . . Previous to . . .“December, 18¥/ (Athens.
Georgia/ 1837), 2W^T.----- -----------Secretary of War to Newcomb, Nov. 10, 1830,
SWLS. Roll 13, 15.
44

17;

Secretary of War to Ward, Nov. 13,1830, Ibid.,
MacRea to Jones, Dec. 17, 1830, LSWD. V.
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The fact that the frontier was moving beyond the
South was clearly indicated by General Macomb’s re
commendations to consolidate the various regiments and
establish a line of defense on the frontier.

Cantonment

Jesup was the only post mentioned that was located in a
southern state.

The scheme called for the gathering of

full regiments at three posts, Cantonments Leavenworth,
Gibson, and Jesup, with smaller detachments at other
posts.

Some posts that had outlived their usefulness

were to be abandoned a3 soon as possible.

The proposed

distribution of the troops would allow them to protect
not only the white settlers but also the Indians who were
expected to remove from the areas east of the Mississippi.

45

White expectations of a quick expulsion of the
Indians from their lands were increased in May 1825» when
Congress enacted an Indian removal bill.

The measure

authorized the President to begin negotiations with the
Indians to cede their lands and appropriated funds to
finance their removal.

By September 27, 1830, the Treaty

of Dancing Rabbit Creek was signed with the Choctaws.

The

Choctaws ceded all of their land east of the Mississippi
and were given three years to remove to the territory
assigned to them west of the A r k a n s a s . T h e Treaty of
45Macomb to Eaton, July 20, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I.
46
U. S. Statutes at Large, IV, 411-12; Charles
J. Kappler7 Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1^7JT, II, 316-13.
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Dancing Habbit Creek was only the first in a series of
treaties negotiated with the Indians living east of the
Mississippi that would eventually result in the removal
of most of the Indians.
By January of 1331 the troops were preparing to
escort the Indians to the western territory.

The troops

stationed at the Yazoo River would be the first soldiers
to take part in the Indian removal.

While the removal

process was beginning in Mississippi, preparations were
made across the South during 1831 for the removal of the
47
eastern tribes.
In Alabama Major Wager was still in command at
Port Mitchell, but he was being called upon to defend
his actions in removing intruders.

Wager faced the

possibility of being sued by the citizens for destroying
their property while executing the orders of the War Depart
ment.

The possibility that an officer might be called

upon to defend his actions in a court of law, undoubtedly
influenced the officers in the execution of their duties
when civilians were involved.

Wager's case was not un

usual, in the same year that he faced court action a suit
stemming from an officer's actions during the War of 1812
was finally settled.

The case was decided in favor of the

plaintiff and against Major Massias.

The officer had been

^ M a c R e a to Butts, Jan. 3, 1831, LSWD, V.
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assisted in his fifteen-year court fight by government
attorneys.

Even after the legal question of liability

was settled, the officer's problems were not over.

To

obtain reimbursement for the expenses he had incurred and
the cost of the damages, he was required to make an
application to Congress to obtain his m o n e y . I f
Congress did not appropriate funds to meet the expenses,
the full burden of the judgement fell upon the officer.
During the spring and summer of 1831 the strength
of the southern posts was increased as the preparations
for the removal continued.

During the summer the Army

was concerned with the possibility of a slave revolt in
Louisiana.

49

But by September the crisis had passed, and

attention was once again focused on the task of removing
the Indians.
It was hoped that the Cherokees living in Georgia
could be induced to move.

To speed the process, Benjamin

Curry of Tennessee was appointed to direct the operation.
He was to determine the Indian's attitudes concerning re
moval and attempt to eliminate any opposition.

Curry was

to confine his operations to the Indian lands within the
AR
Cooper to Wager, Jan. 25, 1831, Macomb to
Thompson, Jan. 27, 1331, Macomb to Wager, Feb. 23» 1831,
Cooper
to Wager, Apr. 11, 1831, LSHQA. Vol. I; Secretary
of War
to Moxey, Nov. 10, 1831, SwEs. Roll 13, 92 and
Secretary of War to Massias, Nov. 13, 1831, Ibid., 95.
49
DeHart to Jones, Feb. 20, 1831 and DeHart to
Jones, Mar. 2, 1831, LSWD, V. See Chapter IX.
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state of Georgia.

He was to make a report of his findings

to the President and no final decision would be made until
his report was received.

50

The preparations for the removal of the Choctaws
proceeded rapidly.

George S. Gaines, brother of General

Gaines, had been appointed to supervise the movement of
the Choctaws from Mississippi.

Major F. W. Armstrong had

been appointed as the permanent agent for the Choctaws
once they reached their new homes in the west.

Gaines had

selected the sites where the Choctaws would board the boats
that would move them to the west.

The southern part of the

nation would board steamboats in the vicinity of Vicksburg,
and the northern part would board at Memphis.

51

Although events were moving rapidly in Mississippi,
in Georgia they were not proceeding quickly enough to
satisfy the whites.

On September 9 the Secretary of War

informed Representative Thomas Foster that the President
had not yet decided to extend the emigration system to
the Creek Indians.

On the same day he told Governor Gilmer

to be patient:
So far as it depends upon the actions

50

Secretary of War to Gibson, Sept. 3, 1831»
SWLS, Roll 13, 75; Secretary of War to Gilmer, Sept. 7,
THTT, Ibid.. 77-78.

51

Secretary of War to George Gaines, Sept. 8,
1831 and Secretary of War to Coffee, Sept. 8, 1831, SWLS,
Roll 13, 78-79; Clark to Lewis, Oct., 1831, LSWD. VI.
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of this department every reasonable
facility shall be afforded to carry
into effect the plan of emigration.
If all the measures which are re
commended are not taken, and as
speedily taken as you could wish,
you must attribute the result not
to any indisposition to meet the
question in every proper manner,
but to its complicated bearing
and to the practical difficulties
of removing a large body of de
pendent people. . . .52
The Secretary might have added that the biggest obstacle
to a speedy emigration of the Indians was the fact that
the Cherokees did not want to leave their lands.
Despite the Secretary's plea for patience on the
part of Georgia, the state legislature began to debate
whether or not to survey the Indian lands.

This debate

once again brought a request from the Secretary that the
legislature not authorize a survey of the land:
Every effort in the power of the executive
is now making to induce the Cherokees to
cede their rights in Georgia, and to
migrate to the country west of the Missis
sippi; I can but hope that this measure not
less necessary to their present comfort
than their future existence will ere long
be accomplished.54
^Secretary of War to Foster, Sept. 9, 1331 and
Secretary of War to Gilmer, Sept. 9. 1831, SWLS, Roll 13.
79-80.
53
Henry Thompson Malone, Cherokees of the Old
South, A People in Transition (Athens: ^Ke^University
of Georgia Press, 1956), 170-71.
54
Secretary of War to Troup, Dec. 13, 1831,
SWLS, Roll 13, 98-99.
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The year 1832 began in much the same way as 1831*
with complaints against the actions of the officers of the
Army engaged in removing intruders.

Not only were charges

made by whites, but the Indians complained that the troops
had destroyed their property while removing the squat55
ters. ^

In an effort to circumvent the regulations con

cerning mining operations on the Indian lands, one white
group applied to the War Department for a license to
work the mines.

The Secretary declined to issue such a

license on the grounds that he lacked the authority and
that it was inexpedient at the present time.

56

The problem of intruders continued to plaque the
government and spread to include the Creek lands in
Alabama and the Cherokee mining areas within North Carolina.
Major Wager, still commanding at Fort Mitchell, was in
structed to give all assistance required by the United
States Marshall to remove the intruders in Alabama.

57

In North Carolina the problem centered around a
large number of whites, who had moved on to the Cherokee
lands with a work force of Negroes to work the gold mines.
The white force was said to number about 200.

The Governor

55

Secretary of War to Foster, Jan. 14, 1832, Ibid.,
112-13; Van Buren to Wager, Feb. 16, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II.
56
Secretary of War to Carson, Jan. 17, 1832, SWLS,
Roll 13, 116.
■^Macomb to Wager, Apr. 5, 1832, LSHQA. Vol. II.
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of North Carolina had requested assistance from the War
Department to remove the intruders and enforce the treaty
obligations with the Indians.

To meet this request, two

companies of artillery were ordered from Charleston Harbor
to the Indian territory.

The troops were to cooperate
Kg

with the Indian agent in the expulsion of the whites.
By July the Commanding General informed the Governor that
the whites had been removed and the troops would remain
in the area to prevent their return.

If the settlers

should move back onto the land, they would be arrested
KQ

and turned over to the proper civil authorities.
Actually, the troops were not required to expell the
intruders in North Carolina.

The whites left the Indian

country before the two companies had arrived.

However,

the Indian agent, Hugh Montgomery, and General William
Armistead, commanding the troops, had decided that the
soldiers should be used to remove the intruders on the
Cherokee lands in Tennessee.^
On July 14 Macomb informed the Secretary of War
that the troops were available for assignment in either
*58
Macomb to Armistead, Mar. 21, 1832, Ibid.;
Stauton, Virginia, Spectator, June 8, 1832.
^Macomb to Stokes, July 18, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II.
60

Macomb to Armistead, July 18, 1832, Ibid.
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the Creek or Cherokee nations.

There were two companies

stationed near Calhoun, Georgia, to prevent intrusions on
the Cherokee lands.

At Port Mitchell two companies were

available for immediate action in that region.

If

additional troops were needed in the Indian country, they
could be drawn from the garrisons at Augusta and
Charleston.^1
The reason for the concern about the availability
of troops was that a potentially explosive situation was
developing in Alabama.

The source of the trouble was a

treaty signed by the Creeks on March 24, 1832.

The treaty

did not specifically call for the removal of the Creeks,
but set up a system whereby each head of a family would
receive an allotment of 320 acres of land within the
nation.

Presumably the unallotted lands could be occupied

by whites.

The treaty guaranteed the Indians against

intrusions on their lands and forcible removal.

The intent

of the treaty was one thing, but its actual operation was
fiP
an entirely different matter.
The treaty required that whites who occupied Indian
lands would be removed.

But as in some other instances,

those intruders whose improvements did not infringe upon
the Indian rights were to be allowed to remain long enough
to harvest their crops.

These decisions once again placed

^1Macomb to Secretary of War, July 14, 1832, Ibid.
Kappler, Indian Affairs, II, 341-43.
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the men of the Army in the middle of a potentially
dangerous situation.
In July the soldiers, acting in support of the
Federal Marshall, evicted a number of white settlers at
Irvington and burned their homes.
with their weapons and the sheriff.

The whites returned
When the sheriff

attempted to serve writs on the Marshall, the officer
commanding the troops, and the Indians who had repossessed
their improvements, the commander ordered one of the
soldiers to stop him.

The soldier bayoneted the sheriff

in the arm as he advanced upon the Marshall.^
As a consequence of the influx of settlers hoping
to acquire the unallotted lands and the anger aroused by
the clash between the United States Marshall and Federal
troops on one side, and the sheriff and intruders on the
other, the Marshall requested that troops be stationed on
the Creek lands to protect the Indian’s crops and homes.
Major Wager was ordered to prevent encroachments and de
predations by the whites.
limit his expenses.

At the same time he was to

The Major was to govern his conduct

according to the dictates of the situation and the
“"Mary E. Young, Redskins, Ruffleshirts and
Rednecks: Indian Allotments in Alabama and Missis
sippi, 1830-186b (Norman: Dnrversiiy of Oklahoma

Press, T55D7TT.
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suggestipns of the Marshall.

64-

The situation in which the officers commanding
in the Indian territories found themselves was summarized
by General Gaines in a letter to Major Francis Belton:
You are placed in a position where
important conflicting laws, with
adverse authorities and interests operating powerfully upon the worst
of the bad passions of man, white as
well as red. Combine to render your
command deeply interesting, delicate
and difficult.
The only guide the general could offer was con
tained in his closing statement:
When we recollect that we are 30lumnly
sworn to bear true faith and allegiance
to tfae~UhH;ed Stales'"af America, and to
serve them honestly and faithfully
against their enemies or opposser3
whomsoever, and to oHey the orders
of the £resilent of the United States,
and the orders of~theOfficers appointed
over us, according to the Rules and
Articles of War; we cannot but perceive
the strong outline by which we are to
pass through the labyrinths of conflicting
legislation and opinion.
The problems in the Indian nation were momen
tarily overshadowed by events in South Carolina.

As the

nullification movement developed, the commander of the
troops in the harbor of Charleston was cautioned to be
alert to any attempt to seize the fortifications.

On

^ Coo p e r to Wager, Aug. 10, 1832 and Cooper to
Wager, Aug. 13, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II.
65Gaines to Belton, Aug. 23, 1832, LSWD, VI.
Gaines' italics.
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October 29 orders were issued to Major Julius Heileman
to defend the fortifications against attack:

"The attempt

to surprise the forts and garrisons, it is expected, will
be made by the militia, and it must be guarded against by
constant viligance and repelled at every hazard."

66

On November 7 two companies of artillery were
ordered to Charleston Harbor from Fort Monroe, Virginia.
Macomb ordered that if the companies were not at full
strength, the ranks should be filled before the troops
67
sailed for Charleston.
On the same day Macomb in
formed Heileman that the troops were ordered from Virginia
to strengthen this command.

He instructed Heileman to

inspect the ordnance stores and to have those that might
be useful transferred from the arsenal in Charleston to
the fort in the harbor=>
Heileman was to inspect the fortifications and
make all repairs that were possible under the existing
circumstances.

The Major was to keep the commanding

general informed about conditions within the city and
the state, specifically whether or not the people actually
planned to resist Federal authority.

As a last precaution

he was to determine if any of the men under his command
were inclined to side with those who opposed the authority
of the United States.

If he found any men who were so

^Macomb to Heileman, Oct. 29, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II.
67
Macomb to Eustis, Nov. 7, 1832, Ibid.
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inclined, they were to be transferred from Charleston.

68

On November 12 Macomb sent additional instructions
to Heileman concerning his conduct at Charleston.

If the

authorities of South Carolina demanded that Heileman
surrender the Citadel and the state weapons stored there,
he was to comply with the request.

The Citadel belonged

to the city but was occupied by a company of artillerists.
Heileman was cautioned to conduct all of his negotiations
with city and state officials in writing.

He was to avoid

any committment about hostilities, ’’but defend yourself if
attacked in conformity with the instructions you have
received.
On November 18 the Secretary of War ordered
General Scott to repair to Charleston.

He was to inspect

the fortifications and make any repairs that might be
necessary.

He was also authorized to draw additional

troops from any other posts to reinforce the garrisons.
The Federal laws were to be enforced by the civil
officials until the President decided otherwise:
Till, therefore, you are otherwise
instructed, you will act in obedience
to the legal requisitions of the proper
civil officers of the United States.'0
^^Macomb to Heileman, Nov. 7> 1832, Ibid. This
letter marked confidential.
gq
Macomb to Heileman, Nov. 12, 1832, Ibid.
70

Secretary of War to Scott, Nov. 18, 1832, as
seen in Niles Weekly Register, Feb. 28, 1833» Vol. XLIII.
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In late November additional troops were ordered
to Fort Mitchell to aid in the removal of white squatters.
One week later Macomb informed General Winfield Scott,
who was at Savannah supposedly on his annual tour of in
spection, that the troops were marching to Fort Mitchell.
He had just learned that the troops were no longer needed
in Alabama and therefore Scott could use them in South
Carolina if he believed it was necessary.

Macomb also

informed Scott that four additional companies had been
ordered to move from Fort Monroe to Fort Moultrie and
that all officers were ordered to join their companies
at Charleston.

The command of the force gathering in

Charleston would be assumed by Colonel James Bankhead who
had been ordered to the city.

On December 7 another company

of artillerists w a s ordered from Fort Monroe to Charleston
Harbor.71
By mid-January General Scott was in Baltimore on
his way back to his headquarters in New York, having left
Colonel Bankhead to supervise the activities in Charleston.
However, the General was prepared to return to South
Carolina at the shortest notice.

72

On January 24 Macomb

71

Macomb to Anstill, Nov. 26, 1832 and Macomb to
Commanding Officer at Fort Mitchell, Nov. 27, 1832, LSHQA,
Vol. II; Macomb to Scott, Dec. 4, 1832 and Macomb to
Eustis, Dec. 4, 1832, Ibid.; Cooper to Commanding Officer
of Fort Monroe, Dec. 7, 1832, America State Papers,
Military Affairs (Washington: Galesand Seaton, 1836),
V, 166. Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.

72
Macomb to Scott, Jan. 22, 1833, LSHQA. Vol. II.
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informed Scott that the President and the Secretary of War
expected him to return to Charleston by the end of the
month.

Two days later the Secretary of War ordered Scott

to proceed to Charleston without delay and assume command
of the force that was gathering there.

The Secretary’s

letter contained specific instructions by which Scott was
to govern his conduct:
It is the earnest wish of the
President that the present unhappy
difficulties in South Carolina should
be terminated without any forcible
collision; and it is his determi
nation that if such collision does
occur it shall not be justly imputable
to the United States. He is therefore
desirous that in all your proceedings,
while you execute your duty firmly,
you act with as much discretion and
moderation as possible. . . .
The troops were to act only in self-defense against the
citizens of South Carolina.
The Secretary expressed his concern for the
security of the Federal arsenal at Augusta.

He felt that

Scott had acted wisely in ordering a company of troops
from the Indian Country to Augusta to reinforce the garrison
The arsenal was to be defended to the **last extremity” if
it was attacked by the citizens.

Colonel Daniel Twiggs

was to be told to destroy the arms and ammunition rather
than allowing them to fall into the hands of the
assailants.

73

Cass to Scott, Jan. 26, 1833, ASPMA, V, 160-61.
The company ordered to Augusta had been stationed at Camp
Armistead, see Macomb to Scott, Dec. 4, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II
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While Congress considered what action should he
taken regarding the situation in South Carolina, General
Scott and his command waited patiently to learn the out
come of the debates.

On February 20 Secretary of War

Lewis Cass told Scott that the settlement of the dispute
by Congress was not certain.

Until some definite decision

was made "the President relies upon you to pursue the
same discrete and firm course you have heretofore taken.
On March 13 General Macomb informed General
Scott that complaints had been received that numerous
intruders had moved onto the Indian lands in North Carolina
and Tennessee after the troops had been marched to the
coast.

If Scott believed that the situation in South

Carolina had quieted sufficiently to allow the removal
of some of the troops, he was to order two companies of
artillery to North Carolina.

The commander of the detach

ment was to follow the directions of the Governor of North
Carolina in removing the whites.

Scott was to order the

extra three companies at Augusta Arsenal to return to Fort
Mitchell.

When they reached Fort Mitchell, they were to

follow the direction of the District Attorney of Alabama
in removing the intruders on Indian lands in that state
and in Georgia.

On March 22 the orders were issued send

ing the three companies back to Fort Mitchell and the two
^Secretary of War to Scott, Feb. 20, 1833, SWLS,
Roll 13, 343-44.
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companies back to Fort Armistead.

7C

On May 10 Macomb issued specific instructions to
the commanding officer at Fort Mitchell:
You will on the application of Robert
L. Crawford, United States Marshall
for the Southern District of Alabama,
furnish such aid from the force under
your command as he may require to
carry into effect the instructions
he has received from the War Depart
ment in relation to the removal of
intruders on the Creek lands and if
required will march the whole force
to effect the object.76
The execution of these orders would involve the
United States Army in a major confrontation with the state
of Alabama.

The Alabama legislature in 1832 and 1833 had

extended the jurisdiction of the state over the area in
cluded in the Creek cession.

This action had only served

to increase the number of settlers who had moved onto the
Indian lands.

The Indians had been complaining about the

activities of the whites, and the troops had been ordered
to cooperate with the Marshall in removing them.

77

In August one of the intruders was shot and killed
by soldiers who were assisting the United States Marshall.
75

Macomb to Scott, Mar. 13, 1833 and Macomb to
Swain, Mar. 14, 1833, LSHQA, Vol. II; Mercer to Gardiner,
Mar. 22, 1833 and Scott to Twiggs, Mar. 22, 1833, LSED, X.
76
Macomb to Commanding Officer at Fort Mitchell,
May 10, 1833, LSHQA, Vol. II.
77

Young, Redskins, Ruffleshirts and Rednecks,
78, discusses the actions of Alabama.
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The events leading up to the fatal shooting are clouded
by the partisan feelings aroused by the incident, and it
is difficult to establish the sequence of events.

But it

seems that the intruder, Hardeman Owens, one of the most
objectionable and unscrupulous of the invaders, was
ordered to leave the Indian nation by the Marshall.
refused to obey the order.

Owens

He attempted to lure the

Marshall and his escort into his home, which he had mined
with explosives, in an attempt to blow them up*

Failing

in his attempt to ambush the soldiers and the Marshall,
Owens attempted to fire upon the party, whereupon he was
78
shot and killed by the soldiers.
The shooting of Owens brought the situation in
Alabama to an explosive point.

Many citizens of the state

asserted that Owens had been murdered by the soldiers who
had no legal right to be in Alabama.

The Tuscaloosa

Expositor stated:
It does, indeed, appear that the
President intends to trample tinder
his feet the constitution of the
United States, and the sovereignty
of the states. If there is any
one thing, which the constitution
does not authorize him to do, it
78

Ibid.. 78; Albert James Pickett, History of
Alabama and incidentally of Georgia and Mississippi
(Burmingham: The Webb Book Company, l‘5'06), 686-87.
Charleston Courier, Dec. 15, 1833. The Charleston
Courier ~of Oct. 19, 1833, reprinted the letter of the
Marshall to lewis Cass in which he made a full report
on the shooting of Owens.
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is the sending an Army into a state,
to settle disputes between her cit
izens.79
Another Alabama paper told

the whites:

We would 3ay be calm, but firm.
The President is already in the
wrong - keep him so. Let his menials
dare commit another murder - they
will be imprisoned and punished if
they do.30
On August 19 Secretary of War Cass asked the
Attorney General for his opinion as to whether or not
the government had the right under the provision of the
Treaty
lands.

of 1832 to remove theintruders from theCreek
8l

Three days later the Attorney General replied

with a long and detailed statement.

The important point

of the opinion concerned the jurisdiction over the land
ceded in 1832 and was contained in the last sentence of
the letter:
The lawful possession is still in
the United States, and may in my
opinion be defended against such
trespasses, according to the di
rections of the act of 1807, by
the removal of the intruders by
military force.32
79

As seen in Niles Weekly Register. Oct. 26, 1833,

XLV.
30

States Rights Expositor as seen in Niles Weekly
Register, Oct. 26, Tb33, XLV.

81

Secretary of War to Attorney General, Aug. 19,
1833, SWLS, Roll 13, 406.

82

Attorney General to Secretary of War, Aug. 22,
1833, in Letters Received, Main Series, 1801-70, Record
of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record Group 107,
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Armed with the Attorney General’s opinion, Sec
retary of War Cass informed Governor John Gayle of
Alabama that the right to remove intruders from the
ceded lands in Alabama belonged to the Federal govern
ment and not to the states.

He also informed the Governor

that the removal of the settlers would continue until the
provisions of the treaty with the Indians were implemented.
Governor Gayle replied by again asserting that the state
of Alabama had jurisdiction over its territory and that
Q7
the Federal government was acting unconstitutionally.
By October the situation in Alabama was reaching
a dangerous point.

On October 7 Governor Gayle issued a

proclamation informing the people of the Federal govern
ment's intentions to continue expelling intruders on the
Indian lands.

The Governor implored the people to put

their faith in the "Majesty of the law."

His next state

ment was virtually a call to arms for those people living
in the areas effected by the removal policy.
In order, therefore that "the
laws may be faithfully executed,"
and by virtue of the power and
authority in me vested, I hereby
require all civil officers in the
countries aforesaid, to be attentive
Microcopy 222, Roll 120, 312-14.
SWLR.

Hereinafter cited as

^Secretary of War to Gayle, Sept. 5, 1833, SWLS.
Roll 13, 418-20; Gayle to Cass, Oct. 2, 1833, SWLR.
Roll 120, 335-36; For Cass's reply see Cass to Gayle,
Oct. 22, 1833, SWLS. Roll 13, 425-26.
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to the complaints of the people,
upon whom any crime or crimes may
he committed. . . . by issuing all
such warrants and other process as
may be necessary to bring offenders
to justice, particularly such as
may be guilty of murder, false
imprisonment, house burning,
robbery, forcible entries, and g.
all such like heinous offences.
The Russell County Circuit Court indicted the
soldiers who were members of the party involved in the
shooting of Owens.

When the sheriff attempted to serve

the court orders at Port Mitchell, Major James McIntosh
refused to admit him to the post.

The sheriff made his

report to the Court and was ordered to return to the fort
and bring the Major before the Court to be cited for con
tempt.

The sheriff was again unsuccessful and his report

summarized the situation in Alabama:
I went to the fort and called on
defendant. He swore I should not
touch him. I am satisfied if I had
made the attempt it would have been
at the rigque [sic] of my life; that
defendant was commanding officer of
the fort, and had sworn on yesterday
he would not surrender up any one in
the fort.85
On October 29 the Secretary of War issued orders
to McIntosh not to hinder the officials of the courts in
84
Proclamation of Governor Gayle, Oct. 7, 1833,
as seen in Niles Weekly Register, Oct. 26, 1833, Vol. XIV.
gc
Statement of Sheriff Crowell, Oct. 16, 1833,
reprinted Ibid., Nov. 16, 1833, Vol. XLV.
.
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the execution of their duties:
It is not the intention of the
President, that any part of the mil
itary force of the United States
should he brought into collision
with the civil authority. In all
questions of jurisdiction, it is
the duty of the former to submit
to the latter, and no consideration
must interfere with that duty.”®
Similar instructions not to interfere with the
state authorities were issued to Marshall Anstill.

At

the same time Cass instructed the District Attorney for
the Southern District of Alabama to offer all legal assist
ance possible to the officer and the men charged by the
Qrt

state of Alabama.

To try to settle the differences be

tween the Federal government and the state, Francis Scott
Key was sent to Montgomery.

He was to investigate the

entire incident but was to exercise due caution:
The Marshall and the military force
must be defended against vexatious
proceedings; and you will, therefore,
without delay, in every instance
where these are instituted against
them, have the matter brought before
a judge of the United States for his
determination.
Cass to McIntosh, Oct. 29, 1833# in Letters
Sent by Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81, in Records
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75,
Microcopy 21, Roll 11, 294-96. Hereinafter cited as LSOIA.
^Secretary of War to Anstill, Oct. 29, 1833 and
Secretary of War to District Attorney, Oct. 29, 1833,
Ibid., 296-99.
88Cass tc Key, Oct. 31, 1833, Ibid., 302-305.
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On October 25 the Mobile Commercial Advertiser
reported that the United States Marshall had indicated
that he and the troops would take no action against the
intruders before the fifteenth of January.

The editor

expressed the hope that the differences would be adjusted
before that date.

89

On November 20 General Macomb ordered eight
companies of artillery from Port Monroe and two companies
from the Cherokee country to proceed to Fort Mitchell.
When these companies reached Alabama, the full strength
of Port Mitchell would be fourteen companies.

Lieutenant

Colonel Daniel Twiggs was ordered to assume command at
Fort Mitchell and hold the troops in readiness to assist
the Marshall in his duties.

Macomb suggested:

"the

duties to be performed by the troops is a very peculiar
nature, and while you will be firm in the execution of
it, let me recommend as little violence and injury to
the persons and property of individuals as possible

90

Key managed to arrange a compromise between the
two governments.

The state of Alabama dropped the pro

secution of the soldiers who had "murdered" Owens, and
the Federal government agreed not to act against the
intruders until the Indian reserves had been located.^
89
Mobile Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 25, 1833*
90

Macomb to Twiggs, Nov. 20, 1833 and Macomb
to Eustis, Nov. 22, 1333, LSHQA. Vol. II.
91

Young, Redskins, Ruffleshirts and Rednecks, 79.
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On January 4, 1834, Macomb informed Twiggs that the
Marshall had been ordered to carry out the removal of
settlers on the Indian allotments.

Twiggs was to assist

him in the performance of his duties:

"and if you should

be opposed by force, you must as a matter of course, put
ap
it down, by all the means you possess.”
On March 12 the Secretary of War informed Governor
Gayle that the additional troops that had been ordered to
Fort Mitchell during the preceeding year had been withdrawn
and that only the regular garrison remained.

Cass also

expressed his pleasure over an act passed by the Alabama
legislature in January.

The law provided a fine of from

$250 to $1,000 or three months in jail for anyone found
guilty of trespassing on an Indian reserve without con
tracting to buy or lease the land.

He believed that this

law would mean that the Federal government would no longer
be required to enforce the treaty with the Creeks.

J

With the settlement of the problems in Alabama,
the Army in the South settled back into a peaceful routine.
Preparations were being made to remove the various Indian
tribes to the west of the Mississippi.

By the spring of

1834 all of the southern tribes, except the Cherokees, had
^^acomb to Twiggs, Jan. 4, 1834, LSHQA, Vol. II.
^Secretary of War to Gayle, Mar. 12, 1832, LSOIA,
Roll 12, 185. Alabama Laws (1833-34), 42.
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signed treaties agreeing to remove.

94

There were scattered

incidents of Indian raids on isolated white farms and a
few white intrusions on Indian lands that required the
attention of the soldiers.

However, most of their time

was occupied with drilling and policing the various posts.
Even the large-scale building program of coastal forti
fications was virtually completed, and only general main
tenance work was required.
Undoubtedly there were some individuals who could
foresee the day not too far distant, when complete peace
would reign in the South.

The Indians would have been

removed and the only soldiers left in the South would be
those who garrisoned the coastal fortifications and those
areas where a slave insurrection might occur.
The few indications that events might not be
proceeding as well as expected were largely ignored by
most people.

In January of 1835 General Duncan Clinch,

who was trying to persuade the Seminole Indians to leave
Florida, informed the Adjutant General:
The more I see of this tribe of
Indians the more fully am I con
vinced that they have not the
least intention of fulfilling
94

In addition to the treaties with the Creeks and
Choctaws, the United States had signed treaties with the
Seminoles on May 9, 1832, although it was not ratified
until Apr. 12, 1834. A treaty had been signed with the
Chickasaw on Oct. 20, 1832, Kappler, Indian Affairs, II.
344-45, 356-62.
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their treaty stipulations, unless
compelled to do so by a stronger
force than mere words.95
The General continued his efforts to persuade the
Indians to remove throughout the summer.

By late October

instructions were issued by the War Department to remove
the Indians:
It is very desirable to accomplish
the object of removing the Seminole
Indians without the application of
actual force. . . . You will of
course proceed to embark and remove
those first who are willing to go,
postponing any decisive course with
relation to the refractory ones till
the others have set out. My impression
is that they will then all peaceably
follow.
In the event that the "refractory** Indians did not
peaceably "follow," the Secretary had ordered four addi
tional companies to join Clinch.

These companies would

bring the number of companies at Clinch’s disposal to
fourteen, with a strength of 700 men.

96

In his annual

report of November 30, Cass stated that he felt the force
under Clinch's command was adequate to enforce the treaty
obligations.

But by December 9 the situation was changing,

and Clinch was authorized to call out one hundred mounted
troops from the Florida militia to aid him in his efforts
95

Clinch to Adjutant General, Jan. 22, 1835,
quoted in Rembert W. Patrick, Aristocrat in Uniform:
General Duncan L. Clinch (Gainesville: University of
Florida Press, 1963), 7l•
96

Secretary of War to Clinch, Oct. 22, 1835,
SWLS. Roll 14, 304-305.
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to remove the Indians.
On December 28 any prospect of a peaceful removal
was shattered when the Indians attacked and killed the
Indian agent, Wiley Thompson, and Lieutenant Constantice
Smith outside of Port King.

On the same day a detachment

of troops under Major Francis L. Dade was ambushed on the
Withlacoochee River.

Dade’s command was slaughtered:

of

one hundred and eleven officers and enlisted men only
three survived.

With these two events the Second Seminole

War began and would not be officially declared at an end
until August 14, 1842.^®
The beginning of the Seminole War marked the end
of an era for the United States Army in the South.

By

the time the war ended in 1842, the attention of the nation
and the Army had shifted to the Trans-Mississippi West.
During the war many of the southern posts would be stripped
of their garrisons, and after the war the frontier posts
were not re-garrisoned.

With the removal of the Indians,

the old posts were no longer necessary.

After the war the

Army would be assigned to the coastal fortifications and a
few posts in areas with large concentrations of slaves.
The passage of the frontier removed the need for a large
^T a SPMA, V, 627; Secretary of War to Clinch,
1835, Ibid.. 368-69.
98
For an account of the War see John K. Mahan,
History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842 (Gaines
ville: University of Florida Press, 19^7).

Dec.

9,
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military force in the South, and the soldiers followed
the Indians west across the Mississippi River.
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CHAPTER VII
FEEBLE EFFORTS TO REFORM THE ARMY
The years between 1789 and 1835 were ones of rel
ative calm, consequently little was expected of the men
who joined the United States Army.

They were required to

render steadfast service in the face of countless hard
ships but could not hope to receive personal fame or
material rewards.

In these circumstances, men were re

luctant to offer their services to the Federal government
without the incentive supplied by a national emergency,
and many of those who enlisted were not of the highest
caliber.

This situation had existed since the American

Revolution, but it was not -until the late 1820's and the
early 1830's that a concerted effort was made to improve
the type of men who served in the ranks of the Army.

The

reforms were directed at the enlisted men and had little
effect on the officers.

The first reform attempted was

one designed to make the Army more American.
The enlisted strength of the Army in peaceful
periods was drawn largely from the northeastern cities
and at times consisted of a large number of foreigners.
Until 1825 there were no restrictions placed upon foreigners

344
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who wished to enlist in the Army.

The General Regulations

of 1820 stated that "all free male persons, above eighteen
and under thirty-five" who were physically fit might en
list.

From 1821 through 1823 approximately one quarter

of the men who entered the Army were foreign-born and this
factor probably prompted the provision in the General Reg
ulations of 1825 that "no foreigner shall be enlisted in
the Army without special permission from general head
quarters."

Probably as a result of this regulation, the

number of enlistments dropped in 1825 and 1826.

The re

striction was removed on August 13, 1828, when it was
ordered that all citizens could be accepted for service,
without regard to their place of birth.^
Although the officers complained about the type
of recruits that the Army attracted, little or no im
provement could be expected as long as no inducements
could be offered that were attractive enough to draw
better recruits.

The term of service was long; the

duties performed were arduous; the hazards to life and
limb were many; the chance to advance was limited; many
Americans viewed the very existence of the Army with
suspicion; the pay was low; and the benefits to be derived
1General Regulations of the Army (Philadelphia,
1320), Article 74, Paragraph TJ. General Regulations
of the Army (Washington, 1825), Article 74, Paragraph
T2S7. Order Number 43, Aug. 13, 1828, War Department
General Orders, Adjutant General's Office, Record Group
94 (National Archives).
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from the service were few.

Faced with these uninviting

prospects, most Americans were reluctant to enli3t.

In

addition, a large proportion of those who did enlist,
2
deserted before their term of service expired.
As a result of these circumstances, the actual
strength of the Army was rarely equal to that authorized
by Congress.

Even when the paper strength of the Army

was increased by Congressional action to meet specific
emergencies, such as the War of 1812, the number of men
who entered the Army fell short of the figures required
to meet the new quotas.

In the early years, the dis

parity between real and authorized strength lay in both
the number of officers and enlisted men on duty.

After

the 'War of 1812, when many officers chose to remain in
the service and new vacancies in the officers corps were
filled with graduates from the Military Academy, the
deficiency resulted because the number of enlisted men
was lower than authorized by law.

This small force of

enlisted men performed the bulk of the services and
labors executed by the Army.
The men who composed the rank and file of the
Army left few written records that reveal any details
about themselves or their life in the Army.^

The only

2

See Appendix II.

^One account, written and published annonymously,
by an enlisted man is Recollections of the United States
Army. A Series of Thrilling TalesT~ant1 Sketches (Boston:
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extensive body of information available concerning these
men was left by their officers and by observers from out
side the service.

In most cases, the picture of the rank

and file that can be drawn from these sources is anything
but flattering.

The prevailing opinion was probably best

summarized in a statement by Surgeon Thomas Henderson,
who wrote:

"The fact of voluntary enlistment is a warning

to the Surgeon that, morally or physically, something may
be wrong about the recruit.

Too many offer for service

who are fit for nothing else. . . ."

4

The attitude adopted

by most observers who commented on the character of the
peacetime volunteers was that a man who volunteered his
services to the nation was fit for nothing else.

He

simply could not make it in civilian life and sought
refuge in the Army.
Surgeon Henderson's assessment was too harsh and
did not tell the complete story.

An English officer

traveling through the United States probably came closer
to the truth when he observed:
The great extent of territory in
the States, with a scanty population,
James Monroe and Co., 1845)» according to a statement by
the author the work was written "during a period in 'the
service' since 1830." The book presented an unfavorable
picture of the Army's officers and the life of the en
listed men.
4

Thomas Henderson, Hints on the Medical Examination
of Recruits for the Army; and on the discharge of Soldiers
from the Service on Surgeon^s Certificate, Adapted to the
Service of the United States (Philadelphia: Haswell,
Barrington, and Haswell, 1S4O), 20.
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causes wages to be high, and pro
visions are cheap. Generally
speaking then, the most worthless
characters enter the Army, which
consists of a melange of English
deserters, Dutch, French, Americans,
etc. Five dollars is the monthly
pay of a private, and many labourers
in the States earn a dollar per day
so that it is obvious there is no
great inducement to belong to an
Army which is held in no estimation
by the citizens generally, and has
no pension-list or asylum for dis
abled soldiers.5
The condition of the American economy influenced
the recruiting efforts of the Army.

During the periods

of prosperity, most men could find some type of employ
ment that would pay them considerably more than they re
ceived for their service in the Army.

When periods of

recession and depression set it, many found that the
prospect of military service was more inviting than when
jobs were easy to find.

As might be expected, a direct

relationship existed between the economic condition of
the country and the rate of desertion from the Army.

De

sertions rose during the periods of prosperity and fell
during periods of depression.

The same type of correlation

appears to exist for other categories, such as enlistments,
'’"Notes on the Army of the United States of
America," Military and Naval Magazine of the United
States. I, (Apr., 1^33), 9?-l3ET IrT1B^7" an order from
the War Department had prohibited the enlistment of
British deserters, but it would not have been difficult
to avade the regulation and it is safe to assume that
British deserters did enlist in the United States Army.
The order was issued September 15, 1807 as seen in the
Order Book for the Garrison at Fort Johnston, N. C., 17951811. Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National Archives).
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re-enlistments, joined from desertion, resignations, and
the number of recruits required at the posts.**
Economic conditions also influenced the difference
between the actual and the authorized strength of the Army.
During the depression that lasted from 1816 through 1820,
the number of officers in the Army was higher than the
authorized level in four of the five years.

In the middle

three years of the same period, the enlisted strength was
not substantially below the legal limit and fluctuated
only slightly.

The next eight years were relatively pros

perous, with the exception of three recessions:

one in

the first half of 1322; a second from mid-1825 to mid-1326;
and a third in late 1828 leading to the depression of 1829*
During these years, with the single exception of 1824, the
number of enlisted men declined in prosperous periods and
increased in times of recession and depression.

The number

of officers in the service remained fairly constant
throughout the period, but increased noticeably in 1825
and then sharply in 1829.

Economic factors along cannot

fully explain why men chose to join or leave the Army, but
^Returns from United States Military Posts, 18001916, National Archives Microfilm Publication, M617. Fort
Johnston, N. C., Roll 558; Fort Petite Coquille, La.,
Roll 906; New Orleans, La., Roll 343; Charleston Harbor,
S. C., Roll 197; Augusta Arsenal, Ga., Roll 55; Baton
Rouge, La., Roll 84; Fort Pike, La., Roll 921; Fort Morgan,
Ala., Roll 805; Fort Mitchell, Ala., Roll 735. Hereinafter
cited as Post Returns.
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it appears that they did influence the men who served or
7
might have considered serving in the Army.
The recruiting parties faced not only the task
of increasing the size of the Army to its legal limit,
but also of matching the rate at which men left the
ranks, because of discharge, death, or desertion.

The

yearly losses from the ranks were such that it required
a concerted effort to hold the strength at a constant
level.

In spite of the fact that the enlisted strength

of the Army never equalled the authorized strength, the
officers and enlisted men assigned to recruiting duty
did a remarkable job in obtaining enough recruits to
ensure the continued existence of the Army.
The high number of desertions which occurred
annually were a constant drain upon the limited manpower
of the Army.

The War Department and the officers of the

Army were generally at a loss to explain why so many of
the men who enlisted subsequently decided to desert.

Most

of the individuals who ventured an opinion on the subject,
7

Secretary of War Jefferson Davis reported that
there was a definite relationship between the prosperity
of the nation and the number of desertions that occurred
in the Army. Senate Executive Documents (33d Congress,
1st Session), £art 2, Serial 697, 7-8. Also Jack D.
Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars; Army
Life and Reforms, 1865-1898 (New Tories Humanities Press,
1970), 3-9, draws similar conclusions for the period
covered by his study. Leonard P. Ayres, Turning Points
in Business Cycles (New York: The Macmillan Co., 193^)»
WTllard Long Thorp, Business Annals. . . . (New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1926).
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attributed the high desertion rate to the prohibition of
flogging as a punishment for the crime by an act of
Congress in 1812.

Commanding General Jacob Brown wrote

in 1824 that there was no ". . . imaginable cause for the
prevalence of desertion, but the inadequancy of the punish
es

ment annexed to it by law."
On January 25, 1830, Adjutant General Roger Jones
reported the number of desertions since 1823; he noted
that 1,340 recruits had deserted either from the rendez
vous or before they joined their company.

Another 2,796

had deserted during their first year, most of these during
the first six months.

The remaining 1,533 men had deserted
q
during the last four years of their terms.
Jones esti
mated that these 5,669 desertions represented a total loss
10
of $471,263 to the government.
The magnitude of the desertion problem is clearly
illustrated by comparing the number of men who were either
killed or wounded to the number of men who deserted.

Be

tween 1789 and 1846 the regular Army was engaged in 163
®Brown to Calhoun, Nov. 20, 1824, Jacob Brown MSS,
Letter Book, II, 252-53 (Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress).
Q
682 men in the 2d year; 400 men in the 3d year;
263 inthe 4th year; and 188 in the 5th. American State
Papers, Military Affairs (Washington: Gales and Seaton,
i836), IV, 287. Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.
1 ° T V ^ '

Ibia.
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actions in which 2,320 officers and men were killed and
another 3,750 wounded.11

The 6,070 casualities suffered

in combat by the Regulars is just slightly higher than
the 5,669 desertions reported in the period from 1823 to
1829.12
The officers seldom mentioned the number of men
who "joined from desertion" in their reports.

The men

who filled this category were those who took advantage
of Presidential pardons issued to those deserters who
surrendered themselves at any one of the nation's military
posts.^

From 1823 to 1829, 1,353 men. were either

apprehended or joined from desertion, and it can be
assumed that the majority of these men returned volun
tarily since the capture of deserters was extremely
difficult.

An observer at Fort Mitchell noted that,

"whenever a man became tired of his duty, off he went,
14bag and baggage, and pursuit was hopeless."
The size
^Francis Heitman, Historical Register and Dic
tionary of the United States~~Army. if. 295 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1965), II, 295. Here
inafter cited as Historical Register.
12
Jones to Macomb, Jan. 25, 1830, communicated
to the Senate, Feb. 19, 1830, Ibid.
1^For example see: James K. Richardson, A Com
pilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
1
8§7“TWashington: Government Printing Office,
1896), I, 425, 512, 514, 543; II, 499. Hereinafter
cited as Messages and Papers.
^ ASPMA, IV, 287; Thomas Hamilton, Men and Manners
in America (Edinburgh, 1833, 2 volumes), II, 26$.
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of the United States and the location of its military
posts afforded the deserter ample opportunity to hide
once he left his assigned station.

15

Despite the apparent

ease with which an escape could be made, a number of de
serters decided to return to the Army.

However, the rate

at which men returned from desertion never approached the
1
rate at which they left the Army.
Adjutant General Jones was unable to explain the
desertions, but he made five recommendations designed to
reduce the number.
I.
The bounty system as now
established by law should be abolished,
thereby dispensing with any bounty in
hand or previous to two years' faithful
service.
II.
The term of service should be
reduced to four years. The pay of the
non-commissioned officers should be
increased. One dollar should be added
to the monthly pay of the private
soldier.
15

In an effort to aid in the capture of deserters,
rewards were offered. A General Order was issued by the
Adjutant and Inspector General's Office on August 4, 1818,
that authorized a $30 reward and all reasonable expenses
incurred during the apprehension and return of a deserter,
the amount of the reward and the expenses were to be de
ducted from the pay of the deserter. On August 10, 1819,
the order was amended so that the $30 reward would include
all expenses. Orders of the Adjutant 8th Military Depart
ment, 1817-1820, Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National
Archives).
16
The number of desertions in the period from 1823
to 1829 was 5,669 and the number of men who were either
apprehended or joined from desertion was 1,853, which left
the Army with a deficit of 3,816 men. ASPMA, IV, 287. At
the ten posts surveyed by the author there were 1,584
desertions and 359 men joined from desertion during the
same period. Post Returns.
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III. Establishment by law, a
uniform, certain, and adequate punish
ment for the crime of desertion.
IV. The absence of too many
captains from company duty, the
frequent changes in company commanders,
and the consequent exercise of command
by young, inexperienced officers, who,
although otherwise qualified, have not
acquired the art of commanding or ad
ministering to the comfort of the private
soldier.
V. To the foregoing causes maybe
added the prevalence of intemperance.^?
Commanding General Alexander Macomb was also un
able to make any positive statement as to why so many men
deserted.

He suspected that the excessive use of spirits

and the low pay received by the troops were the chief
reasons.

In an attempt to defend the pay received by

the privates, Macomb stated that the pay was not just
five dollars a month since there were additional benefits
included, such as three dollars for subsistence; two and
a half dollars for clothing; fifty cents for fuel; and
fifty cents for quarters.

According to the General's

calculations, the monthly pay for a private was actually
18
twelve dollars.
A letter from General Edmund P. Gaines in which
several recommendations were made concerning the punish
ments awarded by military courts, accompanied the reports
of Adjutant General Jones and General Macomb that were
17Jones to Macomb, Jan. 25, 1830, ASPMA, IV, 288.
18

Macomb to Eaton, Jan. 29» 1830, communicated to
the Senate, Feb. 19, 1830, Ibid., 287.
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submitted to the Senate.

Gaines was glad that "stripes

and lashes" had been prohibited by law, but he objected
to several forms of punishment still employed by the
Army, and felt that they should be abolished.
He specifically mentioned:
I. Branding, marking with durable
ink, and all such inflictions as tend
durably to cripple or multilate the
offenders.
II. An iron collar, a ball and
chain, and with either or these attached
to the neck, leg or other part of the
offender, for him to perform hard labor
in public, or otherwise, except in
solitary cells.
III.
Shaving the head, putting a
straw around the neck of the offender,
or requiring him to stand upon a barrel,
etc., etc.
The General suggested the elimination of these
punishments because they did little to improve the dis
cipline of the troops.

In lieu of the objectionable

practices, he recommended the establishment of a uniform
system that stipulated specific punishments for specific
crimes.

He suggested four types of punishments that

might be used as guidelines in drawing up such a system:
I. Punishment of death, or from
39 to 100 lashes, might be prescribed
for the crimes of desertion, cowardice,
or mutiny.
II.
From 10 to 50 lashes for
drunkenness or for stealing.
III.
From one to 30 days* solitary
confinement to hard labor on bread and
19

Gaines on "General Courts-Hartial:
Punishments," Ibid., 290.

Crimes and
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water for some two or three of the above
crimes, and for the most aggravated of
the minor offences.
IV.
Fines, not to exceed one half
the pay of the offender for one to six
months, in part for anyone of the above
offences as may in the opinion of the
court, require a small fine.20
Gaines hastened to point out that thesepenalties
were to be awarded only by a general court martial and
solely for the crimes of desertion, cowardice, mutiny,
habitual drunkenness, and stealing.

The General stated

that these penalties would not be considered any more
stringent than the penalty of death or hard labor for
crimes, such as piracy, robbery, forgery, or perjury in
a society that considered these capital offences.

He

did not believe that such a system of punishments would
hinder the Army's efforts to recruit good men.
encourage them to join

It would

. . a s without this kind of

punishment the best of men are obliged to watch and labor
whilst the worst of them sleep under guard."

21

2QIbid.
21

Ibid. In addition to these recommendations, in
an earlier report, Gaines had given other examples of
punishments employed at some of the military posts.
"Hard labor with ball and chain attached to his leg, to
wear around his neck an iron yoke of 10 pounds weight,
having two arms extending from the neck 10 inches, to
be marked on the hip with the word deserter an inch
long. . . .
To be marked on the right hip with the word
Mutiny and on the left with the word Deserter. . . .
To
be marked on the right forearm and right hip with the
word "deserter," and on the left forearm and left hip with
the word "Fraud," to wear an iron collar with four pro
jecting arms, to have his head shaved, be drummed out of
service with straw halter. . . .
To stand on the head of
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General Gaines attributed the high rate of de
sertion to the intemperate habits of many of the soldiers
and recommended that the whiskey ration be abolished.

As

an additional measure to reduce desertions, he suggested
that the pay of the enlisted men be increased, especially
of the non-commissioned officers.

The General offered

the opinion that with a population of twelve million the
United States should be able to maintain an Army with the
strength of 1,000 men for every million citizens.

While

maintaining such a force, the nation should be able to
pay wages to its soldiers equal to those paid by private
individuals to their employees.

Finally, he suggested

that the period of enlistment be reduced from five to
22
three years.
In his report to the Senate, Secretary of War
John Eaton supported the conclusions of his officers.
He added one factor which they had not considered when
he suggested that the limited opportunities for advance
ment open to enlisted men greatly influenced the type of
recruits attracted b y the Army.

Because of established

practice, although not by law, the graduates of West Point
had the exclusive privilege of becoming officers.

The

a barrel, with a 24 pound shot on his back, every alternate
two hours for fifteen days from sunrise to sunset. . . ."
These punishments were awarded in 1829. Inspection Reports,
1825-1829, Serial 1, Vol. 2, 225-28. Inspector General,
Record Group 159 (National Archives). Gaines' italics.
22ASPI'.IA, IV, 290-91.
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consequences of this system were that any hope of advance
ment, based on loyal and meritorious service, was futile.
The enlisted man knew that no matter how diligently he
worked and how proficient he became, he could not advance
beyond the rank of sergeant.

Eaton believed that if this

practice was altered in some way, better recruits might be
enlisted.

23

The Secretary felt that there was an urgent need
to place the Army "on a more respectable footing."

To

accomplish this goal, it was necessary to improve the
image of the Army and to remove the "opinion of in
feriority attached to this service" by the people.

If

this was done, the soldiers might regain some of the
self-respect that should be attached to their service
in the Army.

To achieve this object, the enlistment of

men with "intemperate habits and of dissolute character"
should not be allowed, since association with such men
caused men with better characters to lose some of their
pride.

If higher self-respect and honorable incentive

were not produced, the problems would continue to exist
in the Army.

He cautioned that "partial remedies are

mere palliatives and cannot answer any permanent good."24
To further the reform efforts, Secretary Eaton
believed that a new law establishing new penalties for
23Ibid., 285.
24Ibid.
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desertion was necessary.

He warned the members of the

Senate that the law must receive the sanction of the
people in order to be truly effective:
Popular opinion, in the absence of
War, is not with the existing law
for the punishment of desertion.
In time of peace, public opinion
turns with abhorence from the
severity of the penalty, and
renders the law a dead letter
on the statute book. Milder
punishments should be resorted
to, carrying with them a more ps
appropriate and certain effect.
Secretary of War Eaton, Generals Macomb and Gaines
and Colonel Jones all agreed that some type of reform was
necessary to improve the Army and they agreed on the es
sential areas that required attention:

something had to

be done to reduce the number of desertions that drained
the limited strength of the Army; the term of service
should be reduced from five years to either three or four
years; the punishments awarded by military courts should
conform more closely to the nature of the crime committed
in order to make them effective; the pay of the enlisted
men should be increased to enable the Army to compete more
effectively with civilian employers; and most importantly,
the ration of whiskey issued to the men should be dis
continued, and additional efforts made to curtail the
intemperate habits of the soldiers.
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These reforms, recommended in 1830, were directed
toward solving problems that had plagued the Army and
hindered its operations since the early days of its
existence.

Although they agreed in general as to what

needed to be done, specific reforms would be difficult
to achieve.

Some problems could be eliminated simply

by an order from the War Department, others required
Congressional action, and some virtually defied solution.
The easiest of the recommended reforms to accom
plish was the abolition of the daily whiskey ration.
Whiskey or some other type of alcoholic beverage had
been an intregal part of the soldier’s ration since the
American Revolution.

Throughout the period, officers had

accused the soldiers of drunkenness, and civilians had
26
criticised the intemperate habits of the men.
Whether the Army whiskey ration should be con
tinued or not received extensive consideration in 1329

26

It is necessary to read only a few of the
garrison and departmental order books, which contain
the charges brought against the soldiers and the re
sults of the courts martial conducted at the various
posts, to find that most of the trials were the result
of too much consumption of alcohol on the part of the
soldiers. For example see: Letters Sent 8th Military
Department, May, 1817 - May, 1321; Orderly Book for the
Garrison at Ft. Johnston, N. C., 1795-1811; General Orders,
Southern Department, 1812; Orders Garrison of New Orleans,
1806-1312, all in Army Commands, Record Group 98
(National Archives); Letters Sent Western Department,
1321-1835t Vols. I-VII, Records of the United States
Continental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393
(National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSWD. Letters
Sent Headquarters of the Army, 1828-1833» Vol. I-II
Headquarters of the Army, Record Group 108 (National
Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSHQA.
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and 1830.

During this period a number of reports were

submitted to the House of Representatives concerning its
beneficial and adverse effects, and various suggestions
were advanced to control the use of whiskey by the
soldiers.
In late January 1829, Secretary of War Peter B.
Porter communicated reports on the effect of the whiskey
ration to the House of Representatives from the Commanding
General and the Commissary General of Subsistence.

Porter

summarized the opinions contained in the reports:
1st - That the habitual use of
ardent spirits, in moderate quan
tities, is unfavorable to health;
and that the chances for health,
vigor, and protracted life, in
favor of an individual who finds
it convenient wholly to abstain
from them, are generally greater
than of him who indulges.
2nd - That the use of so small
a quantity as one gill a day, taken
at proper times, will not seriously
impair the constitution or diminish
the health of a man who pursues
laborious or active employments.
3rd - That a sudden and total
abandonment of the practice by one
who has been long accustomed to the
free use of ardent spirits will
diminish his vigor, and possible
injure rather than improve his health
and constitution; and
4th - That the evils of intem
perance in our Army arise not so much
from the moderate allowance of spirits
made to the soldiers by the government
and its officers, as from the excessive
quantities procured by other means.*7

83*

2^Porter to Stevenson, Jan. 31, 1829, ASPflA, IV,
In 1830 one gill of whiskey a day was allotted to
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These four propositions set the tone of the
opinions delivered by the officers of the Army who sub
mitted reports on the subject in 1529

1330.

The

amount of the whiskey ration was not considered to be
excessive.

Porter ventured the opinion that in the United

States there was not one man in four, among the laboring
class, who did not drink more than one gill a day, and it
was from this class that the members of the Army were re
cruited.

In addition, the ration was believed to be

beneficial, because it stimulated the digestive process,
something the soldiers required because their diet con23
sisted primarily of foods thax were dry and solid.
Secretary Porter, and the officers who submitted
opinions, laid the blame for drunkenness upon the illegal
sale of whiskey to the soldiers by civilians.

This

each man and it was usually issued in equal parts twice a
day. An additional quantity, either a half or a full gill,
was normally issued to those soldiers who were assigned to
fatigue duty. It was the individual soldier's choice as
to whether or not he drew his daily ration. Therefore,
it is virtually impossible to answer several important
questions concerning the ration, for instance: how many
men drew the whiskey ration for personal consumption; how
many men received the ration in order to pass it on to
fellow soldiers; what proportion did not draw their ration;
and how consistently did each man draw his daily ration?
Despite these questions, a number of officers had expressed
the opinion that the whiskey given to the men as a part of
their ration was not the actual source of the problem. On
March 16, 1802, the whiskey ration was increased from one
half to a full gill. J. F. Callan, The Military laws of
the United States (Philadelphia: G.~W7 Childs. 1^64).

TZT-VT.

oo
Porter to Stevenson, Jan. 31, 1829, ASPMA, IV, 83.
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practice had not been stopped because the civilians who
made the sales were not liable to any sort of penalty in
most of the states, whereas the soldier who purchased
additional whiskey without permission was subject to severe
punishment.

To correct this situation, Porter suggested

that the House of Representatives pass a resolution rec
ommending that the states enact laws that would provide
for the punishment of citizens who sold alcoholic beverages
to soldiers.

29

Porter observed that there was probably a higher
proportion of individuals in the Army addicted to the
excessive use of liquor than was to be found in other
occupations.

This fact arose from the Army's practice

of enlisting confirmed drunkards.

The Secretary defended

the whiskey ration for the vast majority of the men in
the Army who were not drunkards, but were men who "exhibit
examples of as pure integrity, as correct habits, as
ardent love of their country and zeal for its defense"
29

Ibid., 33-34. In some cases the Army attempted
to punish those individuals who were illegally selling
liquor to soldiers. For example, in 1798 a Spanish sub
ject, Martias Agustin, was found guilty by a court martial
of selling taffia to soldiers without a permit. He was
sentenced to receive one hundred lashes and to be drummed
out of camp with two bottles suspended from his neck.
General Wilkinson approved the sentence and then remitted
all punishment, except his removal from camp. He justified
his action on the basis of the amicable relations that
existed between Spain and the United States. General
Order, Nov. 19» 1798, ’
Wilkinson's Book of General Orders,
1797-1808, National Archives Microfilm Publication, M654.
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as might be discovered in the best of society.

He stated:

To interdict such men the use of that
which; if not a necessary, is deemed
one of the comforts of life, and which
is forbidden to no other persons but
convicts, would be stamping them with
a mark of degradation more injurious,
it is believed, and debasing to their
moral sense, than would follow from
the most unrestrained license for its
use.30
Surgeon General Joseph Lovell stated in his report
that more ill effects might result from the abolition of
the ration among men who were accustomed to receiving it,
than the evils produced by the drinking.

He speculated

that the men who were inclined to drink too heavily would
continue to do so even if the ration were stopped.

The

gill of whiskey that was issued was only a small quantity
and the heavy drinkers would be willing to pay any price
in order to obtain an adequate supply from other sources.
The ending of the ration would produce great dissatisfaction
among the men and would not stop those individuals who
drank excessively.
Lovell pointed out that there were only three ways
in which a soldier might acquire ardent spirits; from his
ration; from the sutler on written permission from his
commanding officer; and from the civilians who ’'infest
almost every military post."

He felt that if the civilian

dealers could be controlled, intemperance would cease to be
3°Ibid., 84.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

365
a problem.

He stated that only one state provided any

penalty whatsoever for illegal liquor sales to soldiers
and recommended that the other states be requested to
establish similar laws.

In his opinion, all of the

suggestions for solving the problem of intemperance were
useless as long as the Army continued the practice of en
listing new soldiers and re-enlisting others who were known
to be drunkards.^1
In 1830, at the request of the House Committee on
Military Affairs, Secretary of War Eaton, General Macomb
and Colonel George Gibson, Commissary General of Sub
sistence, submitted reports on the influence of alcohol
on the members of the Army.

Secretary Eaton's report

served to reinforce the opinions rendered the previous
year by Secretary Porter.

Eaton wrote:

It is not the allowance made by the
government to the soldier which pro
duces his intemperance; the quantity
is too small. It is occasioned by
supplies of ardent spirits obtained
from citizens, and which no vigilance
heretofore practised at posts, has
been sufficient to prevent.32
The resolution prompting the reports from the
three officials had directed the Committee on Military
Affairs to study the feasibility of a plan to induce the
soldiers and sailors to voluntarily relinquish the whiskey
■^Lowell to Porter, Jan. 26, 1829, Ibid., 85 .
32
Eaton to Andrew Stevenson, Jan. 12, 1830, House
Document #22 (21st Congress, 1st Session), Serial #195.
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ration.

The inducement to be offered was a cash payment,

equal to the value of the ration given up by the men, to
be made at the expiration of the term of enlistment.

To

encourage sober and orderly conduct, it was suggested
that the payment of an extra bounty, either in money,
clothing, or both, be made to those men who could produce
a statement, signed by their commanding officer, attesting
to their good conduct and total abstinence during their
term of service.
General Llacomb felt that nothing had done "so
much to degrade the rank and file of the Army, as the
excessive use of ardent spirits nor has it been less
destructive of their health and discipline."

He stated

that he would welcome any plan which would eliminate the
problem, Macomb suggested that the whiskey ration be
stopped, and in its place the soldiers be issued a portion
of rice and molasses.

The General believed that a bounty

paid at the time of discharge would be a valuable incentive
to good behavior and abstinence.

The bounty should consist

of one dollar for each month of service to each non
commissioned officer, musician, artificer, and private
who could produce a certificate from his commanding officer
attesting to his total abstinence and good conduct during
his period of service.^
^Macomb to Eaton, Jan. 11, 1830, Ibid.
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George Gibson agreed that something should be
done, but he was sceptical of the success that might be
achieved by any voluntary system that would pay the
soldiers a bounty.

His scepticism was a result of the

efforts to establish a similar system in 1820.

At that

time he had sent a circular letter to the fifty-six
Assistant Commissaries of Subsistence at all of the
military posts informing them that Secretary of War John
C. Calhoun and he wished to end the whiskey ration.

The

plan was to be voluntary and the men would receive a cash
compensation, equivalent to the value of the ration.

The

payments were to be made either monthly or quarterly, at
the option of the commanding officer, who was to appoint
an officer to make the payments to the troops.

The plan

was adopted at some posts and completely rejected at
others.

The new system was continued at the posts where

it was adopted until the determination was made that the
plan was ’'entirely of non-effect.”
As an alternative to the bounty system, Gibson
recommended a plan which he had suggested the previous
year when the House had considered the subject of the
whiskey ration.

He felt that this plan would adequately

solve the problem of drinking among the soldiers and he
strongly advised the Representatives to consider the
proposal.^
34

Gibson to Eaton, Jan. o, 1830, Ibid.

Also in
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On January 26, 1829» Gibson had informed the
Secretary of War that he could not think of any ben
eficial effects of the whiskey issue nor did he feel
that any were likely to result.

On the other hand, he

could not think of any great evil that might arise from
the issuance of the small amount of whiskey that made
up the ration.

He concluded:

The most unhappy and pernicious effects
of spirituous liquors to the Army result
from its being clandestantly supplied by
citizens; nor can this be totally pre
vented, but might be in a very great
measure arrested, by inducing the states
to enact laws prohibiting persons selling
ardent spirits to soldiers, under the
penalty of levying fines, recoverable
before a Justice of the Peace, one half
of said fines to be applied to the use
of the State, and the other half to
the person giving the information. . . .
Could this be efficiently done, there
ASPMA. IV, 86. For the 1820 circular see Gibson to 56
Assistant Commissaries of Subsistence, Aug. 10, 1820,
Records of the Office of the Commissary of Subsistence,
Letters Sent, 1818-1820, Commissary General of Sub
sistence, Record Group 192 (National Archives). Calhoun
had strongly recommended the abolition of the whiskey
ration in 1818. He wrote that "the spirits ought to be
placed in depot, and be issued occasionally under the
discretion of the Commander. Thus used, its noxious
effects would be avoided, and the troops, when great
effects were necessary, would, by a judicious use, derive
important benefits from it. Molasses, beer, and cider
according to circumstances, might be used as substitutes."
Calhoun to House of Representatives, Dec. 11, 1818, ASPMA,
IV, 781. In 1803 an effort had been made to substitute
beer and light wines for whiskey, rum or brandy. If a
majority of the troops at a post agreed, the commander
could substitute malt liquor for spirits during the period
from May to October. The attempt was a dismal failure.
Dearborn to Freeman, et. al., June 17, 1803, in Records
of the Office of the Secretary of War. Letters Sent, Re
lating to Military Affairs, 1800-1389, Record Group 107,
Microcopy 6, Hereinafter cited as SWLS.
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is no doubt that the deleterious
effects of the use of spirituous
liquors by the Army would cease,
as regards the health, morals, and
discipline of the s o l d i e r s . 35
On January 14, 1830, the reports were sent to the
House of Representatives and read before that body.

After

the initial reading they were laid upon the table without
any action being taken on any of the recommendations.

On

February 8, 1830, the Commissary General of Subsistence
informed the House of Representatives that any plan to
abolish the whiskey ration and substitute a ration of
coffee and sugar would require approximately $ 21,900 a
year in additional funds.

He based his estimate upon the

cost of the rations at all posts, one cent for whiskey
■3g

and two cents for coffee and sugar.

No further action

was taken by Congress on the subject of the whiskey ration
after Gibson submitted his report in February.

However,

in December of 1330 the whiskey ration was abolished in
the Army.
35

Gibson to Porter, Jan. 26, 1829, House Document
#22 (21st Congress, 1st Session), Serial #195.
■^Gibson to House of Representatives, Feb. 8, 183O,
ASPMA, IV, 275-76. Based upon Gibson's figures, the Array
had issued 2,190,000 gills of whiskey for the period upon
which he had based his estimate, or a total of 68,437
gallons. The reported strength of the Army in 1829 was
6,332 officers and enlisted men, if each man had drawn
one ration per day, 2,311,180 gills should have been
issued. If some men drew an extra half gill or full
gill it is apparent that some men did not draw their
ration each day. Gibson's calculations were fairly
accurate, Secretary of iVar Lewis Cass reported that
the Army issued 72,537 gallons of whiskey to the soldiers
in 1830 at a cost of $22,132. Ibid., 709.
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Order Number 72, issued by the Adjutant General's
office on December 8, 1830, promulgated a new regulation
that prohibited the whiskey ration.

Under the new reg

ulation, soldiers would receive cash payments to com
pensate them for the loss of the ration.

The system of

payments proved to be unsatisfactory and in November of
1832 a regulation was established by the War Department
that abolished it and substituted the issuance of eight
pounds of sugar and four pounds of coffee for every one
hundred rations.

37

Men who were engaged in activities

such as building fortifications, cutting roads, making
surveys and other types of manual labor for a period of
not less than ten days would still receive one gill of
whiskey each day, or at their own option, one cent per
Q
ration.
The whiskey ration was permanently eliminated
by legislative action in 1338.

This step was apparently

taken to prevent any future President from restoring the
ration by executive order.

39

In abolishing the whiskey portion of the ration,
^ O r d e r Number 72, Dec. 8, 1830, War Department
General Orders. Order Number 100, Nov. 5, 1832, War
Department General Orders.
38
Regulations for the Subsistence Department of
the Army (Washington: “sTaTr” and Rivers, 1835), 10.
39

"Classics of Alcohol Literature. Early Medical
and Official Views on Rations of Spirits in the Army and
Navy of the United States," Quarterly Journal of Studies
of Alcohol, IV (Mar., 1944), 606-34. The whiskey ration
for seamen was not abolished until 1862.
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the War Department was making a feeble effort to solve
a serious problem.

It was a step that few of the officers

believed would actually eliminate any of the drunkeness
among the soldiers.

The real source of the problem, the

sale of spirits to the soldiers by civilians, was ignored
by the order.

It would be a safe assumption that without

strict regulation of the liquor trade in the vicinity of
Army posts, those soldiers who were inclined to drink
heavily before the whiskey ration was abolished would
continue to do so as long as they were able to obtain an
adequate supply from other sources.^0
Congress had taken no action on the subject of
the whiskey ration and it delayed any action on higher
pay until 1833.

In March "An act to improve the condition

of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the Army
and Marine Corps of the United States, and to prevent
desertion" was passed by Congress and signed by President
Jackson.

The law incorporated many of the recommendations

made in 1829 and 1830.

It shortened the term of enlistment

to three years and raised the pay of all enlisted men.
40

One possible solution to the drinking of the
soldiers was to isolate them from the temptation. W. C. C.
Claiborne, Governor of the Mississippi Territory, justified
the purchase of forty-one acres of land for the site of
Port Dearborn because it would "prevent the citizens from
erecting tippling houses immediately in the vicinity of
the fort, which invariably produces irregularities among
the troops." Claiborne to Dearborn, Feb. 15, 1803, Dunbar
Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne,
1801-1806 (Jackson: Mississippi State Department of
Archives and History, 1917), I, 268-69.
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According to the provisions of the act, musicians and
privates would receive six dollars a month, one dollar
of which was to be retained by the Army during the first
two years of service.

The soldiers would receive the

retained portion of their pay at the conclusion of the
two year period, provided they had served faithfully
during that portion of their enlistment.

The musicians

and privates who decided to re-enlist, either two months
before or one month after their term expired, would receive
two months extra pay in addition to the pay and allowances
due them from the unexpired term.

The men who re-enlisted

would receive their full six dollars a month without any
temporary deductions.
The act also abolished premiums paid to officers
for enlisting new men and the bounties paid to new recruits.
It further stipulated that no person who had been con
victed of a criminal act was to be enlisted by recruiting
officers.

Finally, the act restored the penalty of

whipping for those men who were convicted of desertion
by a general court martial.

41

41U. S. Statutes at Large, IV, 647-48. The pay
of the other enlisted members was: to each Sergeant
Major, quartermaster sergeant, and chief musician, $16;
to the 1st Sergeant of a company, $15; to all other
Sergeants, $12; to each artificer, $10; to each corporal,
$8. It is interesting to note that the pay for a marine
was one dollar more than to a member of the Army of equal
rank. Also see Regulations of the Army, Mar. 23, 1833»
Adjutant General's Office, this regulation explained the
new system of enlistments and pay.
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Independently of the legislative action of 1833
designed to upgrade the caliber of enlisted men, the War
Department issued regulations for the conduct of the
Medical Department and the Recruiting Service, in 1832
and 1834 respectively.

These two sets of regulations had

previously been included in the General Regulations of the
Army, and now they were expanded to make them more com
prehensive ana issued separately to the officers of the
two services.

42

42
Regulations for the Medical Department of the
Army (Washington: Charles H. 6arron, 1832). Regulations
for the Recruiting Service of the Army of the United
Stateff. (Washington: Francis f’reston STair, 1834).
The Checklist of United States Public Documents, 17391909 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911), I,
lists each of these two publications as the earliest for
each of the branches, the recruiting service is surveyed
on page 1244 and the medical department on page 1388. The
earlier volumes of General Regulations for the Army con
tain the regulations for the two branches, for example,
see Regulations for the years 1808, 1812, 1813, 1814, 1816,
1820, 1825» A~discussion of the General Regulations is
contained in G. Norman Lieber, Remarks on the Army Reg
ulations and Executive Regulations in General (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 18$8 ). “T n addition to the
regulations for the Medical Department and the Recruiting
Department various other manuals and regulations were
published for the guidence of members of the Army between
1827 and 1841. For example: Regulations for the Sub
sistence Department of the Army (Washington: Blair and
Rives, 1835); Abstract of Infantry Tactics; Including
Exercises and Maneuvers of light Infantry and Riflemen;
for the Use of the MilitTa of the United States (Boston:
HiTliard, Gray, tittle and Catkins, 1830); faules and Reg
ulations for the Government of the Mounted Rangers
(Washington, 1832); A System of Exercise and Instruction
of Field-Artillery Including Manuevures for Light or Horse
Artillery (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, Little, ana vVaTkins,
1829); System of Accountability for Clothing and Camp
Equipage Issued to the Army of the United States (Washington:
James C. Dunn, 1%27); Regulations for the Government of
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The 'regulations were designed to ensure the en
listment of healthy men and the continuation of that good
health after they entered the Army.

Surgeons and assistant

surgeons were to eliminate men carried on the muster rolls
who were medically unfit for service.

They were to inspect

the rations issued to the soldiers and the living quarters
and sanitary conditions at the military posts with a view
to determining whether the General Regulations pertaining
to these subjects were being observed by the officers and
men.

These precautions were to be emphasized so that the

health of the men did not suffer from causes that could be
corrected.

43

Ordnance Department (Washington: Francis Preston Blair,
1834); Denis H. Mahan, A Complete Treatise on Field
Fortifications, with the-General"’
Outlines of the prin
ciples Regulating the Arrangement,' the Attack, and the
Defence of Permanent Works (New ‘
fork: Wiley and Long,
1BIS); Alfred Mordecai, A Digest of the Laws Relating
to the Military Establishment of the United States
{Washington: Thompson and Homans, 1833J; Alexander
Macomb, The Practice of Coyts Martial (New York: Harper
and Brother, 1841 andHTew York: S. Colman, 1 8 4 0 ) ; and
Thomas Henderson, Hints on the Medical Examination of
Recruits for the Army; ana on the foischarffe of Soldiers
from the Service of the~United States (Philadelphia:
Kaswell, Barrington, and Haswell, 1840).
43

Regulations for the Medical Department of the
Army, passim. Just how effective the regulations were
might oe seriously questioned, if the letter from the
Assistant Adjutant General of the Western Department,
A. Miller, is an example of what actually happened.
Miller informed Lieutenant Colonel William S. Foster,
commanding officer at Baton Rouge, that ’’Private George
Simpson should be examined by the Surgeon, on whose
certificate he maybe discharged should his short leg
contribute to render him less efficient than he other
wise would be.” Miller to Foster, Mar. 15, 1833» LSWD,
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The regulations concerning the recruiting service
required that each recruit receive four physical exam
inations before being permanently assigned to a company.
It was expected that any individual who was physically
unfit would be eliminated at one of the examinations.

To

avoid any laxity in the examination process, the reg
ulations provided that the expense of any bounty and
clothing which the recruit might have received from the
government was to be deducted from the pay of any officers
and surgeons who had not observed the recruiting regula44
tions.
The regulations provided:
Medical officers, who's duty it
maybe to examine recruits, will be
particular in causing each recruit
to be striped of all his clothes,
and to be made to move about and
exercise his limbs in their pres
ence, in order to ascertain whether
he has the free use of them; that his
hearing and vision are perfect; that
he has no tumors, ulcerated legs,
rupture, or chronic cutaneous affections,
or other infirmity a disorder which may
IV. That such a case should be called to the attention
of the Department Commander, in light of the Army Reg
ulations, reveals a decided unwillingness on the part
of officers and surgeons to make decisions, even when
authorized to do so.
ations for the Recruiting Service of the
Army of the United States. 12. The recruits were to be
examined at the following times: upon being recruited;
three days after their arrival at the general depot;
before leaving the depot for their assigned stations;
and four days after their arrival at their permanent
station.
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render him unfit for the active duties
of a soldier, or be the means of in
troducing disease into the Army; and
it shall be their duty to ascertain,
as far as practicable, whether the
recruit is an habitual drunkard, or
subject to convulsions of any kind,
or has received any contusions or
wounds in the head which produce
occasional insanty.45
A recruit was to be rejected as unfit if any of the
negative conditions were found to exist.

The surgeon

was to determine if the acceptable men should be vaccinated,
and if so, it was to be done as soon as possible.
The overall results of the reform efforts of the
War Department and Congress in the early 1830's are dif
ficult to assess.

However, on November 28, 1334, Command

ing General Macomb was able to state in his annual report:
The character of the soldiery
is evidently improving. The law for
bettering 'the condition of the rank
and file seems to have already pro
duced the most beneficial results.
The vice of drunkenness has diminished,
and with it desertion and other crimes,
while at the same time better men enlist.
In addition to the improvements noted by General
Macomb, the Adjutant General reported that enlistments from
January 1 to September 20, 1834, numbered 2,111 and that an
additional 335 men had re-enlisted and would receive two
months extra pay.

He estimated that 507 additional recruits

45Ibid., 13.
46
Report of the Commanding General accompanying
the Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1834, ASPMA,
V, 362.
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would be needed to fill the ranks by December 31 »47

The

reported strength of the Army at the end of 1334 was 7,030
only slightly below the 7,194 men authorized by Congress
_
48
in 1833*
The increase in the number of enlistments was
probably only temporary, because in the first three
quarters of 1835 the number of recruits dropped to 1,590.4^
The strength of the Army at the end of the year was 7,337,
or 143 more than authorized by law.

The increase in the

size of the Army during the last quarter was in all like
lihood unrelated to any policy of the Army, but was a
result of the warfare that marked the beginning of the
Second Seminole War.

50

The November 1333 issue of The Military and Naval
Magazine of the United States carried a letter to the editor
which touched off a brief but heated discussion of the
monthly pay of privates.

From the letters that were pub

lished, purported to have been written by privates, it is
47Ibid., 371-72.
48

The actual strength of the Army is available in
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the
United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington: Govern
ment Printing Office, 1960). Hereinafter cited as
Historical Statistics. The authorized strength is
available in Historical Register, II, 560-85, and in
the annual reports of the Secretary of War in the ASPMA,
I-VII.
49

Report of the Adjutant General in accompanying
the Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1335, ASPMA,
V, 642.
50

Historical Statistics, 737.
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evident that their authors did not believe that the six
dollars a month granted by Congress in March was sufficient
to meet the needs of the soldiers.

It is impossible to

determine if their feelings reflected those of their
fellow privates, but if the figures presented had any
validity, it is probable that the men were not impressed
with the new pay scale.
One critic wrote that there were certain "immediate
and indispensible expenses” incurred by the soldiers, in
addition to those allowed by the government.

The extra

expenses included such items as washing; wear and tear
on mess furniture; pipe clay, etc.; entertaining visiting
soldiers; beer; coffee; contributions for paints, towels;
and the making and preservation of a seine.

These items

cost the soldier five dollars and thirty-five cents each
month and when deducted from his monthly salary left him
with a cash payment of sixty-five cents.

The author cal

culated that a prudent soldier would be able to retire at
the conclusion of ten years of honorable service with
savings totaling seventy-two dollars.

Given these cir

cumstances, he seriously questioned whether the United
States would ever have an efficient Army.

51

51

The soldier broke down the monthly expenses as
follows: washing, 750; wear and tear of mess furniture,
250; entertaining visiting soldiers, 250; beer from the
sutler, $2.50; coffee, 750; contribution of making and
preservation of seine, 250; contribution for paints, pur
chase of towels and other articles, 250; total per month,
$5.35. Letter to the editor, The Military and Naval
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In his remarks on the soldier's letter, the editor
of the magazine stated that "the private soldier is as
much entitled to a hearing as the General Officer, and
he shall have one." He then proceededto lower the
estimate by eliminating those itemshe considered un
necessary and those supplied by the government. He dis
posed of the following items: beer as "a very unnecessary
and therefore useless expense"; mess furniture since it
was provided either by the government or from a company
fund; and coffee because it was a component part of the
ration. He agreed that the expenseof the seine was not
proper, but pointed out that if anyfish were caught, the
soldier could save his meat ration which was worth more
than the cost of the seine. The calculations of the editor
revealed that the individual soldier was required to pay
only two dollars for his maintenance each month instead
of five dollars and thirty-five cents. The editor stated
that his estimate was too high and he had been assured by
officers “well informed on the subject" that one dollar
was sufficient for the soldier to purchase all of the
necessary items not supplied by the government. 52
In January the privates' point of view was further
expounded upon in a letter signed simply "Wayne". He
Magazine of the United States, II, Nov.
William Greene, T53477 1B^.

3» 1333

(Washington:
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wrote that the private soldiers were grateful to the
magazine for giving them a forum from which to express
their opinions, because "there are many little occur
rences happening every day, which it is of consequence
for the good of the Army that they should be made public;
and which are known among the privates, but unknown to
the officers."*^
Wayne's calculations yielded a slightly lower sum
than the one given in the first letter. Despite the
lower total, his list of articles purchased was more
inclusive. He estimated that each month he was required
to pay four dollars and fifty-six cents, or fifty-four
dollars and seventy-two cents a year, for the articles
not allowed by the Government. 54 He concluded that after
the deductions were made from his pay, he would receive
one dollar and forty-four cents a month, or seventeen
dollars and twenty-eight cents a year.
Wayne agreed that some of the articles on his
53

Letter to the editor, The Military and Naval
Magazine of the United States, II,Nov. 3, Jan., 1834
(Washington: William"”Greene, 1 8 3 4 ), 2 9 4 .
54

The itemized list included: 3 extra pair of
shoes, at $1 . 5 0 each, 370 a month; 3 extra shirts, at
870 each, 210 a month; repairing shoes, 290; repairing
clothes, 1 8 0 ; utensils for shaving, 1 2 0 ; blacking,
brushes, etc. for shoes, 1 2 0 ; washing clothes, 5 0 0 ;
sugar and coffee, 370; brooms for company rooms, 6 0 ;
tobacco, 1 2 0 ; rotten stone and whiting for belts, 1 8 0 ;
mess furniture, plates, etc., 6 0 ; postage on letters
(250 each letter), 6 0 a month; 2 extra pairs of stock
ings per year, 6 0 per month; beer, 1 pint per day at
60 a pint, $1.80.
Ibid.
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list, specifically beer, tobacco, sugar and coffee, were
considered useless luxuries by some individuals.
he justified each item on the basis that:

However,

a pint of beer

after a hard day's work was beneficial to the soldier and
perhaps even essential; tobacco, to the soldier who was
accustomed to its use might suffer serious injury as a
result of not having it; and sugar and coffee were
necessary because the amount issued to the soldiers was
insufficient to meet their needs.

All of the remaining

articles were listed at the lowest price and were in
dispensable to the private soldier.

In addition to the

items on the list, there were other articles that were
necessary to maintain a soldierly appearance that were
not included which would have raised the figure still
higher.

55
In addition to the statements concerning the pay

of enlisted men, Wayne illustrated the inequality that
existed between the men who had enlisted before and after
the provisions of the "Act to improve the condition of
the non-commissioned officers and privates" were imple
mented.

He cited the example of two men in his company,

one of whom had enlisted on March 1 and the other on
March 4-.

Both men had sworn to serve for five years,

but because of the provision in the act that stipulated
55

He specifically mentioned button sticks and
clothes brushes.
Ibid., 295.
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that those who enlisted after March 2 would serve only
three years, the second private's turn was shortened by
two years.

Also, he would receive six dollars a month

for the three years, whereas the first soldier would re
ceive five dollars a month for two years and then six
dollars a month for the remaining three years.
V/ayne stated that many of the soldiers he knew
were dissatisfied with the new system because they had
already served from twelve to eighteen months of their
enlistments and the new recruits who joined the company
not only received higher pay but would be discharged
before the older soldiers.

He declared that if the

purpose of the law was to put all of the men on an equal
footing, it had failed.

The new regulations had served

only to arouse considerable discontent among the soldiers.
He closed his letter with the plea that "notice will be
given of these few facts, and the grievances remedied, so
that we poor soldiers may at all events be contented."

56

Two letters appeared in the next issue of the
magazine, one supporting and one attacking the position
taken by the privates.

An officer who claimed to have

"grown up with the service" rejoiced that the privates
had called public attention to the amount of their pay.
He wrote to support the author of the November letter

56Ibid., 296.
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and to refute the editor's remarks that had accompanied
that letter.

He believed that a careful reading of the

letter could not "fail to throw light on the matter, and
enable the world to understand in what manner our Govern
ment makes provisions for its defenders, and what induce
ments are held out to her citizens to enroll themselves
under her banners."

57

Just as the first two writers had presented lists
of items and their costs to justify their arguments, the
officer presented a third list which he felt was appli
cable at most of the garrisons throughout the country.
His list of necessary items yielded a total cost of three
dollars and thirty cents a month, which left the soldier
with a balance of two dollars and seventy cents on pay
day.

He calculated that this would allow the soldier to

retire at the end of ten years with savings amounting to
$324 and if he did not use beer he could accumulate
$547.20.58
When he justified the articles on his list, the
57
Letter to the editor, The Military and Naval
Magazine of the United States, II, Nov. 6, Feb., 1S$4
(Washington: William Greene, 1834), 381.
58

The items and their cost per month were: wash
ing, 500; wear and tear of mess furniture, 6 1/40; pipe
clay, whiting, black varnish, etc., 6 1/40; entertaining
visiting soldiers, no charge; beer, 1 pint per day at
6 1/40, $1.86; coffee, sugar, tea, 500 ; contribution
for seine, 250; contribution of towels, etc., 6 1/40.
Ibid.
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officer made some candid statements about the items
supplied by the government.

He indicated that mess

furniture was not furnished by the government or from
a ’’post fund."

Although the Quartermaster Department

did furnish mess pans and camp kettles, they were "but
seldom, if ever, used for culinary purposes, being un
suitable for it."

Such items as knives, forks, plates,

glasses and other utensils were normally acquired either
by a contribution or from a company fund, if such were
available.

The soldiers should be furnished with whiting

and the other items necessary to keep his arms and accou
terments in proper order.

The assessment for entertaining

visiting soldiers at posts w a s eliminated by the officer
since it was not accepted at any of the garrisons.

With respect to the expense of coffee, sugar, and
tea he wrote:
The Army regulations contemplate
but two meals, viz; breakfast and
dinner. To enable the men to have
the third meal, they are permitted
to purchase the articles for that
purpose. The small rations fur,-q
nished them, being found inadequate.
The officer indicated that since the location of
his post provided good fishing, he had assessed each of
his men twenty-five cents for the purpose of making and
maintaining a seine.

In the first year the catch was

large enough that the surplus was sold and the men received
59Ibid., 332.
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a return on their investment in the seine amounting to
approximately 400 per cent.

Although the catch earned

the soldiers additional money, the fish obtained by
using the seine did not save the regular rations as had
been implied by the editor.

The officer stated:

There are no "surplus provisions
and flour saved in serving our rations,”
or "re-bought by the Government.”
Rations always fall short of the normal
weight and measure. But should there,
at any time, be a surplus, it reverts
to the Subsistence Department."^
The officer believed that neither the pay of the
soldiers nor their rations were adequate.

The officer’s

opinions were directly opposed to those of the author of
the second letter, who called himself "an old soldier.”
The old soldier took upon himself the task of
answering some of Wayne's complaints.

He attributed

Wayne's discontent to the fact that "the government are
so illiberal as not to furnish him "beer and tobacco.”
The basis of his argument was that while the soldiers
did not receive these articles in kind, he was afforded
"ample means” of obtaining them without drawing upon his
pay proper.

The "ample means" provided him was the clothing

allotted to him by the government but not drawn by the in
dividual.

Drawing upon his own experiences, the old

soldier related that when a man's clothing account was

60

Ibid.

Officer's italics.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

386
settled at the expiration of his term of service, he
received more money from this source than from his pay.
Now that the clothing accounts were settled periodically,
he was certain that it would he an "improvident man who
did not receive enough money to provide his beer and
tobacco, from the liberality of the government in so
abundantly clothing him."^1
The old soldier evidently believed that Wayne
was fomenting discontent among the members of the Army:
It is to be regretted, that a
man who can wield his pen so well as
"Wayne", instead of devoting it to
the instruction and improvement of
his less fortunate comrades, to the
repression of discontent and the ex
citement of emulation, should pro
stitute it to the making of unfair
(at least) statements, calculated
to produce uneasiness and dissatis
faction in those not so well informed,
The clothing allotment was altered when the
period of enlistment was changed from five to three
years. The allowance for five years was:
3 uniform
coats complete; 4 cotton jackets; 4 woolen jackets;
20 pairs of boots; 10 flannel shirts; 10 cotton shirts;
20 pair of stockings; 2 leather stocks; 1 great coat;
3 blankets; 1 forage cap; 10 pair woolen overalls; 15
pair cotton overalls; 6 pair of drawers, and 1 hat
complete. The allowance for three years was: 2 uniform
coats complete, 3 cotton jackets; 2 woolen jackets; 9
pair of boots; 6 flannel shirts; 6 cotton shirts; 9 pair
pair of stockings; 1 leather stock; 1 great coat; 2
blankets; 1 forage cap; 6 pair woolen overalls; 9 pair
cotton overalls; 3 pair of drawers; and a hate complete.
Report of the Clothing Bureau, Mar. 25, 1S33» approved
by the Military 3oard on Mar. 27, 1833* Proceedings of
the Military Board, 1832-1835. Army Commands, Record
Group 98 (National Archives). This issue hardly re
presented an abundant clothing allowance for men who
were engaged in hard manual labor.
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as himself; as for instance, the
young recruit, or aspirant for
the honorable ranks of the Army.
In an effort to relate the details which he felt
Wayne had neglected to mention, the irate "old soldier"
drew upon his own experiences in the Army.

He pointed

out that in the many companies with which he had been
associated, all of the articles mentioned by Wayne, except
postage and button sticks, had been purchased with money
from the company fund.

This fund consisted of money that

had been saved by combining certain parts of the men's
rations and the payments received for the whiskey portions
of the ration.

The fund was normally administered by the

company commander, and it was to this source that Wayne
should turn for those small items not furnished by the
government.
He dismissed Wayne’s questions concerning five
and three year enlistments by saying that his captain
would explain the situation to him if Wayne would
"condescend to ask him the favor."

The old soldier

criticised Wayne for mentioning the discontent among
the soldiers caused by the reduction of the term of
service.

He concluded with these words:
On his intimation, however, that such
inequalities promote discontent, and
6?

Letter to the editor, The Military and Naval
Magazine of the United States, il, Nov. 6>, Feb., 18 j}4
(Washington: vTilliam Greene, 1334), 381.
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will not prevent desertion.
I have
only to say, that whenever a man
seeks for excuses for desertion,
he will find them. . . . Much has
been said and much written on the
subject of desertion, but when
Government will adequately punish
the cowardly deserter, and not
only him, but all aiders and
abettors, citizens or soldiers . . .
then a check may be given to the
disease.° ’
Wayne's reply to the "old soldier" appeared in
the May issue of the magazine.

He maintained his original

contention that the articles he had mentioned were neces
sary if the private soldier was to properly present him
self for inspections.

Contrary to the statements made

by his advisary, the items were not furnished by the
government nor purchased from the company fund, but were
acquired by the individual soldier at his own expense.
Wayne pointed out that the clothing allowance could
scarcely be considered abundant and that any cash derived
from the accumulated surplus should not be denied to the
soldier as it arose from "an economy amounting to a selfdenial."

Having dismissed the idea that the soldier was

only required to pay fifty cents a month from his pay,
Wayne turned to a different topic:
63Ibid.

64

Wayne illustrated the insufficiency of the
clothing allowance with one example: "Rationally speak
ing, our clothing is not more than sufficient for our use,
and some articles are not at all sufficient. There are
but three pairs of boots allowed to us in a year; and at
some shelly posts, where there is much drill, six pairs
will not serve us. . . ." The Military and Naval Magazine
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I am well pleased with the "old
soldier's" idea, in regard to the
five years* men and three years'
men, he states, that the inequality
is apparent. There he agrees with
me, hut as he has tired himself by
his previous effort, he finds him
self unable to explain the subject,
and refers me to my captain for an
explanation.65
The private was quick to point out that it was the
"old soldier" who had brought up the question of desertion.
He stated that his " . . .

wish was to ameliorate our con

dition as much as possible, but with that wish the idea of
desertion was never associated."

He lamented the fact that

a soldier was unable to present what he considered to be
just grievances without being accused of fomenting discontent and unrest among his fellow soldiers.

66

Wayne rested his case with the conclusion that
". . . every one acquainted at all with such matters will
at once pronounce that "an old soldier knows very little
67
about soldier's affairs."
If "an old soldier" knew very little about the
affairs of the common soldier, it is certain that most
Americans knew even less.

The opinion of the Englishman

Thomas Hamilton would appear to have been very near the
of the United States. Ill, #3, Hay, 1334, 233-34.
65Ibid.
66Ibid.
67Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

390
truth.

In 1833 he wrote:
The people care nothing for a set
of invisible being mewed up in some
petty forts on the vast frontier,
who have no enemy to contend with,
and are required to brave nothing
but fever and mosquitoes.68

Public apathy and the problems of maintaining a peacetime
volunteer Army serve to explain the failure of the piece
meal reform efforts of Congress and the War Department.
Ten years were sufficient to substantiate Secretary of
War Eaton's warning that "partial remedies are mere
palliatives and cannot answer any permanent good."**9
of the old complaints were again being voiced:

All

the rate

of desertion was too high; the soldiers drank too much;
discipline was lacking; and the men who volunteered were
not of the highest caliber.

Despite repeated attempts to

find lasting solutions to these problems, they persisted
throughout the century.

As long as the Army remained small

and its activities effected only a few Americans, little
improvement could be expected.

The peacetime Army found

itself in the unenviable position of being necessary and
at the same time unwanted.

68
Thomas Hamilton, Men and Manners in America
(Edinburgh: 1833, 2 vols.), II, 268-69. A thoughtful
discussion of American opinion of the Military is con
tained in Marcus Cunliffe’s Soldiers and Civilians:
The Martial Spirit in America, 1773-1866 (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1968),
69ASPMA, IV, 285.
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CHAPTER VIII

A CLIMATE REQUIRING ALL THE
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE THE LAW ALLOWS
The reforms attempted in the period from 1825 to
1835 were directed toward solving problems over which the
officers of the Army and the officials of the War Depart
ment could expect to exercise some control.

However,

there was one problem in the South caused by a factor
beyond official control.

As the noted historian of the

South, Ulrich B. Phillips, said when discussing the
factors that made life in the South unique:
begin by discussing the weather. . . .

"Let us

Since the

weather and its effects could not be controlled, all
that could be done was to find ways to lessen their impact
on the soldiers.

The weather and its influences must have been one
of the first things that the soldiers noticed as they
moved into the South.

The men who enlisted in the Army

were usually not native to the southern region and they
must have quickly become aware of the warmer temperatures
1Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Life and Labor in the
Old South (New York: Little, Brown and Qompany,
2$), 3 .
391
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and the different types of crops and foliage.

2

These

differences became more pronounced and more apparent as
spring arrived in the South.
Springtime came early in the year in the southern
region, bringing heavy rains, swollen rivers and streams,
and swarms of mosquitoes.

To soldiers and civilians it

was known as the sickly season.

It took each year, in

some more devastatingly than in others, a heavy toll in
human lives.

Whether called yellow fever, ague, the "black

vomit", the fever, or a variety of other names, the exact
description of the malady mattered little, for the end
result for many of those stricken was death.
No class or race was spared as sickness spread
rapidly across the South in the spring and summer.

A

few citizens fled to the safety of regions which were
known to be generally healthy.

However, for the vast

majority of the people who could not leave, each summer
brought the specter of death in its wake.^
2
Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States
Army (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), 1&9.
Francis Paul Prucha, Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of
the United States Army in the Development of the North
west, ISI^-Tff&O (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press
IJBison SooksJ, 1967), 36. Both of these works deal with
the source of recruits enlisted into the Army, as does
the author in another part of the study.
^The Rudolph Matas History of Medicine in Louisi
ana, John l)uffy (ed.) (Baton Rouge: Louisiana !TEate
University Press, 1958), I, passim. Hereinafter cited
as History of Medicine in Louisiana. William Dosite
Postell, The Health of Slaves on Southern Plantations
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The majority of the fever victims were the
residents of low lying areas and of cities and towns,
and in these areas the Army maintained most of its gar
risons.

In the cities of Charleston, Savannah, Augusta,

New Orleans and Baton Rouge, and in the coastal fortifi
cations of the Southern states, the number of sick and
dead rose in the spring and summer.^
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1970), 7. In History
of Medicine in Louisiana it is stated that the figures
Tor the ifew Orleans epidemic of 1819 do not include many
individuals who were buried on plantations, and the
members of the lower economic classes who were un
ceremoniously dumped into the river, I, 359. This
comment is undoubtedly valid for all of the available
statistics. See Daniel Clark, senior to Capt. Guion,
June 4, 1793, in Guion Family Papers, 1789-1906, Southern
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill. Clark writes, "I have just paid my annual
tribute to the fever and ague and am beginning to crawl
about again. . . . ”
4
Survey of available monthly returns from eleven
posts. See Appendix II. Returns from United States
Military Posts, 1300-1916, National Archives Microfilm
Publication, M617. Port Johnston, N. C., Roll 558. Port
Petite Coquille, La., Roll 906. New Orleans, La., Roll
843. Charleston Harbor, S. C., Roll 197. Augusta Arsenal,
Ga., Roll 55. Baton Rouge, La., Roll 84. Port St. Philip,
La., Roll 1074. Savannah, Ga., Roll 1125. Fort Pike, La.,
Roll 921. Fort Morgan, Ala., Roll 805. Port Mitchell,
Ala., Roll 785. Hereinafter cited as Post Returns. In
describing the climate of Alabama in 181 § Justus Wyman
wrote ’’The climate is various, almost the whole of the
upper, and the high lands in the lower parts of the
territory, are considered healthy; but the low lands,
particularly about the head of Mobile Bay, are very un
healthy during the summer months. . . . Families residing
in the low lands and near the rivers are subject to the
fever and ague, and other intermittent fevers, occasional
probably, by their being more exposed to the Natural Causes
of unhealthiness, than those on higher lands.” Justus
Wyman, "A Geographical Sketch of the Alabama Territory.”
Transactions of the Alabama Historical Society, Vol. Ill,
114.
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The illness and high mortality among the troops
profoundly effected the soldiers stationed at the un
healthy posts.

A survey of the available monthly returns

for eleven southern posts indicates that as the incident
of illness increased, the number of soldiers in arrest
or confinement and the number of soldiers who deserted
increased.
Reports of sickness and death started coming to
the War Department and the Headquarters of the Army as
soon as United States troops began to occupy the former
Spanish posts and erect new ones throughout the South in
1797*

Captain Isaac Guion, commanding the American forces

taking possession of the former Spanish posts, reported
sickness among his troops -at Chickasaw Bluffs.^

The

sickness had prevented the men from completing the con
struction of the fortifications and new quarters.
one period, three-fourths of the men had been sick.

During
7

As Captain Guion moved his force south to Natchez,
•he found that the situation became worse as he extended
5
Post Returns.
^Guion to Wilkinson, Sept. 2, 1797, in "Military
Journal of Captain Isaac Guion, 1797-1799" in Seventh
Annual Report of the Director of the Department of
Archives and HTstory oi the ?ta7e of Mississippi~TNashville: Brandon Printing Company, T^09), 42-44. Here
inafter cited as Guion.
^Guion to Wilkinson, Sept. 2, 1797, Ibid., 42-44;
Guion to Capt. Z. Pike, Sept. 25, 1797, Ibid.. 44-46;
Guion to Pike, Oct. 24, 1797, Ibid.. 56-57.
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his lines of communication still further from his supply
base.

In April of 1798 he wrote that the medicine he

had requested the preceding autumn had not arrived and he
Q

was forced to buy provisions where he could find them.
Captain Guion informed the Secretary of War that
a physician was indispensable at Walnut Hills as it was
"an unhealthy spot."

Therefore, he had engaged the serv

ices of a doctor until the War Department could provide
Q
a surgeon for the soldiers.
On May 22 his command was
reinforced by a detachment of twenty-four men, but they
added little to the strength of the garrison because half
of them were sick.1<^

In June Guion reported that he had

still not received the hospital stores that his detachment
so desperately needed.

He had been able to purchase only

a small quantity of drugs at a "cost more than would an
ample quantity of those articles for a Regiment for the
same time, bought in the U. States."11
Upon his arrival at Walnut Hills Lieutenant
Colonel John Francis Hamtramck, the new commanding officer
at that post, found that the members of the garrison were
very sick and without the services of a doctor.

In

Q

Guion to Kersey, Apr. 12, 1798, Ibid., 75-76.
q
Guion to the Secretary of War, Apr. 19, 1798,
Ibid., 77-78.
10Guion to Kersey, June 7, 1798, Ibid., 90-91.
11Guion to Wilkinson, June 23, 1798, Ibid., 94.
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addition to the absence of a physician, there were no
hospital stores or medicine available to issue to the
troops.

12

By the end of July more than half of the

troops at Walnut Hills were sick and only two officers
were fit for duty.

At Natchez the situation was only

slightly better, from a force of one hundred and seventy
enlisted men, fifty-two were s i c k . ^

In August Guion

wrote to Hamtramck and summed up the situation, "I feel
for your situation environed with fever and death and
sincerely wish it was in my power to alleviate it - as
we are not so deadly here, but our prospects are suffi
ciently gloomy. . . ."

The Captain included a recom

mendation that he believed would safeguard the Colonel’s
health:

"You must not expose yourself to the sun beams

from nine to five o'clock, and not at all to the night
air; Sleep with your chamber windows shut and continue
your bath and all will be right I hope.”
12

14

Guion to Secretary of War, July 9, 1793, Ibid.,

98-99.
1^Guion to Wilkinson, July 30, 1798, Ibid., 99-100.
1^Guion to Hamtramck; Aug. 6, 1798, Ibid., 100-101.
The practice of avoiding the bright sun from nine to five
might have been carried over from the French practice of
working during the early morning hours, then taking a long
break and finally returning to work in the late afternoon,
see Dumont du Montignv, Memoirs Historiques sur la Louisiane
(2 vols., Paris, 1753), II, 241 -TT. A similar system was
employed when slaves were working during the summer months,
for example see, George J. Xollack, Rosedew Plantation Book
(1840). "Plantation Rules." Kollack Plantation Records,
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina,
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On August 11 Guion wrote that many of his men
were sick and some were dying.

The new Governor of the

Mississippi Territory, Winthrop Sargent, had arrived in
Natchez five days earlier, but he had been unable to
perform any of his duties because he too was sick.

15

J

Captain Guion was finally transferred to another post,
but his successor, Colonel Thomas Cushing, voiced the
same complaints in 1799.
Cushing reported sickness at Loftus Heights and
Walnut Hills with some of the men in danger of dying,
but sickness was rare at Natchez.

He stated that the

season was so hot that one of the Kentucky oxen had died
from heat exhaustion.

Deputy Quartermaster General,

William Jones, was sick with "Mississippi fever" and
had not been able to perform his duties for three weeks.
One officer, Captain Piercy Pope, had died as a result
of the fever.

In addition to these problems, the command's

medical supplies were virtually exhausted at the time when
they were most needed.1^
Chapel Hill; Charles Tyell, Second Visit to the United
States of North .America (2 vols., New Vork, 1849)» I,
263; Postell, Fhe Health of Slaves on Southern Plan
tations, 28-29.
^ G u i o n to Mitchell, Aug. 11, 1798, Guion, 102.
1^Cushing to Manuel Gayoso, July 20, 1799, and
Cushing to Williamson, July 22, 1799, Letters Sent,
Cushing, Records of Army Commands, Record Group 98
(National Archives).
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The complaints made by Captain Guion and Colonel
Cushing in the late 1790's would be repeated again and
again in later years by officers who commanded in the
southern states.

Combined with the high rate of illness

were other conditions that bore directly on the soldier's
welfare which were attributable to the South's climate and
weather.
The Army's summer uniforms had to be issued ear
lier to those who served in the warmer section of the
nation.

Various parts of the rations issued to the

soldiers either spoiled quickly in the South or were
not available at certain times of the year.

The design

of the barracks was modified to provide adequate venti
lation in an effort to protect the health of the troops.
The work performed by the troops was influenced by the
weather, since certain types of work were not performed
if it was possible to delay them until cool weather re
turned to the region.

The Army sought solutions to all

of the problems presented by the South's climate.

The

solution most urgently required and most diligently sought
after was to the problem of the sickly season.
Three plans were suggested that might reduce the
number of soldiers stricken by disease during the sickly
season.

The most logical plan was to remove the troops

from the unhealthy permanent stations and assign them
temporarily to relatively healthy positions until the
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season passed.

The second scheme was to recruit native

southerners, who were thought to be immune to the dis
eases, for service at posts in the South.

The third plan

was to rotate the troops every two years from southern to
northern stations.
The practice of moving the troops to healthy
locations was only partially effective in reducing the
number of sick.

If the summer quarters were not care

fully chosen, the results could be disastrous.

The most

glaring example of an improper selection occurred in 1809,
when General James Wilkinson lost approximately one-half
of his army because of disease.

The General was not

solely responsible for the fiasco, a part of the blame
must rest with the War Department.
After the United States acquired Louisiana, a
number of reports sent to the government recounted the
hazards which befell newcomers during the warm months of
the year.

17

In addition to the normal rigors of the

season, New Orleans experienced yellow fever epidemics
in 1804, 1807 and 1808, and lesser outbreaks of the disease
18
in almost every year after 1796.
Secretary of War Henry
17

Claiborne to Jefferson, Aug. 29, 1804, Clarence
E. Carter (ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United
States: IX, Orleans Territory (Washington: (xovernment
Printing Office, 1934-1962), 280. Hereinafter cited as
Carter, Territorial Papers. Claiborne to Jefferson,
Sept. 10, 1 W , Ybx&T'ZQA.
18
John G. Clark, New Orleans, 1718-1812: An
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Dearborn, a physician, was aware of all of these facts.

19

The series of events which lead to the disaster
below New Orleans began when Secretary Dearborn ordered
three full regiments of Infantry, the 3rd, 5th, and 7th,
and a battalion of a fourth regiment, the 6th along with
all Riflemen, Light Dragoons and Light Artillery recruited
south of New Jersey to assemble at New Orleans.

This

force, the largest concentration of troops in the country,
was collected to protect the city from an anticipated
Economic History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1970), 278 . History of Medicine in Louisiana,
345-49. Jo Ann Carrigan, "YeTlow Fever in New drleans,
1853: Abstractions and Realities,” Journal of Southern
History, XXV (Aug., 1959), 339-55.
19
^Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana: The
American Domination (4th Edition. New Orleans T~ P.
Hansell and Brothers, Ltd., 1903;, IX, 36-37. Reveals
that President Jefferson was aware of the unhealthiness
of New Orleans as early as 1804. As early as April 23,
1804, Secretary of War Dearborn had told Colonel Freeman
"You will as early as possible look out for the most
healthy retreat for such part of the troops as can be
spared from New Orleans in the sickly season it ought
to be as near New Orleans as possible and where the
transportation to and from will be as much as possible
by water, and where it will not be difficult or very
expensive for the contractor to furnish provisions I trust it will not be found necessary for you to retire
from New Orleans, and I hope it will not be found necessary
for any part of the garrison to retire for more than two
or three months at farthest." Secretary of War to Freeman,
Apr. 23, 1804, in Records of the Office of the Secretary
of War, Letters Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 18001889, Record Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 2, 219-20.
Hereinafter cited as SWLS.
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attack by the British.

20

On December 2, 1803, the Secretary of War ordered
General Wilkinson to assume command of the force gathering
21
at New Orleans.
The General did not arrive in New
Orleans and take command of the force until April 19»
1809.

By the time he arrived, the force was already

on the verge of disintegration.

22

Experienced officers

commanding veteran troops had found the maintenance of
discipline difficult when stationed at New Orleans, where
prostitution and gambling flourished and liquor was cheap
and plentiful.

In such surroundings, the training and

control of the new recruits that made up the force was
virtually impossible for their equally inexperienced
officers.

23

The consequent lack of discipline combined

with the fact that disease was spreading rapidly through
the army served to render the force virtually useless.
The number of sick had increased by twenty-five
percent in the six days between the tenth and the sixteenth

20
Dearborn to Wilkinson, Dec. 2, 1808 in American
State Papers: Military Affairs (Washington: Gales and
Seaton, i832), t, 272. Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.
21Ibid.

22

James Wilkinson, Memoirs of General Wilkinson,
(Washington, 1811), II, Appendix, cYTl.
23

Wilkinson, Ibid., 345-46. Deposition of Captain
George Peter, ASPMA, I, 282. Deposition of Dale,
Wilkinson, Memoirs, II, Appendix, CXI.
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of April.

On the latter date the enlisted strength of

the force was 1,733» of this number 553 men were unable
to perform any duties due to a variety of complaints.

24

There were two hundred officers present, many of whom
were too ill to perform their duties.

Only three of

the doctors attached to the command were well enough
to render any assistance to the men.

With the worst

part of the simmer months rapidly approaching, the hos
pitals were filled to overflowing and medical supplies
were scarce. 25
General Wilkinson's orders of December 2, 1808,
allowed him to move the troops to any location he might
choose, as long as they remained in a position to defend
26
New Orleans.
On April 30, 1809- Secretary of War
William Eustis, who had assumed office on March 9> wrote
to Wilkinson stating that the health of the troops should
be his primary consideration.

Eustis suggested that they

be moved up the Mississippi River to the high ground near
27
Natchez and Fort Adams.
On May 29 after considering a number of possible
sites, Wilkinson announced that he would move his command
2^Wilkinson, Memoirs. II, Appendix, CIII.
25

"Mortality in the Troops at New Orleans."
ASPMA, I, 268-69.
26
Dearborn to Wilkinson, Dec. 2, 1308, Ibid., 272.
2^Eustis to Wilkinson, Apr. 30, 1809, Ibid., 273.
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to Terre au Boeufs, some twelve miles below New Orleans
on the Mississippi River.

He reported that the new

position was dry and healthy and had been recommended
by Governor Claiborne and the people of the neighborhood.
Despite the General's claims for the new ground, it proved
to be a most unsatisfactory site for a camp.

28

On June 9 the troops reached the new cantonment
where they would spend the hot summer months.

When the

summer rains started, the campground, which was three
feet below the river level, flooded and turned into a
sea of mud.

The supply system broke down forcing the

men to eat spoiled provisions.

Throughout the growing

crisis, Wilkinson and the contractor, both of whom re
mained in New Orleans, argued over the condition of the
supplies.

The soldiers were unable to help themselves by

purchasing fresh supplies because their pay was months in
arrears. 29
28
Wilkinson to Eustis, May 29, 1809, Wilkinson,
Memoirs, II, 258-61; Wilkinson to Claiborne, July 27,
ASPMA, I, 292; Claiborne to Wilkinson, July 28,
1809, flpid. The exchange of letters between Wilkinson
and Claiborne was prompted by the criticism directed at
Wilkinson and he sought confirmation in July that
Claiborne had indeed endorsed the site.
29
ASPMA, I, 279-99. "From a medical standpoint
one of the mosi astounding aspects of this whole episode
was the failure of some of the hospital surgeons to
diagnose the nature of the soldiers' trouble. The cause
and cure of scurvy were well known by this date. Con
sidering that the paymaster had sat in New Orleans for
months, not deigning to journey the twenty-odd miles
down the river to Terre au Boeufs while the soldiers
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The rate of illness at Terre au Boeufs was
staggering and was much higher than at New Orleans.
On June 22 Secretary of War Eustis, alarmed by reports
he had received from the camp, ordered General Wilkinson
to move his command to higher ground.

Again he suggested

Natchez and the surrounding a r e a . ^
General Wilkinson received the order on July 20
and took steps to implement the movement north.

He

doubted that the move would help because there had been
sickness at Port Adams when the area was originally
occupied by American forces.

The General predicted that

he would have trouble finding adequate transportation for
the entire command.

Twenty-four navy gunboats had been

assigned to move the troops.

But they could only carry

900 men, slightly more than half the force.

Wilkinson

assured Eustis that if the gunboats were supplied he
would adopt other measures to ensure that only the men
who were too ill to travel would be left behind.

The

letter ended with a startling statement:
Under all circumstances,
frankly say that, was my
permitted, I should stay
hazard the consequences,

I must
discretion
here and
but, as

were dying for want of fresh food which they might have
been able to purchase with their pay. . . .* History
of Medicine in Louisiana, 472.
^Eusti3 to Wilkinson, June 22, 1809, ASPMA, I,
274.
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there would be hazard, I am glad for
your order to move, not only as it
lessens my responsibility, but be
cause the change of place may prove
salutary to our men. In all events,
you may depend on whatever my judge
ment, experience, personal exposition,
and attention, can effect.3*
On August 19 General Wilkinson wrote that he was
"progressing rapidly in my arrangements for moving the
troops, an object near my heart and which occupies all
my attention."

He indicated that the movement might be

delayed by problems involved in using the naval gunboats.
There were not enough men available to properly man the
boats since most of the sailors were sick.

In addition,

the design of the boats made them impractical for trans
porting troops, but they were being modified in an effort
to make them usable.

Several barges, lying at Natchez

since 1807, had been brought to the camp to supplement
the gunboats.

The old barges would be repaired and

additional boats would be hired in New Orleans if the
gunboats were not available.

Wilkinson estimated that

his makeshift transportation system would enable him to
move his command to Natchez in twenty days, the sick going
by water and the healthy marching overland.
Wilkinson's letter described the situation in the
camp:

disease, primarily fever and ague, was prevalent
Wilkinson to Eustis, July 23, 1809, Ibid.
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throughout the army; and there was a shortage of food,
especially meat and flour.

In an effort to acquire

supplies, he had offered one hundred dollars for a small
cow and advertised for one hundred barrels of flour on
any terms, but to no avail.

He anticipated further com

plications as the number of men on the sick list approached
six hundred, and the medical stores were being rapidly
consumed.

The General warned that his expenses, already

high, would increase if he was forced to replenish his
depleted stores on the open market.
Defending the location of his camp, Wilkinson
related that sickness had never been so rampant among
the local residents as during the present season.

He

reported that the inhabitants of the neighborhood were
all afflicted with the same illnesses that were sweeping
through the army.

He closed with assurances that he would

begin his movement north as soon as all of the necessary
32
arrangements were completed.
It was not until September 10 that the remnant
of Wilkinson’s army began to move up the river to Port
Adams.

Many of the men who survived the trip to reach

the high ground at Natchez died from the effects of their
ordeal before the end of the year.
32

Prom January, 1809 to

Wilkinson to Eustis, Aug. 19, 1809, Ibid.»

274-75.
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January, 1810, the force under General Wilkinson*s command
suffered ruinious casualties.

In a force of 2,036 en

listed men, there were over 1,000 losses, consisting of
166 desertions and an undetermined number of deaths.^
The disaster which virtually destroyed General
Wilkinson*s army was unique, but it served as a constant
reminder of the fate that awaited any commander who was
not extremely careful when selecting a site for quartering
his command.

The report of the Committee of Congress

which investigated the reasons for the high incident of
illness among the troops at Terre au Boeufs listed the
factors which they felt had caused the high death rate:
1) The detachment consisting of new levies.
2) The insalubrity of the climate - the
summer and autumn of the year 1809 being
•unusually sickly.
3) To the nature of the ground on which the
detachment was encamped at Terre au Boeufs,
and the detention of it at that place during
the whole of the summer, contrary, as the
Committee conceive, to the instructions con
tained in a letter to the Secretary of War,
bearing date the 30th of April 1809.
4) To the want of sound and wholesome pro
visions and of vegetables; the want of an
hospital, hospital stores and medicines.
5) The excessive fatigues to which the troops
were subjected in clearing, ditching, and
draining, the ground on which they were
encamped.
^ J a m e s R. Jacobs, The Beginning of the U. S. Army,
1783-1812 (Princeton: Prince'bon University Press’, T947),
552; James R. Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior: Major General
James Wilkinson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 193b),
247-60. At a time when the strength of the Army was 6,954
men, Weigley, History of the United States Army, 566.
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6)

7)
8)

To the want of repose during the night,
owing to the troops not being provided
with bars or nets to protect them from
the annoyance of musquitoes [sic].
The want of cleanliness in the camp,
the impracticable to preserve it.
The sick and well-being confined to
the same tents, which neither pro
tected them sufficiently from the
heat of the sun, nor kept them dry
from the dews and rains.34

Normally the troops that were moved during the
summer faired far better than those vuader General Wilkinson
in 1809.

The sites for summer encampments were carefully

selected and if they proved to be unhealthy the troops
were removed and the locations were not used again.
The troops from the garrisons at New Orleans,
Baton Rouge and Savannah were usually moved during the
spring and summer months.

The troops at Baton Rouge used

a variety of summer posts such as, the Pine Woods, near
the city, or Barataria Bay.

The troops from New Orleans

moved to Bay St. Louis or Pass Christian on the Gulf of
Mexico.

The soldiers from Savannah moved to posts known

to be healthy during the summer months.

When the troops

were withdrawn, the posts were left to the care of small
detachments of "seasoned soldiers."
34ASPMA, I, 272.
Post Returns. The returns for the posts from
which the troops were removed show that in most instances
a small detachment was left at the post to guard the care
for it. When all of the troops were removed a civilian
caretaker was usually employed to maintain the post.
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However, some of the unhealthy posts, usually
permanent fortifications, were too important to be aban
doned for six or seven months each year.

Consequently,

the troops remained at these sites, and hoped for a rel
atively healthy season.

Fort St. Philip, situated sixty-

five miles below New Orleans on the left bank of the
Mississippi River, was such a post.

Inaccessable by

land, surrounded by swamps, sluggish streams and land
which would not support the weight of a man, Fort St.
Philip gained a reputation unequalled by any ether post
in the United States.

A survey of eleven permanent

garrisons shows that only at Fort St. Philip did the
total number of deaths surpass the number of desertions.
This startling comparison indicates not only the un
healthiness of the post but also its isolation, there
was no place for a deserter to go if he left the p o s t . ^
In an article written by a 3ritish officer that
appeared in The Military and Naval Magazine of the United
States, a story was told that graphically illustrated the
situation at Fort St. Philip.

In 1315 a young artillery

officer, a recent graduate of West Point, was assigned to
the post along with two senior officers and 150 enlisted
men.

Within a short time after their arrival, the second

in command and fifty of the soldiers had died from
^Ibid. The available returns for Fort St.
Philip list 45 men dead and 39 deserted.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

410

sickness.

The senior officer, apparently in a fit of

despair over the loss of his men, committed suicide by
jumping from the parapet into the ditch where he drowned.
After nine months at Port St. Philip the young officer
and ten soldiers were ordered to New Orleans, where all
of the men, except the officer and his servant, died of
yellow fever.

The officer, ordered to Fort St. Philip

to replace the young artillerist indicated that he would
resign his appointment before going to the fort.

He re

turned his orders along with his commission to the War
Department.
The editor of the magazine had only one comment
about the story, "A solitary case, incident to a post
which is perhaps the most unhealthy in the country.
military ->osts are generally healthy."

yj

The

The episode was

probably unique, but at least a part of the story must
have been relatively common.

The reluctance of officers

to report to Fort St. Philip was so widespread that
General Edmund Pendleton Gaines suggested that new duty
stations not be announced by the Headquarters of the Army.
Instead, officers should be ordered to Department Head
quarters to receive their assignments in person.

The

General felt that this method was advisable since officers
assigned to certain posts, especially Fort St. Philip,
"Notes on the Army of the United States of
America," The Military and Naval Magazine of the United
States, I (Apr~ 1^33), 100.
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had countless excuses for not reporting for duty.

A

situation which did not exist at the better duty stations,
■3 Q

such as Boston and New York.
Line officers were not the only ones who tried
to avoid serving at posts such as Fort St. Philip.

The

members of the Medical Department also tried to avoid
stations that were hazardous or undesirable.

The policy

of the Medical Department allowed the senior men to select
their assignments, a practice that worked against the in
terests of the soldiers.

General Gaines strongly protested

the action of the Department in placing "junior and com
paratively inexperienced assistant surgeons" in the city
of New Orleans and the surrounding area.

Gaines argued

that the Surgeon General placed the most inexperienced
men in the posts that required the most experienced med
ical officers.

He stated:

There is perhaps no military principle
better established, than that the post
of greatest danger is the post of honor
and at which~the most experience? veterans
should be stationed. And when the enemy
to be apprehended is only disease, then
this principle will apply more particularly
if not exclusively to the medical staff.39
•sO

Gaines to Roger Jones, Adjutant General U. S.
Army, Aug. 10, 1826, Letters Sent, Western Department,
III. Records of the United States Army Continental
Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives).
Hereinafter cited as LSWD.
■^Gaines to Jones, June 20, 1327» LSWD, IV.
Gaines' italics.
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On March 16, 1330, an order was issued that re
scinded the regulation of December 14, 1525, that allowed
surgeons to choose their stations.

Following the order

of March 16, they would be assigned to their stations by
the Secretary of War on "application through the Surgeon
General."

The order also provided that no surgeon or

assistant surgeon should receive a furlough or leave of
absence that exceeded thirty days.

If an extension beyond

the thirty day limit was necessary, an application was to
be made through the Surgeon General to the Secretary of
War.

The application was to be accompanied by the written

approval of the commanding officer of his Regiment or post.
The tightening of the regulations governing furloughs was
an attempt to eliminate the expense of employing private
physicians to care for the soldiers during the absence of
the post physician.

This regulation was intended to

correct the situation which General Gaines had complained
40
of three years earlier.
Fort St. Philip was too important not to be
garrisoned at all times.

The importance of the fort had

been amply demonstrated when a powerful British naval
force had been prevented from ascending the Mississippi
to support the 3ritish land force below New Orleans in
^Order No. 10, Adjutant General's Office,
Mar. 17, 1330.
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December, 1314.41

General Gaines tried to improve the

living conditions at Fort St. Philip by recommending the
construction of new barracks for the men.
1826

In March of

he said that the building should have been reported

as "untenable and uninhabitable" in 1322. 3ut he had
been convinced that the repairs contemplated by the
commander would provide adequate shelter for the troops
until the new fort across the river was completed. Gaines
lamented the fact that those repairs had not been made,
because:
With good barracks, I have no
doubt that troops would enjoy better
health at Fort St. Philip than at any
immediate point on the Mississippi
Hiver from Thence to St. Louis; but
without such as will effectually
screen them from rain and stormy
weather, it would be a matter of
surprise to no one acquainted with
the character of the place to learn
that in the course of one summer and
autumn more than a majority of the
troops stationed there had been
carried off by disease.
41For the importance of Fort St. Philip during
the British attack on New Orleans see: Alexander Walker,
Jackson and New Orleans. An Authentic Narrative of the
Memorable Achievements of the American Army, iJncTer Andrew
JacksonT~before New Orleans, in the 'Winter of 1814, *1$,
(New York! J. C. Derby, 185677 370-74. WiTTiam James,
A Full and Correct Account of the Military Occurrences
of the Late War Between Great Britain and the United
States of America; with an Appendix, and platesT (London:
T89877 TT, 348. H. M. Brackenridge, History of the Late
War Between the United States and Great Britain: Com
prising a Minute Account”of the Various Military and
Naval Operations (6th Edition, Philadelphia: James
Kay, and Brother, 1836), 287.
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I think it my duty to report
that the barracks at Port St. Philip
are absolutely unfit to be occupied
by the troops during the approaching
summer, and that it is very question
able whether mere repairs will be
sufficient to render them habit
able. . . . The fort needs thorough
repairs.42
It was not until the following year that the War
Department instructed General Gaines to remove the troops
from Fort St. Philip during the sickly season.

Gaines

promptly ordered the troops to move to Pass Christian, a
location that had been uniformly healthy for a number of
years.

Although the removal left the river approach to

New Orleans unguarded, the new summer location was close
enough to New Orleans to enable the troops to return to
defend the city.

The General cautioned Lieutenant Colonel

Zachary Taylor to select a healthy site at Pass Christian
out of the grasp of land speculators.

48

By the time General Gaines received authorization
to move the troops from Fort St. Philip during the sickly
season, the post had lost its standing as the unhealthiest
station in the United States to the site at Baton Rouge.
The 1st Regiment of United States Infantry had the
42

Gaines to Adjutant General Jones, Mar. 29, 1826,

LSWD, III.
^Gaines to the War Department, June 8, 1827,
LS'WD, IV; Gaines to Lt. Col. Z. Taylor, June 8, 1827,
ibid. James W. Silver, Bdmund Pendleton Gaines:
Frontier General (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1949), 99*
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misfortune of occupying the post, which one writer called
"the grave of the regiment", during most of the period
from 1820 to 1828.^

In the period from 1829 to 1825,

the quarterly reports from 3aton Rouge reveal that the
annual percentage of deaths among the members of the
command averaged just over twenty percent.

"In the third

quarter of 1321, for example, the total of deaths was
thirty-five, in a mean strength of 237, being one third
45
of the aggregate of the whole army."
At 3aton Rouge
between 1329 and 1838 there were sixty-five deaths re
corded on the medical returns and seventy-one on the
46
Adjutant General’s returns.
General Gaines tried to protect the troops at
Baton Rouge from the threat of disease during the sickly
season.

He proposed that the government purchase a tract
44

Samuel Forry, The Climate of the United States
and Its Endemic Influences. 3ased Chiefly on the Records
of the Medical Department and Adjutant General's, United
sTates Army (New York, 1342). 201.
45

Ibid., 200. Thomas Lawson, Statistical Report
on the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the Unixed
States. Compiled from the Records of the ISurgeon Ceneral's
and Adjutant General *'s Office - Embracing a Period of
Twenty Years, From January, 1819~^o January, 183$ (Washing
ton: Jacob Gideon, 1840). The annual percentage of
deaths at Baton Rouge were 12.8 in 1819; 22.2 in 1820;
23 in 1821; 25.8 in 1822; 18.5 in 1823; 17.3 in 1824.
The strength of the garrison ranged from 123 to 479 and
the annual deaths from 29 to 85, 125.
46
Lawson, Statistical Report of the Sickness and
Mortality in the Army of the United States,
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of land outside of the city to be used for summer quarters.
His proposal was not enthusiastically received by the War
Department and no action was taken.

47

The regulars re

mained at the post and the policy of removal to the Gulf
Coast continued.

Despite the glowing description that

appeared in 1840, the post remained unhealthy:
The barracks, constructed of brick,
with slate roofs, were completed in
1824. The hospital built of the
same material, was finished in 1339•
These buildings are well constructed
and admirably adapted for the purposes
intended. The public grounds are well
shaded by trees, such as the mulberry,
pride of China, et. These trees,
planted in 1824 contribute it is
believed, very materially towards.n
the healthfulness of the station.
47

Ibid., 255-56. The illnesses reported were
Intermittent Fever, Remittent Fever, Synochal Fever,
Typhus Fever, Diarrhea and Dysentery, Catarrh and
Influenza, Pneumonia, Pleuritis, Phthisis Pulmonalis,
Rheumatisn. The number of men reported sick on the
quarterly reports for the other posts surveyed are as
follows, the number in parenthesis is the number of quarters:
3d
4 th
1st
2d
506
Fort Moultrie
(7) 521 (6) 278
(7) 456 (7)
Fort Johnston
(7) 181 (7) 198 (6) 194 (5) 124
110
Oglethorpe Barracks (6) 185 (5) 181 (4) 183 P
Fort Jesup
(7) 1520 (7) 932
(7) 1058 (7)1591
Augusta Arsenal
(7) 327 (7) 213 (7) 237 (7) 102
Fort Mitchell
(5) 543 (6) 381 (7) 364 (6) 286
New Orleans
(3) 330 (4) 275 (2) 161 (4) 308
Fort Pike
(7) 125 (7) 155 (6) 170 (6) 98
Fort Wood
(7) 350 (7) 265 (7) 377 (7) 243
Fort Jackson
(4) 143 (2) 68 (2) 152 (4) 144
(6) 145 (6) 177 (7) 243 (4) 114
Fort Marion
Fort King
(4) 171 (4) 244 (3) 347 (4) 388
Fort Brooke
(5) 542 (4) 435 (4) 560 (4) 474
Key West
(5) 313 (4) 227 (3) 260 (3) 197
48
o
Adjutant General to Gaines, Apr. 4, 1331* Letters
Sent, Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94 (National
Archives).
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The permanent posts in the South were generally
more healthy than Fort St. Philip and Baton Rouge.

But

at each of the posts the death rate and sick list showed
a marked increase during the period from April to
49
October.
In certain years other posts were as unhealthy
as Fort St. Philip and Baton Rouge.

In 1826 for instance,

two companies of artillery moved from Fortress Monroe,
Virginia, to Savannah, Georgia, within two years nearly
one-half of the men had died.

On April 1, 1828, an

additional 103 men arrived at Savannah to augment the
depleted garrison.

By December fifty-one of the new men

had died and their families had suffered in the same
50
proportion.
The effectiveness of the removal policy is
difficult to judge because the number of sick and dead
at the posts still increased during the summer months.
It can only be assumed that the number would have been
even higher had removal not been practiced.
49
Lawson, Statistical Report on the Sickness and
Mortality in the Army of the United States, 2$4.
50
Post Returns. Lawson, Statistical Report on
the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the Unite'd
States, 24^-43; 284-85; 318—19- Niles Weekly Register,
Apr. 4, 1329, XXXVI, 86. The editor cited these figures
and recommended that the troops be removed and the gar
rison abandoned. These deaths do not appear in the
totals in Appendix II, as seventeen returns are un
available out of a possible thirty-six, but sixty-two
deaths were recorded.
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The second plan for reducing the effect of the
sickly season was prompted by the belief that a period
of time was necessary in order for individuals to adjust
to the South’s peculiar climate.

This assumption was

widely accepted in the South, especially in the city of
New Orleans where disease was common.

In the areas

where sickness was prevalent, the reason usually given
for the high mortality rate was the large number of new
comers and transients in the area.

During the yellow

fever epidemic of 1817, the New Orleans City Council re
quested that all individuals "who have just arrived and
are not yet acclimated" leave the city and reside in the
country for a few weeks until the crisis had passed.

To

aid those individuals who could not afford to leave the
city, the council set up a relief camp across the Missisippi River.

The camp was located in some old Army barracks

which were no longer being used by the Federal government
51
to quarter soldiers.
The observations of Dr. Gerardin, a physician,
who served in New Orleans during 1817, seem to confirm
the assertion that newcomers were the principle victims
of the fever.

In 1820 he wrote:

The epidemic did not end, being fed
by all the French who arrived at
51

Proceedings of the City Council, Book 3, Vol. I,

54-55.
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this time; if the American government
had forced them to ascend the river
and spread out in the country it would
have saved the lives of a great many
of these unfortunates. . . . Imbued
with this truth, the American went
and saved himself, the Frenchman
always impruident and foolhardy,
remained and died.”52
The doctor's opinion was supported by the editor of the
Louisiana Gazette who stated that most of the deaths in
1817 occurred among transients.
Justus :
.Vyman observed in 1819 that in the area
around Mobile and Blakely, Alabama, "It is presumed that
not more than two-thirds of the emigrants from the Atlantic
States who attempt to stay in either of these places
through the unhealthy months live; and not more than one5^
tenth escape the sickness."
One authority on Louisiana medical history has
observed that:
The tragedy of this bland assumption
was that it blinded the public au
thorities and leading citizens to
52
Dr. N. V. A. Gerardin, Memoires sur La Fieuve
Jaune (Paris, 1320), 88-89.
^^Louisiana Gazette, Oct. 23, 1817* Justus Wyman,
"A Geographical Sketch of the Alabama Territory," in
Transactions of the Alabama Historical Society, III, 116.
See Letters from Soloman Mordecai to his sister, Ellen
Mordecai. Soloman was a physician in Mobile for a number
of years and wrote to his sister each week for about ten
years. Their letters contain much information about health
conditions in Mobile. Their letters are in the Mordecai
Family Papers, 1783-1947, Southern Historical Collection,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Kill, North Carolina.
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the fact that the city was the un
fortunate possessor of one of the
highest death rates in the country.
If only the new arrivals were sus
ceptible to the fevers, then it
followed logically that there was
little need for any sanitary and
public health reform measures.54
The health problems at New Orleans were perhaps
more prominent than in other cities and areas of the
South, but no area was completely free from the threat
of disease.

Reliable figures on the number of deaths

that occurred in the southern countryside are unavailable,
but a survey of newspapers and personal letters indicates
that "the fever” was an annual fear in most areas of the
South.

General Gaines, who accepted the assumption that

a period of acclimation was beneficial, suggested that the
Army recruit native southerners for assignment to southern
posts.

He argued that since these men were already accus

tomed to the southern climate, it was likely that the
sickly season would not take such a heavy toll among the
men.
Governor Claiborne had hinted at such a system in
1811 when he requested Naval commissions for the sons of
two prominent New Orleans families.

The Governor asked

that the two men be stationed in New Orleans because they
were already accustomed to the unhealthy climate and were
54

History of Medicine in Louisiana, 357.
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well suited for service in that area.

55

It remained for

General Gaines to strongly recommend the idea to the A'ar
Department.
In 1827 General Gaines suggested to Lieutenant
Colonel Zachary Taylor that the unhealthy posts in
Louisiana should be garrisoned by native-born officers
and enlisted men.

The plan would be put into operation

by removing seven-tenths of the men from the Louisiana
posts to Pass Christian on the Gulf Coast.

This site was

healthy and close enough to New Orleans to allow the men
to return by steamboat in six hours.

The remaining three-

tenths of the troops would garrison the posts during the
summer.
He reasoned that:
In times of unusual disease these
guards if furnished by regular
details would doubtless encounter
the risk of a forlorn hope but
native born officersand men of
Louisiana and of other southern
states would cheerfully encounter
this risk and . . . would be at
least as healthy as the native
citizens whilst a more numerous
body of troops at these posts
composed of men from the middle
and northern states could not
fail to suffer the frequent
5C
Claiborne to Hamilton, Dec. 25, 1811, in Dunbar
Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of tf. C. C. Claiborne,
1801-1816 (Jackson: State Department of Archives and
History, 1917), VI, 19. Hereinafter cited as WCC.
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scourge of mortal disease.:>0
This plan was transitional in nature.

It en

visioned the construction of large and spacious barracks
at Pass Christian to accommodate the troops removed from
the other garrisons.

The men left at the posts would

consist of native southerners and seasoned veterans.
Under this system, a force of regulars would maintain
the forts and not civilian caretakers.
In the spring of 1832 General Gaines wrote to
Adjutant General Jones to suggest his solution to the
health problems encountered by the
Gaines had first advanced

Army in the

his plan in 1825 but

not been favorably received.
to his recommendation of 1827.

South.
ithad

The earlier plan was similar
The General wrote:

Convinced as I am that no means
hitherto employed will preserve from
frequent disease and premature death,
officers and soldiers born and raised
in the middle and northern states and
stationed at any of the unhealthy posts
or places south of Arkansas, Tennessee
or North Carolina
and that a remedy for
this evil will befound in making se
lections or accepting as volunteers
southern officers and men and sending
such as shall have been completely
acclimated to Southern stations and
recruiting southern men with clear
understanding that they shall not,
except on extraordinary occasion be
ordered from the southern frontier
to suffer the consequent risk of a
Gaines to Taylor, June 8, 1827, LSWD, IV.
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57
northern climate. . . .
When Gaines had first proposed the idea, he was
informed that the laws did not authorize such a plan.

He

argued that the President, as commander in chief, could
make changes in the disposition of the troops that were
necessary for the good of the service, provided the changes
were not contrary to existing laws.

The plan could be put

into operation by issuing a few orders and transporting
approximately twenty companies from southern to northern
stations.
Gaines assured the Adjutant General that there
were enough southern-born officers in the various corps
of the Army, who would welcome an opportunity to serve
in the South, to execute the plan.

Native southerners

stationed at the posts in the South offered two important
advantages:

(1) these men had a necessary understanding

of the institution of slavery; and (2) they were already
adjusted to the climate.

58

To support his argument that the plan was necessary,
Gaines cited the example of Forts Jackson and Wood.

During

57
Gaines to Adjutant General Jones, Apr. 30, 1832,
Ibid. Also see Adjutant General Patrick Galt, Western
department to Captain Richard Zantzinger, Mar. 26, 1829,
Ibid. Captain Zantzinger was given permission on the
advice of his medical staff to remove the garrison of
Fort Wood to Bay St. Louis.
^®For a discussion of the Army and slavery, see
the following two chapters.
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the last sickly season, the posts had been manned by a
small company of northern men and it had been impossible
to muster enough men to remove the ever "accumulating
masses of vegetable and animal matter embracing the
elements of disease and death, duties in many respects
peculiar to the Mississippi and its swamps."
The General believed that the feeble condition
of the troops, especially those unaccustomed to the
climate "during the season of heat, Musquitoes [sic]
and disease", required some type of positive action.
He concluded his letter with the recommendation that a
force of at least four companies, composed entirely of
southern officers and men be stationed at Fort Jackson.

59

In May, George McCall, the Acting Adjutant General
of the Western Department informed Captain Nehemiah Baden,
the commander of Fort Wood of the recommendation that Fort
Jackson be garrisoned by four companies of southerners.
This force would enable him to maintain a proper police
of the post and still have an efficient disposable
*
60
force.
General Gaines was convinced that most of the men
who enlisted, especially those from the great northeastern
•^Gaines to Jones, Apr. 30, 1832, LSWD, VI.
^°McCall to Baden, May 25, 1832, Ibid. In another
letter to Major Richard Zantzinger, June 8, 1832, Ibid.,
McCall repeated the information concerning General Gaines'
recommendation.
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seaports, would never make good soldiers for the garrisons
in Louisiana.

The General felt that better recruits were

needed, but the type of men required would never be
attracted by the existing bounty and pay offered by the
Army.

61

The type of recruit attracted by the Army was
the principle reason the plan proposed by General Gaines
was impractical.

The number of men who enlisted from

the southern states was not large enough to meet the
demands of such a system.

It is probable that enough

southern born officers were available, but sufficient
enlisted men were not.

The garrisons in the South con

tinued to be manned largely by men recruited in the
great northern cities.^
In the South several severe sickly seasons in
succession meant that the number of non-immunes was re
duced.

This probably explains the mildness of the yellow

fever epidemic in New Orleans in 1820.

The city had

^Albert Miller, Aide de Gamp, to Lt. Col. William
S. Foster, Mar. 15, 1833, Ibid.
62
For information on the Army's recruiting
activities see Adjutant General's Office, Recruiting
Service Letter Books, 1825-1349, and Adjutant General's
Office, Registers of Enlistment, Records of the Adjutant
General's Office, Record Group 94 (National Archives).
In all probability Southerners enlisted and volunteered
in proportional numbers to Northerners in time of national
need, but in peacetime the Army was forced to rely on its
recruiting officers in the northern cities to fill the
depleted ranks of the Army.
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suffered two major epidemics in three years:
Hence, when the yellow fever again
became epidemic in 1820, its ravages
were limited by a lack of material.
A high percentage of the natives
must have acquired an immunity
through a mild attack while the
mortality of the past three years
would have thinned the ranks of
the newcomers.^3
A similar thinning process worked at the garrisons
in the South and the number of soldiers who gained a degree
of immunity to the fevers through mild attacks increased.
But the vacancies that occurred were continually filled,
usually with men from outside the South who were not
immune and who had little or no choice in where they
spent the sickly season.

If there was any validity to

the theory that a period of acclimation was necessary and
that newcomers were the most susceptible to the ravages
of the season, the policy of the Army simply helped to
keep the mortality rate high.
The third plan suggested was the rotation system.
It was intended not only to help preserve the health of
the troops, but also to add a degree of fairness to the
assignment of stations.

Under this system, every two

years units serving at southern posts would exchange
stations with units serving in the north.

The system

was first tried among artillery units before being
^ History of Medicine in Louisiana, I, 361.
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expanded to include the infantry,,
The rotation system was contrary to the idea that
acclimation to the South's climate was necessary.

It was

generally assumed that the period of acclimation lasted
two or three years.

If the individual managed to sur

vive this period of exposure, his chances of contracting
any of the illnesses were greatly reduced.

Thus, under

the rotation system, men who had gained a degree of
immunity after serving two years in the South, would be
replaced by men who would have to undergo the same process.
Although ignoring the idea of acclimation, the rotation
system was implemented because it was believed that the
burden of southern service should be shared by all
members of the service.
In early 1326 the Secretary of War asked the
Quartermaster General Thomas Jesup and Surgeon General
Joseph Lovell to estimate the expenses which would be
incurred under the rotation system and the possible ben
efits to the health of the troops.

The plan being con

sidered was to replace the troops in the following manner:
the First Regiment would replace the troops of the Third;
the Third would replace the troops of the First; the Second
would replace the troops of the Fourth; and the Fourth
64
would replace the troops of the Second.
64

Secretary of War to Jesup, Jan. 24, 1306, m
Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Letters
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The War Department considered the plan for more
than a year.

On October 12, 1827, orders were issued

putting the plan into operation.

The system was jus

tified in the first paragraph of the order:
This has been determined on as a
measure of equal justice to all;
as being called for by the best
interests of the service, and by
the common rule of equity in
military detail. It is there
fore to be regarded as the
commencement of a system, prom
ising to the artillery,generally,
the advantages of a biennial ex
change, and to the garrisons of the
sickly stations in particular, (on
the southern frontiers) the hope of
periodical relief.
Consideration was given to the health of the
troops during the move.

The surgeons and assistant sur

geons of the First and Second Regiments were ordered to
"accompany the troops of those regiments to the South,
and return with the troops of the Third and Fourth Reg
iments, who may be relieved from thence.
The plan broke down rapidly and became the sub
ject of a heated debate between the members of the infantry
Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1300-1889, Record
Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 12, 206. Hereinafter cited
as SWLS. Secretary of :
.Var to the Surgeon General, Jan. 24,
l80F7T b i d ., 206.
^General Order No. 54, Oct. 12, 1827, Records of
the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94 (National
Archives), also in Niles Weekly Register, XXXIII, Oct. 20,
1827 , 121-22 .
66Ibid.
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and the artillery.

In addition to the charges of dis

crimination that were leveled at the new system by the
members of the infantry, there were criticisms of the
additional expenses entailed by the movement of the
troops.

In addition; questions were raised as to whether

or not the President could order such a movement.
The expenses incurred by moving the four Regiments
of Artillery amounted to 315,632.

An additional expend

iture of forty-eight dollars for medical assistance given
the troops brought the final total to 315,680.

In response

to a resolution from the House of Representatives, in
quiring upon what authority the movement had been made,
Commanding General Jacob Brown wrote:
The only "regulation" known to the
Army, "respecting the removal of
troops from one post to another” ,
since the Declaration of Independence
as a nation, is to be found in that
discretionary power inherent in the
president, as commander in chief,
or in a general commanding an Army,
to make such disposition of the
troops as may be demanded by the
high interests of the public service,
and by that measure of justice and
impartiality which may be due to the
troops themselves.
The movement was justified on the basis of the powers
possessed by the Chief Executive and because the move
was necessary for the good of the service.
67

Brown to House of Representatives, Dec. 22, 1827,
in Niles Weekly Register, XXXIII, Jan. 26, 1328, 362-63.
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As an addition justification, Brown referred to
those European powers who possessed West Indian colonies.
They relieved their garrisons in sickly regions at
regular intervals after short-terms of service.

As

further proof that such a system was needed, the General
cited the case of one of the rotated regiments.

The

regiment had been stationed on the Gulf frontier since
the reorganization of the Army in 1821 and had furnished
the troops for most of the "dreary and sickly posts in
that quarter."

General Brown reported that sixteen

officers had died in seven years, four times the average
number in the other three regiments.

68

The General was willing to concede that the move
ment was likely to cause some personal hardships.

But

individual interests were to be "viewed as secondary"
to the more important military considerations involved.
The General's letter touched briefly on the issue that
would eventually evoke the most controversy.

General

Brown justified the movement on the grounds of fairness

68
The General did not specify which of the
Regiment's suffered these losses, but in all likelihood
it was the Fourth Regiment.
69

On January 9, 1328, the Secretary of War in
formed Senator Martin Van Buren that the provisions of
the order could not be relaxed and that Lieutenant
Merchant, on whose behalf the Senator had written,
would have to move from his present post to his new
assignment on the southern coast.
Secretary of War
to M. Van Buren, Jan. 9» 1828, SWLS, Roll 12, 332.
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in the assignment of stations when he wrote:
Ever ready to obey the calls of
the country, and to devote its last
energies in its defense, the Army
still looks to its government for
justice and impartiality in its
dispensations. Neither severity
of discipline nor rigor of service
will ever be complained of, while
its distributions are S&de with
fairness and equality.
The assignment of stations might have been fair
within the artillery, but the new system brought complaints
from the infantry that one branch was favored over another.
The rivalry and jealousy was clearly expressed in
a series of letters published in The Military and Naval
Magazine of the United States.

In August of 1833 a letter

appeared which was the first of many in the verbal battle
between the two branches.

It was addressed to the Pres

ident of the United States and signed simply "W".

The

tone of the letter clearly indicated that some members
of the infantry resented the apparent favoritism shown
to the artillery.

The author presented the infantry's

argument in concise terms when he wrote:
In a series of years past the
Artillery and Infantry of the Army
have been distributed, the former
on the seacoast in the several
fortifications, and the latter on
the Indian frontier, for the most
part in temporary cantonments— the
70
Brown to House of Representatives, Dec. 22, 1827,
Niles Weekly Register. XXXIII, Jan. 26, 1828, 363.
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former admidst the enjoyment of
luxuries, the pleasures of society,
the repose of peace— the latter
often remote from comfort far dis
tant from friends, and frequently
engaged in warfare with the savage.
During the long period of this
distribution but one or two changes
have been made affecting the Artillery,
and these involving no privation, no
fatigues; while the Infantry, almost
without exception, have been year
after year, employed either in con
structing cantonments, opening roads,
changing posts, or warring with
Indians.7“
The author might have overstated his case, but
there is little doubt that life in the infantry was far
different than that in the artillery.

The rotation system

could only have added to the infantry’s feelings that the
artillery received preferential treatment.

General Brown's

references to fairness in the assignment of stations and
sharing the burden of southern service must have seemed
strange to the members of the infantry regiments that had
served for long periods at posts in the South; for ex
ample, the First Infantry Regiment had been stationed at
Baton Rouge since 1821.

The controversy soon spilled

over into the public press when the New York American
published several letters concerning the assignments
given to the infantry and artillery.
71

Letter to Benjamin Homans (ed.), The Military
and Naval Magazine of the United States, I. Mar. to Aug.,
1833 (Washington: Thompson & Homans, T833), 335.
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The assignment of artillery units to permanent
duty in coastal fortifications and arsenals was justified
by the argument that the forts were primarily armed with

artillery pieces and they should be manned by members of
artillery.

Since the arsenals were designed to produce

small arms and artillery pieces, it also seemed only
logical that the posts be garrisoned by artillerists.
The discussion continued for a year after the first few
letters without anything new being added to the debate.
The final shot in the controversy was fired in

May of 1334, when a letter written by a private in the
Second Regiment of Artillery, appeared in the press.

The

private's regiment had been ordered South in 1827 and
after seven years it was still there.

Each year the men

felt that they might be returned to the North, but had
been disappointed in their expectations.

The men hoped

to return to the North because:
The 2d Regiment of Artillery is com
posed, almost entirely, of northern
men, the most of them left their
relations and friends to come out
to the south, when the 2d Regiment
came, totally unacclimated, and
with the hope that they soon would
be relieved. What is it that forms
the basis of our small but effi
cient Army? It is, that all, as
far as practicable, may be satisfied;
and how is this desirable end to be
obtained? It is by placing us all
upon an equality. We are all serving
our country on the same terms, and if
there are bitter and sweets in the
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service, let us all, at least, have
our share.72
He concluded by citing the first paragraph of
Order No. 54, which assured the members of the artillery
that they would only serve two years at a time in the
South.

He requested that the men of the Regiment be re

moved as soon as possible.
The rotation system was theoretically still in
operation when the Second Seminole War erupted and ended
any hope of a prompt movement out of the South for the
Artillery units.

The plan never had a fair test, since

only the first move had been made, and no attempt had
been made to move the troops after two years.

In all

likelihood, if the system had been followed, it would
not have reduced the amount of sickness among the troops.
There is evidence that acclimation to the southern climate
was necessary.

In two years the troops would just have

become acclimated when they would be moved and replaced
by troops who would have to undergo the same process.
All three of the suggested plans to protect the
health of the troops were temporary measures and not ex
tremely effective.

The removal system was costly and

inefficient, and required the maintenance of additional
72
Letter to Benjamin Homans (ed.), The Military
and Naval Magazine of the United States, III,Mar. io
Aug., 1834 (Washington: William W. Moore, 1334), 236.
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military posts and the expense of transporting the troops
to and from the summer camps.

The recruitment of native

southerners for service in the South was impractical,
because an adequate supply of recruits was not available.
The rotation system was never properly tested and probably
would have been too expensive if extended to both infantry
and artillery units.

None of the plans was a solution to

the real problem, the cause of the high incidence of
disease.
Despite the attempts to reduce the number of sick
during the summer months, the sickly season would con
tinue to be a problem until the causes of the various
illnesses were understood and eliminated.

No amount of

acclimation or rotation would help as long as the swamps
and mosquitoes remained and the improper disposal of
filth and waste persisted.

73

Medical science would have

to make great progress, not only in the treatment of
73

In describing the causes of the unhealthiness
at Mobile Justus flyman wrote, "The natural causes of
this unhealthiness must always exist; but the vegetable
causes will gradually be removed. The fogs arising from
the rivers, and exhalations from the swamps and low lands,
together with the quantities of stagnant water always to
be found in these swamps, will ever be prevailing causes
of sickness. But as the country increases in population,
the vast quantities of old logs and other vegetable subsistance which now lays consuming and which, in a manner
corrupts the air, and renders it putrid, will be destroyed.
This, however, will be a work of several years." Justus
Wyman, "A Geographical Sketch of the Alabama Territory,"
in Transactions of the Alabama Historical Society, III,
1141
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disease but also in the prevention of illness, before the
sickly season would vanish.

Even when medical science

made the necessary advances, there was no assurance that
the information would be disseminated rapidly throughout
the Medical Department of the Army.
Prom 1789 to 1335 the Army's Medical Department
was neither very large nor extremely efficient.

It was

adequate to meet the demands of normal conditions, but
it normally failed in times of crisis.

On September 29,

1789, Congress passed an act which provided for the
organization of an Army.

The act provided for one sur

geon and five surgeon’s mates to care for the 886 members
of the Army.

By 1836 the Medical Department had been in

creased to include a Surgeon General, fifteen surgeons and

sixty assistant surgeons, to care for 7,957 men.

74

In

spite of the fact that surgeons and assistant surgeons
were available at the permanent posts throughout the
country, the presence of a member of the Medical Depart
ment did not necessarily ensure the soldiers of proper
medical attention.
Much of the blame for the disaster that befell
General Wilkinson's command at Terre au Boeufs must rest
with three men who were trained as physicians, General

74.. .
unixea States Statutes at Large, 1st Congress,
Session 1 (1739), I, $5-^6; UnTtecT~States Statutes at
Large, 24th Congress, Session 1 (1836), V, 117.
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Wilkinson and Secretaries of War Henry Dearborn and
William Sustis.

The physicians on the scene were un

doubtedly overwhelmed by the number of sick.

3ut there

can be no excuse for their failure to recognize the
symptoms of scurvy among the troops and to treat it prop
erly.

Surgeon Jabez Heustis, who served at Terre au

Boeufs in the Second United States Regiment, wrote a
vivid description of the medical situation at the camp.
The men were first beset by fevers and dysentery and then
the situation was complicated by the appearance of scurvy.
Heustis described the condition of some of the soldiers:
The patients would pick them [teeth]
from their mounts with their fingers
. . . . [one patient] taking hold of
his tongue, . . . deliberately drew
it from his mouth, . . . The jaws
of several patients became carious;
and in some instances, the lower jaw
was detached from its natural connexions
by the spreading of the mortification,
and fell from the head in a state of
putrefaction.
The attending physicians either did not recognize
the symptoms or were simply unable to rectify an extremely
bad situation.

Heustis stated that the standard treatment

for scurvy had been mercury, with the result that:
Its effects were certain and un
equivocal to those who would give
themselves the trouble of observing.
75

Jabez Wiggins Heustis, Physical Observations on
Ifledical Tracts and Researches, on the Topography and
Diseases of Louisiana (New York, l8l7), yb-91.
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A violent salivation immediately ensued;
and every symptom was rapidly and sen
sibly aggravated. A few doses of this
medicine relieved the patient of his
misery, and put an end to his earthly
sufferings. Death, perhaps, was in
evitable; and it is certain that the
patients' sufferings were shortened
by this mode of treatment. Whether
this, therefore, was to be considered
as an act of humanity consistent with
the duties of a physician, I leave for
others to judge.
The problem at Terre au Boeufs was primarily caused
by a lack of fresh fruits, vegetables, meat and a shortage
of medicines, compounded by the fact that the troops had
not been paid and were unable to purchase fresh provisions
on their own.

When the troops were paid and able to buy

fresh foods, the health of the troops improved rapidly.

77

The performance of the surgeons at Terre au Boeufs
could not have been worse.

According to one authority on

medical history, malaria and dysentery were common dis
eases among the soldiers of the Army in all sections of
the country.

By 1809 malaria was not common in the New

England states, but it was still prevalent in the states
south of New York.

The standard treatment for malaria

and victims of most other types of fevers was cinchona
bark.

In addition there were medicines which would give

relief to those suffering from dysentery.

"The excessive

76

Heustis, Physical Observation on Medical Tracts,
98; History of Medicine in Louisiana, 47lT
77

History 01 Medicine in Louisiana, 472.
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use of mercury in treating a large group of men suffering
from the combined effects of scurvy, dysentery, and ma
laria dees not speak well for the calibre of army sur,,78
geons.”
In 1834 an effort was made to improve the caliber
of Army surgeons.

On June 30, 1834» Congress passed an

act which required that all prospective assistant surgeons
be examined by an Army medical board before receiving their
79
appointments.
The laxity of the system prior to 1834 had
allowed men who were completely unqualified to hold the
post of assistant surgeon.

These men might have been

able to cope with the every day problems that arose, but
in periods of stress and urgency the medical system
functioned badly.
Many of the men who were appointed to the'Medical
Department were undoubtedly men of ability and dedication,
but the Department was not an extremely important branch
of the Army and offered little opportunity for advancement
or reward.

The pay was 1CVYf *u]jLS life was hard, and chances

for advancement were slight.

The position of the surgeons

and assistant surgeons was ill defined within the frame
work of the Army, and military rank was not conferred
7 ft

History of Medicine in Louisiana, 473-74.
79
United States Statutes at Large, 23d Congress,
Session 1 ('1834), IV,' 7lTI-------------
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upon Army doctors until 1847.

80

Despite their many deficiencies, the members of
the Medical Department produced a number of reports and
studies concerning various aspects of the health of the
81
soldiers.
Despite the valuable information contained
in many of the reports, the routine medical problems of
the soldiers went without solutions.

Until medical science

discovered not only the causes of the wide-range of ill
nesses but also effective preventive measures, soldiers
and civilians would continue to suffer during the sickly
season.

In general, the treatments prescribed for the

various diseases were the same in 1835 as they had been
in 1739, and there was general disagreement as to which
go
Michael J. Reedy, "Army Doctors - Long Years
Attaining Military Rank and Command," Military Medicine,
CXXX (Aug., 1965), 813-20. Michael J. Reedy, "Army
Doctors: Four Short Term Medical Chiefs," Military
Medicine. CXXXII (Mar., 1967), 188-94.
81
See the Annual Report of the Surgeon General
which accompanied the Annual Report of the Secretary of
War. Also James Mann, Medical Sketches of the Campaign
of 1812, 13, 14, To which are added Surgical Cases:
reservations on Military Hospitals; and Plying hospitals
Attached to am o v i n g Army" Also, An Appendix, Comprising
a Dissertation on Dysentery; which~obtained the~iioylstonian
Prize Medal for the Year 1805, and Observations on the
Winter"Epidemic of l8l5-l£ Denominated Peripneumonia hotha,
As it Appeared at Sharon and Rochester, Slaxe of faas’sachussetts (Dedham: H. Mann and Co., 1816). Report
Books 1818-1835» Surgeon Generals Office, Record Group
112 (National Archives).
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of the known treatments was most effective.
Army physicians and civilian doctors fought the
same battles in the South:
In these Army garrisons medical pro
cedures varied little from those used
by private practitioners in Louisiana
and elsewhere in the United States.
In general health conditions among
soldiers stationed in Louisiana were
far worse than was generally true of
other army posts. The semi-tropical
climate of New Orleans intensified
the malaria and dysenteries and made
their ravages among the northern born
troops exceedingly severe, w&ile yellow
fever exacted an added toll.°3
To the soldiers of the United States Army, medical
science could offer little protection from the ravages of
the diseases that seemed to flourish in the South's pe
culiar climate.

They could only hope that their con

stitutions were strong enough to carry them through the
32

See John Duffy, Sword of Pestilence: The New
Orleans Yellow Fever Epidemic of~~T853 (BatonRouge:
Louisiana State University Press, "f§o6); John Duffy,
"Medical Practices in the Ante Bellum South," Journal
of Southern History, XXV (Feb., 1959), 53-72; John
Duffy, "Sectional Conflict and Medical Education in
Louisiana," Journal of Southern History, XXII (Aug.,
1957), 289-366; Jo Ann Carrigan "Yellow Fever in New
Orleans, 1853: Abstractions and Realities," Journal
of Southern History, XXV (Aug., 1959)* 339-55; Jo Ann
Carrigan, "The Saffron Scourge: A History of Yellow
Fever in Louisiana, 1796-1905," (unpublished Ph. D.
Dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1961); Jo
Ann Carrigan, "Medicines and Miscellanies, A Handbook
of Remedies, Recipes, Etc. (c. 1830-1870)", (Unpublished
Masters Thesis, Louisiana State University, 1956).

33History
.
of Medicine in Louisiana, 486.
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normal rigors of life in the section and that the summer
months would not be unusually unhealthy during their tour
of duty.
The South's climate had a definite impact on the
life of the Army.

From 1789 to 1835 more soldiers died

from disease than from all other causes.

At the Battle

of New Orleans, General Jackson's casualties were six
killed; in the first quarter of 1321, an unusually healthy
34
period, there were eight deaths at 3aton Rouge.
Illness
was common throughout the Army of the United States, but
in the northern section it was not nearly as devastating
as in the southern region.

In the first quarter of 1320

there were twenty-six deaths in the northern division and
one hundred and forty-two in the southern, with thirty85
eight at the post of Baton Rouge.
In the words of the
Secretary of War, the South truly possessed ". . . a
climate requiring all the medical assistance the law
,i
„36
allows."
As the South's reputation as a burial ground
spread, it seriously effected the men who were assigned
John S. Bassett, Life of Jackson (New York,
1925), 197. Lawson, Statistical Report on the Siclaiess
and Mortality in the Army of the United I^Eates, 124.
85

Lawson, Statistical Report on the Sickness and
Mortality in the Army of the United Spates, 124.
86

Secretary of War to General Pinckney, Nov. 4,
1812, SWLS, Roll 6, 221-22.
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to serve there.

Officers refused to serve in the section,

either resigning or requesting to be assigned to other
posts for reasons of health or personal hardship.

The

only alternative to service in the South open to enlisted
men was desertion, and it is certain that many of them
took that alternative.

The problem could not be avoided

because the posts were too important to be abandoned.
Therefore new troops were continually dispatched to fill
the depleted ranks of the garrisons in the South.
In spite of the earnest efforts of the War Depart
ment and the officers of the Army to find a solution to
the problems presented by disease, the men faced the very
real prospect of dying.

Not the death of a warrior, but

death in a sick bed, struck down by disease.

The soldiers

could protect the nation against Indians, foreign
enemies and domestic insurrections, but they could not
defend themselves against an enemy which was unseen and
unknown to them.
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CHAPTER IX

THE ARMY AND THE INSTITUTION
OP SLAVERY, 1789-1815
The Army’s principle function in the South, as in
the rest of the nation, was to protect the citizens from
foreign invasion and hostile Indians.

In the southern

states and territories, the citizens assumed that the
troops would serve as a protective shield against yet
another source of potential danger.

Although spoken of

only in carefully guarded terms and usually in private
communications, Southerners hoped that the United States
Army would protect them in the event of slave rebellions.
The fear of slave insurrections was persistent
throughout the antebellum period.
revolts i3 open to debate.

The actual number of

In what he calls a minimal

list, historian Herbert Aptheker cites revolts in fortythree of the forty-seven years from 1789 to 1825.

In

twenty-six of the forty-three years he reports that more
than one revolt occurred.^

The number of revolts recorded

1Herbert Aptheker, Negro Slave Revolts in the
United States. 1526-1860 (New York: International
Publishers, 1939), 71-72. For a more comprehensive
analysis by Aptheker see his American Negro Slave Re
volts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1541).
Hereinafter cited as Negro Slave Revolts.
444

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

445

by Aptheker is much too high and includes incidents that
should more properly be classified as conspiracies and
forms of resistance.

If these are carefully defined and

counted, it is probable that there were no more than a
p
dozen insurrections between 1691 and 1835*
For the purposes of this study, the specific number
of revolts is not as important as the number of suspected
conspiracies and planned rebellions, and the currency given
to the reports by white Southerners.

Aptheker bases his

extensive list of revolts upon the numerous reports and
rumors that circulated in the slave states.

Even if none

of the stories were true, they reveal that white Southerners
lived in constant fear of their slaves.

Little or no actual

proof was necessary to substantiate the reports, they were
true because the Southerners believed they were true.
Whether the numerous reports of plots and revolts
were real or imagined, they profoundly influenced the
2
John 31assingame’s definition of a revolt in The
Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Ante Be H u m South
(rtew York: Oxford University Press, 19?2), 125, is acceptable to this author. Blassingame defines a revolt "as any
concerted action by a group of slaves with the settled
purpose of and the actual destruction of the lives and
property of local whites. In addition, the activities
must have been recognized as an insurrection by public
officials who called out the armed forces of the locale
to destroy the rebels." Using this criteria he states
that there were at least nine revolts between 1691 and
1865. Marion D. de B. Xilson in "Toward Freeman: Am
analysis of Slave Revolts in the United States," Phylon,
XXV (Summer, 1964), 175-87, defines a revolt "as attempts
to achieve freedom by groups of slaves." With this
liberal definition the number of revolts between 166 3
and 1865 is increased to sixty-five.
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Southerner's concept of the role the Array should play in
the South.

The fear of rebellions was most prevalent in

those areas where there were heavy concentrations of
blacks, or in areas where the number of white residents
was reduced during various times of the year.

Until 1332

the fear of rebellion seeras to have been greatest in
Louisiana, followed closely by South Carolina and Georgia.
Following the Nat Turner Rebellion, the appeals for pro
tection came from all areas of the South.^
To provide an adequate safeguard against its slave
population, the South developed an internal system of
Garvey Wish, "American Slave Insurrections before
1361," The Journal of Negro History, XXII (July, 1937),
299, 320. "As might be expected, insurrections tended
to occur where King Cotton and his allies were most firmly
entrenched and the great plantation system established.
Slave unrest seems to have been far greater in Virginia
rather than in the states of the Lower South," 311. "Next
to Virginia, Louisiana had the greatest difficulty among
the Southern states in coping with repeated attempts at
insurrection," 313. Kilson found that of the sixty-five
revolts studied, 25$ were in Virginia, 15$ in Louisiana,
and 15.5$ in South Carolina, "Towards Freedom: An Analysis
of Slave Revolts in the United States," 179* The percent
age of the slave population to the total population by
states from 1790 - 1840.
1840
1810
1820
1800
1830
1790
---------38.1
Alabama
32.7
42.9
---------—
—
47.2
44.6
Florida
40.6
42.1
Georgia
35.5
41.7
36.5
43.9
------45.0
50.8
47.3
Louisiana
45.3
---52.0
36.0
33.3
48.1
Mississippi
43.5
32.6
North Carolina
32.1
30.4
25.5
27.9
33.3
43.0
55.0
South Carolina
51.4
47.3
54.3
42.3
Lewis Cecil Gray , History of Agriculture in the Soutnern
United States to 1360 (Washington: Carnegie Institution
of 'Washington, 1933)» II, 65ST
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defense.

Intended to enforce the slave codes, it con

sisted of the individual masters on their plantations,
the local patrols and finally the state militia.

Upon

this system of defense the South preferred to rely, rather
than admit to the world the possibility that it was unable
to maintain order among its bondsmen.

4

Despite the elaborate system developed in the
section to insure internal security and assurances that
it was capable of meeting any situation which might arise,
the petitions, memorials and letters addressed to Federal
officials reveal that some citizens were not completely
convinced that the South could quell uprisings if they
should occur.

State and local authorities repeatedly

requested information concerning the availability of
Federal troops should they be needed.
In actual practice, regular troops were rarely
used to suppress rebellions with physical force because
of the Southerner’s preference for using the local militia.
Instead, the Army served an important psychological func
tion.

It was an ever present force upon which the whites
4

For one such statement see Anthony Benezet to
Robert Pleasants, Apr. 8, 1773» in George S. Brooks,
Friend Anthony Benezet (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1937), 301. ”1 know it is the
general opinion, that nothing ought to be published
whereby the Negroes maybe made acquainted with their
own strength and the apprehension of danger the whites
are in from them, for this reason in every publication
I have made, I have guarded against it. . . ."
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could call if the situation was critical enough to
warrant such action.

In addition, the presence of the

regulars was believed to be a powerful deterrent to any
group which might be contemplating an insurrection.
The orders issued to commanders stationed in
the South indicate that the Secretary of War and the
ranking officers of the Army heeded the requests and
pleas of the citizens of the South.

Officers were

instructed to render whatever aid and assistance might
be required by state and local authorities.

The aid

authorized included, arms and munitions for the militia,
suggestions for defensive measures, and the employment
of military force by the regulars.
In December of 1301 W. C. C. Claiborne, the new
governor of the Mississippi Territory, requested Federal
aid in his efforts to organize the militia of the
Territory.

He informed Secretary of State James Madison

that except for the small detachment of regular troops
at Fort Adams, the Territory was virtually defenseless.
He expected the Territorial Legislature to pass a strong
militia law before it adjourned, but he feared that arming
the force would be difficult since suitable arms were
scarce in the district.
Governor Claiborne suggested that four hundred
muskets and a similar number of rifles be sent to Natchez
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by the government.

These weapons would be sold at a

price sufficient to repay the United States their original
purchase cost.

The Governor based his conviction that a strong
militia was needed on four important points:

(1) the

Mississippi Territory bordered the territory of a foreign
power and a military force might be required to protect
that border; (2) the Territory was separated from the
nearest state, Tennessee, by six hundred miles of wilder
ness and must depend on its own resources for immediate
protection.

Uppermost in the Governor's mind were the

last two reasons:

(3) the Territory was surrounded by

numerous tribes of potentially hostile Indians; and (4)
its Negro population was nearly equal to the white pop
ulation.

The prospects for peace under these conditions

depended upon the existence of a well armed and trained
5
body of militia.
Governor Claiborne gave careful attention to the
establishment of a militia system in the Mississippi
Territory and again in the Orleans Territory because of
the importance of that organization to the defense of the
nation.

The militia system as outlined in the Constitution

5
Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 20, 1801, in Dunbar
Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne,
1801-1816 (Jackson: State Department of Archives and
History, 1917), I, 27-31. Hereinafter cited as Rowland,
WCC. Again the need for arms was expressed by the
Governor to Madison, Jan. 23, 1802, Ibid., 38-39.
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and later Acts of Congress, placed the responsibility for
organizing the state bodies upon the individual states.
In the territories the responsibility rested with the
Territorial Governor and Legislature.

The militia was

considered important not only to the security of the
nation but also of the states.

A reliable force was

essential and in the South it was more important than
in any other section of the nation, and considerable time
and attention w a s expended to see that it was ready to
meet any emergency.
The President is the commander in chief of the
militia only when it has been called into the service of
the United States by Congress.

At all other times, the

militia is under the control of the chief executive of
the individual states.

The power to appoint officers in

the militia is denied to the President and is retained by
the states.

The Constitution makes no mention of who

has the authority to appoint the commanding officer when
the militia of two states are serving together.

Nor are

command arrangements specified in the event a militia
force is to serve with a regular force.
The President is 30lely responsible for the con
duct of war.

His powers as set forth in the Constitution

are generally supplemented by statutory grants of authority
U. S., Constitution. Art. 2, Sec. 2, Clause 16*
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from Congress.

The first major statutory grants concerning

the militia were passed by Congress in May 1792, in an
effort to provide an effective defense force.

These acts,

renewed with slight modifications in 1795, would plague
7
the War Department for over a century.
The first act, approved on May 2, 1792, was
entitled, "An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia
to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections
and repel invasions."
Section one of the act provided that whenever
the United States is invaded or is in danger of invasion
by a foreign nation or Indian tribe, the President is
authorized to call upon the militia most convenient to
the area in danger.

The number of men to be called forth

was left to the judgement of the President.

The orders of

the President were to be issued through the officers of
the respective militia units.

The President was also

authorized to call the militia into service to put down
insurrections in any state, upon the request of the state
legislature.
In the second section of the act, the President
was given the authority to call upon the militia to en
force the laws of the Union.

If the militia called upon

7

A. A. Schiller, Military Law and Defense
Legislation (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1941), 27.
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refused to obey the orders of the President, he was
authorized to call out the militia of another state in
numbers sufficient to enforce the laws of the Union.
The third section of the law stipulated that when
the President shall decide that it is necessary to call
out a military force to suppress an insurrection, he shall
issue a proclamation commanding the insurgents to disperse
and retire to their homes within a specified time.

Only

when this procedure has been followed could the President
use the militia against domestic insurrections.
The fourth section of the law provided that the
militia force called into the service of the United States
shall be paid and receive the same allowances as troops
of the United States, and were to be governed by the same
rules and articles of war.

The militia called into the

service of the nation could not be compelled to serve more
5

than three montns in any one year.

A second act approved by Congress on liay 8, 1792,
provided for the establishment of a uniform militia
throughout the United States.

All free able-bodied white

male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five
years of age were to be enrolled in the militia of their
respective states.

Every citizen enrolled was to provide

g
United States Statutes at Large, 2d Congress,
Session 1 (1792), I, 264-65. Walter Millis (ed.y,
American military Thought (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Kerrii
Company, Inc., 1966), 61-62.
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himself with a good musket or fire lock, a bayonet and
belt, two spare flints, a pouch with a box containing
not less than twenty-four cartriages within six months.
Certain groups of citizens were exempt from
militia duty by the act:

the Vice President of the

United States; the officers of the judicial and execu
tive branches of the government; the members of both
Houses of Congress and their officers; the custom-house
officers with their clerks; the post officers and stage
drivers who handled the mail; all ferry men employed on
ferries or post roads; and all persons who might be ex
empted by their respective states.
The act also provided an outline for the organi
zation of the militia, the number of men and officers in
the various units and the number of units.

It specified

that the militia was to be governed by the rules set
Q
forth by Congress in 1779.
In the territories of the southern region where
frontier conditions combined with the existence of
slavery to produce a potentially explosive situation,
the militia system was ’’exti'emely" important.

The func

tion of the militia was to supplement the Federal forces
in the event of an invasion or rebellion, and close co
operation between the militia and the regulars was
9
United States Statutes at Large, 2d Congress,
Session 1 (1792), I, 271-74. Uillis, American Military
Thought, 62-67.
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necessary.

In the territories, where the Governor was

appointed by the central government, such cooperation
was easier to acquire than when the militia of a state
was involved.

Governor Claiborne realized the importance

of the militia to the defense of the nation and of the
close relationship between the function of the regular
Army and the territorial force.
While awaiting an answer from Washington, Governor
Claiborne turned to General James Wilkinson for assistance
in solving the arms problem.

He acknowledged that the

small body of Federal troops at FoT't Adams would afford
some protection in the event of trouble.

However, the

distance of the fort from the populous settlements meant
that much slaughter might result before the troops could
take the field in the event of a sudden attack.

The

militia was needed to support and supplement the small
body of regulars in the event of attack by Indians or
insurrection among the blacks.
To be effective the militia needed arms and the
command at Fort Adams had a quantity of extra weapons.
The Governor suggested that if these weapons could be
stored at some central location and their use subject
to his order, it would be to the advantage of the citizens
4.1 .
oi- the
region. 1 0

^Claiborne to Wilkinson, Jan. 2r
J, 1-302, Rowland,
WCC, I, 42-4 3.
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On February 5 the Governor informed the Secretary
of State of the request he had directed to General
Wilkinson.

He stated that the peaceful situation which

existed was at best precarious due to the presence of
Indians and the numerous Negroes.

Assurances were given

that the erection of new buildings for the proper storage
of the weapons would cost the government nothing, since
the land, materials, and labor would be donated by the
citizens.^
The General's response to the Governor's request
was immediate and positive.

Wilkinson stated that his

superiors considered the "safety and tranquility" of the
citizens to be of primary importance in the disposition
of the troops.

He would issue orders for the establish

ment of a small post at a site selected by the governor
and place 250 or 300 stand of arms there subject to his
order.

General Wilkinson believed "that our troops were

intended for the accommodation of the civil authority, to
be used or employed as circumstances should render
„12
necessary. . . . ”
Although the General and the Governor agreed upon
the establishment of a post, it was a year before con
struction began.

In the intervening months, Claiborne

11Claiborne to Uadison, Feb. 5, 1802, Ibid., 40-42.
12
Wilkinson to Claiborne, Jan. 29, 1802, Ibid.,
43-44.
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requested the sanction of the President for the new post,
the loan of 1,000 arms, and supplies for the artillery
company of Natchez."*^
In I.Iarch Secretary of War Henry Dearborn informed
Claiborne that in response to his requests, the President
had ordered five hundred rifles and three hundred muskets
shipped to the Governor.

These arms were to be sold to

the militia in whatever manner the Governor deemed proper
to defray the purchase cost of the weapons.1^- In April
the Secretary of War stated that the President had autho
rized the movement of one company of soldiers from Port
Adams to Natchez.

The troops were to be used in the

manner previously suggested by the Governor.

15

The collaboration between the civil and military
authorities resulted in the construction of Fort Dearborn
near the city of Washington some six miles east of Natchez.
Construction began in 1803, but before the post was com
pleted both Governor Claiborne and General Wilkinson had
left the Mississippi Territory to take formal possession
1^Claiborne to Madison, Mar. 6, 1802, Ibid., 5354; Claiborne to Dearborn, Apr. 8, 1802, Ibid.» 71-74.
These letters concern sanction of the new post by the
government. Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 3* 1802, Ibid.,
69-70. Request for 1,000 arms. Captain Bartholomew
Shamburgh to Claiborne, Apr. 7» 1802, Ibid.. 79;
Claiborne to Shamburgh, Apr. 12, l802,*TFTd., 80-81.
^Dearborn to Claiborne, Mar. 10, 1802, Ibid..
104.
1^Dearborn to Claiborne, Apr. 8, 1802, Ibid., 11Q12; Claiborne to Dearborn, May 24, 1802, Ibid., 112-13.
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of New Orleans for the United States.
Claiborne was appointed Governor of the new pro
vince and upon taking possession of New Orleans he turned
immediately to the task of organizing the machinery of
government.

He again faced the problem of using Federal

and militia troops'to reassure the citizens that they
were safe from possible slave insurrections.

He found

that the normal apprehension of slave rebellion had been
increased by the events in Santo Domingo, which were told
and retold by refugees who fled to Louisiana from the
French Colony.
The military force which had accompanied the
American Commissioners to New Orleans was a combination
of regulars and volunteers, numbering between four hundred
and fifty and five hundred men.

Of this force approximately

two hundred were volunteers who would remain in service
only until General Wilkinson felt that they could be safely
discharged.

16

.Vhen this force of volunteers was dis

missed and returned to their homes, protection of the new
territory would depend upon the regulars and militia of
the territory.

17

1^Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 4, 1803, Ibid., 302303; Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 5, 1803, Ibid., 303-304;
Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 7, 1803, Ibid., 305; Claiborne
to Madison, Dec. 8, 1803, Ibid., 305-^06.
1^Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 27, 1803, Ibid., 31216. The volunteers had not been dismissed due to the small
number of regular troops in the province.
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The situation of the militia in New Orleans was
somewhat different than it had been in the Mississippi
Territory.

The Spanish had maintained an efficient

militia organization, and it only remained for Governor
Claiborne to recommission the units in order to have a
militia force at his disposal.

During the reorganization

process, Governor Claiborne encountered a problem which
went to the very heart of the Southern system and the
relationship of the military to the "peculiar institution."
Governor Claiborne was called upon to determine
the fate of two large companies of "people of colour",
both of which had been a part of the Spanish militia
system.

The governor promptly recommissioned the white

units, but the fate of the two companies of blacks raised
two perplexing questions.

If they were recommissioned,

the action might anger a large segiment of the nation's
population and destroy some of the principles upon which
the safety of the South rested.

If they were not re

commissioned, the militia members might be angered and
possibly become an armed enemy in the heart of the nation.
Governor Claiborne chose the diplomatic way out of the
dilemma; he requested instruction from Washington before
taking any action. ®
18

Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 27, 1803, Ibid., 31216; Claiborne to Madison, Jan. 17# 1804, Ibid.. 359-41;
A’ilkinson to Dearborn, Dec. 21, 1803, Clarence E. Carter
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On February 20, 1804, Secretary of War Henry
Dearborn wrote to Governor Claiborne informing him that
he should renew the Corps of Free Men of Color.

The

Secretary cautioned that the number of men in the or
ganization should not be increased and if at all possible
it should be diminished.

The letter was received on

March 22, and was answered with assurances that the instructions would be followed.

19

In compliance with the instructions from Washington,
the subsequent actions of Governor Claiborne indicated that
the position of the Battalion of Free Men of Color was
changing.

On April 19 the Governor requested that the

officials of New Orleans conduct a census which would
(ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United States, IX,
The Territory of Orleans, 1803-1812 (A'ashingTion, 19457.
13$. Hereinafter citedas darter, Territorial Papers,
IX. Contains a request that 500 regular troops be
assigned to New Orleans. The reason for the additional
troops was "the formidable aspect of the Armed Blacks
and Malattoes [sic] officered and organized," Wilkinson
found to be "Painful and Perplexing." Donald Everett,
"Emigres and Militiamen: Free Persons of Color in New
Orleans, 1803-1815." The Journal of Negro History,
XXXVIII (Oct., 1953) t~~T77-$5Zm
.
19
^Claiborne to Dearborn, Mar. 22, 1804. Rowland,
WCC, II, 58-60. John Hope Franklin in The Militant South
180O-1861 (Cambridge: Oxford University £ress, 1956*5
to be an official part of the militia, citing Charles
Gayarre, History of Louisiana (New Orleans: F. F. Hansell
& Brothers, Ltd., 1903;, IV, 127. Roland C. McConnell,
Negro Troops of Antebellum Louisiana: A History of the
Battalion of Free Men of Color (teaton Rouge: iiouisiana
State tJniversity Press, 1968), gives the full history of
the battalion.
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facilitiate his reorganization of the militia.

The census

was to include all free, white males between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five.

There was no mention made in

the governor’s request of free Negroes.

20

On June 9 the Governor reported to the War Depart
ment that he had appointed two officers to serve in the
Battalion.

The appointment had aroused some dissatisfac

tion among the men of the Corps.

The men commissioned

were white, and the members of the militia unit had expected to be commanded by their own officers.

21

The apprehension over the existence of an or
ganized and armed body of blacks in the heart of an area
with a large slave population was a natural outgrowth of
the existence of the institution of slavery.

It was re

ported that there was a great dislike between the white
natives of Louisiana and the free blacks, and it is
probable that the whites would have greeted the end of
the Corps with approval.

22

In 1805 the Territorial Legislature failed to
make any mention of the Free Men of Color when they passed

20

Claiborne to the Mayor and Municipality of New
Orleans, Apr. 19, 1304, Rowland, WCC, II, 106.
21

Claiborne to Dearborn, June 9» 1804, Ibid., 199200. For instructions to Major Fortier, one of the officers
in question, see Claiborne to Fortier, June 22, 1804,
Ibid., 215-16.
22

Claiborne to Dearborn, June 22, 1804, Ibid.,

217 -18 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

461

the general militia law on April 5.

Claiborne felt that

this had been done as much from a fear of the organization
as from a desire to injure him personally.

The Governor

was certain that the men had been "soured" on the American
government and that their dependibility was no longer a
certainty.

He was of the opinion that at least the

property holders and those of a "fair reputation" could
be depended upon to remain l o y a l . O n January 9, 1807,
Governor Cliaborne ordered a census taken of all free men
of color in New Orleans and the surrounding area who had
previously held positions in the Corps.

The Governor

hoped that the Territorial Legislature would pass an act
which would make the corps a part of the permanent militia
organization.

24

Four days after ordering the census,

Claiborne addressed the Legislature and urged them to
recognize the Corps.

He outlined the loyal service of

the Corps under the Spanish regime and stated that they
still wished to become a part of the regular militia.

25

2^
JClaiborne to Madison, Jan. 3, 1806, Carter,
Territorial Papers, IX, 561. James Brown reported that
"the free people of color have lost their consequence by
being stripped of Arms and are anxious to regain it."
Brown to Albert Gallatin, Jan. 7, 1806, Ibid., 559.
24
General Order, Jan. 9, 1807, signed by Colonel
Henry Hopkins, Adjutant General, Territorial Militia,
Ibid., 717. The number of free men of color in New
Orleans in 1806 was 2,312 and increased to 5,727 by 1310.
Free Men of Color to Claiborne, Jan., 1808, Ibid., 174.
25Rowland, WCC, IV, 92-93.
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The Territorial Legislature again took no action on the
issue when it considered the organization of the militia.
The reason for the concern stemmed logically from
the southern concept of the principal functions of the
militia.

If it was to be the major acency is suppressing

slave insurrections, any doubt about its reliability and
ability to fulfill its assignments could not be enter
tained.

But the loyalty of the free blacks could always

be questioned.

26

The anxiety about the loyalty of the Battalion
appears to have been unfounded.

During the insurrection

of 1311, the militia was called out to suppress the re
bellion north of the city.

One company of free men of

color was called into service and won the praise of
Governor Claiborne for its conduct in the city of New
Orleans during the crisis.

27

The Battalion of Free Hen of Color still retained
its organization in 1815 -

General Andrew Jackson addressed

26
For a discussion of free Negroes and the owner
ship of arms see John Hope Franklin, The Free Negro in
North Carolina, 1790-1860 (New York: W. V«. Norton ancf
Company, Inc., 1971), 75-78 and 95-101. A discussion
of slaves and the possession of weapons can be found in
most of the general works on slavery, for instance, John
Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of
Negro Americans (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 3rd ed.,
1967), l8b. Herbert S. Klein, Slavery in the Americas:
A Comparative Study of Virginia and Cuba (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 197T), 4o.
27

Claiborne to Du Bourg, Jan. 14, 1811, Rowland,
V, 9 9 .
Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 14,
TST1, Ibid., 10U.
vvcc,
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a proclamation to the free colored inhabitants of Louisi
ana promising them the same privileges and considerations
pQ
enjoyed by white soldiers if they enlisted.
By midDecember of 1314-, a second battalion of free men of color
had been raised in response to Jackson's proclamation.
Both battalions held front line positions during the
defense of New Orleans and performed admirably.

29

The problems of organizing the civil and military
affairs of the province were momentarily overshadowed by
problems in the western part of the territory.

While

forcing administrative details into the background, the
unrest pointed out the importance of a well organized
militia and close cooperation between that body and the
Federal troops.
In October of 1804, the first hints of trouble
among the slaves in the vicinity of Natchitoches were
discovered and promptly reported to the governor.

The

source of the trouble was attributed to the presence of
the readily accessible border between American and Spanish
territory.

Nine slaves had run away and it was feared

pD
A. Lacarriere Latour, Historical Memoir of the
War in West Florida and Louisiana in l3l4-1^ (Philadelphia,
1316J7 Appendix No. XVII, XXXI-XXXII. Charles Gayarre
lists two proclamations issued by General Jackson, one
on Sept. 21, 1314 and the other on Dec. 13, 1314, in
History of Louisiana, IV. 355 and 403.
29

McConnell. Negro Troons of Antebellum Louisiana,

64-90.
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that more would join them.

They were pursued in the

direction of the Spanish post at Nacogdoches, where they
apparently expected to receive santuary.

The inhabitants

of the area feared that if no action was taken to prevent
the crossing of the border, what had begun as a minor
30
incident might become general.
Governor Claiborne addressed two strong protests
to the Spanish representative, the Marquis de Casa Calvo.
The protests were prompted by the agitation among the
slaves, combined with reports that Spanish agents had
been urging certain Indian tribes to attack the Americans.
The letters pointed out that the reported actions by the
Spanish authorities might injure the good understanding
which existed between the two countries. ^

On November 3

the Governor reported the situation to Secretary of State
James Hadison and informed him that if the Spanish author
ities were disposed to be unfriendly, trouble might re-

^ Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Oct. 30, 1804, Howland,
WCC, II, 382-83. Turner to Claiborne, Oct. 16, 1804,
Tfbid. , 386-38. An 1306 census of the Territory of Orleans
gives the following populations:
Pointe Coupee, 267 white
males of 21 years and up, 258 white males below 21, 443
white females of every age, 115 free men, women, and child
ren of color, and 2,251 slaves; Natchitoches, 407 white
males of 21 years and up, 270 white males below 21, 410
white females of every age, 121 free men, women, and
children of color, and 1,209 slaves. Carter, Territorial
Papers, IX, 923*
31

Claiborne to Casa Calvo, uct. 3 0 , 1 3 0 4 , Rowland,
WCC, II, 3 8 2 - 6 3 ; Claiborne to Casa Calvo, (<ct. 31» 1 3 0 4 ,
Ibid., 3 3 3 - 8 4 .

\2Claiborne

to Madison, Nov. 3» 1 8 0 4 ,

Ibid., 3 8 1 - 3 2 .
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While endeavoring to settle the problem through
diplomatic channels, Claiborne suggested to Colonel Thomas
Butler, commanding the American forces, that reinforce
ments be sent to the post at Natchitoches owing to the
apprehensions over possible Indian attack and the unrest
among the slaves.

The Governor recommended that a sub

altern and twelve or fifteen men might be detached from
the troops stationed at Attakapas and Opelousas in an
effort to preserve good order.

~>^

Captain Edward Turner, the civil and military
commandant at Natchitoches, gave the governor ample reason
to worry about the situation in Natchitoches when he re
ported:
This circumstance has so enraged
the Inhabitants against the Spaniards,
that I believe they would almost to a
man willingly go to Nacogdoches and
lay it in waste. In fact they have
requested me in case the Negroes are
not sent back to permit them to go,
observing that is [sic] something is
not immediately done, they will not
have a slave left in three months.
I have tried to quiet them by saying
they may depend on protection and
justice.34
Turner was obviously a man caught between the
desires of the citizens of Natchitoches and the in
structions of his government.
■^Claiborne to Butler, Nov. 1, 1304, Ibid., 384.
^4
Turner to Claiborne, Oct. 17, 1304, Ibid., 38556.
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3y November 3 the crisis had passed, Claiborne
was able to inform Captain Turner that the Marquis de
Casa Calvo had censured the actions of the Commandant
at Nacogdoches and that the fugitives would probably be
arrested and returned to their owners.

Turner was to

continue the night patrols and afford the residents of
the district all the protection possible.

If these

measures did not quiet the citizens, the Commandant was
to make every effort to see that they took no aggressive
action against the Spanish.

35

As the crisis passed at Natchitoches, the Gov
ernor informed the Secretary of State that the unrest
had spread to Pointe Coupee, where the occurrences in
Nacogdoches were known among the slaves.

The citizens

addressed a petition to the governor requesting a force
to protect them in the event of an insurrection.

The

Governor wrote to Colonel Butler asking him to dispatch
a subaltern's command to Pointe Coupee to provide the
area an added measure of protection.
Claiborne's report to the Secretary included
a statement that would be repeated again and again by
officials in the South:

"Our troops here are too few

in number to admit to detachments to the various posts
where they would be serviceable, and I most earnestly
■^Claiborne to Turner, Nov. 3* 1304, Ibid., 33990.
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advise that the regular force in Louisiana be augmented
*> /■

with all possible dispatch."'5
Colonel Butler dispatched a force of regulars
composed of a subaltern and twenty-five or thirty men
to Pointe Coupee.

The detachment took with it one hundred

stand of public arms.

These weapons were to be distrib

uted to the militia in an effort to bolster the local
defenses.

37

Although Governor Claiborne lamented the necessity
of maintaining a standing army, he realized that the un
rest within the Territory and the presence of a superior
Spanish force on its borders would not permit a reduction
but instead required an increase in that force.

He stated

that this situation would continue to exist at least until
38
the civil authority was strong enough to maintain order.
In 1307 the planters of the Mississippi Territory
reported to Governor Robert Williams that they suspected
that there might be a slave revolt in the region during
the summer.

As a precaution against such an event, the

Governor established a patrol to guard against the slaves.
■^°Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 8, 1304, Ibid. , 394.
Claiborne to Butler, Nov. 8, 1804, Rowland, WCC, III, 5.
^Claiborne to Butler, Nov. 8, 1304, Ibid. , 5.
Claiborne to Turner, Nov. 3, 1304, Ibid. , 6-7.
Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 10, 1304, Ibid.,

7-3.
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In addition to the patrol, a detachment of United States
troops was stationed at Fort Dearborn.

39

Either the sus

picions of rebellion were unfounded or the presence of
the militia and regulars accomplished their desired object
for there was no more talk of large-scale rebellion in the
Territory for a period of three years.
In 1310 the fear of slave rebellion spread rapidly
through the Mississippi Territory and the neighboring
province of West Florida.

As the men of West Florida

rushed to join the revolutionary forces in 3aton Rouge,
they left their families behind without adequate pro
tection.

The families appealed to Colonel Hugh Davis, of
40
Homochitto, for protection.
The request was forwarded
to Governor David Holmes, who immediately sent a request
to Colonel Thomas Cushing for a detachment of regulars to
protect the Americans and their property in the vicinity
of Pinckneyville, near the border with 'West Florida.

The

Governor also put into motion plans for bringing the
militia into service.

The militia and regulars were to

patrol the American side of the border to prevent slaves
from crossing in either direction and to maintain order
39
Dunbar Rowland, History of Mississippi: The
Heart of the South (Chicago:
S. J. Clarke Publishing
Co., 1925)t II, £34. Aptheker, American Negro Slave
Revolts, 243*
40

Davis to Holmes, Sept. 25, 1o10, Mississippi
Territorial Archives, i-I. S., Vol. 9.
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along the border.

The combined operation was successful

in maintaining the peace, and the regulars returned to
Fort Adams.

41

On January 9, 1011, the citizens of New Orleans
and the surrounding area were thrown into a state of
panic when word was received that the slaves on the plan
tation of Colonel Andre had revolted.

After wounding the

Colonel and killing his son, the slaves started to march
toward New Orleans, only thirty-six miles to the south.

42

As the slaves proceeded south, they gained strength
as they passed plantations which were abandoned by their
owners when they learned of the uprising.

While the

whites mobilized their military strength, the slaves con
tinued their advance, burning three houses and pilliaging
Carter, Territorial Papers, The Mississippi
Territory, VI, 121~ Holmes to Cushing, Sept. 26, 1ol0
and Holmes to Smith, Oct. 3, 1810, 3ureau of Rolls and
Library in the Department of State, Government Corres
pondence, Mississippi Territory. Holmes to Davis,
Sept. 27, 1810, Proceedings Executive Council, Missis
sippi Territory, M. S. I. Issac J. Cox, West Florida
Controversy, 1798-1313 (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1557),
406—407•
^Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 9, 1311,
Rowland, Vv’CC. V, 95. Claiborne to Andre, Jan. 13, 1811,
Ibid., 97. The 1806 census of Orleans Territory gives
the following populations: the German Coast, 555 white
males of 21 years and above, 647 white males below 21,
972 white females of every age, 229 free men, women and
children of color, and 3,285 slaves; Orleans, 2,108
white males of 21 years and above, 1,422 white males
below 21, 2,781 white females of every age, 2,312 free
men, women and children of color, and 8,378 slaves.
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 923.
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several other plantations.

43

The strength of the force

gathered by the slaves was variously reported as being
44
from 180 to 500 men strong.
The insurrection on Louisiana's German Coast
provides an excellent example of the speed with which
the South could put a military force into action.

Gov

ernor Claiborne received the news of the revolt at ten
in the morning on the ninth and immediately set the defensive machinery in motion. 45 New Orleans was sealed
against entrance or exit to the north by blacks when a
4-6
guard of regulars was placed at the Bayou Bridge.
By
three in the afternoon Claiborne reported that a detach
ment of regulars and two companies of volunteer militia
had marched to meet the slaves and the remaining members
47
of the militia were on duty in New Orleans.
The strength
Francois-Xavier l/.artin, The History of Louisiana
(New Orleans, 1822), II, 300. Alcee Fortxer, A History of
Louisiana (Paris, 1904), III, 78. Gayarre, History of
Louisiana, IV, 265. In a letter from Governor dlaiborne
to John N. Detrehan, the loss of property is called con
siderable, Claiborne to Detrehan, Jan. 19, 1811, Howland,
V/CC, V, 107-103. Claiborne to Dr. Steele, Jan. 20, 1Si 1,
Ibid.. 112-13.
44
Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 9, 1311,
Howland, VVCC, V, 95*
45
o
Claiborne to ilajor Bullingney, Jan. 9, 1811,
Ibid.
46
Claiborne to General Hampton, Jan. 9, 1311,
Ibid., 93^Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 9, 1311,
Ibid., 95-96.
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of the force that marched north was reported by the Governor to number several hundred men.

APi

The picture which Claiborne presented was some
what different than that painted by Brigidier General
Wade Hampton in his report to the Secretary of vYar.
Hampton was informed by Claiborne of the outbreak at
noon, and he immediately began to assemble a military
force:
The regular force in the city was
inconsiderable, and as there was
nothing like an organized militia,
the confusion was great beyond de
scription.
So soon as two companies of
volunteer militia could be paraded,
I joined to them 30 regulars and
marched at their head, about six
o'clock, to meet the Brigands.
It was all the force, except a
small garrison left in the Fort,
which at that time appeared sus
ceptible of command. On our march
we overtook a company of seamen,
which Comodore [sic] Shaw had sent
forward, of which I also took the
command. This little force reached
the Plantation of Colonel Fortier,
six leagues from the city, about
half after 4 o'clock on the morning
of the 10th through roads half leg
deep in m u d . 49
43

Claiborne to St. Amand, Jan. 9. 1511, Ibid.,

93-94.

49
«
Hampton to Secretary of War, Jan. 1b, 1311,
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 917-18. Claiborne to
Secretary of State, Jan. 14, 1811, Rowland, vYCC, V,
100. In this letter Claiborne states that several hun
dred sailors had volunteered their services, and that
one company of them had marched to aid the planters.
The regulars, militia, and sailors hardly represent a
force of several hundred men from New Orleans.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

472

From the standpoint of the slaves, the area in
which the insurrection began was filled with disadvantages.
Bounded on the west by the Mississippi River, to the south
by New Orleans, to the north by Baton Rouge, the only pos
sible avenue of escape was to the east into the woods and
swamps.

There could be little doubt as to the outcome

once the whites regained their composure.
General Hampton marched at the head of the com
bined force from New Orleans and Major Homer Milton, of
the United States Army, marched with a detachment of
regulars from 3aton Rouge.

Before the two forces could

converge on the scene, the slaves were met and soundly
defeated by a local force.

About eighty planters, who

responded to the "exertions and exhortations" of Colonel
Andre, had pursued the fugitives as they moved south.

The

planters caught and attacked the rebels, and in a brief
but furious battle they either killed or captured a large
number of the slaves.

The slaves who managed to survive

the initial attack took refuge in the dense woods that
bordered the battlefield.
The planters divided their force and in con
junction with the forces that arrived on the scene after
the battle, continued to pursue the slaves in the heavily
wooded countryside.

During the vigorous pursuit, the re50
m a i n m g slaves were either killed or taken prisoners.
Andry [Andre] to Claiborne, Jan. 11, 1311,
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On January 11 the force under General Hampton net
Major Milton's command.

The Major and his troops were

posted in the neighborhood of the rebellion to give aid
and assistance to the citizens in their search for the
remaining slaves.

General Hampton returned the troops

from New Orleans to the city, feeling that the planters
were now capable of protecting their own property.

How

ever, as an added precaution, he ordered a company of
light artillery and a company of dragoons to march from
3aton Rouge to visit every settlement of any size.

This

force was intended to crush any rebellions that might
have broken out further up the river.

General Hampton

attributed the outbreak of trouble as being "unquestion
ably of Spanish origin, and has had an extensive combination."

51

Fifteen of the captured slaves were tried in a
court of law for their part in the insurrection.

The

sentences which they received were considered to be equal
to the enormity of their crimes.
guilty and executed.

The fifteen were found

As a deterrent to future rebellions,

the heads of the executed slaves were put on tall poles
which were placed along the river from New Orleans to the
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 915-16•
51

Hampton to Claiborne, Jan. 12, 1811, Ibid.,

915-17.
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plantation where the revolt started.

52

In commenting on the sentences of the court,
Governor Claiborne wrote:
The example which has been made
of the guilty actors in the late in
surrection will I hope produce the
desired effect. Justice, policy,
our future safety required that the
guilty should suffer; for the sake
of humanity however it is greatly
to be desired that the list of the
guilty may not be found still
greater.53
The Governor hoped that the insurrection would have
some beneficial effect.

The Territorial Legislature had

adjourned for two weeks during the insurrection and was
soon to return to its deliberations.

54

Claiborne wanted

the legislature to pass laws providing for a more energetic
52
Martin, History of Louisiana, II, 301. Fortier,
A History of Louisiana, III, 78-79* These two accounts
give the number tried and executed as 16. Gayarre, A
History of Louisiana, IV, 267- Aptheker, American Negro
Revolts, 25^7 The correspondence of Governor Claiborne
indicates that fifteen slaves were tried, all of them were
convicted but that one had been recommended to the mercy
of the executive. The Governor indicated that if a jury
recommended mercy he would comply and issue a pardon.
Claiborne to Judge St. Martin, Jan. 19, 1811, Rowland,
ACC, V, 104. The Governor states that six of those
captured were ordered to St. Charles Parish for trial;
eight had already been tried and condemned in New Orleans,
with mercy recommended for one; and Chief Gilbert, one of
the leaders had just surrendered. Claiborne to Detrehan,
Jan. 19, 1311, Ibid., 107-103. Claiborne to John Ballinger,
Jan. 20, 1311, Ibid., 108-109.
•^Claiborne to Detrehan, Jan. 19, 1311, Ibid., 107.
54
Proclamation of Claiborne, Ibid., 98.
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militia system and to check the "indiscriminate impor55
tation of slaves from the southern states."
In accessing the role of the United States Army
in suppressing the rebellion, General Hampton wrote:
The prompt display and exhibition of
a regular military force all along
the coast (the river) by land and
water, has had a most happy effect
as well upon the blacks, as the
citizens, who by this countenance
have been enabled to use and feel
their own strength and to rely upon
that which the government can at all
times from Baton Rp^ge or this city
send to their aid.^°
In spite of the executions, the hopes of the
Governor, and the predictions of General Hampton, the
citizens of the German Coast and New Orleans were thrown
into turmoil again in December.

Although doubting the

reports of unrest had any foundation in truth, the Gov
ernor made certain that the military forces in the area
were prepared to meet any outbreak. 57
The militia forces in the area were alerted and
put on patrol duty both in New Orleans and along the
CC

Claiborne to John Ballinger, Jan. 20, 1811,
Ibid., 108-109. For the Governor’s recommendations see
Claiborne to both Houses of the Legislative Body of the
Territory of Orleans, Jan. 29, 1811, Ibid., 123-24.
56
Hampton to the Secretary of War, Jan. 16, 1811,
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 918.
57
Claiborne to the Secretary of the Navy, Paul
Hamilton, Dec. 26, 1811. Rowland, vVCC, VI, 20.
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German Coast.

53

The Governor ordered the commander of

the regular forces in New Orleans to hold his command
ready for prompt action.

The Governor also requested

that Major iVilliam MacRae place one hundred and fifty
stand of arms and several boxes of cartridges at the
disposal of the City Guard, to be used only if they
were needed.

This supply of weapons was for the use

of the militia, which Claiborne observed would be of
little use unless they were well supplied with arms and
59
ammunition.
The Governor's desire to have a well-armed
and effective militia force to combat slave insurrections
would be echoed by others as the threat of a foreign war
increased.
In the debates that preceded the declaration of
war by the United States on Great Britain on June 18,
1312, predictions were made that the Americans would
march victoriously into Canada, inflict defeat on the
British, and humble Spain if she were foolish enough to
join the Unglish.

At least one member of Congress voiced

an opinion that must have occurred to more than one
Southerner as he listened to the orators painting pictures

18.
17.

58
Claiborne to James Mather, Dec. 24, 1811, Ibid.,
Claiborne to Adland Fortier, Dec. 24, 1311, Ibid.,

■^Claiborne to MacRae, N. C., Ibid., 16-17.
This letter was either written on the 23d or 24th of
December.
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of American victories and retrieved national honor.

John

Randolph, Congressman from Virginia and a slave owner,
spoke of the danger arising from the black population
of the Couth:

"While talking of taking Canada some of

us are shuddering for our safety at home.

I speak from

facts when I say that the night bell never tolls for fire
in Richmond that the mother does not hug the infant more
closely to her bosom."

60

The vision of its male population marching off
to a distant theatre of war must have been 'unsettling to
more Southerners than just Representative Randolph.

In

August of 1312 the Secretary of War informed General
Pinckney that the intention of the President with respect
to the militia was to use that force until the regular
troops could be raised.
In the northern states where it
was found necessary to concentrate,
the regulars for offensive operations
the aid of the militia was relied on,
al "tiro uhe views of the President have
not been seconded by the governors of
some of the states.
From the southern states there
is at this time no probability that
the regular troops will be required
for distant operations, and as it is
desirable that the militia should be
spared as much as possible, particularly
Hugh A. Garland, The Life of John Randolph of
Roanoke (2 vols. in 1, 11th edition,"ITew York,
» I,
293-95. William C. Bruce, John Randolph of Roanoke, 17731333 (2 vols., New York, 192277 250-5U Aptheker,

American Slave Revolts, 23.
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at this season of the year, as our
great reliance in case of strong
emergencies, is in them. . . .
General Pinckney was instructed to reduce the
number of militia in service and to relieve those that
remained as soon as recruits became available from the
regular force.01
The first serious problems arose in Georgia
where the citizens were aroused to fever pitch by a
guerrilla war on the frontier, waged by Indians and runaway"slaves.

The proximity of the border between Georgia

and Spanish East Florida provided a convenient refuge for
the Indians and their black allies.

In addition to the

sanctuary it offered the raiders, Spain had employed a
number of Negro soldiers in its efforts to suppress the
abortive insurrection in East Florida, an action that
further frightened the angered American slave owners.

62

° Secretary of War to Pinckney, Aug. 22, 1312,
in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. Letters
Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1300-1839. Record
Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 6, 91-92. Hereinafter cited
as SWLS. The Secretary's reference to militia having
been refused was in reference to the actions of Mass
achusetts and Connecticut, both refused their quotas
of militia when requested by the President. No case
has been found where the militia requisitioned from a
southern state was refused.
62

Julius 7/. Pratt, Expansionists of 1312 (New
York: Peter Smith, 1949), 192-95, 207-12; T. F. Davis,
"United States Troops in Spanish East Florida, 1S12—
1313," The Florida Historical Society Quarterly (1930—
1931), IX, 3-12, 96-109, 133-55, 255-7HT Rembert vY.
Patrick, Florida Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia -
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While the citizens of Georgia worried about the
situation on their frontier and meddled in the affairs
of 3ast Florida, the fear of rebellion was spreading in
the Mississippi Territory.

On July 2 2 , 1 3 1 2 , Governor

David Holmes wrote to General Wilkinson expressing his
concern for the safety of the inhabitants of the Territory.
The basis of the Governor's concern was the possibility of
trouble with the Choctaw Indians and the equally important
prospect of a slave rebellion.
Holmes wanted Wilkinson to send him a large supply
of muskets, rifles and a quantity of powder and lead for
the use of the territorial militia.

The Governor stated

that hardly a day passed without some warning reaching
him concerning the designs of the slaves.

Holmes

wrote, ". . . it is my firm belief that the safety of
the citizens here may depend upon my procuring a suf
ficient number of arms to enable them to defend themselves against the dangers apprehended.”

As the United States poured its manpower and
resources into the conflict on the northwestern frontier,
Florida Border, 1310-1815 (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1954;, traces the history of the troubles on the
Georgia frontier.
^Holmes to :
Wilkinson, July 2 2 , 1 8 1 2 , Carter,
Territorial Papers, VI, 299. For evidence of the dis
content among the slaves of the Mississippi Territory
see Holmes to David Pannelli, July 23 > 1812, Ibid., 301.
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General Wilkinson was informed that he must make the most
of the means at his disposal.

The General had requested

reinforcements, but no recruits were available and there
was confusion as to who should command the force of
64
marines stationed within the General's Department.
On October 14 General Wilkinson was informed that
not only were additional recruits not available, but be
cause the demand for arms was so great in the north,
65
additional arms for his command would be delayed.
The
General, left to his own resources for the moment, turned
to his one remaining source of manpower, the militia.
He requested that Governor Holmes send a detach
ment of militia outside the borders of the Mississippi
Territory.

The Governor responded by saying that there

were apprehensions of Indian and slave troubles in the
territory if the militia were ordered to another area.
However, Holmes was certain that if the cavalry could
be allowed to remain behind and two hundred additional
muskets supplied for the use of the militia, the security
of the Territory could be maintained.

He pointed out

several important reasons as to why all of the militia
should not be taken:

the militia force encamped at

fid

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Sept. 11, 1512,
SWLS, Holl 6, 136.
6*5
Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 14, 1312,
Ibid., 194.
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Washington was one-fourth of the physical force of the
Mississippi Territory; the slave population of the dis
trict was nearly equal to the white population; and the
frontier counties were thinly populated.

It was the

Governor’s hope that Wilkinson would carefully weigh

rs'

these considerations before taking all of the militia. °
While Governor Holmes worried about the security
of his province, a report was circulating that seemed to
reinforce the Southerners’ apprehensions.

The Tennessee

Herald of September 5 carried the news that the British
had occupied Pensacola, and a part of that force was
composed of black troops.

The author reflected the

opinion prevalent in the South concerning the use of
black troops:
The policy of stationing troops of
that description upon our frontier
cannot be mistaken. The same hand
which has incited against us the
scalping knife and the tomahawk of
the Indians, will not stop to renew
upon the Mobile and Lower Mississippi
the tragedy of St. Domingo.
The report pointed out that the alarm this news
had produced was not unfounded.

The settlements on the

Mobile

were separated from the settled parts of

the

United

States on the north and northwest by six

thousand

Creeks and two thousand Choctaws; to the south were the
66

Holmes to VIilkinson, uct. 19> 1312, Carter,
Territorial Papers, VI, 328-29.
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British and their black and Spanish allies; and in their
midst a population that if excited to revolt would require
the entire military force to subdue.

The states of Georgia

and South Carolina were in no position to afford the
settlements assistance; the only source of aid was
Tennessee, three hundred miles away.
The Herald *s report was bolstered by a letter to
the editor of the Niles Weekly Register from Captain
James 3. 'Wilkinson, who was stationed at Fort Stoddert.
The Captain reported that there were nearly three hundred
63
Negro Troops in the town of Mobile.
The Georgia Legislature was deliberating over
what course of action should be taken with regard to
Florida, as the reports of Spanish cooperation with
England mounted.

The Georgia House of Representatives'

Committee on East Florida reported that the state was
constitutionally vested with the power to occupy East
Florida and maintain its occupation until the national
government did something to eliminate the danger that
69
tnreatened the people of the state.
Apprehensions of slave insurrections and Britishcn

Tennessee Herald, Sept. 5, 1312, as reported
in Niles Weekly Register, Oct. 17, 1S12, III, 107.
63
James 3. Wilkinson to editor, Oct. 14, 1312,
Niles Weekly Register, Nov. 7, 1312, III. Wilkinson
states that the black troops were Spanish.
Q

° Niles vVeekly Register, Dec. 26, 1312, III.
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supported black troops continued throughout the war,
and the British played upon these fears. On April 1,
1814, Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Inglis Cochrane assumed
command of the Royal Navy’s North American Command. The
next day he issued a proclamation that was clearly in
tended to arouse American slaves. The Admiral offered
to persons who wished to leave the United States an
opportunity to do so. Those who left the United States
could either enter the service of the King or become free
settlers in an English colony.70
The proclamation was received with consternation
and anger in the South. The editors of the Savannah paper
refused to print the proclamation, believing it to be
"inexpedient” to do so. One editor's comment was, "If
this proclamation is what we are led to believe it to
be, it caps the climax of dishonor and barbarity and
J. IvlacXay Hitsman, The Incredible War of 1812:
A Military History (Toronto: ijniversity of Toronto Press.
T9b5/, 206-207. The proclamation read as follows:
WHEREAS it has been represented to me, that many
persons now resident in the United States, have expressed
a desire to withdraw therefrom, with a view to entering
into His Majesty’s service or being received as free
settlers into some of His Majesty's colonies.
This is therefore to give notice
That allthose who may be disposed to emigrate from the
United States, will with their families, be received on
board His Majesty's ships or vessels of war, or at the
military posts that may be established upon or near the
coast of the United States, when they will have their
choice of either entering into His Majesty's sea or land
forces, or of being sent as FREE settlers, to the British
possessions in North America or the West Indies, where
they will meet with all due encouragements.
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shall give eternal infamy to the British name, unless
disavowed.
Further alarm was caused when it was reported
that approximately a thousand Creek Indians had gathered
at Pensacola to receive arms and other supplies from the
British.

It was also reported that the British had

17,000 stands of arms in addition to those given to the
Indians.

It was believed that these arms were for "the

'humane* purpose of enabling the slaves to destroy the
72
white population - men, women and children."
As the Americans and British began the series of
maneuvers in the South which would eventually bring them
to the Battle of New Orleans, the fear of insurrection
would hinder and influence the concentration of American
troops.

Anticipating a possible British thrust at

Louisiana through Mobile, the President ordered Governor
'William Blount of Tennessee to detach five thousand militia
to join General Jackson.

In addition the Governor of

Georgia was ordered to muster five thousand militia,
half of this number to be held in reserve until Jackson
73
determined whether he needed them.
^ Niles Weekly Register, May 21, 1814, VI.
72Niles Weekly Register. Aug. 23, 1814, VI.
^Secretary of War to Blount, Sept. 25, 1814,
S.VLS, Roll 7, 317-18. Secretary of War to Governor of
Georgia, Sept. 25, 1314, SWLS, Roll 7, 318-19.
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General Jackson had already requested 2,500
militia from Tennessee, making a total requisition of
7,500 from that state. When the War Department learned
this, it requested 2,500 militia from Kentucky in order
to keep the requisition on Tennessee at 5,000.^ As the
reports of the strength of the British force destined
for New Orleans came to the War Department, the orders
of October 3 to the Governor of Tennessee were rescinded
and the militia from Georgia were ordered to march. Thus
a militia force of 12,500 men had been ordered to join
General Jackson's command.75
General Jackson had at his command all of the
regular troops in his Department, the detached militia
in Louisiana, the Mississippi Territory, and Tennessee.
He also had the authority to engage the warriors of the
Choctaws, Chickasaws, and the Creeks to aid the United
States. At first this appears to be a large reservoir
of men to draw upon, but the Secretary of War added a
sentence to the instructions which revealed the true
74
'Secretary of War to Governor of Kentucky,
Oct. 3» 1814, SWLS, Roll 7, 334. Secretary of War
to Governor of Tennessee* Oct. 3# 1814* SWLS. Roll 7*
337.
75Secretary of War to Governor of Kentucky,
Oct. 10, 1814y SWLS. Roll 7, 342. Secretary of War to
Governor of Tennessee, Oct. 10, 1814, Ibid.* 342-43*
Secretary of War to Governor of Georgia, Oct. 10, 1814,
Ibid., 344. Secretary of War to Jackson, Oct. 10, 1814,
Ibid.. 344.
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situation. "It is known that the regular troops are
distributed into many posts, and that the militia of
Louisiana will be less effective for general purposes
from the dread of domestic insurrection, so that on the
militia of Tennessee your principal reliance must be.”
Thus when Jackson faced the British at the
Battle of New Orleans in January of 1815* his Army was
composed largely of Tennessee and Kentucky militia, with
smaller groups of regulars, pirates, Indians and Louisiana
militia from the immediate area.

Secretary
Ibid.,

of

vYar to Jackson, Sept.

27, 1814,

323-25.
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CHAPTER X

THE ARMY AND THE INSTITUTION
OF SLAVERY, 1816-1835
In the twenty years after the War of 1812, white
Southerners continued to rely principally upon the local
militia for protection against slave insurrections. Al
though the militia was generally better organized and
more effective after the war, Southerners requested that
Federal troops be available to afford them additional
protection from the black population. However, as the
years passed and the agitation against slavery mounted,
the leaders of the South became more and more reluctant
to openly express their fears. Historian Stanley Elkins
writes:
A heavy and cramping tension thus
exists in most of the formal writings.
The spokesmen did not want it supposed
for an instant that the South was un
able to control its slave population
or that the inferior creatures were
anything but pleased with their happy
conditions.1
i

Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in
American Institutional and Intellectual1Iilfe (flew~York:
Grosset and Dunlap LThe Universal LibraryJ, 1963), 218.
Elkins calls the fear of insurrection irrational.
487
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While the formal writing and public utterances
reveal little concern over slave insurrections, the pri
vate correspondence of the southern leaders reveal no
reluctance to call upon the Federal government in their
time of need.

As the frontier line was pushed westward

and settlers moved into the unsettled regions of the
South, military posts and garrisons that might otherwise
have been abandoned were maintained in areas that had
little to fear from Indian attack or a sudden invasion
by a foreign enemy.
In 1816 United States troops took the field in
what would result in one of the few actual clashes be
tween regular troops and blacks in the period from 1815
to 1835.

The clash arose out of the occupation of a

British built fort in East Florida by a large band of
runaway slaves and a few Indians.

In March the Secretary

of War wrote to General Andrew Jackson concerning the
fort and warning him that the practices of the force of
enticing slaves from the frontier of Georgia might en
danger the peace of the nation.

He wrote:

The President has therefore directed
me to instruct you to call the atten
tion of the governor or military
commander of Pensacola to this sub
ject. The principles of good neigh
borhood require the interferences of
the Spanish authority to put an end
to an evil of so serious a nature.
Should he decline this interference,
it will be incumbent on the Executive
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to determine what course shall be
adopted in relation to this banditti.
Should it be determined that the
destruction of the fort does not
require the sanction of the leg
islature, measures will be promptlytaken for its reduction.^
Before anything constructive could be accomplished
through diplomatic channels, the Savannah Journal pointed
out the necessity of some type of action being taken:
"In the course of last winter, several slaves from this
neighborhood fled to that fort; others have lately gone
from Tennessee and the Mississippi Territory.

How long

shall this evil requiring immediate remedy be permitted
to exist?"^
On July 17 Colonel Duncan Clinch, accompanied by
a force of 116 regulars and 150 Indian allies, left Camp
Crawford to march on the Negro fort.

Just one month

after the publication of the denouncement in the Savannah
Journal, a shot fired by an American gunboat struck the
main powder magazine of the fort and completely destroyed
the structure.

In the official report to the War

2

Secretary of War to General Jackson, Mar. 15,
1816, in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War.
Letters Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889,
Record Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 8, 471-72. Herein
after cited as SWLS.
^Savannah (Georgia) Journal. June 26, 1816. See
Isaac J. Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813
(Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1967), 666 ff; Rambert W.
Patrick, Florida Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia Florida Border: 1816-1815 (Athenal University of
Georgia Press, 1954).
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Department, Colonel Clinch reported that out of an esti
mated three hundred and twenty-five people in the fort,
not more than one-sixth escaped instant death.
Although the regulars were not engaged in any
heavy fighting, merely capturing the few survivors, the
actions taken by Colonel Clinch to reduce the Negro fort
on the Apalachicola River did much to ease the minds of
the people on the Georgia-Plorida border.

But the action

did little to further the diplomatic negotiations between

t

Spain and the United States. ‘
The expedition was effective in quieting the
trouble on the border for the moment, and the Secretary
of War felt that the troops could be safely put to work
repairing the road from Port Hawkins to Port Stoddert.
As the hostile disposition of the Creeks
appears to have in some degree subsided
and as the destruction of the Negro fort
on the Appalochicola, may have a tendency
to intimidate them, it is probable that
part of the troops, stationed in the Indian
Country may now be safely employed in this
work.5

4
Clinch to Butler, Adjutant General, Division of
the South, Aug. 2, 1816, Niles Weekly Register, Nov. 20,
1819, XIII; Clinch to Governor Mitchell, Aug. 4, 1816,
Niles Weekly Register, Aug. 31, 1816, XI; See Hawkins
to Governor Mitchell, May 10, 1816, Niles Weekly Register,
June 1, 1816, X; and Sept. 14, 1816, Xl.
5
Secretary of War to David Mitchell, Governor of
Georgia, Sept. 24, 1816, SWLS, Roll 9, 149-50; Herbert
Aptheker, MMaroons within ihe Present Limits of the
United States,** The Journal of Negro History, XXIV,
(1939), 167-84. ----------------- ----------
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Again in March 1820, slaves who had just recently
been brought into Florida (now a part of the United
States) from Jamaica rebelled and the citizens of the
area called for Federal aid.

A detachment of regulars

marched to the scene and quickly subdued the rebels.
One slave was killed in the process, but other details
concerning the insurrection are not available.^
The report of a disturbance on the German Coast
again disrupted the quiet of the New Orleans region.

A

detachment of regulars under the command of Captain
William Harney marched from New Orleans with three days
rations to the scene of the revolt.

The issue was con

fused a few days later when it was reported that the
troops had marched up the Coast merely for the purposes
of "drill and exercise", and further mention of the
7

rebellion disappeared from the news.
The example of a detachment of troops being sent
on an exercise into the area of the German Coast marks
a transition point in the role of the Army in the South.
The activities of the War Department and the Army tended
more and more to become that of a reassuring influence
^Helen T. Catterall, Judicial Cases Concerning
the Negro and American Slavery (5 vols., Washington,
T9?6^Tg37) 7 T i r i 3 7 -28; Aptheker, American Negro Slave
Revolts, 266.
7
New York, Evening Post, Nov. 7 and 9, 1826, as
seen in Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts, 278-79.
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and a powerful psychological force.

The type of ser

vices rendered varied from place to place and from time
to time, but the Army*s role became that of the patient
observer, ready to meet any emergency.

As Governor

Holmes observed in 1812, MIn slave countries the danger
of insurrection always exists, and the inhabitants should
g

be prepared to meet the event."
The city of Savannah affords an excellent ex
ample of the continuous concern of citizens for some
form of protection from its black population.

Fort

Jackson had been built during the War of 1812 to protect
the city from a possible British attack.

With the con

clusion of the war, the Federal government took under
advisement the question of whether or not the post should
be abandoned and the public buildings sold.

In an effort

to reach a decision, the War Department requested opinions
from a number of different individuals and it was not
until 1819 that all of the reports were finally subg
mitted.
Q
Holmes to Wilkinson, Oct. 19, 1812, Clarence
E. Carter (ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United
States. V I . The Mississippi Territory. 328-29.
Q
Secretary of War to the Honorable William
Stevens, Oct. 21, 1816, SWLS. Roll 9, 172; Secretary
of War to Colonel James McDonald, Oct. 21, 1816, Ibid.,
171; Secretary of War to General Gaines, Feb. 4, 1818 ,
Ibid., 2; Secretary of War to Charles Harris, Feb. 4,
1818, Ibid.. 2-3; Secretary of War to General Gaines,
July 14, 1818, Ibid., 99. Secretary of War to General
Gaines, Feb. 2, 1819, Ibid., 239.
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While the fate of the post at Savannah was under
consideration, the troops stationed there were removed
from the garrison during the summer months in an effort
to preserve the health of the soldiers.

In 1819 the

government decided to continue the post, and the soldiers
stationed there suffered heavily from disease during
their tour of duty.
The garrison was removed from Fort Jackson in
1824, and the action brought an immediate and sharp
response from the citizens of Savannah.

In April the

Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, informed Representa
tive Edward F. Tatnall that he was "fully sensible of
the weight of reasons" that the United States troops
should not be removed from the city.

The Secretary

stated that the decision to remove the troops from
Savannah had been made from necessity and for no other
reason.

The soldiers had become virtually ineffective

as a military force due to illness during the period
they had been stationed in the town.

Secretary Calhoun

assured Representative Tatnall that if a more healthy
location could be found in the area, the troops would
be returned.

He also suggested that if the troops re

turned immediately, they might be quartered in the city,
as the season was too far advanced to erect new barracks
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to accommodate the soldiers.^

The next month Calhoun

requested an interview with Tatnall for the purpose of
discussing possible locations for quartering the troops
in or near Savannah.^1
In addition, arrangements would be made for
erecting suitable buildings in some healthy location
near the city.

The troops would occupy the new build-

ings during the sickly season in future years.

12

Major

Call and the members of the Council met and decided upon
a site near Savannah, and the soldiers returned to the
post for the remaining summer months.^
The United States started erecting new barracks
for the Savannah garrison in the follwing year.

By

1827 the Secretary of War was able to report to the
House of Representatives that it would require an ad
ditional 114,452.51 to complete the barracks and other
buildings at Cantonment Oglethorpe.

14

Despite its new

^Secretary of War to the Honorable E. P. Tatnall,
Apr. 30, 1824, Ibid., 49-50.
^'Secretary of War to Tatnall, May 11, 1824,
Ibid.. 53.
12
Secretary of War to the Members of the Common
Council of Savannah, May 15, 1824, Ibid., 56.
1^Niles Weekly Register. June 12, 1824, XXVI.
^American State Papers: Military Affairs
(Washington, 1832-1861), III, 588-83T rfereinafter
cited as ASPMA.
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location and new quarters, the new site at Savannah re
mained as unhealthy as the old site.

In 1829 General

Alexander Macomb authorized Colonel William MacRae to
remove the garrison during the sickly season.

The

General suggested that the troops move to Augusta
Arsenal, a post that was only slightly more healthy
15
during the summer months than was Savannah.
The policy of removing the garrison from the city
during the summer months continued in an effort to pre
serve the health of the soldiers.

During the disturbance

in the fall of 1831 caused by the Nat Turner Rebellion,
the regulars were ordered to return from Augusta to
Savannah as soon as a proper regard for the health of
the soldiers would permit.1^
If the practice of previous years was continued,
the troops would again be removed with the approach of
the 1832 sickly season.

The Mayor of Savannah prompted

by this prospect wrote to the Secretary of War on
January 6, 1832, setting forth his apprehensions.

General

Macomb responded to the Mayor's letter with assurances
1*5
Macomb to MacRea, Apr. 26, 1829* Letters Sent,
Headquarters of the Army, 1821-1903* II* Record Group 108
(National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSHQA. See
Appendix II.
^Assistant Adjutant General to Colonel Panning,
Oct. 21, 1831* Letters Sent Eastern Department, VIII,
Records of United States Continental Army Commands,
1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives), Here
inafter cited as LSED.
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that the troops would remain throughout the coming year
in consequence of the Mayor’s letter.

17

Throughout 1831 the War Department was again
considering the abandonment of the barracks outside of
Savannah and a movement to quarters within the city, be
cause the new position was found to be no more healthy
than the old position.

Commanding General Macomb in

formed the Secretary of War that new barracks in the city
might possibly be healthier than those presently occupied
by the troops.

He cautioned that since the move would

be expensive, quarters should be rented within the city
in order to determine if the move would produce the de
sired results.^®
On March 22, 1832, Congress entered the contro
versy over whether to abandon the post at Savannah.

The

House Committee on Military Affairs made its report on
an application from the citizens of Savannah that barracks
be erected and permanently garrisoned in the city.

The

Committee recommended in favor of the petition after con
sidering the evidence presented.

A letter from the Mayor

of Savannah to the Committee expressed the reason the
people wanted the troops permanently stationed in the
17
Macomb to the Honorable William B. Waring,
Feb. 17, 1832, LSHQA, II.
1^Macomb to Secretary of War, Mar. 19, 1832,
LSHQA, II. Also in ASPMA, V, 6-7.
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city.

The Mayor requested that buildings be erected for

the quartering of at least one hundred men, ”in order
that this community might be benefited by the residence
of United States Troops among them, and particularly at
a time when, from the periodical migration of many of our
19
white population, a military force is most needed.”

The implication of the Mayor’s argument is
obvious; the people of Savannah wanted the troops to
protect them from their slaves, who might choose the
season when many whites left the area because of illness
to launch an insurrection.

On April 7, 1832, the commander

of the force at Savannah received orders to keep his
troops in the best and most healthy location he could
find near Savannah.

20

Cities other than Savannah called upon the Federal
government for aid.

In June of 1829 the Intendant of

Charleston, South Carolina, requested that a company of
artillerists be removed from one of the forts in the
harbor and stationed in the town.

One company was or

dered into the city to cooperate with the local autho
rities whenever called upon to do so by the Intendant

19ASPMA, V, 6-7.
20
Macomb to Brevet Captain C. S. Merchant,
Apr. 7, 1832, LSHQA, II. See also Macomb to Judge
Wayne, Apr. 25» 1o}2, Ibid.
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or any three of the Wardens of the city.

21

Requests could not always be granted, and on
rare occasions they were denied.

One month after moving

a company of soldiers from the harbor, the Secretary of
War's office denied another request from the Intendant
of Charleston.

The City Guard was trying to obtain per

mission to use some space in the United States Arsenal.
After consulting the Ordnance Department, the Secretary
of War was forced to deny the request because no part
of the Arsenal could be turned over to the city without
considerable inconvenience.

22

In April 1828 General Winfield Scott wrote to
Colonel Roger Jones, the Adjutant General, concerning
a letter that had been referred to him by the Secretary
of War.

The letter was from the Governor of Florida, who

requested that a company of regulars be stationed near
the head of the St. Mary's River, close to the center
of population.

The company was to form a Hnucleus for

the militia" in the event of unrest among the slaves.
The Governor based his apprehensions on the fact "that
many of the slaves taken to Florida are the very worst
in the Union."
21

Secretary of War to Joseph Johnson, June 30,
1827, SWLS, Roll 12, 297.
22

Secretary of War to Joseph Johnson, July 7,
1827, Ibid.. 298.
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Scott wrote:
The distribution of regiments into
detachments of less than several
companies greatly augments ike
expense of their maintanance [sic]
and is highly injurious to their
efficiency and finally that I am
not aware that we have even estab
lished a military post solely on
the grounds of the Governor's
application.
For these reasons General Scott did not believe that a
23

post should be established on the St. Mary's River.

Some of the requests directed to the War Department
were relatively easy to comply with since they required
only the transmission of information to reassure con
cerned citizens.

On March 24, 1829, in response to a

letter from Congressman William Brent of Louisiana,
Commanding General Alexander Macomb outlined the dis
position of the nation's regular forces.

To defend the

city of New Orleans and protect the neighboring area
against possible insurrection, the Army had ten companies
stationed in Louisiana.

In the event more troops were

required, they could be ordered south into the state
24

from Jefferson Barracks.

In addition to the assurances given of the ability
■^Scott to Jones, Apr. 5, 1828, Letters Sent
Western Department, IV, Records of United States Con
tinental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393
(National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSWD.
2^Macomb to Eaton, Mar. 24, 1829, LSHQA, I.
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of the Army to support the citizens of Louisiana,
General Macomb informed the Governor of the orders
issued to the officers stationed in the state.

In

structions had been given "to cooperate with you in any
measures your Excellency may take in suppressing the in
surrectionary disposition manifested by the black pop\ilation. . . . "

25

In December the Commanding General gave addi
tional details concerning the plans for protecting the
inhabitants of Louisiana.

In addition to the ten com

panies stationed in the state, two companies from Florida,
two from Alabama, four of the five companies stationed on
the Arkansas River, and four companies from Jefferson
Barracks could be moved into the state if the situation
were serious enough.

Within a period of fourteen or

fifteen days after receiving marching orders, these
twenty-two companies, with a paper strength of 1,100 men,
26
could be in the state to confront any rebellious force.
In December 1830 the attention of the Commanding
General shifted from Louisiana to North Carolina.

In a

letter, marked confidential, to the commanding officer at

25
Macomb to Governor Derbigny, Mar. 27, 1829, Ibid.
26
Macomb to Secretary of War, Dec. 30, 1829, Ibid.
The letter gives the total number of companies as 32, but
the count from the text of the letter i3 22.
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Portress Monroe, the General ordered two companies to be
sent to Wilmington, North G o TCj.j.na>

uxixy bhtf cumuitiufider

of the detachment was to know the nature of the unit's
mission, which was to meet any insurrectionary movement
which might take place during the Christmas season.

27

The order was in response to a letter from Wilmington's
Magistrate of Police, who had requested aid from the
War Department because of a disposition toward insurrection manifested by the slaves.

28

General Macomb informed Brevet Major Sylvester
Churchill, who was stationed at Smithville, North Carolina,
that the two companies were on their way from Fortress
Monroe.

Churchill was to assume command of the troops

and march with them to Wilmington.

Upon his arrival he

was to consult with the local authorities as to what
measures should be employed to provide security to tne
residents of the area.

Macomb suggested that it might

eliminate confusion if the Major went to Wilmington and
arranged for the accommodation of the troops before their
arrival.

However, the General cautioned him, ” . . .

you

will see the proprity of not disclosing the object of
your visit, lest the black3 anticipating the coming of
2^Kacomb to Colonel J. B. Walbach, Dec. 9, 1830,
Ibid.

28

Secretary of War to James T. McRee, Dec. 9,
1830, SWLS, Roll 13, 22.
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the troops, might attempt to carry into effect their evil
intentions more promptly than they otherwise should do.M

29

late in December the citizens of the Wilmington
area were still apprehensive, and additional instructions
were sent to Major Churchill.

General Macomb believed

that a demonstration by a company of troops might have
a beneficial effect on the disposition of the blacks.
To accomplish the desired object, it was suggested that
a show of force be made by marching the company from
Wilmington to Newburn.

This display of force was in

tended to overawe and intimidate the blacks while re
assuring the white population.

The company was to re

main at Newburn unless needed elsewhere in the neighbor
hood or until ordered to return to Fortress Monroe.^
Major Churchill and his detachment remained in
Wilmington and Newburn until the end of April.

As the

rumors and fears subsided, the troops were ordered back
to their station at Fortress Monroe.^1
Louisiana was a continuing source of concern to
the officials of the War Department.

From January to

^ M a c o m b to Churchill, Dec. 9, 1830, LSHQA, I.
^°Macomb to Churchill, Dec. 28, 1830, Ibid.
■^Macomb to Brigidier General George Gibson,
Commissary General of Subsistence, Mar. 29, 1831, Ibid.
Acting Assistant Adjutant General DeHart to Colonel
Jones, Apr. 15, 1831, LSED, VIII.
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July of 1831 a number of letters were exchanged by
citizens of Louisiana, the War Department, and officers
of the Army, all concerned with the protection of the
state and its citizens in the event of an insurrection.
In January the Commanding General informed a concerned
citizen that the commanding officers at New Orleans and
Baton Rouge had orders to cooperate with the local au
thorities in suppressing any insurrectionary movements
that might be discovered.

32

In April the Governor of Louisiana wrote the
Secretary of War, John Baton, expressing his concern
for the safety of the citizens and requesting that reg
ular troops be stationed in New Orleans and that arms be
supplied for the militia.

In answer, the Secretary sent

a detailed letter to the Governor outlining measures
to be taken for the defense of New Orleans.
Eaton suggested that New Orleans follow the
example of the citizens of Charleston, South Carolina,
who had constructed a citadel within the limits of the
city.

The citadel was constantly garrisoned by a company

of United States Artillerists and was designed to serve
as a rallying point for the city*s volunteer corps.

Tf

New Orleans built such a citadel, placed a garrison and
a few small field pieces in it, the purposes of security
and defense would be served.

Additional troops could not

32Macomb to G. Saul, Jan. 21, 1831, LSHQA, I.
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be sent to the city at this time because there were no
quarters available for them.

Colonel Clinch, commanding

officer at Baton Rouge, would be ordered to New Orleans
to confer with the Governor on additional defensive
measures that might be adopted.^
On instructions from the Secretary of War, General
Macomb sent orders to Colonel Clinch for the defense of
New Orleans.

The troops at Baton Rouge and the passes

to New Orleans, along with the forces on the Red and
Arkansas rivers, were available to defend the state of
Louisiana.

The commanding officers of the various posts

had been instructed to cooperate with the state author
ities in the event of an insurrection among the blacks.
The Commanding General lamented the fact that
the United States had relinquished the "ancient barracks"
in New Orleans to the City Council and that circumstances
had prevented the maintenance of a permanent garrison in
the city.

However, if the city were to build a citadel

in which troops could be comfortably quartered, then
Colonel Clinch was authorized to order two companies of
regulars from Baton Rouge to occupy the position.

Colonel

Clinch was to vist New Orleans immediately and confer with
the Governor and the city authorities concerning addi
tional measures which were necessary to defend the town.
■^Eaton to Governor of Louisiana, May 16, 1831 *
Ibid.
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In addition, he was to order a supply of arms, not to
♦

exceed 1,000 stands, to the city if he deemed it absolutely
necessary.

The arms were to be stored in some secure

location until they were needed by the Governor.
Also, Colonel Clinch was to visit the forts at
the Balize, the Rigolets and Chef Menteur and inspect
the garrisons to determine their fitness.

The commanders

were to be especially vigilant to avoid the possibility
of surprise as there had been reports that assistance
might be furnished from abroad.

If these reports were

true, it was probable that an attempt might be made to
seize the forts that guarded the passes to the sea and
to secure the weapons stored xn them.
Colonel Clinch was to assume a general command
if an insurrection or an invasion occurred, but his
authority should not exceed its present limits unless
either or both of the events occurred.

General Macomb

apologized for communieating directly with the Colonel
instead of going through the Department Commander, but
he felt that the urgency of the situation required such
action on hie part.

35

34
J No evidence has been found that would either
confirm or deny that foreign aid to a slave insurrection
was possible. It is probable that this was another mani
festation of the continual fear caused by the successful
rebellion in Santo Domingo.
•^Macomb to Clinch, May 17, 1831, LSHQA, I.
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General Edmund P. Gaines, commander of the Western
Department, who had been bypassed in the chain of command,
received a copy of General Macomb*s letter to Colonel
Clinch and immediately sent a letter to the Secretary
of War containing his own suggestions for protecting
Louisiana.

The answer he received from the Commanding

General, if it had been written twenty years earlier,
might have evoked a call from Gaines for satisfaction
on the field of honor:
The views which you have taken
of the subject and the arrangements
which you have adopted, in regard to
the defense of Louisiana, have been
submitted by the Secretary of War to
the President of the United States,
and I am instructed to say to you
that, as the Government is duly
advised of the state of things in
Louisiana and can conveniently de
termine what cause it may be expedient
to adopt, no movement of the troops
will be made, other than those which
have been authorized by letter to
Colonel Clinch . • ., nor will any
requisition be made by you on the
State authorities for Militia or
Volunteer forces without reference
to General Headquarters, that the
same may be submitted to the War
Department, for the decision of
the President. . . .
I cannot close
this communication to you without
reminding you of the propriety of
making your official communications
connected with military services
according to the established rules
as pointed out by the General Reg
ulations and subsequent orders.
^Macomb to Gaines, July 25, 1831, Ibid.
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The reference in Macomb's letter to requisitions
on the militia was reinforced by a letter from a number
of concerned citizens who wrote to Clinch in August;
their document sheds additional light on the possible
insurrection.

The rumors were that the slaves were

planning a simultaneous attack on Baton Rouge and New
Orleans.

The slaves needed the arms stored in Baton

Rouge to facilitate their assault on New Orleans and
give it a chance of success.

The citizens did not want

the local militia called into service:

"doing so would

in our opinion only show to that class of our population
that we feared them and would consequently be the best
means that could be devised of letting them know their
own strength of which it is our obvious policy to keep
them ignorant."

37

After the admonishment from Macomb, Clinch for
warded the letter from the citizens to General Gaines
with a cover letter describing conditions in the area.
An additional detachment of troops had arrived in New
Orleans and everything seemed to be tranquil throughout
the entire state.

Whatever had been the intentions of

the slaves, the rebellion never occurred, and events in
^ H . H. Gurley, et al to Clinch, Aug. 19, 1831,
Letters Received, Adjutant General's Office, Record
Group 94 (National Archives).
^ C l i n c h to Gaines, Aug. 22, 1831, Ibid.
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Louisiaxia would soon be overshadowed by those in far-off
Virginia.
The Nat Turner Rebellion which erupted on
August 21, 1831, brought an avalanche of requests for
aid and protection from all areas of the South.

Al

though the Secretary of War was able to inform a group
of concerned citizens in Southampton County, Virginia,
on September 8, that it was the belief of those in his
Department that the insurrection had been completely
quelled and no additional troops should be stationed
there, it was only the beginning of the scare.

3Q

On September 23, 1831, General Macomb proposed
a disposition of the troops on the Atlantic Coast to
Louis McLean, Acting Secretary of War.

This disposition

was, he felt, the best possible one to afford adequate
protection to the citizens of the slave states.

Two

companies would be removed from Boston harbor, one com
pany from New London, two companies from the harbor of
New York, and two companies from New Castle, Delaware.
Five of those companies were to be stationed at Fortress
Monroe and two were to occupy the Marine Barracks in the
city of Washington.

The companies stationed in Washington

would be in a position to guard Washington, Georgetown,
Alexandria and the state of Maryland.

The troops at

39

Secretary of War to Jeremiah Cobb, et al
Sept. 8, 1831, SWLS, Roll 13, 78.
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Fortress Monroe would protect Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia and Maryland.
The two companies of Infantry stationed at Fort
Mitchell, Alabama, would be marched to Augusta Arsenal,
where they would be in a position to act in Georgia,
South Carolina and North Carolina.

Should more troops

be needed, two battalions of Infantry could be called
from the frontier garrisons without endangering the
safety of the citizens or posts.

If this force was not

equal to the task, three companies could be moved quickly
from Sackett's Harbor and Fort Niagara.

All of these

movements would be made with very little expense to the
government and would leave no post without a garrison.
General Macomb expressed a special concern for
the security and safety of the Arsenal located near
Richmond.

There was a large and well organized force

of black laborers, said to number 1,500, working in
the coal mines within gun-shot of the Arsenal.

Within

a short distance, not exceeding seven miles, were ap
proximately 6,000 able-bodied blacks who were capable
of bearing arms.

Stored in the Arsenal were 17,000

stand of arms intended for the use of the militia in
case of invasion or insurrection.

If the blacks could

gain possession of the arms they might be able to capture
Richmond and spread the insurrection over a wide area
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before they could be checked.

To guard against this

eventuality, Macomb recommended that one company be
dispatched from Portress Monroe to provide additional
protection for the Arsenal.
General Macomb felt that these preparations
would enable the government to afford the best possible
security against any slave uprising.

The movements were

never completed because the crisis in Southampton passed.
However, requests continued to be sent to Washington from

throughout the South.

40

Prom the state of North Carolina, Major Churchill
informed the headquarters of the Eastern Department on
September 12 that he had detached a part of his command
at Port Johnston to the city of Wilmington.

He had taken

this action upon the requisition of the magistrates of
the city, who felt that additional measures were necessary
to defend the city.

The Commanding General of the depart

ment approved the actions taken by Major Churchill, and
immediately sent ten recruits to reinforce his weakened
command.^1
^Mac o m b to McLean, Sept. 23, 1831, LSHQA, I.
^Churchill to Headquarters Eastern Department,
Sept. 12, 1831, Letters Received, Eastern Department,
Records of United States Continental Army Commands, 18211920, Record Group 393 (National Archives); Bache,
Assistant Adjutant General, Eastern Department, to
Churchill, Sept. 21, 1831, LSED, VIII.
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On October 3, 1831, General Macomb addressed a
letter to the Intendant of Police at Beaufort, North
Carolina.

The letter was in response to a resolution

passed by a unanimous vote of the citizens of the town
and its vicinity, both of which had been sent to the
Secretary of War.

The population was concerned because

of a threatened insurrection among the blacks, and they
requested that a military force be stationed in or near
Fort Macon to protect them.
Macomb informed the citizens that a similar re
quest had been received by the Department of War from
the citizens of Newburn, North Carolina.

In consequence

of this request, a company of troops had been ordered to
Newburn, and it was presumed by the General that because
of the closeness of Newburn and Beaufort, one company
would be sufficient to met the needs of both towns.'
On October 21 General Macomb wrote to a number
of citizens in Wilmington, where the fear of an in
surrection was still strong, that the company of Artillery
stationed at nearby Fort Johnston should be sufficient to
protect the citizens.

He felt that because of the prompt

action by local officials in suppressing the insurrec
tionary movement and the punishment of the offenders that
the need to assemble a military force at Wilmington had
^^Macomb to Conady, Oct. 3» 1831» LSHQA, I.
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almost ceased to exist at the time of his writing*

The

General informed the citizens:
The military means at the dis
posal of the government you must be
aware, are not very extensive. It
may be satisfactory to you however
to know that additional troops are
ordered to Fortress Monroe, with a
view to affording aid to the au
thorities of the States in which
the Blacks may attempt any in
surrectionary movements, should the
authorities of those states desire
it. . . • Should the alarm continue
in your vicinity, any communication
on the subject which you should think
proper to make for the information of
the Department will receive due at
tention. 4 3
As the fear engendered by the Turner Rebellion
swept through the South, Robert C. Nicholas, a Louisiana
planter, wrote that Louisiana needed all of the help it
could obtain in order to provide an effective security
system.

He suggested that the best way to solve the

problem of rebellion on the German Coast was to establish
a patrol on the Mississippi River.

The patrol would be

maintained by two steamboats, each with a well armed
complement of Federal troops aboard, working up and down
^Macomb to Citizens of Wilmington, N. C.,
Oct. 21, 1831, Ibid. Macomb's last paragraph con
cerning reinforcements for Fortress Monroe and
correspondence with the War Department, was identical
to the last paragraph of his letter to Conady at
Beaufort, North Carolina, Oct. 3, 1831, Ibid.
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the river between New Orleans and St. Francisville.

44

General Gaines suggested a similar plan to
Governor A. B. Roman of Louisiana, one calling for un
scheduled and unannounced tours through the region bylarge units of United States troops.

Gaines believed

that this scheme would provide a satisfactory system
of defense for the planters of Louisiana.

45

On October 12 General Macomb once again explained
the measures taken by the government to defend Louisiana.
The apprehensions of the citizens, which never completely
disappeared, had been intensified by rumors that the
black population of New Orleans and the German Coast
intended to rise against the whites, it was also re
ported that the slaves had been in correspondence with
the blacks in the Islands.

On Macomb’s orders Colonel

Clinch conferred with the Governor, inspected the forts
protecting the approaches to the city, stationed two
companies in the city, supplied arms to be used by the
militia, and reached an understanding with the Governor
and city authorities concerning defensive measures to
be taken in the event of trouble.
Clinch was certain that the troops at Baton Rouge
^ R o b e r t C. Nicholas to Nicholas Trist, Oct. 22,
1831, Nicholas Trist Papers, Library of Congress.
45

Gaines to Roman, Nov. 16, 1831, Personal Papers,
Miscellaneous, G, Library of Congress; Aptheker, American
Negro Slave Revolts, 312.
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and those in New Orleans were sufficient to suppress any
outbreak among the slaves.

However, in the event re

inforcements were required, Colonel Clinch possessed the
authority to call additional troops from the Arkansas and
Red rivers.
caution:

The General closed his letter with a note of

"You will of course see the propriety of not

allowing the information here given to find its way into
the public prints."

46

During the first week of November General Gaines,
commanding the Western Department, wrote from Mobile that
the apprehensions of an insurrection had subsided to a
level where he felt it safe to begin his inspection tour.
The season had been healthy in Louisiana and Mobile, and
most of the white inhabitants had remained in their homes
thus enabling them to keep a close watch on the slave
population.

Gaines adequately summarized the services

the regulars performed in Louisiana:

"The known habitual

vigilance of the few troops stationed in that state, with
the precautionary measures taken to increase their
efficiency, and whenever necessary their numbers had
doubtless contributed to dispel the fears of the inhabitants and to keep in check the evil disposed Blacks."
^ Macomb to Nathan Morse, Oct. 12, 1831, LSHQA,
I.
^Gaines to Jones, Nov. 3* 1831» LSWD, IV.
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In late November and early December the commanders
in Louisiana were reminded of their responsibility to co
operate with local officials and to afford protection to
the citizens of Louisiana.

When 3revet Major R. A.

Zantzinger was assigned to command the Artillery units
in the area around New Orleans, he was ordered to cooperate
with the Infantry commanders and local officials to avert
or suppress any insurrections.^®
General Gaines instructed Colonel Clinch to issue
a supply of arms and ammunition to the Governor of Loui
siana in response to his requisition.

General Gaines had

already ordered a supply to be sent from the 3aton Rouge
Arsenal but any additional arms not required for the
immediate use of the Federal troops should be sent to
the governor, the total number not to exceed 2,000 stand,
along with the equipment and ammunition to correspond with
such a supply of arms.

Gaines stated, "that measures of

prevention constitute the most certain means of security
against the apprehended evils of insurrection. . . . "

He

concluded his letter with an admonishment to Colonel
Clinch, "Repeating my desire that you will cooperate with
the public functionaries of the state in whatever measures
^®M. L. Clark, Acting Aide de Camp to the Governor
of Louisiana, Mayor of New Orleans, and Commanding Officers
of Forts Pike, Wood, Jackson and New Orleans, Nov. 20,
1831, and Clark to Mayor of New Orleans and Governor of
Louisiana, Nov. 27, 1831, Ibid.
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you may deem necessary and proper to ARREST THE APPREHENDED
EVIL OR TO ARREST OR CRUSH IT, if it should commence.’'49
The requests for detachments continued to come
into the War Department throughout December, and for
the first time the Commanding General was forced to deny
the requests because of a shortage of troops.

General

Macomb denied the request of the Committee of Vigilance
of Raleigh, North Carolina, and one from the Governor of
Florida for a detachment of troops to be stationed in the
city of Pensacola.

These requests were rejected because

of the dispersed state of the Army and the belief that
further detachments would interfere greatly with the
plans of the War Department and the discipline of the
troops.

50
General Macomb, in a communication to Represen

tative Thomas R. Mitchell of South Carolina, reiterated
the problems posed by a further dispersal of the regular
forces.

The city of Georgetown, South Carolina, had

requested a detachment of troop3 to protect it in the
event of an insurrection in the district.

Macomb stated

that the dispersed state of the Army and its limited
members precluded affording protection to more than the
49

emphasis.
50

Gaines to Clinch, Dec. 2, 1831» Ibid.

Gaines*

Macomb to Cass, Dec. 8, 1831» LSHQA, I.
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maritime frontier and the garrisons on the interior border.
Orders were issued to the commander of the three companies
in Charleston to watch the events in Georgetown and if
there, was cause for serious alarm he was to detach a small
part of his small force to aid the citizens.

Macomb could

only express his hope that this arrangement would meet the
approval of the citizens of Georgetown.

51

On January 17 General Macomb, in answer to the

representations of the citizens of Alexandria, Louisiana,
could only state that the troops at Port Jesup would be
used if a rebellion broke out, because additional troops
could not be ordered into the district.

The limited means

of the Army had been exhausted by the numerous requests
which had been received from the Southern states since the
disturbances of the previous year.

52

General Gaines, commanding the Western Department,
wrote to the Adjutant General of the Army expressing his
concern for the safety of the inhabitants of Louisiana.
He felt that because of the strength, character and con
dition of the slave population, Louisiana required twelve
Macomb to Mitchell, Dec. 27, 1831, Ibid.;
A. Van Buren to Major Heilman, Jan. 7, 1832, LSHQA,
II; Van Buren to Heilman, Jan. 23, 1832, Ibid.
"^Macomb to W. H. Overton, Jan. 17, 1832, Ibid.;
Van Buren to Brigidier General H. Leavenworth, Cantonment
Jesup, Jan. 24, 1832, Ibid.
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to fifteen additional companies of regular troops to pro
vide adequate protection against insurrections.

Gaines

wrote:
I should be guilty of an unpardonable
omission if I did not solicit the
attention of the proper authorities
to the mortifying fact that, there
is not within or near the Island of
Orleans nor at Baton Rouge as Colonel
Clinch justly intimates a sufficient
force to justify the expectation that
in the event of insurrection (to the
extent reasonably apprehended, when
the Blacks out number the whites as
three or four to one) very little if
anything could be done by the U. S.
troops beyond the immediate defense
of the positions which they occupy.
Not doubting but that it is the
dictate of humanity and justice
rather to provide efficient means
of prevention and security against
the PROBABILITY if not the possibility
of insurrection than by witholding
these means so completely within our
power, suffer a stroke to be struck
or a match to be lighted that a few
triumphs might not be checked. . . . ”
In April and again in May of 1832 General Macomb
sought to reassure the citizens in and around Baton Rouge
that their safety and security was being considered by the
War Department.

As soon as additional troops were avail

able they would be stationed at Baton Rouge to provide

greater security for the Arsenal and to the citizens of
54
the community.
5

Gaines to Adjutant General, Apr. 11, 1832,

LSWD, VI.
54
Macomb to Philip Hicky, Baton Rouge, Apr. 16,
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The eruption of numerous rebellions and reports
of rebellions which had culminated in the Turner Re
bellion and the subsequent anxiety of the citizens of
the South for their safety led to a period of relative
calm.

55

It was not "until August of 1835 that the fears

of an insurrection returned to haunt white southerners.
In that month a letter was sent to Lieutenant Colonel
William Poster, the commanding officer at Baton Rouge,
from the Headquarters of the Western Department.

Foster

was cautioned to remain alert and vigilant to the dis
position of the black population and to the rumors of
planned insurrections instigated by white men.

It was

stated that much good and no evil could result from an
eg

increased watchfulness and readiness for action.
The year 1835 ended with the citizens of Louisiana
again aroused to a high state of singer.

A plot had been

discovered in the East Pelician district where slaves had

been found with arms and other weapons.

Armed patrols

marched through the countryside and some of the planters
57
fled to the safety of New Orleans.
1832, LSHQA, II; Macomb to Representatives White, Thomas
and Ballard, May 30, 1832, Ibid.
55

Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts, 323-24.

56
McCall, Aide de Camp, Western Depsirtment, to
Poster, Aug., 1835, LSWD, II.
^ N i l e s Weekly Register, Jan. 16, 1836, XLIX,
letter dated New Orleans, Dec. 29, 1835.
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In the period from 1789 to 1835 the United States
Army performed a function which Southerners viewed as
essential to their safety.

58

The elaborate system of

controls which the existence of slavery fostered did
not afford the whites a3 much protection as they desired.
The United States Army, with the power and resources of
the Federal government at its command, seemed to afford
the Southerners the extra security that they required.
When viewed against the background of the per
sistent requests that Federal assistance be given to the
lecal authorities, the assurances given to Southerners by
their leaders of their ability to control the slave
population have a hollow ring.

In actual practice, how

ever, the local system of control appears to have been
effective in most cases, with the authorities turning
to the employment of regulars against the slaves only
on rare occasion.
The regulars possessed one advantage over the
local forces and it was invaluable in the event of an
insurrection.

Unincumbered by personal property and

families, the regulars could move rapidly against the
rebels without the worries that plagued the white
^^William L. Richter, "Slavery in Baton Rouge,”
Louisiana Higtory, Spring, 1969, Vol. X, 136-37. It is
stated that "Partly because of the presence of the United
States Army in the fort, Baton Rougeans felt rather safe.”
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Southerner who might be called upon to leave his home
and family unprotected if called into service.

South

erners were rarely anxious to leave their homes to
fulfill their militia obligation if it meant that their
families would be unprotected.
The War Department and the individual officers
tried to comply whenever possible with the requests they
received from Southerners for all types of aid.

It is

evident that the Federal officials felt that the pro
tection of American citizens from their slaves was as
much a part of their duty as protecting them from hostile
Indians and foreign invasion.

General Gaines suggested

that Southern officers might be stationed in the South
because:
Their constitutions being adapted to
the climate posses the additional
advantage of knowing more intimately
than Northern or Eastern men, the
characters and peculiar habits of
the Southern people of all colors,
so that in any such emergency that
we have reason now to apprehend,
the most efficient service might
reasonably be expected from the
officers and men born and raised
upon the spot, or in its immediate
vicinity.59
It is difficult to imagine a slave rebellion of
such a magnitude that the white Southerners would not
have been able to suppress it rapidly.

Armed and

59

Gaines to Adjutant General Jones, Apr. 30,
1832, LSWD, VI.
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organized, the whites actually had little to fear from a
general uprising among the slaves, and this was amply
demonstrated by the end results of all the efforts to
mount rebellions.

But the fear was always present and

the picture of Santo Domingo never disappeared from
view.

Though reluctant to speak about the need they

felt for Federal troops, many white Southerners pro-,
bably rested more comfortably at night than they would
have had the soldiers not been present.
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EPILOGUE
THE PASSING OP THE ARMY
The role of the Army in the westward movement has
been acclaimed by some historians and questioned by others.
Earlier writers generally recognized that the military had
played an important part in pushing the frontier across
the continent.

More recent writers have tended to con

clude that the Army’s influence has been exaggerated and
may even have been harmful.

Representative of the views

of the new school is a statement by Roger Nichols:
In particular, frontier and military
historians have placed increased
emphasis upon the contributions of
the United States Army to the west
ward movement, A group of historians,
which might be labeled the “imperial
school," claims that soldiers more than
other frontier agents, explored the west,
built roads, pacified Indians, enforced
laws, protected settlers, founded cities,
and even brought religion, education, and1
other cultural trappings to the frontier.
Nichols then states that if the performance of the
Army in the Missouri River Valley during the first thirty
years of the nineteenth century was any indication of their
Roger L. Nichols, "The Army and the Indians
1800-1830 - A Reappraisal: The Missouri Valley Example,”
Pacific Valley Historical Review, XLI (May, 1972), 151.
523
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importance, it has been vastly overestimated:
Their incompetence and bungling caused
them to play only a modest role in
solving the Indian problem and in
promoting expansion and settlement.
Instead of serving as the "Sword of
the Republic," as one prominent
military historian claims, the Army
in the Missouri Valley might better
be described as the republic's broken
lance, or at least its dull one.2
Perhaps this assessment is correct for the Missouri
Valley frontier.

However, on the southern frontier for

forty-six years the Army was not only the "Sword of the
Republic" but also its shield.

During the period from

1789 to 1835 the officers and men of the Army performed
virtually every conceivable type of service, civil as
well as military.

By the time the need for the troops

had passed in the South, the Army had left an indelible
mark upon the region.
The activities of the Army were essential to the
settlement of the southern frontier.

The vast wilderness

would have been opened and settled eventually had the
2

Ibid., 152. The reference by Nichols is to the
work of Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic:
The United States Army on the Frontier,T 7 B j M 846 (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1 969). In this work
Prucha expands the thesis contained in his earlier work
Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States Army
in the Development of the Northwest, 1815-1860 (Madison:
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1953)• Prucha
contends that the Army played an important part, perhaps
more than any other factor, in bringing civilization to
the frontier.
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soldiers not been present, but the process would have
taken far longer to complete.

The Army made an organized

attack upon the wilderness and helped to bring some
semblance of order to the movement.

The Army provided

an available source of manpower, men who were able to
devote their time and labor to projects not directly
connected to their own survival.

It is difficult to

imagine how the settlers, struggling to carve homes and
farms from the wilderness, could have found the time
necessary to perform the numerous tasks assigned to the
soldiers.
Perhaps the most important function the Army per
formed was the assertion of Federal authority.

For many

of the settlers on the frontier, the soldiers were the
only representatives of the national government with whom
they had any contact.

Whether occupying new territory,

fighting Indians, or enforcing the national laws, the
soldiers represented the United States.

There were other

Federal officials on the frontier - revenue officers,
Indian agents, marshalls - but these individuals lacked
the physical power necessary to enforce the law.

It was

one thing to resist the authority of a marshall or revenue
collector; but to defy the orders of Federal officials
when they were supported by a detachment of armed soldiers
was an entirely different matter.

The use of the troops

to enforce national laws normally produced the cry of
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military despotism from those individuals whose interests
the soldiers opposed.

The same groups who opposed the

use of the soldiers in the enforcement of Federal laws
were often the first to call upon the soldiers to enforce
state and local laws, especially those intended to prevent
slave uprisings.
The officers and men usually performed the varied
duties assigned to them competently and on occasion with
distinction.

This was remarkable in view of the limited

training which the officers had received; many of them
were scarcely prepared to command troops, much less to
perform countless other jobs, both civil and military.
It can only be assumed that they relied upon the experi
ence gained from long years of service in subordinate
positions to guide their conduct when they found them
selves in difficult situations.

The officers were also

aware that if they overstepped the bounds of their au
thority, they were responsible to military as well as
civil authorities.
The troops occupied the position of being wanted
when a crisis arose, but unwanted at other times.

The

existence of the Army was viewed as a necessary evil.
Albert Gallatin probably summarized the sentiments of
civilians, at least those of Jeffersonian persuasion,
concerning the Army:
The distribution of our little Army
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to distant garrisons where hardly
any other inhabitant is to be found
is the most eligible arrangement of
that perhaps necessary evil that can
be contrived. But I never want to
see the face of one in our cities
and intermixed with the people.3
With such attitudes prevailing, efforts to im
prove the Army were doomed to fail.

The military estab

lishment had to be small because a large establishment
was not only expensive but dangerous to the liberties of
the citizens.

An Army that was efficient might be

difficult to control.

Political leaders did not really

consider that the condition of the rank and file might
be made more comfortable or bearable.

The kind of life

lived by soldiers was not a concern of civilians.

The

Army might protect society but it was not a part of
society.
Most civilians held soldiers in low esteem.

The

men were frequently characterized as crude, tough, and
uncivilized.

By safe, stay-at-home standards they were.

But considering the type of life they led, it would have
been surprising if they had been refined individuals.
Isolated for long periods, engaged in hard, monotonous
work, the soldiers had little inclination and no time to
learn the social graces.

By and large the characteristics

^Gallatin to his wife, July 7, 1807, in Henry
Adams, life of Albert Gallatin (New York, 1901), 304.
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of the soldiers strongly resembled those of other fron
tiersmen, who led similar lives of isolation and hard
work.
The accomplishments of the officers and men of
the Army who served in the South were numerous, and
although their actions and units were small they added
up to a great result.

The Army had opened a wilderness

to settlement and then had policed and protected it while
it was being peopled.

But once the Indians had been

subdued, the presence of the Army was no longer considered
necessary or desirable.

After 1835* with the exception of

the installations in Florida, most of the military posts
in the South were abandoned.

The permanent fortifications

that protected the nation*s maritime frontier were retained, as were the posts at New Orleans and Baton Rouge.
From these small garrisons southern whites would be able
to draw whatever military assistance they might require
in the event of slave insurrections.
The Army in the South had outlived its usefulness
once it appeared that the Indian problem was about to be
eliminated.

The Indians would move west and the soldiers

were expected to follow.

By 1835 the soldiers in the

South were preparing to follow the frontier line west,
just as other soldiers before them had dene.

They left

a country that was vastly different than it had been
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when the first soldiers had arrived more than forty years
before.

The soldiers had done much to tame the wilder

ness, and now they moved on to begin the process anew on
a different frontier.
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APPENDIX I
SOUTHERN MILITARY POSTS
ALABAMA
Port Bowyer.

General James Wilkinson began construction

of a wooden work called the "Seraf" in 1813, it was lo
cated on Mobile Point and guarded the sea approach to
Mobile Bay.

The name was changed to Port Bowyer before

the end of the War of 1812.

The United States began the

construction of Port Morgan on the site in 1819, it was
completed in 1834.
Pert Charlotte.

The post had been constructed by the

Spanish in the city of Mobile.
American troops in April, 1813-

It was surrendered to
The United States main

tained a garrison in the works until about 1820.
Fort Claiborne.

Established in 1813 on the Alabama River,

at the site of the present town of Claiborne, Alabama, the
post was not continued after the campaign against the
Indians was completed.

552
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Fort Crawfordo

During Jackson’s campaign against the

Indians, Fort Crawford was established at the site of
the present town of Brewton, Alabama.
Fort Confederation (Fort Tombigbee).

The works were

originally built by the French in 1735 and called Fort
Tombigbee.

It was located above the confluence of the

Tombigbee and Black Warrior rivers, in Chickasaw and
Choctaw Indian country.

The British occupied the site

following the French and Indian War and changed the name
to Fort York.
years.

The British abandoned the post after five

The Spanish occupied the site in 1794, recon

structed the fort and named it Fort Confederation.

It

was garrisoned by the Spanish until 1797, the next year
the fort became a possession of the United States.

It

was abandoned soon after the United States negotiated a
treaty with the Choctaw Indians there in 1802 - 1803.
Fort Deposit.

General Andrew Jackson erected the fort

on the Tennessee River at the site of the present town
of Fort Deposit, Alabama.

The post was not continued

after the War of 1812.
Fort Gaines.

The fort was constructed on the eastern end

of Dauphin Island at the entrance to Mobile Bay.

Con

struction began in 1822 but was delayed a number of times
while the advisability of the post was considered.
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was designed to compliment Fort Morgan on the opposite
side of the Bay.
Fort Hamilton.

It was not regularly garrisoned.
The fort was constructed in 1810, to the

north of the great hend of the Tennessee River, near the
present town of Athens, Alabama.

The post apparently was

not used on a regular basis after 1815, but there was a
garrison there in 1817.
Fort Jackson.

The post was established in April, 1814,

as a post during the Creek War, near the junction of the
Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers.

The post was garrisoned

until 1817.
Fort Mims.

This was the stockaded farm of Samuel Mims.

Located on the eastern bank of Lake Tensaw, twenty miles
nc-**th of Mobile.

The farm was the site of the Fort Mims

Massacre in August, 1813.
Fort Mitchell.

Located on the west side of the

Chattahoochee River, at the present town of Fort Mitchell,
Alabama.

Originally constructed by the Georgia militia,

it was first occupied by United States troops in 1813.
It was a part of the factory system beginning in 1817The post was again occupied by troops in 1828 and the
garrison was continued until 1837.
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Port Morgan.

The fort was constructed on the site of

Fort Bowyer at Mobile Point to protect the entrance to
Mobile Bay.

The post was first occupied in 1834.

Cantonment Montpelier.

Located ten miles from the Alabama

River and seven miles northwest of Port Montgomery,
Alabama.
Port Montgomery.

Constructed in 1814, ten miles above

the junction of the Tombigbee and Alabama rivers.
Port St. Stephens.

Constructed by the Spanish on the

Tombigbee River north of Mobile. Alabama.
ferred to the United States in 1799*

It was trans

The post was not

maintained after the United States built Fort Stoddert
to the South.
Port Stoddert.

After the area was evacuated by the

Spanish, Port Stoddert was established in 1799.

It was

located four miles below the junction of the Alabama and
Tombigbee rivers.
Port Strother.

Established in 1813 on the Coosa River as

a defensive post during the Creek War.
Port Tombigbee (see Port Confederation).
Fort Toulouse.

Begun in 1717 by the French, it was the

eastern outpost of French Louisiana until the end of the
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French and Indian War.

Located at the junction of the

two tributaries of the Alabama River, the Coosa and
Tallapoosa rivers.

The moat was all that remained in

1814 when General Andrew Jackson constructed Fort Jackson
on the site after the Battle of Horseshoe Bend.
Fort York (see Fort Confederation).

FLORIDA
Fort Barrancas.

Constructed as an addition to the older

Spanish fortification to protect the entrance to Pensacola
Harbor.

It was occupied by American troops in 1820.

It

served as a naval reserve from 1825 to 1844.
Fort Brooke.

Located at the head of Tampa Bay on the

Hillsboro River about thirty miles from the Gulf of Mexico.
It was originally intended to protect the Seminole Indians
in the vicinity.

Called Cantonment Brooks from 1824 until

1835 when the name was changed to Fort Brooke.
Fort Clinch.

Constructed three mile3 from Pensacola in

1823* it was abandoned in 1834.
Fort Gadsden.

Established by General Andrew Jackson on

the east bank of the Apalachicola River in 1818 during
his invasion of Florida.
Key West Barracks.

It was abandoned in 1821.

Established in 1831 on the north shore

of Thompson9s Island, about sixty miles southwest of Cape
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Sable•
Fort King.

Constructed in 1827 near the present city of

Ocala, about ninety-five miles northeast of the head of
Tampa Bay, forty miles due west from the Gulf of Mexico.
Post of St. Augustine.

The post was originally con

structed by the Spanish and was occupied by the United
States troops when the territory was acquired in 1821.
The fort was named Fort Marion in 1825 and irregularly
garrisoned until 1852.

Located about two miles from the

ocean.
Fort St. Marks (see San Marcos de Apalache).
Fort San Carlos de Barrancas.

Originally constructed in

1787 by the Spanish on a bluff called "Barrancas de Santo
Tome" and occupied the same site as Fort San Carlos de
Austria, which had been constructed during the first
period of Spanish settlement, and had been destroyed by
the French in 1719.

The British blew up the new post in

1814 when General Jackson captured the city.

After the

Americans withdrew the Spanish began to rebuild the fort.
The fort passed to the control of the United States when
the city was again attacked by General Jackson.

During

the period from 1833 to 1844, the United States strength
ened the defenses of Pensacola Bay.

In the rear of Fort
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San Carlos de Barrancas they constructed Port Barrancas
and 1,000 yards to the north Fort Redouht.
Port Marion (see Post of St. Augustine).
Fort Pickens.

Construction began in 1828 on the western

end of Santa Rosa Island to command the entrance to
Pensacola Harbor.

The post was first garrisoned in 1834

but not on a regular basis.
Fort Redoubt (see San Carlos de Barrancas).
San Marcos de Apalche.

The Spanish constructed three

different forts on the site from 1565 to 1763.

During

the British occupation the name was changed to Fort St.
Marks.

During the Seminole Campaign in 1818, General

Jackson captured the fort and settlement.

Control of

the fort passed permanently to the United States with
the ratification of the Adams-Onis Treaty in 1819-

GEORGIA
Augusta Arsenal.
locations.

The arsenal occupied two different

Originally established in 1817 as an arsenal

of deposit on the Savannah River, but because of the un
healthiness of the site the arsenal was moved in 1826.
The new site was three miles from the west bank of the
Savannah River and about the same distance from the city
of Augusta.
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Post at Colraine.

The post at Colraine, on the St.

Mary*8 River, was first garrisoned in 1793 and con
tinued until about 1796.
Port Pidius.

In its efforts to protect the Georgia

frontier, the United States established Fort Pidius in
1793.

It was located on the north bank of the Oconee

River.

The garrison was removed in 1797.

Fort Gaines.

The fort was erected on the Chatachoochee

River near the Creek boundary line in 1816.

A small

garrison was stationed there until 1819«
Port Greene.

The fort was constructed on Cockspur Island

at the mouth of the Savannah River in 1794.

It was de

stroyed by the action of the ocean in 1804.
Port Hawkins.

The fort was started by Colonel Benjamin

Hawkins on a hilltop commanding several miles of the
Ocmulgee River, at the site of the present city of
Macon, Georgia.
factory.

It was a combined military post and

The troops and factory were moved to Port

Hawkins from Port Wilkinson in 1806.

The factory was

moved to Port Mitchell, Alabama in 1Si7 and after 1819
the post was not garrisoned by troops.
Fort Jackson.

Constructed on the west side of the Savannah

River, three miles below the city of Savannah.
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Port Jones.

Constructed on the south bank of the

Altamaha River in 1797.
Oglethorpe Barracks.

The post was abandoned in 1802.

The post was located in a number

of different positions, within the city of Savannah, the
suburbs and beyond the limits of Savannah.
Fort Pulaski.

The post was constructed on Cockspur

Island on the site of Port Greene.

It was started in

1833 but not garrisoned until the Civil War.
Port Scott.

Constructed on the Flint River near its

junction with the Chattahooche River.

It was garrisoned

in 1816 and abandoned in 1821.
Port Telfair.

The post was one of those constructed for

the defense of the Georgia frontier.

Built on the

Altamaha River in 1790 it was abandoned about 1795.
Fort Wayne.

The post was established near the present day

site of Brunswick in 1821.

1823

The garrison was removed in

.

Fort Wilkinson.

The fort was started in 1797 on a site

west of the Oconee River near the present-day site of
Milledgeville.

It was the principal post in that portion

of the frontier until it was replaced by Port Hawkins.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

561
LOUISIANA
Fort At Attakapas.

When the United States occupied the

Louisiana Purchase a garrison was stationed at Attakapas.
The garrison was maintained from 1804 to 1808 and troops
were again stationed at Attakapas in 1818 and 1819.
Camp Atkinson.

Established on the Calcasieu River near

the present town of Lake Charles.

It was established in

1830 and abandoned in 1832.
Baton Rouge Barracks.

The Spanish town and fort of Baton

Rouge was occupied by United States troops on December 10,
1810 and buildings were constructed for the troops.

In

<820 barracks and an arsenal were started on a site pur
chased the previous year on the east bank of the Missis
sippi River.
Fort Jackson.

An arsenal was established there in 1826.
The fort was constructed on the west bank

of the Mississippi River about seventy-five miles below
New Orleans, directly opposite Fort St. Philip.

Con

struction was started in 1322 and the two posts were
thereafter jointly administered.
Fort Jesup.

The fort was established on the watershed

between the Sabine and Red rivers in 1822.

From 1822

until its abandonment in 1845» the post was the most
southwesterly military establishment of the United

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

562

States.

Located about twenty-five miles southwest of

Natchitoches.
Fort Macomb.

The post was established on the west side

of the Chef Menteur Pass on the southern boundary of
Petite Coquille Island, about twenty-five miles from
New Orleans in 1827.

It was originally called Fort Wood

but the name was changed to Fort Macomb on June 23 t 1851.
Post of New Orleans.

New Orleans was first occupied by

United States troops in 1803 and the city was garrisoned
thereafter as a guard against slave rebellion.

In 1834

and 1835 new barracks were constructed on the left bank
of the Mississippi River below the city.

The new barracks

were originally called New Orleans Barracks, after the
Civil War the post was known as Jackson Barracks.
Post at Natchitoches.

Natchitoches, on the Red River was

first occupied by United States troops in 1804.

The post

was called Fort Claiborne and in 1820 a new post, Fort
Selden, was constructed at Natchitoches.

After the

establishment of Fort Jesup the troops were withdrawn
in 1822.
Post at Opelousas.

The town of Opelousas was first

garrisoned by United States troops in 1804 as a part
of the occupation of the Louisiana Purchase.

The

garrison was withdrawn in 1808.
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Post at Ouachita.

The town of Ouachita was first garri

soned by United States troops in 1804 as a part of the
occupation of the Louisiana Purchase.

The garrison was

withdrawn in 1808.
Port Pike.

A post was established on the northern margin

of Petite Coquille Island at the entrance of Lake
Pontchatrain about thrity-five miles northeast of New
Orleans in 1816.

The post was first called Petite Coquille

but in 1827 the name was changed to Port Pike.

The post

was abandoned in 1849.
Post at Pointe Coupee.

The town of Pointe Coupee was

first occupied by United States troops in 1805 as a part
of the occupation of the Louisiana Purchase.

The garri

son was withdrawn in 1808.
Port St. Philip.

Originally a Spanish fort, located on

the east bank of the Mississippi River at the mouth of
the Plaquemine River about seventy-five miles below New
Orleans.

The post was first occupied by American troops

late in 1803.

Located opposite Port Jackson and adminis

tered jointly after the building of Port Jackson.
Fort Selden.

Constructed at Natchitoches in 1820, it

was abandoned in 1822 when the troops were moved to Fort
Jesup.
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Fort Wood (see Fort Uacomb).

MISSISSIPPI
Fort Adams.

The post was established at Loftus Heights

on the east bank of the Mississippi River in 1798.

Lo

cated at the extreme southwestern corner of United States
territory it was to guard the boundary between American
and Spanish Territory.

In 1807 Cantonment Columbia

Spring was established four miles east of the fort.
Both the fort and camp were abandoned in 1810.
Fort Dearborn.

As a protection against possible Indian

attacks and slave rebellions the fort was constructed
near Washington in 1803.
Port McHenry.

The post was abandoned in 1809.

The post was established in 1798, after

the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from the territory,
at the town of Vicksburg.

The post was not regularly

garrisoned.
Fort Rosalie.

The fort was a French post established in

1716 at the site of present-day Natchez.
Post at Natchez.

The town of Natchez was occupied by

United States troops in 1798 and was used by General
James Wilkinson as his headquarters.

The General des

ignated the post Fort Sargent, but the name was not
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regularly used.
Fort Nogales.

The post was abandoned in 1808.
The Spanish built a post at the present-

day site of Vicksburg in 1790.

The Spanish evacuated the

post in 1797 and the Americans occupied the area.
Post at Pass Christian.

United States forces were

stationed at Pass Christian to guard the entrance to Lake
Borgne in 1812.

The post was used by American troops as

a summer camp until about 1818.
Fort Sargent (see Post at Natchez).
Cantonment Washington.
Washington in 1809.

A cantonment was established at

The camp was abandoned in 1811.

NORTH CAROLINA
Fort Hampton.

Located in the town of Beaufort, North

Carolina.
Fort Johnston.

Located in the town of Smithviiie, North

Carolina, on the west bank of the Cape Fear River, three
miles from its mouth.

The site was occupied by United

States troops in 1794 and construction of a permanent
post began.

The post was repeatedly abandoned and re-

garrisoned.
Fort Macon.

The fort was built between 1826 and 1834

on Bogue Island, near Beaufort, North Carolina.

It was
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first occupied in 1834

SOUTH CAROLINA
Fort Moultrie.

Located on a sand island in the mouth

of Charleston Harbor, Fort Moultrie was constructed on
the site of the Revolutionary War Fort Sullivan.
Charleston Harbor.

The works in Charleston Harbor were

reported together.

They included such works as Fort

Johnson, Castle Pinckney, Fort Moultrie and Fort Sumter.
And in the city of Charleston, Fort Mechanic, situated
on the point of the city.
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APPENDIX II
POST STATISTICS
The material contained in these tables was ob
tained from the monthly post returns.

The first figures

given are the total number of men, officers and enlisted,
reported present at the post on the available returns,
and the average number present each month.

As none of

the returns are complete, percentages are given for the
number of returns available:

(I) the percentage available

on a yearly basis; (II) the percentage available for the
period from April to October; and (III) the percentage
available for the period from November to March.
The five categories considered are the number of:
(A) enlisted men sick; (B) officers in arrest or confine
ment; (C) enlisted men in arrest or confinement; (D)
desertions; and (B) deaths from all causes, a few of
which can be attributed to causes other than sickness,
but not in sufficient numbers to materially alter the
calculations.

Totals are given for three

periods of time:

different

(1) the total number of men reported

in each category; (2) the total number of men reported

567
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in each category from April to Ootober; and (3) the total
number of men reported in each category from November to
March.
In order to make a comparison of the three periods,
monthly averages were taken for each of the three catego
ries.

These figures show the average number of men re

ported on the available monthly returns.

Not included in

the tables are totals obtained by using the percentages
and averages to determine the total in each category if
the returns were complete and if the rate of occurrance
was constant.

For example, if the returns were complete

for the sickly season at Baton Rouge:

on the basi3 of

216 deaths on 77.1# of the possible returns the projection
for 100# of the returns would be 277.5 deaths; and on the
basis of 2.66 deaths per month for 105 months, the total
is 279.3 deaths.
The figures should be 1,Q?d only for comparing the
situation at the ten garrisons, and it should be remem
bered that they are not complete.

If the missing returns

were to be included, the totals, averages and percentages
would probably be altered, but not the overall picture
presented by the figures.

For instance, the high incidence

of sickness and death reported at Savannah in the period
from 1826 to 1828 is shown by 62 deaths on 19 returns.
The returns for the entire sickly season of 1827 are
missing, when it is to be presumed that additional soldiers
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died.
When the monthly averages are compared they show
that the death rate was higher during the sickly season
at all of the posts, except Port Morgan.

The average

number of men reported sick was higher in the period from
April to October at all of the posts, except Charleston
Harbor.

The desertion rate was higher during the sickly

season at seven of the ten posts, Baton Houge, Port
Morgan and Port Pike the exceptions.

The posts of Baton

Rouge, New Orleans, and Charleston had the highest monthly
death rate and the highest rate of desertion.
These figures present a bleak picture of service
in the South.

Assuming that the rates remained constant,

the War Department could expect to lose a total of 234
men each y6ar, at the ten posts surveyed, from desertion
and deaths without the troops ever taking the field for
any type of activity.
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Augusta Arsenal, Georgia.

1822 - 1325

Total number of men reported present on 166 monthly
returns, 8,695, or a monthly average of 52.37.
I.
166/168 =
II.
96/93 =
III. 70/70 =
Total
April
May
June
July
August
September
October

98.8$
97.9$
100$
A
860
70
66
92
60
80
33
56

c
889

D
196

E
43

17
24
23
20
13
18
10

5
0
3
7
4
7

----

50
76
89
116
71
30
63

3
3
1
------—

—

----

Total

512

1

550

130

32

Total N-M

348

2

339

66

11

Av. 166 mos.
Av. 96 mos.
Av. 70 mos.

5.18
5.33
4.97

0.01
0.01
0.02

5.35
5.72
4.34

1.13
1.35
0.94

0.25
0.33
0.15
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Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

1821 - 1835

Total number of men reported present on 138 monthly
returns, 22,536, or a monthly average of 130.73.
I.
II.
III.

138/130 =
81/105 =
57/75

Total
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
Total
Total N-M
Av. 1 38 mos.
Av. 81 mos.
Av. 57 mos.

76.6$
77.1$
76$

A
2740
215
261
221
268
300
264
229

n.

D

u

o

30
2
4
5
6
2
1
_2__

2405
158
245
157
158
170
193
202

L
479

E
294
18
35
46
19
28
30
40
216
78

1758

22

1280

52
56
29
33
24
36
,)1
261

982

8

1125

218

19.85
21.70
17.22

0.21
0.27
0.14

17.42
15.80
19.73

3.47
3.22
3.82

2.13
2.66
1.36
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Charleston Harbor, South Carolina.

1819 - 1835

Total number of men reported present on 101 monthly
returns, 13,242, or a monthly average of 131.10.
I.
II.
III.

101/204
65/119
36/85

=
=
=

49.5$
54.6$
42.3$

Total

A
977

B
5

April
May
June
July
August
September
October
Total

45
65
74
101
109
127
8?
604

__ _
-----

Total N-M
Av. 101 mos.
Av. 65 mos.
Av.
36 mos.

c

D
219

E

1140

1
1
2
1
5

49
73
72
130
137
138
135
734

12
8
28
15
54
23
22
162

3
2
4
2
12
14
8
45

373

0

406

57

12

9.67
9.29
10.36

0.04
0.07
0.00

11.28
11.29
11.27

2.16
2.49
1.57

0.56
0.69
0.33
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£ ort Johnston, North Carolina,

1318 — 1835

Total number of men reported present on 185 monthly
returns, 9»523, or a monthly average of 51.50.
I.
II.
III.

185/216
100/126
81/90

Total

=
=
=
A
533

35.
79.35°
90.Og
B

c
349

D
49

E
44

---

24
33
31
41
30
30
30

2
8
4
9
5
4
1

5
1
3
4
9
2
5

--— -

April
May
June
July
August
September
October
Total

346

---

219

33

29

Total N-M

237

---

130

16

15

0.26
0.33
0.18

0.24
0.29
0.17

Av. 185 mos.
Av. 100 mos.
Av. 85 mos.

42
44
52
53
47
60
48

3.15
3.46
2.78

— —
—

—

1.83
2.19
1.52
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Fort Mitchell, Alabama.

1825 - 1835

Total number of men reported present on 84 monthly
returns, 7,181, or a monthly average of 85.47.
I.
II.
III.

84/113
51/65
33/48

=
=
=

74. 3#
78.4#
68. 7#

Total

A
478

April
May
June
July
August
September
October
Total

33
44
38
45
67
46
42
315

Total N-M

163

Av. 84 mos.
Av. 51 mos.
Av. 33 mos.

5.69
6.17
4.93

3
3

C
516

3
127

E
20

__

21
10
5
15
15
12
6
84

3
5
1

1
1
2

47
44
34
41
59
41
48
3H

1

202

43

6.14
6.15
6.12

1.51
1.64
1.33

__

- —
----------—

—

0.03
0.03
0.03

------

2
3
17
3
0.23
0.33
0.09
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Fort Morgan, Alabama.

1822, 1823, 1833* 1834, 1835

Total number of men reported present on 44 monthly
returns, 1,594, or a monthly average of 36.22.
I.

II.
III.

44/ 6O
27/35
17/25

= 73.#
= 77.1#
=
68#
A
89

a

Total
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
Total

5
6
9
15
10
11
6
62

__ _
---

-------

79

11

--1
1
2
--2
6

Total N-iff

27

---

19

12

5

2.02
2.29
1.53

_
---

2.22
2.92
1.11

0.52
0.40
0.70

Av. 44 mos.
Av. 27 mos.
Av. 17 mos.

u
93

— —

-----

—

—

3
5
S
29
13
17

}

.s
11

23
2
4
2
2
1
---

0.25
0.22
0.29
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New Orleans, Louisiana.

1821 - 1835

Total number of men reported present on 103 monthly
returns, 10,866, or a monthly average of 105.49.
I.
II.
III.

103/180
61/105
42/75

Total

=
=
=

57.2^
58£
56£

A
1132

B
2

C
1025

D
305

E
85

1

1

101
36
93
97
63
72
105

31
56
25
26
13
19
20

3
3
6
10
3
14
22

April
May
June
July
August
September
October

98
116
115
97
64
62
222

Total

774

2

617

190

66

Total N-M

358

0

408

115

19

10.99
12.68
8.52

0.01
0.03
0.00

9.95
10.11
9.71

2.96
3.11
2.73

Av. 103 mos.
Av • 61 isos.
Av. 42 mos.

-------

--

---

0.32
1.08
0.45
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Fort Pike (Petite Coquille) Louisiana.

1821 - 1935

Total number of men reported present on 151 monthly
returns, 7,312, or a monthly average of 48.42.
I.
151/180
II.
90/105
III. 62/75
Total

=
=
=

33.8#
85.6#
82.6#
A
305

B
8

C
269

D
36

-- ■
4
--—

24
27
26
23
28
25
20

2
4
1
4
5
4
---

T
24

April
May
June
July
August
September
October
Total

205

4

173

20

3
3
5
1
2
1
1
16

Total N-M

100

4

96

16

8

0.05
0.04
0.06

1.78
1.92
1.57

0.23
0.22
0.26

Av. 151 mos.
Av. 90 mos.
Av. 61 mos.

26
32
32
44
32
19
20

2.01
2.27
1.63

--—
---

0.15
0.17
0.13
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Fort St. Philip, Louisiana.

1821 - 1831

Total number of men reported present on 97 monthly
returns, 4,502, or a monthly average of 46.30.
I.
97/124
II. 53/71
III. 44/53

=
=

73.2$
74.6$
33$

Total

A
468

April
May
June
July
August
September
October
Total

32
49
35
61
30
45
33
340

Total N-M

128

5

63

14

14

Av. 97 moe.
Av. 53 mos.
Av. 44 mos.

4.82
6.41
2.99

0.09
0.07
0.11

1.49
1,54
1.43

0.40
0.47
0.31

0.46
0.58
0.31

B
9

c
145

D
39

E
45

6
6
2
2
4
4
1
25

2
2
1
7
5
11

4

13
12
12
9
12
12
12
82

1
— —

-

2
1
------

-—

3
31
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Savannah, Georgia.

1824 - 1835

j.ot.ai numDer oi men reported present on 105 monthly
returns, 5,833, or a monthly average of 55.55.
I.
II.
III.

105/144
55/84
50/60

* 72.#
=: 65.4£
= 83.3£

Total

A
741

April
May
June
July
August
September
October
Total

32
41
40
71
110
130
78
502

Total N-IS

239

Av. 105 mos.
Av. 55 mos.
Av. 50 mos.

7.05
9.12
4.78

B

n

---

572

D
111

E
87

---

37
30
40
53
46
41
43
290

13
7
8
14
4
12
2
60

2
1
4
5
15
23
22
72

---

282

51

15

—

5.44
5.27
5.64

1.05
1.05
1.02

0.82
1.30
0.30

____

---
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ALABAMA

.

1
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Fort Gaines
Fort Morgan
Fort Charlotte
Fort Montgomery
Cantonment Montpel
Fort Stoddert
Fort Mims
St. Stephens
Fort Claiborne
Fort Crawford
Fort Jackson
Fort Strother
Fort Deposit
Fort Hampton
Fort Mitchell
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Key West
Fort Brooke
Fort King
St. Augustine
Bowleg’s Town
Fort Gadsden
Fort Pickens
Fort Barrancas
Fort Clinch

FLORIDA
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See
tnsert
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GEORGIA

.

1
2.
3*
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Port Gaines
Fort Scott
Fowl HInmw
Fort Hawkins
Fort Wilkinson
Fort Fidius
Coleraine
Fort Wayne
Fort Telfair
Fort James
Savannah
Fort Pulaski
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LOUISIANA

Camp Atkinson
Fort Jesup
Natchitoches
Ouachita
Opelousa
St. Francisville
Baton Rouge
New Orleans
Fort Jackson
Fort St. Philip
Fort Macomb
Fort Pike
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MISSISSIPPI

Or

1.
2.
34.
5.

Fort Adams
Fort Dearborn
Fort McHenry
Bay St. Louis
Pass Christian
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NORTH CAROLINA

CD C E

o ttoas
4* S +=
J-t H t-i
O-H O

(*<=e Ex<
CM r<~i
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SOUTH CAROLINA

X>

1.

Charleston Harbor
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Baton Roug
St. Francisville
Opelousas
Natchitoches
Los Adais
Nacogdoches
Orcoquisac
Matagorda
San Antonio
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